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Abstract 
Between 1978 and 1992 the number of juvenile offenders aged under 17 in England 
and Wales who were removed from home under sentence and sent to institutions such 
as detention centres, borstals, youth custody institutions or residential Community 
Homes with Education fell from 14,000 to 1,800. This thesis documents how this 
significant decarceration came about, and why it has been given little attention in the 
criminological literature, placing it in context of developments in juvenile justice 
legislation and practice between 1965 and 1996 and theories of policy change. It 
suggests that the key development was the funding of charity and voluntary sector 
organisations to provide Intensive Intermediate Treatment programmes to juvenile 
courts as an alternative to custody, and the development of a small group of 
practitioners willing to act as campaigning advocates for young offenders in court. 
Interviews with key politicians, civil servants, academics and practitioners from this 
period are used to explore these trends in more detail, and consideration is given to 
the respective roles of the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social 
Security and the tensions between them over responsibility for young offenders. The 
development is then situated within theories and examples of decarceration, 
deinstitutionalization, abolitionism and reductionism, drawing on attempts to close 
institutions or to reduce institutionalization in the fields of youth justice, mental health 
and learning difficulties in the UK and other countries. Alternative explanations of 
what happened in juvenile justice in England and Wales are considered and 
challenged. Conclusions are then drawn as to the conditions that are necessary for any 
decarceration strategy to be successful and sustainable 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction, Aims and Methodology 
 
In the spring of 2000 I was invited to attend the 10th United Nations Congress on 
Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders in Vienna. Throughout the week of 
the Congress there were presentations of projects working with offenders from all 
over the world, many of them claiming to be ‘alternatives to custody’. Yet none of 
them made any reference to custody rates among the client group to which they were 
referring, or seemed to see this as a valid criterion of success. As imprisonment rates 
were rising in most parts of the world, it appeared that ‘alternatives to custody’ were 
allowed to exist, and be evaluated, without any reference to sentencing patterns.  
There exists a substantial literature on ‘alternatives to custody’ which mirror this (e.g. 
Dodge, 1979). My attempts to raise concerns about ‘net-widening’ (Cohen, 1979; 
Austin & Krisberg, 1982) or to use the terms ‘deinstitutionalization’ and 
‘decarceration’ only resulted in blank looks and a lack of comprehension. 
 
In England and Wales, between 1978 and 1992, a major development of ‘alternatives 
to custody’ for young offenders took place. There was a significant reduction, from 
14,000 a year to less than 2,000 a year, in the numbers of young people aged between 
14 and 16 who were removed from their home and family and placed in institutions as 
a result of criminal convictions (See Figure 1). Over the same period recorded crime 
rates by this group fell dramatically, the number of juveniles aged between 10 and 16 
found guilty of indictable offences falling from 90,200 in 1980 to 24,700 in 1990. A 
large number of institutions were closed, with significant central government savings.  
It has been described as a period of ‘remarkable deceleration and humanising’ of 
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youth justice (Rutherford, 1994) and ‘one of the most remarkably progressive periods 
of juvenile justice policy’ (Rutherford, 1995). This happened through the use of 
‘Intermediate Treatment’, a concept developed in 1969 that ceased to be used in the 
1990s, which was used to refer to work with young offenders in the community. 
 
There has been considerable academic debate about how the above fall in juvenile 
incarceration came about. Some claim that it was part of a systematic attempt by 
practitioners, supported by politicians, to reduce custodial sentencing (see Rutherford, 
1995), while others believe it was due to various changes in police practice, 
legislation and a declining age cohort that had the unplanned result of a fall in 
juvenile custody. This academic debate is set out in Chapter 9, which includes a 
consideration of other explanations of the fall in youth crime and custody, and an 
examination of the strategies and motives of relevant academics, politicians, civil 
servants and campaign groups.  
 
The overall focus of the thesis is to re-evaluate previous accounts of juvenile justice 
policy and practice in England and Wales and to analyse the reasons for their apparent 
failure to understand the significant role played by practitioners in transforming the 
sentencing of juvenile offenders in England and Wales. For a few years, the near 
abolition of custodial sentencing for young offenders seemed a distinct possibility. 
This abolitionist perspective almost achieved cross-party recognition in policy terms, 
and the analysis extends to explore how the changing politics of crime control in the 
post-1992 period led to a renewed agenda to be tough on young offenders, seemingly 
regardless of the balance of evidence. 
  12 
Figure 1: Under 17’s sentenced to custody and care for offences: England and 
Wales 1964 – 2000 
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The remainder of this introduction sets out and considers my methodology, discusses 
a range of theories of policy change, and chooses Kingdon’s model as the most 
relevant to the thesis. Developments in juvenile justice in England and Wales are then 
set out. Chapters 2 to 6 offer a history of the development of juvenile justice policy 
and practice in England and Wales between the early 1960s and the early 1990s. 
While there are many such histories, I hope this will offer a different perspective on 
the role of politicians, policy makers and practitioners than has been previously 
published. Chapters 7 and 8 then consider a range of theoretical approaches to 
decarceration and the lessons from practical attempts to develop decarceration or 
deinstitutionalisation in criminal justice, mental health and learning disability services 
in a range of countries. Finally, in Chapter 10, I amalgamate the whole material to 
draw lessons for future attempts to develop and sustain decarceration strategies. 
 
I set out, and believe that I largely succeeded, in reading everything published on 
juvenile justice and IT between 1964 and 1996, even though not everything was 
subsequently used (my original bibliography was double the length of the present one, 
and would be a significant contribution to a future bibliography of juvenile justice for 
this period). Material was identified by following up every reference  in everything 
read, and searching out every entry in the bibliography of IT published by Skinner 
(1985) for the National Youth Bureau [hereafter NYB} and a later unpublished update 
which I was co-editor of. I visited the IT archive of the NYB and was also given 
access by Skinner to the material that she had taken with her, which the NYB did not 
want, when she moved to the Centre for Social Action at De Montfort University. 
Specialist libraries were visited that held relevant material, including archived 
material, at the National Association of Probation Officers [hereafter NAPO], the 
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National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders [hereafter NACRO], 
the Howard League, Dartington Social Research Unit, the Institute of Criminology, 
the Institute of Education and the Centre for Criminal Justice Studies. The Annual 
Reports of all the relevant organisations were also searched.  
 
A great deal of the literature on IT was published in professional and practitioner 
journals, and I read through every issue of the following journals to identify relevant 
material: The Abolitionist; AJJUST; Approved School Gazette; British Journal of 
Criminology; British Journal of Delinquency; British Journal of Social Work; 
Childright; Child Care; Child Care Quarterly Review; Christian Action Journal; 
Clearing House for Social Services Research; Community Care; Community Schools 
Gazette; Community Homes Schools Gazette; Criminal Law Review; Criminal 
Justice Matters; Critical Social Policy; Home Office Research Bulletin; Howard 
Journal; IT mailings (NYB); Journal of Adolescence; Justice of the Peace; NAPO 
News; New Law Journal; New Society; Prison Report; Prison Service Journal; 
Probation Journal; Research, Policy and Planning; Social Work Service; Social Work 
Today; The Magistrate; Youth and Policy; Youth in Society; Youth Justice; and 
Youth Social Work Bulletin. 
 
In order to cover the political debates about juvenile justice I searched the index of 
every issue of Hansard for both the House of Commons and the House of Lords for 
the period, using a prepared list of around 50 key words, names of ministers and 
opposition shadow ministers for the time, and other members known to contribute to 
juvenile justice debate, such as Robert Kilroy-Silk and Lord Longford. All relevant 
debates and parliamentary questions were read. All relevant Bills were followed 
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through all of their parliamentary stages, including the full unpublished accounts of 
the standing committee stages, which the House of Lords library allowed me to 
access. I searched the annual catalogues of the Home Office and the Department of 
Health and Social Security [hereafter DHSS] to identify and then read relevant 
publications, and  used the annual HMSO catalogue to identify relevant Parliamentary 
Papers and Command Papers, again all of which were read, as were all relevant 
proceedings and reports of relevant House of Commons Committee Inquiries: these 
included the Home Affairs Committee; Expenditure Committee; Social Services 
Committee; Health Committee and Estimates Committee.  
 
The statistics on the process and sentencing of juvenile offenders, which are presented 
in Appendix 1, were gathered through a detailed study of the Annual Statistics 
published by the different government departments (Home Office; DHSS; Prison 
Service etc.) and their supplementary tables and have been identified in the 
bibliography under ‘HMSO’, ‘Home Office’ or ‘DHSS’. These tables did not always 
agree with each other, and I have added a note at the start of Appendix 1 which 
explains why. I believe that the tables in this thesis are the most accurate now 
available on the disposal of young offenders in the period covered. 
 
It has also been necessary to narrow the area for consideration in the thesis. In looking 
at juvenile justice in England and Wales I have concentrated on young male 
offenders, and only mentioned issues about female crime and justice in passing. I 
have also ignored the remand stages of the juvenile justice process, focusing on final 
sentencing outcomes. When considering mental health and learning disabilities, I have 
chosen to focus on the literature about adults, not children, so as to allow a focus on 
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decarceration and deinstitutionalization without engaging with a totally separate and 
complex debate about residential and compulsory schooling for children with learning 
disabilities or mental health problems. 
 
Initially I had planned to include a detailed section in the thesis on comparative 
attempts to reduce juvenile incarceration in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s through 
the Deinstitutionalisation of Status Offenders, Diversion, and the California Probation 
Subsidy programs. A 30,000 word chapter has been removed from the thesis due to 
word length, and in the end only a section on the Massachusetts experiment has been 
included. In order to gather this material I again tried to read everything published on 
juvenile justice in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, working through 
government publications, Senate and House of Representative committee hearings 
and reports, over 100 University Law Journals, other key journals (Crime and 
Delinquency; Research in Crime and Delinquency, for example) and the materials of 
campaigning organisations. 
 
A similar 30,000 word draft chapter on decarceration in mental health and learning 
disability services in the USA, UK, Italy and elsewhere was removed from the draft 
thesis and instead some of the key findings are summarised in chapter 8. This was 
based on a total follow up of all relevant references, trawls through every issue of key 
journals, Web of Science searches of ‘decarceration’, ‘deinstitutionalization’ (with 
various spellings!), government publications in the USA and UK, and visits to 
specialist libraries like the Institute of Psychiatry and the King’s Fund. 
 
The London School of Economics library has the largest collection of US 
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Government publications in the UK, though it is not well catalogued. Eventually I 
was allowed direct access to the restricted access space in which they are stored, 
rather than having to complete search requests for every item which the staff were 
often unable to locate. I accessed several thousand documents, though most of these 
were used in the chapters which were subsequently deleted from the thesis. 
 
For the abolitionist perspective and the theoretical issues around criminal justice 
abolition, social control, net-widening and reductionism, I found literature searches 
less helpful. A search on ‘abolition’ produced material on the slave trade, for 
example. Instead, this material was found by following up references, the publications 
of key authors, and the previous journal searches carried out mentioned above. 
 
Noaks & Wincup (2004) stand in a long tradition of social researchers to suggest that 
there is no need to be restrictive about using both qualitative and quantitative research 
in the same project, and it was considered that some useful material would be 
generated by interviewing the leading politicians, civil servants and academics 
involved in the development of juvenile justice and IT policy. My supervisors and I 
made a list of Home Office and DHSS/DoH ministers and other politicians who had 
contributed to juvenile justice debate or as opposition spokespersons throughout the 
period; key civil servants involved in policy (whose names were often attached to 
departmental circulars, for example);  civil service members of the Children’s 
Division of the Home Office, the Social Work Service at the DHSS, and criminal 
justice sections of the Home Office; leading local government and probation figures 
involved in juvenile justice; key figures in pressure groups; people involved in 
significant IT projects (such as the Woodlands project in Basingstoke) and academics 
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who had written widely about juvenile justice policy. Two academics, Mike Nellis 
and David Smith (of Lancaster) were deliberately left off the list as it was hoped that 
one of them might become the external examiner for the thesis. ‘Who’s Who’ was 
then checked to identify those on the list who might be deceased, and internet 
searches carried out to identify contact addresses for the others.  
 
Initially, 62 names were identified which my supervisors and I went through on three 
occasions to firm it up and use other contacts to identify some who we could not find 
addresses for. An interview schedule of 14 questions was drawn up, which I piloted 
by interviewing three former colleagues in youth justice. It was then revised, and 
approved by the LSE research ethics committee. Letters were then approved by my 
supervisors and sent out to all 62, asking them if they would be willing to be 
interviewed by me at an agreed place and time of their choosing, subject to my own 
diary commitments. Of these, 28 accepted the offer and they were interviewed around 
the country over the following two years (2006-7), in a variety of locations: their 
home, their club; their office, and in restaurants. By allowing them to choose the 
location I was giving power to the interviewee and allowing them to choose where 
they felt most at ease (see Noaks & Wincup, 2004: ch. 5). Several of those written to 
engaged in correspondence with me before declining an interview, in some cases 
allowing me to use this correspondence in the thesis. I made the interviewees aware of 
the other people I had approached, and some of the interviewees suggested other 
people whom they thought would be important to interview, and contact was made 
with another five people, though most interviewees agreed with the names that had 
been chosen, which has hopefully reduced the risk of distortion of the historical 
record (Jensen, 1981), and suggests that the interview sample was representative 
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(Lummis, 1998). Guarantees about confidentiality were addressed in the letter (Fry, 
1975; Robertson, B M., 2006). Christians (2005) suggests a code of ethics for 
qualitative research that involves informed consent, no deception, privacy and 
confidentiality and accuracy, all of which were met in this study. While Eisner (1991) 
claims that it is virtually impossible to avoid exploiting the interviewee, I believe I did 
as much as possible to minimise this risk, by recognising my own inclinations and 
biases (Fischer, 1995). 
 
One danger was that, as I knew some of the interviewees, this could also have 
affected the interview (Yow, 1995; 1997; Sarantakos, 1994: 199). I ensured that all 
the interviewees approached had a clear sense of who I was and what I was trying to 
do, that my questions would be clear, that they were free to consent or decline the 
interview and that this consent was informed, and that I offered the right to privacy, 
anonymity and confidentiality (Sarantakos, 1994: 1 - 24). 
 
Preparation was essential (Grele, 1991a; Cutler, 1970; Sommer & Quinlan, 2002; 
Quinlan, 2011: 29ff; Robertson, B M., 2006: 8ff). I prepared for each interview 
(Thompson, 2000: 222ff) by reminding myself of the role that the interviewee had had 
in juvenile justice and over what period, for as Harris (1991: 5) says, ‘a cardinal rule 
is to come to the interview thoroughly informed and then to let the subject do the 
talking’, as ‘interviews ... reflect the participants’ self-conscious attempts to preserve 
what they remember for the future’. Interviews were tape recorded, with the questions 
I asked being followed up during the interview as appropriate, and certain questions 
that seemed irrelevant to the specific interviewee not being asked. Rapport was 
established with all interviewees (Cutler, 1970; Morisey, 1998). The style of interview 
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was what Grele (1994: 2) has described as a ‘conversational narrative’, 
acknowledging that the interview is a joint activity influenced by both participants’ 
perspectives (Grele, 1991: 135). Almost all the prepared questions were open-ended, 
and were then followed up with more probing questions (Morisey, 1998; Quinlan, 
2011). Sarantakos (1994: 177ff) acknowledges the value of ‘unstructured interviews’ 
with no restrictions on the order of questions and the value of flexible, neutral 
probing, whereas mine were ‘semi-standardised and open’ (ibid: 187). Silverman 
(2001) believed that open, unstructured interviews do elicit authentic accounts. 
 
 Full transcripts were not made of each interview, due to the amount of work this 
would have generated, but comments and statements that I considered relevant by the 
interviewee were written down. As I borrowed the tapes and recording equipment, 
and reused tapes after making notes on the previous interview, I also did not keep 
copies of all the interview tapes, something which I later discovered that oral history 
texts strongly recommend. I promised to send a copy of the parts of the interview I 
would be using to each interviewee for their approval, and did so, copying the 
relevant draft sub-sections of the thesis to them so they could see the wider context in 
which I was using their information (This is consistent with the recommendations of 
Borland, 2006). All but one of the interviewees agreed with the text and were happy 
for it to be included. 
 
One interviewee insisted that I included a context of over 1,000 words, that he 
drafted, before quoting him, but I did not consider that I could justify using this 
amount of word space, much of which replicated historical context material included 
elsewhere in the thesis, and after a substantial amount of correspondence we agreed 
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that I would withdraw all reference to him in the thesis except in the 
acknowledgements. 
 
While it was impossible to test reliability (‘the consistency with which an individual 
will tell the same story about the same events on a number of different occasions’, 
Hoffman, 1974: 25) by repeating the interviews, validity (‘the degree of conformity 
between the reports of the event and the event itself as recorded by other primary 
sources’, ibid: 25)  could be checked against that of other interviewees, and the 
document record, to help with verification, as part of the wider research (Tuchman, 
1972). Lummis (1998) notes how factual details can be ‘triangulated’ for general 
accuracy by using other sources and other interviewees, a term also used by Jupp 
(2001: 308) to refer to ‘the use of different methods of research, sources of data or 
types of data to address the same research question’. Maguire (2000) argues the case 
for using as many different and diverse sources of evidence as possible. Sarantakos 
(1994: 308-9) suggests that interviews can be interpreted by noting the patterns and 
themes coming out of them, which also allows the checking of their plausibility. 
However,  written memoirs, biography and autobiography are more accepted as part 
of the documentary record than interviews, but also have questions of accuracy 
(Portelli, 1998), and there is danger in putting more weight in a source simply because 
it has been written down (Ritchie, 2011). Ritchie (1995: 92) argues that oral history 
evidence needs to be treated ‘as cautiously as any other form of evidence’. 
 
 Fischer (1995) is very supportive of  the use of interviews to assess policy change,  
suggesting that this is the best means ‘to tap the cognitive realities of those 
knowledgeable about the situation’ especially the policy stakeholders (ibid: 80). As 
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those who had been involved have unique ‘experiences and ideas’ the interviewer sets 
out to draw out their perspectives, to understand how they interpreted their 
experiences, how they defined the situation that they were in, how they identified the 
problems they faced and how they formulated the plans to respond to these problems. 
  
Reliability of interview data and the notion of ‘historical truth’ are contested concepts 
(Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003; Ritchie, 1995: 6), as is the question of what is historical 
‘evidence’ (Thompson, 2000: 118 - 172). Frisch (1979: 74) asked ‘what happens to 
experience on the way to becoming memory? What happens to experience on the way 
to becoming history?’ and noted how the reality of what happened at the time is 
filtered by time and subsequent experience. As Samuel & Thompson (1990: 10) say, 
‘any life story ... is in one sense a personal mythology, a self-justification’. As 
Fontana & Frey (2005: 696) point out, interviewing is not merely the neutral 
exchange of asking questions and getting answers, and total neutrality is not possible: 
it is important to be aware that two people are involved, and it is the exchange in the 
interview that leads to a ‘contextually bound and mutually created story’. Abrams 
(2011: 10) suggests that ‘there are two people in an interview, which means two 
worlds, or subjectivities, are colliding’. Miller & Glassner (2004) note that radical 
social constructionists suggest that no knowledge of reality can be elicited from an 
interview, which is only an account of an interaction between the interviewer and 
interviewee, but challenge this by arguing that, while the interview is itself a symbolic 
interaction, this does not discount the possibility that knowledge of the social world 
beyond the interview can be obtained. Holstein & Gubrium (2004: 141) believe that 
‘interviewers are deeply and unavoidably implicated in creating meanings that 
ostensibly reside within respondents’. 
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Oral historians have given substantial attention to accuracy of memory (see Abrams, 
2011: chapter 5; Grele, 1991; Perks & Thomson, 2006; Robertson, 2006; Thompson, 
2000; Thomson, 2011) As Darien-Smith and Hamilton (1994: 14 – 15) say ‘what gets 
remembered, and how, is of critical importance in the process of remembering’. 
 
There has been a lack of interaction between oral history studies and psychological 
studies of memory (Hamilton & Shopes, 2008), and when they are brought together 
Hamilton & Shopes point out the need to explore what people remember, why they 
remember it, and the meaning of their recollections, being aware of the gaps and 
silences in the transmission of memory and the collapsing of the past and present in 
individual recall.  Myths can become accepted as fact over time by the interviewee 
(Grele, 2006: 85ff). Even ‘errors, inventions and myths lead us through and beyond 
facts to their meaning’ (Portelli, 1991: 2).  
 
In using the interview data I was aware that this was information about what people, 
in 2006-7, remembered about the 1960s to 1980s (see Grele, 1979; Grele, 2006: 81ff). 
At the same time, it was necessary to acknowledge that this information would not 
exist, in this form, without my own motivations, interests, questions, values, 
ambitions and ideas (Grele, 1991b). Clearly, interviewing people about the past, in 
some cases about 30 years ago, carries dangers (see Ritchie, 1995: 57 – 83), and I am 
grateful to my examiners for drawing my attention to the literature in the field of oral 
history, particularly from its early years when a range of ethical issues were addressed 
in the key journals and texts. There is some evidence that all interviewees (Lummis, 
1998), and particularly older respondents, could be prone to errors of recall (Jensen, 
1981; Menninger, 1975) and to forgetting uncomfortable information (Fry, 1975; 
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Sypher et al, 1994)  in order to explain their own role in the best possible light.  Moss 
(1977) points out that interviewees own recollections can be influenced by hearsay, 
self-defence and self-promotion; what they believe, in retrospect, is significant 
enough to remember and recount; and that ‘a recollection is itself a complex piece of 
evidence’ which should be separated from ‘reflections’.   Portelli (1998) notes that 
‘memory is not a passive depository of facts, but an active process of creation of 
meanings’ which reveal how the interviewee makes sense of the past, and Richardson 
(1990: 23) that ‘people organise their personal biographies and understand them 
through the stories they create to explain and justify their life experiences’. Hoffman 
& Hoffman (2006) note the problem of reliability and validity of memory, as does 
Ritchie (1995: 11ff). Samuel (1994: x) argues that memory is ‘an active, shaping 
force’, and is dynamic, with what it forgets being as important as what it recalls, as 
memory is historically conditioned, revisionist, and can be altered. Research in 
experimental psychology has identified that older adults can be more biased in verbal 
hindsight (Bernstein et al, 2011). Leary (1981) found that individuals retrospectively 
overestimate the degree to which they expected certain events to occur – possibly to 
maintain their own self-esteem or appear positively to the interviewee or to the 
historical record, while previously known information that does not fit with what the 
interviewee wants to go in the record can be forgotten, de-emphasised or 
reinterpreted. Fischhoff (1975) referred to ‘creeping determinism’ as one of the 
characteristics of ‘the silly certainty of hindsight’. 
 
 Initially it was hoped that a questionnaire completed by people who were working 
with young offenders during the period, which is reproduced in Appendix Two, would 
be useful, despite the known disadvantages of questionnaires (Sarantakos, 1994: 
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158ff). This was sent out as a paper copy within a mailing to all 400 members of the 
National Association of Youth Justice in 2005, and also sent to every Youth Offender 
Team manager in the country as an e-mail attachment, asking them to ask any of their 
staff who had been in practice in the 1980s or early 1990s to complete. However, 
almost all practitioners in youth justice before 1997 (including myself) left their posts 
in response to the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, which completely changed the 
culture and ideology of practice and which required every existing practitioner to 
forget everything that they had ever done before and be ‘retrained’ to a new set of 
standards and philosophies laid down by the new Youth Justice Board. As a result I 
received only 12 returned questionnaires and have only made minimal use of them in 
Chapter 9. The partial response limits their validity as little other than illustrative 
material (Sarantakos, 1994: 159). 
 
Theories of Policy Change 
 
My examiners also asked me to locate this thesis within a more detailed consideration 
of theories of policy change, which I had only given limited space to in my first 
submission. The policy studies and political science literatures provide a range of 
models which authors have promoted to explain the policy making process. These 
have also been applied to the understanding of decision-making, the development of 
policy, the transfer of policies across different areas of provision or from one country 
to another (see Benson & Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000; Dolowitz et 
al, 2000; James & Lodge, 2003), how policy is influenced by lobbying, how 
uncertainty is dealt with and other issues. It has been necessary to try and focus on a 
model that explains policy change in the context of this thesis, without turning the 
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thesis into a case study of the same. 
 
One of the problems is that most of the material is based on examples from the USA, 
despite the titles of many of the books and articles seeming to intend that they have 
international application.  
 
Sabatier (1999) provides the best overview of the main theories of the policy process, 
identifying several distinct approaches: 
 
Institutional rational choice theories 
 
This approach focuses on the leaders of a few critical institutions or organisations 
within the area being studied, and assumes that these leaders are pursuing material 
self-interest. Study can focus upon key institutional categories, such as legislators, 
interest groups or lobbyists, all of whom are assumed to be aiming to achieve the most 
rational (for themselves) decision, and how institutional rules affect the behaviour of 
these rational actors. Ostrom (1991, 1999) suggests that it is most effective when 
applied to institutional change: the ‘shared concepts used by humans in repetitive 
situations’ with ‘rules that are mutually understood and predictably enforced’ as 
everyone shares the norms. Schlager & Blomquist (1996) consider that the model falls 
short of being a complete explanation of policy formulation and change. As my thesis 
is mainly concerned with unplanned, unexpected and unintended consequences of 
developments in juvenile justice, I have chosen not to use this model. 
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Advocacy coalition theories 
 
This approach is based on the assumption that belief systems are more important than 
institutions, that actors and decision makers have a wide variety of objectives, and 
that the policy decision results from the outcome of all these objectives being 
synthesised into a politically acceptable outcome. Sabatier (1986; 1988; 1991; 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988; Heintz & Jenkins-Smith, 1988) has been its main 
advocate, and it continues to gain attention (Weible et al, 2011). It is suggested that 
‘coalitions’ are formed of those interested in achieving a certain outcome in the policy 
process, and there has been substantial focus on how these coalitions come about (see 
Schlager, 1995). It is based on five premises: the role played by technical information; 
a time perspective of more than a decade; a focus on a policy sub-system; 
consideration of the role of journalists, researchers and policy analysts; and the belief 
that priorities can be valued, that important causal relationships can be identified, and 
that policy instruments can be effective (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). It has been 
applied to 34 different case studies, but these are mainly to do with environmental 
issues or energy policy (ibid). Heintz & Jenkins-Smith (1988) suggest that the 
approach is more concerned with the roles of policy analysts and economics than with 
policy change, and Schlager & Blomquist (1996) that it falls short of being a full 
explanation of policy change. 
 
Theories of stages in the development of policy 
 
Various attempts have been made to develop a series of ‘stages’ to explain the 
development of policy. For example, in criminal justice, Morris and Tonry (1990: 17) 
  28 
have documented a pattern that they suggest that successful new policies in criminal 
justice go through:  
1. The experiment is launched 
2.  it works well  
3. it is written up  
4. it makes excessive claims of success  
5. the enthusiasm of its supporters diminishes  
6. key players move on to other jobs 
7. other agencies are not excited by it 
8. and the reform dies. 
 
To be embedded into the infrastructure, they argue that new initiatives need long-term 
funding and long-term resources, not just experimental money (ibid: 17 - 18); 
evidence of real cost savings, not just marginal cost savings (ibid: 157 and 233); and 
the project must deal with the constitutional, legal, political, organisational, 
bureaucratic, ideological and financial complexities (ibid: 221). 
 
Most of these theories will identify stages of agenda setting, policy formulation, 
policy implementation and evaluation, leading to revision.  One of the earliest models 
was that of Lasswell (1956), which had seven stages: intelligence, promotion, 
prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. Brewer (1974) 
revised this structure into six stages (set out in most detail in Brewer & De Leon, 
1983) of: 
1. Initiation: problem recognition, selection of criteria, determination of goals 
and objectives, and generation of alternatives 
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2. Estimation: of the various alternatives 
3. Selection: from the choices identified above 
4. Implementation: which will be affected by the source of the policy, its clarity, 
the level of support, the incentives for implementation, resource allocation and 
the complexity of administering the policy 
5. Evaluation 
6. Termination. 
 
Lasswell (1974) later stressed the role of professionals, and Lindblom (1959, 1979; 
Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993: 27ff) added the notion of ‘incrementalism’ to the 
framework: the idea that fast moving sequences of small changes can achieve a 
drastic alteration of policy. This has received some criticism (Bendor, 1995). Jones 
(C.O., 1984: 36) used a very similar model but termed the stages as problem 
identification, proposal, decision, programme, implementation and evaluation. 
Anderson (1994) uses problem identification, agenda setting, impact, evaluation and 
revision in a five stage model, which suggests that policies emerge in response to 
policy demands or claims for action by a range of actors in the policy process, leading 
to decisions by officials. He uses a simple version of political systems theory in which 
demands for change are the ‘inputs’ and laws are the ‘outputs’, which can incorporate 
group struggles and elite theory, in which policy is determined by a power elite, and 
which can  include organisational, professional, personal and ideological values. His 
‘rational-comprehensive theory’ is based on six stages: decision makers are 
confronted by a problem; the goals, values and objectives are known; various 
alternatives are examined; the costs and benefits of each alternative are investigated; 
each alternative is compared; and the best one is chosen. De Leon (1999) offers a 
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strong defence of the model.  
 
However, Sabatier (1999) argues that this is not a causal theory, that most policy 
development does not go through such stages and that the theory is too legalistic and 
top-down, ignoring the complex nature of policy development which involves 
multiple intersecting cycles. Etzioni (1967) had concerns that the model assumes that 
decision makers have all the necessary knowledge, whereas in reality many decisions 
are based on limited knowledge. 
 
Punctuated-Equilibrium Theories 
 
These assume that there are long periods of little or only incremental changes which 
are punctuated by brief periods of major policy change. Most change is seen as 
disjointed and episodic, with long periods of stability or ‘equilibrium’ which is then 
‘punctuated’ by bursts of activity (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; 2009; Baumgartner, 
2006). They have been mainly applied to policy making in the United States and in 
particular to budget decisions (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; True et al, 1999), and 
areas such as air transportation (Baumgartner & Jones, 1994).  
 
Policy Diffusion Frameworks 
 
The only application of these models to date has been to State government decisions 
in the USA (Berry & Berry, 1999), so I have not used them in this study. 
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Learning theories 
 
Various attempts have been made to apply learning theory to policy change, in which 
the model is based on application and correction of policy through experience. Hall 
(1993)  suggests that policy is determined by previous policies and the reactions to 
them, and offers three levels of change: first order change, which is incremental and 
routine; second order change, which is the development of new policy instruments 
and new strategic actions; and third order change, which is paradigm shifts and 
discontinuity. Bennett & Howlett (1992: 288) believe that so far this has been 
‘overtheorized and underapplied’. 
 
Policy Network Analysis 
 
Rhodes & Marsh (1992;  Marsh 1998)  have advocated the study of ‘policy networks’, 
of the regular contact between members of interest groups, bureaucratic agencies and 
government which lead to policy decisions. In this model policy making is based upon 
an ‘exchange relationship’ as participants manoeuvre for advantage. However, Hill 
(2005: 76) claims that it lacks explanatory power. 
 
Kingdon’s model of change   
 
The model that I have found most useful and applicable to my thesis is that of 
Kingdon (1995). Kingdon argues that it is necessary to take into account the situation 
within the policy-making process in which agendas are set. He develops his 
framework from the ‘garbage can’ model of decision-making developed by Cohen et 
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al (1972: see also Cohen & March, 1974; March & Olsen, 1976; Mohr, 1978; 
Mucciarino, 1992). This is based on the belief that there are often no clear articulated 
sets of preferences for decision-making, but that decisions are still made, often 
through trial and error. Participation in decision-making varies as people drift from 
one decision to another. Because problems and preferences are not well developed, 
then selecting an alternative yielding the best net benefit is impossible. Accordingly, 
choice can be viewed as a ‘garbage can’ into which problems and solutions are 
dumped, from which some outcomes then get drawn out and applied. 
 
Kingdon identifies four factors that influence the movement of choices and solutions 
in the agenda-setting process: 
• The ‘problem stream’ identifies which issues are recognised as significant 
social problems, within which citizens, groups and journalists work actively to 
develop interest in the problem and the need for a solution 
• The ‘policy stream’ influences which advice is regarded as ‘good advice’, 
which changes according to external events 
• The ‘political stream’ can affect which problems and solutions are chosen  as 
ones needing to be addressed 
• The ‘policy windows’ occur which provide the opportunity to have 
alternatives considered. 
 
These ‘windows of opportunity’ may or may not be taken up. These occur within the 
‘policy primeval soup’ (Kingdon, 1995: chapter 6), when ‘several things come 
together at the same time’ (ibid: 179). Policy entrepreneurs can seize the opportunity 
to effect policy change. Often a focusing event, such as a scandal, can give impetus, 
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such that ‘a pressing problem demands attention ... and a policy proposal is coupled to 
the problem as its solution’ (ibid: 201). The reason why some ideas for policy change 
are adopted may be due to their technical feasibility or cost indicators (Zahariadis, 
1999). Durant & Diehl (1989) expressed concern that the model only applies to rapid 
change and not to incremental changes.  
 
Kingdon’s model has been supported by Baumgartner & Jones (2009), Page (2006), 
Bardach (2006), and Sharp (1994) who applied it to anti-drug policy making in which 
the ‘window of opportunity’ stayed open. John (1998: 173) considered that it was ‘as 
close to an adequate theory of public policy’ as any of those currently available. 
Zahariadis (1995) found it useful in an analysis of public privatisation policy in the 
UK, adding the importance of the ideology of the party in government to the analysis. 
Terrill (1989: footnote 2: 430), looking at the Thatcher government’s law and order 
agenda, found that Kingdon’s ‘basic approach to the problem appears equally valid in 
the British context. Exworthy et al (2002) and Stone (D., 1989) also support 
Kingdon’s model, Stone noting how ‘causal stories’ can help to put things onto the 
agenda, but that these then ‘need to be fought for, defended and sustained’ from 
competing stories. Boin & Otten (1996), citing Kingdon, noted how ‘windows for 
reform’ are often associated with crises, and Alink et al (2001) used Kingdon’s model 
to develop the notion of crisis, in which the’ institutional integrity of a policy sector is 
at stake’ to consider asylum policy in Europe, noting that ‘reform success requires 
delicate timing, which presupposes an ability to detect and exploit a window of 
opportunity’ (ibid: 303). Klein & Maroner (2006: 898ff) see ‘windows of opportunity’ 
in the development of the appeal system for asylum seekers, ID cards and the 
modernising of child protection in the UK, and Cortell & Peterson (1999),  use 
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Kingdon’s model to explain domestic policy change.  Annesley et al (2010), draw on 
Kingdon to suggest that the election of New Labour in 1997 provided a window of 
opportunity for the emergence of gender changes in politics. 
 
Bannink & Resodihardjo believed that the window of opportunity and the role of 
policy entrepreneurs were important in explaining a variety of reforms in Europe. 
Keeler (1993) developed Kingdon’s windows of opportunity to include ‘micro-
windows’ and ‘macro-windows’ to explain  wide-ranging policy change including 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, Thatcherism, Allende’s socialist revolution and others. 
Richards & Smith (1997) suggest windows of opportunity can explain how 
government department’s change, using the example of how the culture in the Home 
Office  did not change much from the mid-1960’s until 1989, and how David 
Waddington was made Home Secretary with a brief to change this culture.  
 
Kingdon’s model has been applied to far more UK related settings than any of the 
others discussed, and also seems more relevant to the account of the development of 
juvenile justice policy which I will set out below, in which I will suggest that a lot of 
the developments arose from the seizing of windows of opportunity, often by key 
individuals fulfilling his notion of policy entrepreneurs, in a setting in which at times 
there was no clear policy direction from government. 
 
Other Approaches 
 
Rothman (2002) had shown how well intended reforms can become subverted into 
tools of ‘convenience’ for the bureaucrats and managers whose concerns are with 
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organisational survival, and how the ‘failure’ label is often attached to a reform 
programme far too quickly. Reformers and organisations willing to accept that their 
‘success’ makes them redundant are rarely found, and when they do occur they should 
be applauded. Berry et al (2010) have pointed out that in the USA very few 
government agencies or programmes are ever eliminated, but continue to exist even if 
their initial purpose disappears. Brewer & de Leon (1983), for example, claim that 
there are very few examples of research into policy termination, though they fail to 
draw on the closure of the Massachusetts training schools (see below: pp. 281 - 289) 
even though they have 4 references to this research in their supplementary reading list 
(Brewer & De Leon, 1983: 467). 
 
For Davies & Trevisas (1986), reform campaigners need to develop reform campaigns 
such that they are acceptable to those who have the power to implement them, which 
can be achieved by avoiding moral controversy, and do not offer direct challenges to 
the moral views of their opponents. They should use utilitarian arguments of causes 
and consequences, pointing out that the existing services cause more harm or 
suffering than if they are abolished. They suggested that these were the tactics used to 
amend laws on homosexuality, abortion, obscenity and the death penalty in the UK in 
the 1960s. 
 
Pettigrew et al. (1992) developed the notion of receptive and non-receptive contexts 
for change, identifying the quality and coherence of the policy, in which broad and 
imprecise visions can stimulate change; the role of key leaders and a critical mass of 
enthusiasts; long-term pressures; a supportive organisational culture; effective 
management and management/practitioner relations; co-operative inter-organisational 
  36 
networks; simplicity and clarity of goals and priorities, and incentives to change. 
 
Bannink & Resodihardjo (2006) challenged what they saw as three myths about the 
impossibility of reform, that are based on arguments that institutional structures make 
reform impossible, that reform needs a crisis, and that reforms need a strong leader. 
They noted several barriers to reform: veto points in the decision-making structure; 
policy lock-ins (assets, buildings etc); existing policy paradigms and vested interests; 
but argued that reform does happen, offering a series of case studies to demonstrate 
this. They suggested that reform can be facilitated by crisis, by a window of 
opportunity, by leadership, or by being compatible with national and international 
trends. Heyse et al. (2006) also noted the importance of leadership, and added another 
barrier to reform as being an expectation of failure. 
 
Explaining decarceration in particular 
 
Recent attempts to identify what determines a particular country’s penal policies are 
obviously relevant to the conditions that would need to be in place for a sustainable 
policy of decarceration. Tonry (2007) identified the following risk factors that will 
create tendencies towards greater punitiveness: 
 Conflict political systems 
 Elected judges and prosecutors 
 Sensational journalism (see Green, 2007) 
 Anglo-Saxon political cultures {i.e. first past the post} 
 The view that criminal justice policy falls appropriately within the province of
  public opinion and partisan policies, which denies professional  
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  knowledge and expertise 
 Income inequality  
 Weak social welfare systems (Downes & Hansen, 2006) 
 Low levels of perceived legitimacy of government institutions 
 Concentration of power. 
 
On the other hand, protective factors that may contribute to the success of less 
punitive policies are: 
 Lower levels of income inequality 
 Generous social welfare systems 
 High levels of trust in fellow citizens and in government 
 Consensus political systems 
 Non-partisan judges and prosecutors 
 Francophonic political structures (see Snaecken, 2007; Webster & Doob,  
  2007;  Roche, 2007; Levy, 2007) 
 The view that criminal justice policy falls within the province of expertise and 
  professionalism (see Snaecken, 2007; Webster & Doob, 2007; Levy, 
  2007; Roche, 2007; Lappi-Seppala, 2007). 
 
Pratt (2008), writing about low custody rates in Scandinavia, suggested that it was 
their insulation from the law and order politics of Anglo-American societies that had 
allowed their criminal justice policies to remain expert driven and research led. Their 
‘penal exceptionalism’ is, he argued, based on a strong state bureaucracy with 
significant autonomy and independence from political interference, an objective mass 
media, and the influence of expertise. 
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Summary 
 
In this chapter I have set out my methodological approach, documented the large 
range of material that I have read, and shown how the people that I interviewed were 
selected. I have considered some of the strengths and weaknesses of using interviews 
with people in which they are asked to remember what they were doing over a time 
period of up to 40 years previously, and drawn on literature from research methods, 
qualitative interviewing and oral history to contextualise this methodology. I have 
then explored a range of models of policy change, and chosen one (Kingdon’s model) 
to apply to the account of the development of juvenile justice policy since the mid-
1960s which follows. 
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Chapter 2 
Juvenile Justice in England and Wales: 1969 - 1976 
 
While there are many accounts of the development of juvenile justice practice and 
policy in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. Bottoms, 1974; Morris, & McIsaac, 1978; Elliott, 
1981a; Harwin, 1982; Tutt, 1982a; Asquith, 1983; Bottoms, 2002), none have fully 
covered the complexities of the situation, or highlighted the key ingredients which set 
the scene for the decarceration movement of the 1980s. It is therefore necessary to 
cover this period in some detail before going on to the 1980s. The 1969 Children and 
Young Person’s Act [hereafter CYPA] is the appropriate starting point, but first it is 
necessary to consider the antecedents of this Act. 
In 1960 the Ingleby Committee (Home Office, 1960b), which had been set up by the 
government to review existing policies towards children and young people in need or 
in trouble, concluded that there was a conflict between ‘just deserts’ and ‘welfare’, 
and that the responsibility for crime needed to be shared between the child, parents, 
schools and community. It proposed a welfare model for dealing with under 14s, and 
a more punitive one for the over 14s (Bottoms, 1974; Packman, 1975; Hendrick, 
1994), a gradual raising of the age of criminal responsibility (which was to attract 
sustained criticism: see Justice of the Peace, 1960c and 1960d), and a reduction in 
legal representation.  
The Conservative government of the time did not respond to Ingleby’s proposals, 
focused as they were on problems at Carlton approved school (see below: page 48) 
and Home Office, 1960a; Jones, H D., 1960) and a campaign for the restoration of 
corporal punishment for young offenders. Meanwhile, the Labour Party’s response to 
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the Ingleby Report, published through the Fabian Society, was to tarnish it as much 
too timid (Donnison & Stewart, 1958; Donnison et al., 1962) and to offer the 
alternative of a ‘family service’, the avoidance of stigma associated with conviction, 
and the raising of the minimum age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 15 (Hastings 
& Jay, 1965; Packman, 1975). However, Ingleby would be very influential on the 
creation of a separate system of juvenile justice in Scotland (see Cowperthwaite, 
1988). 
Much of the evidence to Ingleby was for reforms that would be implemented over the 
next few decades, even if they were seen as too radical at the time, and  much of it 
was very similar to evidence submitted to the Seebohm Committee a decade later (see 
below: page 43). 
The 1969 CYPA’s: antecedents 
Tables 1 - 11 in Appendix 1 set out how young offenders were dealt with by the 
courts between 1963 and 1970, and provide the context for the following discussion 
of the situation leading up to the 1969 CYPA. 
 
 
This Act (HMSO, 1969a) was the culmination of several years of discussion about 
youth crime and the best means of responding to it within the Labour Party, which 
was in power between 1964 and 1970. It applied to England and Wales, but not to 
Scotland or Northern Ireland. While amended over time, the legal framework that it 
overturned had previously been set out in the 1933 CYPA (HMSO, 1933), the 1948 
Criminal Justice Act [hereafter CJA] (HMSO, 1948a) and the 1948 Children Act 
(HMSO, 1948b), which had established different systems for dealing with young 
people who offended and young people in need. Unhappy with this system, the 
  41 
Labour Party had already, while in opposition, set up a ‘study group’ under the 
chairmanship of Frank Longford (Labour Party, 1964), which contained nine future 
ministers. 
 
Bottoms (1974: 322) argued that  there was a ‘conjunction of interests and ideology’ 
between the Labour Party and key figures in a child care profession then at the height 
of its influence, prior to the first of many scandals that were to later undermine the 
reputation of  child care and social work. The spouses of a number of Ministers of that 
period were themselves active in the children’s work of the London County Council 
and/or the London Juvenile Courts, and in that capacity were known to staff in the 
Home Office Children’s Department, which had a role in the appointment of juvenile 
court magistrates. 
 
The Longford Report was heavily influenced by the work of Baroness (Barbara) 
Wootton, one of the leading social philosophers of the time (see Seal & Bean, 1992a; 
1992b), and developed the Fabian critique of the Ingleby Report mentioned above 
(see Donnison and Stewart, 1958; Donnison et al., 1962; New Society, 1964; Clarke, 
J., 1980). It suggested that there should be no difference between ‘depraved’ and 
‘deprived’ children and that the legal system should deal with them in the same way. 
To achieve this they proposed the abolition of the juvenile court and its replacement 
with a ‘family court’. A government minister, Alice Bacon said that: 
‘It is sometimes sheer chance whether the behaviour of children leads to 
preventive work by the social service before the child reaches court or whether 
the child reaches court before its social behaviour is detected (Hansard, 1965b: 
col. 1210). 
 
The tone of the debate was helped by the fact that ‘crime and punishment’ was a ‘non-
issue’ politically and was not discussed in the 1964 General Election campaign 
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(Walker, 1964). Following Labour’s election to power in 1964 the Longford report 
found expression in a White Paper, The Child, The Family and The Young Offender 
(Home Office, 1965a), which argued that much delinquency could be traced back to 
inadequacy or breakdown in the family, and should be responded to by a ‘family 
service’. Children should be ‘spared the stigma of criminality’, especially as court 
proceedings were not the best means of identifying treatment needs, and should only 
be used for testing evidence. As most children and juveniles admit the offence, it was 
argued, there was no need for the court. Also, existing proceedings did not promote 
parental responsibility. Accordingly, each local authority would be required to set up 
family councils (made up of social workers), develop ‘observation and assessment’ 
centres, and take over the approved schools, while a ‘family court’ would deal with 
disputed cases. Where children needed long term treatment they would be ‘committed 
to the care of the local authority’ and the borstals and senior approved schools would 
be merged into ‘youth training centres’. The proposals represented: 
‘a substantial shift in power, away from central government and towards local 
authorities; away from the courts and legal profession, and towards welfare 
professionals and experts. It is an assault on the dominance of a system of 
justice which the Labour Party had traditionally viewed as being in the pay, and 
working in the interests of, the privileged’ (Pitts, 1988: 6). 
 
The White Paper’s proposals faced sustained opposition from lawyers, the probation 
service (Dawtry, 1965; National Association of Probation Officers, 1965; New 
Society, 1965a; Jarvis, 1966), approved schools (see Hyland, 1993: 66), child 
psychiatrists (Scott, 1966) and magistrates (see Aubrey, 1965; Justice of the Peace, 
1965a; Cavenagh, 1966; Downey, 1966; Fitzgerald, 1966; Magistrates’ Association, 
1966; Bottoms, 1974).  
 
Attacks were made against a ‘privileged position’ for children (Kay, 1965). The 
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Conservative Party tabled a Commons debate on a motion to ‘reject government 
proposals to abolish juvenile courts’ (Hansard, 1965b: cols. 1118 - 1140), and 
elsewhere Conservative MPs would attack the White Paper for being ‘muddled and 
inadequate’, citing the opposition from magistrates and probation officers (Hansard, 
1966). The only professions that supported most of the proposals were the child care 
ones (Justice of the Peace, 1965b; Kahan, 1966). 
 
Within weeks of issuing the White Paper the government was having second thoughts 
and considering other options (Lapping, 1965), such as the development of a 
comprehensive social work department, and setting up an inquiry to give 
consideration to this (the future Seebohm inquiry).  
 
The opposition to the 1965 White Paper proved successful, and its proposals ceased to 
be put forward by the government. According to Bottoms (1974: 330) this was 
because of the strength of the opposition, a change of Home Secretary, a lack of 
support from Home Office civil servants, and its lack of intellectual rigour. As a 
result, a less radical but intellectually stronger set of proposals appeared in a new 
White Paper, Children in Trouble, in 1968 (Home Office, 1968a), which was to form 
the basis of the 1969 CYPA. This paper was heavily influenced by the increasing 
power in the Children’s Branch of the Home Office of Derek Morrell and Joan 
Cooper. There was also the growing power of social work bodies, whose success in 
getting the report of the Seebohm Committee on the reorganisation of local authority 
social services (HMSO, 1968b) accepted fitted in neatly with proposals in Children in 
Trouble for the increasing role of social workers, while reducing the power and 
influence of the probation service. Children in Trouble argued that ‘it is probably a 
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minority of children who grow up’ without breaking the law, and that the commission 
of an offence by a child aged 10 - 14 ‘will cease to be, by itself, a sufficient ground 
for bringing him before a court’. Care, protection and control procedures would, 
however, be widened to allow an offender to be brought to court if the grounds for 
care as set out in the 1963 CYPA were also established. For those aged 14 - 16, the 
paper proposed that prosecution would only be possible via a summons from a 
magistrate after they had heard the views of the police and the local authority, and that 
inter-agency case discussions should take place between magistrates, police, local 
authorities and probation services before a decision was made to prosecute a young 
person. Police juvenile liaison schemes should be extended, and observation and 
assessment [hereafter O & A] facilities expanded. The approved school order should 
be replaced by a new ‘care order’, and ‘new forms of treatment, intermediate between 
supervision in the home and committal to care’ should be developed. Examples of this 
were ‘organised work project{s}, or social service, or adventure training’ involving 
contact with a new environment and participation in constructive activity, including 
residential commitment for up to three months (In an Appendix to Children in 
Trouble Intermediate Treatment {hereafter IT) was set out in more detail, involving 
the use of all existing local youth resources). All supervision orders of those under 14 
should be held by local authorities, not the probation service. Jury trial for under 16 
year olds, except for charges of homicide, should be abolished, and borstal should be 
phased out for under 16s, with attendance centres and detention centres [hereafter 
DC] being phased out as IT developed. Remand homes, reception centres, children’s 
homes and approved schools would all become ‘community homes’ and Joint 
Planning Committees would be established to develop the community home system. 
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Children in Trouble was more welcomed and faced less opposition than its 
predecessor, with which it was often compared (e.g. Justice of the Peace, 1968a), with 
particularly full support from the social work profession (Child Care, 1968; Dawtry, 
1968; Bilton, 1969), who monitored its parliamentary passage assiduously (Street, 
1969). Critics initially centred their concerns on the possibility of local authorities 
taking over probation (Greenald, 1968), and possible limits on police powers, which 
Holley (1968) felt had already been seriously limited by the 1963 CYPA. There was 
surprisingly little reaction from the residential care sector, and initially the approved 
schools headmasters association welcomed the proposals (Coultard, 1968b; Gittins, 
1968; Rees, 1968b) though Ratcliffe (1968a; 1968b) felt that their ‘unrivalled’ 
experience was going to be lost to something which was ‘theoretical, unproved and 
un-realistic’, and wanted more secure places within the approved schools.  
 
However, after initial feelings of relief that it was not as radical as the 1965 Paper, 
other criticism began to develop (see Evans, 1968; Franks, 1968; Godfrey-Isaacs, 
1968; Justice of the Peace, 1968b; Magistrates’ Association, 1968; The Magistrate, 
1969). The Probation Service was also not very sympathetic (see Bochel, 1976; 
Haxby, 1978). NAPO saw dangers in pre-court diversion, and thought that allowing 
social workers to submit Social Enquiry Reports [hereafter SERs] to court, previously 
a preserve of probation officers, was a ‘grave threat to the independence of the courts’ 
(Justice of the Peace, 1969b). 
 
The publication of the Bill which became the 1969 CYPA was welcomed by New 
Society (1969), as ‘the biggest step taken in the Twentieth Century from 
authoritarianism in British Society’, but criticised by the Times and the Magistrates’ 
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Association for undermining ‘equality before the law’ (Leonard, 1969).  
As the Bill went through parliament, there was strong lobbying against parts of it. The 
Magistrates’ Association and the Conservative Party accused the ‘care and control 
test’ of discriminating against children from ‘bad’ homes, arguing that it ‘would 
encourage children to believe that they were not answerable for their actions, nor had 
to pay any penalty for wrong-doing’, even to the extent of encouraging children to 
cause damage (Chapman, 1969;  Justice of the Peace, 1969a; and see Hansard, 1969a: 
cols. 57 – 96; 1969b; 1969c; 1969d; 1969e; 1969f; 1969g; 1969h), with Conservative 
spokesperson Mr. Carlisle claiming that 
 ‘as has been pointed out by the National Council for Civil Liberties, the most 
trivial offence could be used as a means of bringing a child before the court so 
as to get him into the care of the local authority’ (Hansard, 1969a).  
                                                                                                                                       
Bottoms (1974) suggested that the passage of the Act itself was partly eased by the 
need for some legislation to be carried during the 5 year term of the Labour Party, 
who had seen many of their other plans go astray, and he also believed that the 
retention of the juvenile court reduced the sting of magistrates’ opposition.  
 
It appears that enthusiasm for the Act did reduce throughout the period of the 
Government, and there is little discussion of it in many of the memoirs (Wilson, 1971; 
Jay, 1980; Benn, 1988; Jenkins, 1991); or in the political literature focusing on that 
period (see Alexander & Watkins, 1970; Lapping, 1970; Levin, 1970; Roth, 1972; 
Monk, 1976; Donoughue, 1987; Ponting, 1989; Coopey et al., 1993; Sked & Cook, 
1993; Sked, 1997; Tiratsoo, 1997; Haines, 2003; Dorey, 2006; O’Hara & Parr, 2006). 
Despite being the leader of the opposition at that time, there is also nothing in Edward 
Heath’s biography or memoirs (Campbell, 1993; Heath, 1998). 
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The 1969 CYPA: Intentions 
 
The Act had many intentions, the key eleven being: 
 1) to abolish approved schools (run by independent bodies and 
 accountable to the Home Office) and replace them with Community 
 Homes (run by Local Authorities and accountable to a new Department 
 of Health and Social Security). 
  
The approved schools were the successors to the Reformatory and Industrial Schools 
set up in Victorian times (HMSO, 1854; 1857a; 1857b), following the ending of 
transportation (for excellent histories of the approved school system see Simmons, 
1945; Home Office, 1951b; Heywood, 1965; Rose, 1967; Pinchbeck and Hewitt, 
1969; Carlebach, 1970; Mays, 1975;  Millham et al., 1975a and 1978; Parker, 1990). 
They had become ‘approved’ by the Home Office under the 1933 CYPA, which 
allowed magistrates to make a direct committal to a named approved school, which 
that school had to accept. They saw themselves as based on a tough boarding school 
model (Stacpoole, unpublished manuscript), or ‘first of all a penal boarding school’ 
(Newby, 1968), a phrase repeated to me by P D James (personal interview). Their 
reputation began to suffer after the Second World War, with the murder of a teacher 
by a resident young offender at Standon Farm School (Home Office, 1947). There 
was also growing evidence of violence and abuse by staff in the approved school 
system (Willcock, 1949; Kynaston, 2007). 
 
The house journal of the Approved Schools, The Approved Schools Gazette, gives a 
flavour of the sort of attitude held by staff and heads at this time. In 1955 concern was 
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raised about the ‘falling off in the character and calibre of the approved school boy’ 
(Hampson, 1955), ‘the modern tendency of mollycoddling juvenile delinquents’, the 
use of ineffective psychiatrists and psychologists (Sanderson, 1955), and the 
commitment of children to local authority care rather than to approved school 
(Hamer, 1955). Fostering came in for substantial criticism in the journal (Gaughan, 
1956), presumably because it was seen as an alternative to the approved school. 
Between 1955 and 1959 there were many articles in the Gazette on homosexuality, 
religion, boxing, army cadets and general social morals.  
 
Major disturbances at Carlton approved school in 1959 (Home Office, 1960a) were 
blamed on the ‘deterioration in the types of boys committed’, mass absconding, and 
the lack of personal relationships between staff and boys, and led to demands for 
earlier admission (Justice of the Peace, 1960b), less use of probation (Adams, 1960), 
and greater punishment (‘you deserve a thrashing that would leave you senseless for 
48 hours’ said the chairman of a juvenile court to a boy [Justice of the Peace, 1960a]).  
 
The President of the Association of Headmasters and Headmistresses of Approved 
Schools decided not to comment on the Carlton events (Coultard 1959), but then 
welcomed the inquiry report (Coultard, 1960). The schools felt that the Ingleby report 
was ‘a vote of confidence’ in them (Gaughan, 1960b) and that ‘the tide is turning in 
our favour’ (Gaughan, 1960a), and over the next five years articles in the Gazette 
were very complacent. However, the 1965 White Paper was to increase the sense of 
threat in the approved school system, and strong opposition was voiced to being taken 
over by the children’s departments (Lloyd, 1966). 
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New concerns about physical punishment in approved schools, such as Court Lees 
(Home Office, 1967a: see also Gibbens, 1969: Gibbens was the chair of the Court 
Lees inquiry) gained massive publicity following publication of photographs of 
injured boys in the national press, and the Home Office (1967c) asked managers of 
approved schools to review the use of punishment. According to Fowler (1967), the 
school governors wanted to dismiss the whistleblower, while the Home Office wished 
to dismiss the head and deputy head. The report on Court Lees encouraged the Home 
Secretary, Roy Jenkins, to indicate his intention to change the approved school system 
‘as quickly as I can’, despite strong support for the approved schools voiced in two 
debates in the House of Lords (Hansard, 1967a), during which many Lords admitted 
that they were approved school committee members and/or juvenile court magistrates, 
and criticised the Home Office handling of Court Lees (Hansard, 1968b). Within the 
approved school system Court Lees was defended (Approved Schools Gazette, 1967a; 
1967b; 1967c; 1967d; Coultard, 1967; Ebert, 1967; Fergus, 1967; Howard, 1967; The 
Times, 1967; Wilmot, 1967; Baddeley, 1968; Coultard, 1968a; Rees, 1968a and 
1968c). 
 
As Tutt (1970) suggests, part of the problem was that the approved school was a penal 
institution, parents and children expected it to be one, but the staff pretended that it 
was not. Millham et al. (1973), in the most comprehensive study of the approved 
schools, noted staff resistance and hostility to change. Sinclair & Clarke (1973) even 
found staff encouraging deviancy in order to ‘get to’ problems. 
 
Growing evidence of declining ‘success’ rates (Taylor, 1954; Scott, 1964; Wilkinson, 
1964; Miller, 1966; Cornish and Clarke, 1975; Dunlop, 1975; Sinclair and Clarke, 
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1982), with 62 – 68 per cent of boys being reconvicted within 3 years of discharge in 
the 1960s (HMSO, 1967; 1968a) and of increasing absconding rates (Gunasekera, 
1963; Clarke, 1967; Tutt, 1971; Laverack, 1974; Porteous and McLaughlin, 1974; 
Millham et al., 1977a; 1977b; 1978) was produced during the 1960s and 1970s.   
 
It was difficult to ‘treat’ young people in the schools unless they remained in 
residence. Clarke and Martin (1971), for example, noted 8,884 recorded abscondings 
in 1968, rising to 11,557 in 1971, with 40 per cent of boys absconding at least once 
and five per cent persistently (Clarke & Martin, 1975). They found that this then often 
led to borstal sentences for offences committed while absconding, though this was 
challenged by approved school psychologists (Brown et al., 1978).  A whole 
‘correlation industry’ (Millham et al., 1978: 71)  developed trying to identify the 
characteristics of absconders, such as the work of Gittins (1959), Brierley (1963), 
Lloyd (1964), Clarke (1966; 1967; 1968), Martin & Clarke (1969), and Green & 
Martin (1973). 
 
One of the champions of the 1969 CYPA, later to be in a strong position to try and 
change the approved schools, was Barbara Kahan (1967), who described approved 
schools as 
 ‘isolated pockets of custodial and primitive management supported by ad hoc 
bodies of largely self-selected managers whose appreciation of their social and 
personal problems involved has been minimal’. 
 
Millham (1975) described the approved school as a ‘dustbin to contain those boys for 
whom more benign approaches had failed’, that ‘stored problem boys for the borstal 
system’ (Millham et al., 1975b) and referred to the headmaster of a catholic school 
who said ‘his chief aim was to prepare the boys for death’ (Millham, 1975). Looking 
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back on his research into the schools (Millham 1991), he later said that the education 
in them was ‘appalling’, with no expertise in remedial education and no recognition of 
the need for this. The focus was on employment skills, but there was no correlation 
between the trades learnt in the schools and the actual employment taken up by the 
young people after they left.  
 
James Callaghan, who as Home Secretary saw the CYPA through its parliamentary 
stages, says in his memoirs that there was a growing recognition that the approved 
schools were too rigid (Callaghan, 1987: 233).  
 
In the face of all this criticism, and evidence, the complacency of the schools was, at 
times, staggering. Jones (H., 1964) for example, could acknowledge a success rate of 
only 43 per cent in 1962, but still attack the critics of the schools: 
 ‘it is becoming fashionable nowadays to decry residential establishments such 
as homes for old people, mental hospitals and correctional institutions for young 
offenders’,  
 
he said, and he defended the system of placing children initially in an establishment 
for observation, after which, he claimed, children are always sent to the ‘most 
suitable’ school. A Monograph of the Association of Headmasters, Headmistresses 
and Matrons of Approved Schools (1969) suggested that people did not understand 
how difficult approved school boys were: they claimed that only 60 per cent had 
tolerably healthy personalities, 30 per cent were seriously disturbed, and 10 per cent 
were untreatable due to being psychopathic, psychotic or subnormal.  
 
The average daily population of the schools changed little in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Tables 1, 4, 8 and 10 show how many offenders were sentenced to approved schools 
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by the courts, according to the Criminal Statistics. Table 12 shows actual admissions 
to the schools as recorded by a different part of the Home Office. While they differ, 
they show how steady sentencing and admissions were throughout this period, which 
also seems closely linked to capacity. Table 13 shows actual numbers in residence on 
one particular day each year. Most boys and young men admitted were sentenced for 
offences, whereas the proportion of girls who were offenders was much more 
variable, from only a third in some years to over two thirds in others. 
 
Average length of stay in the late 1960s was 19 months for boys (HMSO, 1969b: 
Table 10) though some children could stay in them for up to six years due to repeated 
offences while in them (Millham, 1991). The intake in the early 1970s was less 
delinquent than it had been in the past (Millham et al., 1975a: 12 and 43), but the 
schools complained that their intake was becoming more disturbed and ‘less 
responsive to therapy’ (Home Office, 1967b: 53), and were to continually ask for an 
intake that was younger, less delinquent, and stayed for a longer period (e.g. Ratcliffe, 
1967). 
 
The Court Lees Inquiry had found that five per cent of boys and 60 per cent of girls 
committed to approved schools were sent there for reasons other than the commission 
of an offence (Home Office, 1967a), there being 618 non-offenders committed in 
1970 (Cawson, 1981; see Table 11). Around 15 per cent of approved school children 
were recommitted or transferred to borstal following further offences during their stay 
(Cawson, 1981). 
 
 2) To abolish Detention Centres (section 7 (3)). 
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DCs had been created in the 1948 CJA (HMSO, 1948a), partly in response to the 
abolition of corporal punishment as a sentence, and growing evidence of the failure of 
approved schools (Fox, 1952: 340 -343). They were to be a ‘short but sharp reminder’ 
to a young offender, through a regime of ‘brisk discipline and hard work’, according 
to the Home Secretary (Ede, 1947; Hansard, 1947). Research into their effectiveness 
and operation had consistently raised concern (see Grunhut, 1955 and 1960; Pharaoh, 
1963; Dunlop and McCabe, 1965; Field, 1969; Choppen, 1970). Land (1975) called 
them ‘the experiment that could not fail’ and Muncie (1990) argued that ‘failure never 
matters’. The earliest studies, by Grunhut (1955; 1960) found that 45 per cent of 
junior trainees reoffended within one year, even 33 per cent of those who were 
sentenced for their first offence, a proportion which was increasing over time. More 
sophisticated offenders (those with three or more previous convictions) had a 64 per 
cent reconviction rate over the same time period. Around one quarter of inmates had 
previously been in approved schools.  
 
In 1956 the Home Office had advised magistrates and judges that DC was unsuitable 
for the long-term institutionalized, those with many juvenile court appearances, the 
maladjusted or mentally disturbed, the dull and backward, and the physically unfit 
(Home Office, 1956; Justice of the Peace, 1970b). Magistrates were told that it was 
‘military detention’ without its brutality (Justice of the Peace, 1962). Throughout the 
1960s, the Annual Report of the Prison Department talked about the worsening of the 
intake (Home Office, 1964a), their further deterioration (Home Office, 1965b) and 
raised doubts about their role and value (Home Office, 1967c). Staff in the centres 
blamed declining success rates on the fact they were receiving fewer first offenders 
(Tyndall, 1963).  
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Bank’s (1965) study of 302 boys in senior DCs between 1960 and 1962 had found 
that one third had been in care, 70 per cent were unrepresented in court at the time of 
sentence, and deemed over a quarter to be ‘unsuitable’ (10 were believed to be 
innocent; 11 she thought were sentenced too severely; 19 had physical handicaps; and 
38 psychological handicaps). She found a 47 per cent reconviction rate over two 
years. 
 
By the mid-1960s overall reconviction rates were up to 61 per cent over two years 
(Paley and Thorpe, 1974), and a House of Commons Committee concluded that the 
sentence length of three months was too long, and offenders should be sent there 
earlier in their offending career. They found that only one in eight of those receiving 
DC sentences had been sentenced to DC on a first offence, and argued that the intake 
was too delinquent and sophisticated to be reformed (House of Commons, 1967). 
Around 13 per cent of sentences to DC in 1967 were by higher courts, the remaining 
87 per cent from the magistrates’ courts (Hansard, 1968a). 
 
Tables 4 and 14 show that the number of young men sentenced to DC almost doubled 
between 1964 and 1970, though this was less of an increase as a proportion of all 
offenders convicted (see Table 5), and even less as a proportion of all those dealt with 
(see Table 6) due to rising crime rates and an increase in cautioning at the end of the 
decade. Most of this increase in DC sentencing was as a result of committals from 
magistrates’ courts to the crown court for more severe sentences than the magistrates 
themselves could pass (see Table 7).  
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 3) to abolish borstal for young offenders under 17 (Section 7 (1)). 
 
Borstals had been created by the 1908 Prevention of Crime Act (HMSO, 1908) as a 
‘penal reformatory’ for young people aged 16 to 21, who would serve a period of 
‘training’ for one to three years (see Ruggles-Brise, 1921; Home Office, 1951a; Little, 
1963; Warder and Wilson, 1973). They developed as a punitive model of the public 
school system (Leslie, 1938) and had their heyday in the 1930s (Fox, 1952, Lowson, 
1970). Until the mid 1960s, the number of children under 16 sent to them was small 
but numbers then began to rise sharply, from 266 in 1964 to 1,026 in 1970 (see Table 
4), while still remaining a small proportion of all those dealt with (Tables 5 and 6). 
Magistrates’ courts could not pass borstal sentences, but had to commit the offender 
to a higher court for sentence (Table 7). 
 
Borstal success rates began to decline steadily after the Second World War (Little, 
1962a; Gibbens and Prince, 1965; Hood, 1965; Cockett, 1967; Bottoms & 
McClintock, 1973; Lowson, 1975), which was often put down to the deteriorating 
quality of receptions (Little, 1962a and 1965; Home Office, 1966a and 1969a) and 
‘the failure of the inmate’ to identify with the system and its aims (Little, 1962b). 
They were viewed as anachronistic by the new child care reformers, despite attempts 
to introduce ‘modern’ methods of group counselling (Prison Service Journal, 1960; 
Bird, 1961; Darling, 1964), casework (Robertson, 1961), ‘reality therapy’ (Booth, 
1966) and psychiatric help (Wardrop, 1961). Reconviction rates had risen to 68 per 
cent by the time of the 1969 CYPA (Paley and Thorpe, 1974). The minimum age for 
committal to borstal was lowered to 15 in 1961 (HMSO, 1961: see Thomas, 1963) 
and research soon established a progression from children’s homes and approved 
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schools to DC and on to borstal (Hall-Williams and Thomas, 1965a; 1965b; 1965c; 
Banks, 1966; Lowson, 1970) with 35 per cent of admissions in 1964 having 
previously been in approved school (Hansard, 1965a; see also Banks, 1964). There 
were high rates of absconding from the open borstals (Cowan, 1955; Carter, 1963; 
Laycock, 1977), and in the last three months of 1969 Laycock (1977) found that there 
were 277 abscondings, with 25 per cent later being charged with an average of over 
five offences each.  
 
Court of Appeal decisions had consistently indicated that the imposition of a borstal 
sentence should be a rehabilitative one, and not for purposes of deterrence and 
retribution (Hall-Williams and Thomas, 1965a; 1965b; 1965c). At the time of the 
implementation of the 1969 CYPA the average sentence length served was 10 months 
(Hansard, 1971), having fallen from 15 months in 1965 (Home Office, 1966a: 20).  
 
Andrew Rutherford (personal interview) had been an Assistant Governor for parts of 
the 1960s and 1970s, at Everthorpe, Hewell Grange and Hollington borstals, as part of 
which he had to write summary reports on the inmates as they were being released:  
‘I found myself writing “doubtfully appropriate custodial sentence” on quite a 
large number of them, and was told to stop saying this’. 
 
4) to abolish attendance centres (section 7 (3)). 
 
Attendance Centres had first been proposed in 1938 (Hansard 1938), as a means of 
reducing the numbers of young people received into prison and to contribute to ‘the 
ultimate abolition of imprisonment’ for summary offences, according to the then 
Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare. They were intended to deprive young people of 
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their leisure, and were finally introduced in the 1948 CJA, the first centre being 
opened in June 1950. Those on an Attendance Centre Order would attend at a centre 
run by the police on a Saturday afternoon to be occupied ‘in a manner conducive to 
health of mind and body’ (McClintock et al., 1961; see also Braithwaite, 1952 and 
Spencer, 1953), while being deprived, according to Lord Templewood, ‘of a half 
holiday, to prevent their going to a football match or a cinema and…to make them 
ridiculous’ (Hansard, 1948).  McClintock et al.’s research had suggested that junior 
(for under 17s) attendance centres were effective with young first time offenders, but 
not with recidivists, and Attendance Centre Rules had been passed to prevent those 
who had previously served a custodial sentence being sent to them.  By 1969 over 60 
centres existed and 10,000 orders to attend were made. Tables 1 and 4 show the 
steady rise in the number of boys and young men sentenced to attendance centres 
between 1964 and 1970. 
 
The Labour government’s criticisms of the centres were voiced during the Committee 
stages of the 1969 Bill, in which they likened them to DCs (Hansard, 1969a: col. 
119), though they seemed uncertain as to where they would fit after the 1969 Act. 
 
5) to transfer the supervision of young offenders from the probation service 
to social services (sections 11 and 13). 
 
Under the 1933 CYPA, the court could make a ‘Fit Person Order’ which sent the child 
or young person to approved school and placed them under the supervision of the 
probation service. Probation officers would then visit the young person in approved 
school and be responsible for links with the family and the offenders’ after care 
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following discharge home. The 1969 CYPA proposed that social workers would now 
take over this role from the probation service for all children under 14, and gradually 
take on the role for 15 and 16 year olds.  
 
As Cedric Fullwood (one of the leading figures in the probation service in the 1980s 
and 1990s) told me (personal interview), the ‘majority of leaders of the probation 
service’ were against this, and against the proposed merger of probation with social 
work. 
 
6) to encourage the development of new forms of provision for young 
offenders in the community, to be known as Intermediate Treatment. 
 
IT was a totally new concept, with very little guidance as to what it would involve 
(see below: pages 79ff). The uncertainty provoked all sorts of speculation, but the 
government’s intention appears to have been that IT would be a new form of sentence 
replacing those sentences that the Act was abolishing (attendance centre, DC and 
borstal), but it is difficult to identify any firm statement of intent. As will be discussed 
later, the development and changing nature of IT was to become crucial to juvenile 
justice policy and practice in the next two decades. 
 
7) to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 14 (section 
4). 
 
During the passage of the Bill, Home Secretary Callaghan restated this aim (Hansard, 
1969h, col. 1187), and there was even an amendment proposed to raise it to 16 
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(Hansard, 1969a: col. 208ff). The government finally announced its intention of 
raising it to 12 as part of a gradual raising to 14 (Hansard, 1969a: col. 218), though 
this never occurred. This links to: 
 
8) to enable offenders under 14 to be dealt with via welfare or ‘care’ 
proceedings, not criminal proceedings, in juvenile courts (section 1). 
 
This gave effect to the discussion in the Longford report (see above: page 41) as to 
whether young offenders should be dealt with under welfare or justice grounds, and 
the belief that young offenders should be treated, not punished. 
 
9) to give social workers a new role in the provision of reports on the family 
background of young offenders to juvenile courts (SERs) (section 9). 
 
Probation officers had previously written background reports (SERs) for the court 
prior to sentence. Just as social workers were to supervise these offenders in future, so 
they would now produce the reports. 
 
10) to establish joint forums for the discussion of juvenile offenders between 
social services departments and the police, with a view to increasing 
cautioning of young offenders and reducing court appearances (section 5). 
 
A caution was a means of giving an offender a warning for their behaviour without 
taking them to court, following arrest and charge. Cautioning of young offenders 
developed in London in the first three decades of the twentieth century, though it was 
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then brought to a halt (Lerman, 1984b). It was revived again in Merseyside in the 
1950s (Martin, 1952; Odgers, 1955; Mack, 1963; Pratt, 1986a; Stevenson, 1989; 
Weinberger, 1995), building on proposals by Bagot (1941), and also developed in 
London (Taylor, 1971). It was widely publicised by the influential J. B. Mays (Mays, 
1965; 1967; 1970a; see also British Journal of Delinquency, 1951; Somerville, 1969; 
Lee, 1998: 18ff), and Baddeley (1955; 1960; 1962) as a means for the police to 
develop early intervention with potential offenders. A Home Office Circular in 1954 
(Home Office, 1954), drew attention to developments in Liverpool (House of 
Commons, 1975b: 418; Oliver, 1978) though the Ingleby Committee was opposed to 
the police actually carrying out cautioning (see Pratt, 1986a: 203). The number of 
cautions for males aged under 17 had risen from 19,000 in 1954 to 31,000 in 1963, 
with 21 specialist juvenile liaison schemes in England and Wales (Home Office, 
1967b: 32), and to around 38,000 in 1969 (Table 15A), though most of the growth 
was for 10 - 13 year old boys (Tables 3 and 6) and for girls and young women (Table 
15B). 
 
11) To remove magistrates’ powers to commit young offenders directly into 
approved schools (now community homes): this to be replaced by the power 
to make a ‘care order’ to social services, who would then be responsible for 
the placement decision. 
 
This was to become one of the most controversial parts of the Act, and was opposed 
by the Magistrates’ Association from the moment it passed into law, even before 
implementation.  
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The 1969 CYPA: Theory and Practice 
 
In the 1969 CYPA, as Morris and McIsaac (1978: 30) so eloquently put it,  
‘a particular political ideology, the growth of the social services professions and 
the dominance of a particular view of the aetiology of delinquency converged’.  
 
The Act ‘shifted the locus of decision-making power’ from the juvenile court to social 
services departments [hereafter SSDs] (Haines & Drakeford, 1998: 36 - 37). Bottoms 
(1974: 320) suggested that the underlying philosophy behind the Act was clearly that 
of decriminalization. Apart from the probation services, who were the main losers in 
the Act, there was little initial opposition to the overall intent or philosophy. 
 
The 1969 CYPA: implementation and controversy 
 
While the 1969 Act was passed in the final year of the Labour government, receiving 
Royal Assent on their final day in power, it was not implemented by them, and the 
incoming Conservative government quickly decided only to implement those parts of 
the Act with which they were in favour (Justice of the Peace, 1970c), undermining the 
whole philosophical basis of the Act and strengthening the capacity of magistrates to 
resist it (Burchell, 1979). The borstals, DCs, and attendance centres were not 
abolished, the age of criminal responsibility was not raised and the inter-agency 
forums between the police and social services were not established (Home Office, 
1970c). The Government had to restate its underlying philosophy by issuing a Guide 
(HMSO, 1970a) explaining how the Act would operate under part implementation. 
The government’s views were also set out in an early press release (Home Office, 
1970a: cited by Bottoms, 1974: 321), and a Home Office Circular (Home Office, 
1970b).  
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As Nellis (1991: 52 - 53) pointed out, if the age of criminal responsibility had been 
raised to 14, the juvenile court would have lost the power to make absolute 
discharges, conditional discharges, fines, compensation orders or attendance centre 
orders on offenders under 14, being left only with the sentencing options of binding 
over, care orders and supervision, within which it would have been able to use IT 
conditions. However, with the retention of these sentencing powers, the new option of 
IT, which as far as can be ascertained was expected to be working with those who had 
previously gone into custody or care, was left without a definitive client group for its 
services, and seen, according to government minister Mark Carlisle (Justice of the 
Peace, 1971b), as less important than the approved schools.   
 
In addition, the age of criminal responsibility was not raised from  10 to  14 (Section 
4), leaving the 10 to 13 year old group still open to criminal proceedings, even though 
the new ‘care proceedings’ in the Act, which had been intended to replace criminal 
prosecution, were also available. Technically, children under 14 could not be 
prosecuted if they were doli incapax: the prosecutor was required to prove that they 
knew ‘right from wrong’, but in practice this was rarely queried by courts and the 
requirement was unapplied. The requirement for police and social services 
consultation about pre-court decision making (section 5) was also not implemented, 
with the Home Office stating that they did not object to it happening but would not 
make it mandatory (Home Office, 1970c), though some police forces, such as Thames 
Valley, actually had their scheme set up by October 1970 (Justice of the Peace, 
1971c). Initially, probation would continue to hold all supervision orders on those 
over 12, eventually rising to 14 (Home Office, 1970c), though in 1973 social services 
took over supervision of 10 and 11 year olds nationwide (Hansard, 1973e). The 
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original intention to implement the Act on the 1st October 1970 was postponed for 
three months (Home Office, 1970d), and the removal of juvenile courts power to 
make DC orders, attendance centre orders and borstal recommendations was  delayed 
in 1972 (Hansard, 1972d), and never actually implemented. 
 
Several influential people in the Home Office were less than sympathetic to the 
CYPA. Lady James (the novelist P D James) was a civil servant in the Home Office  
in 1971 (under her original name of Phyllis White) and was  responsible for juveniles 
among her other responsibilities (John Croft: personal interview). Reflecting back on 
that time, she told me that the theory behind the Act was: 
‘The premise was that children were not by nature wicked or particularly 
criminal and that there was always something wrong in their background and 
that could be put right, and then all would be well with the child. However, 
there was no research or evidence for that view at all’ (personal interview). 
 
She felt that the problem was ‘the general philosophy’ behind the Act, but that 
criticisms were always focused on the lack of resources to implement it, rather than its 
fundamental philosophy. It would have been better, she argued, if the government had 
concentrated on reforming and liberalising the approved schools, which she believed 
had all been closed down, whereas they had simply been changed into Community 
Homes with Education on the premises [hereafter CHE’s]. She also felt that the 
reorganisation of social work led to the loss of ‘lots of extraordinary experience and 
skill in children’s officers’, and another of her concerns was: 
‘I got a bit worried about due process. I was always aware that it would be very 
easy to take children’s liberty from them without due process’ (personal 
interview). 
 
The implementation of the CYPA also took place just as the post war consensus on 
delinquency and its treatment started to disintegrate (Bailey, 1987). It certainly 
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seemed to increase the conflict between justice and welfare approaches (Morris, 
1976). Within months the CYPA had been condemned as a failure (Tutt, 1981a), and 
approved schools were raising concern about a fall in referrals and suggesting that this 
was because local authorities and some Directors of Social Services were opposed to 
them (Wilkinson, 1971).  An Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency 
conference in November 1972 (Justice of the Peace, 1972d;  Hodges, 1973), heard all 
of the criticisms that were to be repeated over the coming years, with a call for more 
secure accommodation, and allegations that social workers were physically unable to 
‘tackle a non-co-operative violent young person’. A ‘fairy story’ (Millham et al.  
1975b: 4) developed that the approved school system had been effective prior to 1969.  
 
The Magistrates’ Association expressed dissatisfaction with the Act at a conference in 
July 1971, well before it was implemented (Justice of the Peace, 1971a).  In 1971 
their annual meeting decided to boycott the requirement to check whether there was a 
vacancy in a DC before making the order, and to send children to DC whether or not a 
place was available (The Magistrate, 1971). They submitted a dossier of complaints to 
the Home Office and the DHSS attacking local authorities for returning children home 
and condoning absconding, as a result of which young people were ‘laughing at 
authority’ (see The Magistrate, 1972c). It accused local authorities of failing to 
exercise proper control of children committed to their care, said that it was 
‘commonplace’ for a child offender made subject of a care order ‘to be allowed to 
return home’, and that an absconder from a community home can be ‘reasonably 
confident that he will not be returned’ (Justice of the Peace, 1972a; 1972b; 1972c; 
The Magistrate, 1972a; 1972b; Sugden, 1972; Skyrne, 1983).  
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In November 1972 it was claimed in The Times that children under 17 could now 
commit almost any crime with impunity, as the law was irrelevant and an object of 
mockery which left magistrates powerless (Berlins & Wansell, 1972a). The only 
solution, it was argued, was to expand secure places (Berlins & Wansell, 1972b), and 
delay the implementation of Seebohm (Berlins & Wansell, 1972c). In 1974 a letter to 
the Daily Express by the Chairman of Accrington Juvenile Bench (Broadley, 1974) 
claiming magistrates were ‘taunted on the streets by children saying “ha ha, we’ve 
won, you have lost”’ gained widespread publicity (The Magistrate, 1974). The 
impression was given of young delinquents poring over legal text books identifying 
loopholes! 
 
Several myths surrounded the Act, such as that the approved schools had all been 
closed or that ‘offenders can no longer be sent to approved schools as these no longer 
exist’ (Hilton, 1972), or that there was no secure accommodation now available 
(Skyrne, 1983). Yet the DHSS calculated that only 120 places in approved 
schools/CHEs) were lost during the transfer from approved schools to CHE’s (House 
of Commons, 1975b: 417 – 418).  
 
Voices supporting the philosophy behind the Act were rare (Dartington, no date; 
James, 1972; McClean, 1972) and given little publicity, and there is little published 
challenge to the view that the police and the magistrates were now powerless. An 
exception was Goodman (1973), a magistrates’ clerk, who said that there was no 
evidence to support the view that children were being sent home on care orders, and 
argued that magistrates had more powers than ever. He pointed to the failure rates of 
the approved schools. Allison Morris told a meeting of the Howard League in 1975 
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that many of the problems that were being identified existed before the Act, and were 
also due to lack of implementation of parts of the Act. Nicholas Stacey, the then 
Director of Social Services in Kent, told me that he  had asked his local Magistrates 
Association how, as the Act was not yet fully implemented, could it be judged to have 
failed (personal interview: see also Justice of the Peace, 1975a).  
 
Despite their party being in power, Conservative MPs tabled regular attacks on the 
CYPA in Parliament (see Hansard, 1972a; 1972b; 1972c; 1972d; 1972e; 1973a; 
1973b; 1973c). Loraine Gelsthorpe told me that, as she understood things at the time,  
‘the judiciary and magistrates were important in fuelling Conservative views 
that the liberal route under the Act was not the way to go, and that ACPO were 
quite important at this time in supporting the Magistrates Association’ 
(personal interview).  
 
The Labour party attacked the government for its slow implementation of the Act and 
its partial implementation (Hansard, 1973d and 1973e), something it was to continue 
to claim even after its own return to power (Justice of the Peace, 1975b).  
 
The House of Commons Expenditure Committee established a sub-committee to 
review the operation of the Act, giving a public forum for a major debate about youth 
justice philosophy (House of Commons, 1975a).  While it is not clear who was behind 
the establishment of this inquiry, Tutt (1981a) and Farrington (1984) point out that 
two of the MPs on the sub-committee were magistrates and one was a former 
approved school head, but there was no one on the Committee with a social services 
background. As Tutt (1982a: 3) states,  
‘although chaired by a Labour MP and investigating a piece of legislation very 
much identified with and supported by Labour administrations, [it] appeared to 
base its investigation on the assumption that the Act was not working, an 
assumption for which there was no evidence except hearsay evidence, rumours 
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and beliefs’.  
 
With the return of a Labour Government in 1974, Conservative hostility to the CYPA 
increased, with regular questions and comments attacking the Act (Hansard, 1974a; 
1974b; 1974c; 1974d; 1974e; 1974f; 1974g; 1974h; 1974i; 1975b; 1975c; 1975d; 
1976f; 1976h). 
 
Some commentators have implied an almost Machiavellian intent to the 
Conservatives in their attitude to the Act at this time (e.g. Rea Price, 1978a: 206). 
Harris (1972) referred to the Act being ‘delivered into the world with deliberately 
inflicted deformities’, while Morris et al. (1980) suggested a ‘purposeful construct’ of 
a moral panic over delinquency. Ironically, as Cawson (1981: 8) pointed out, there 
was actually little real change in magistrates powers: they had never had control over 
discharge from approved schools; offenders on fit person orders and approved school 
orders were more likely to be living at home than elsewhere, but this was not known, 
as fit person orders had never been monitored.  She also argued (ibid: 43) that ‘social 
workers do not often deliberately choose to place children at home after the making of 
a care order’, but did so due to the lack of available placements. She (ibid: 11) cited 
internal Home Office research that found that juveniles on care orders made up 10 per 
cent of those found guilty, while 45 per cent of those on care orders were living at 
home and 27 per cent in CHEs. When followed up by the DHSS, the average time 
since making the care order was 30 months, and there were only two cases of 
reoffending within the past 12 months.  Yet the evidence was that reoffending while 
on a care order led to a highly punitive disposal, not to no prosecution at all, as 
alleged by magistrates. According to this study most reoffending was by those in 
residential homes, especially those living in CHEs or absconding from them.  
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While the consequences of partial implementation certainly seemed to play into the 
hands of those who had been opposed to the Labour Party strategy in the 1960s, this 
was probably more by default than by design, with many unintended consequences of 
the legislation only gradually appearing.  
 
The 1969 CYPA: the social work response  
 
Despite the opportunity that the Act gave to social work, it was so preoccupied with 
other developments that it took its attention away from juvenile offenders, in order to 
concentrate on the creation of the new SSDs. A massive restructuring of children’s 
services had been proposed by the Seebohm enquiry (HMSO, 1968b) and was 
implemented in the Local Authority and Social Services Act 1971 (HMSO, 1971a), 
alongside a major reorganisation of Local Government in 1972 (HMSO, 1970b and 
1971b) consequent on the report by Lord Redcliffe-Maud (HMSO, 1969c and 1969d). 
According to an anonymous New Society correspondent (‘Macavity’, 1969) 
 ‘Seebohm himself and his former committee colleagues are championing their 
own recommendations up and down the country with an energy unparalleled by 
any other government committee or royal commission’.  
 
The replacement of probation officers in the juvenile court, coinciding as it did with 
Seebohm and local government reorganisations, which had led to the promotion of 
many of the most experienced social workers, meant that magistrates were faced with 
many young and inexperienced social workers, recently qualified on courses with a 
strong component of critical sociology, and less deferential to the court than a 
probation service that had been strongly identified as ‘servants of the court’. As 
Cedric Fullwood (personal interview) told me, looking back at that period, 
 ‘In the Manchester area magistrates felt that probation officers had more sense 
  69 
of structure and control than ‘young women in jeans coming into court and 
giving social work reports’ and they were very happy to see “their” orders 
being supervised by “their” probation officers. When they could choose who 
supervised they would often choose probation. Local authorities in the area 
were not keen on offenders, so very little professional development in working 
with them was taking place’. 
 
Suggestions that social workers improved their knowledge of law (Harris, 1973a) and 
that local authorities considered appointing specially trained court officers (Harris, 
1973b), were ignored.  These social workers, ‘largely inexperienced, rather shell-
shocked and inadequately supported’ (Adams et al., 1981: 44) had also taken over 
magistrates’ previous power to place children and young people in residential care, 
and became the obvious target of magistrates’ anger and insecurity. It has even been 
claimed that the magistrates sent young offenders to DC and borstal so that they 
would then go to the probation service for supervision on release, and not to SSDs 
(Worrall, 1997: 69). There also appears to have been some ambivalence among social 
workers about actually working with young offenders (Rea Price, 1978), and little 
attention was given to IT or supervision of juvenile offenders on the new Certificate 
in Qualification of Social Work courses (Andrews, 1977).  
 
P D James (personal interview) told me that at the time she believed that ‘the court 
really must have power to make a secure care order – to say “this child must not be 
left at home”’.  She believed that the new SSDs were opposed to removing the child 
at any cost: she said that ‘I had little sympathy for social workers, and would rather 
they spent their time visiting and helping families than sitting around in case 
conferences’. John Stacpoole (unpublished manuscript) felt that the social work 
profession could never decide whether their services to the disadvantaged or their 
professional standing were more important. 
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The hostility that it now faced took the social work profession by surprise, 
unaccustomed as it was to criticism and more used to being on the attack itself, full of 
the belief that it could right all the wrongs of society. One of the consequences of this 
hostility was that social workers started to try to out-guess the magistrates, and began 
to recommend care orders and custodial disposals to avoid being accused of leniency. 
As Haines & Drakeford (1998: 39) put it, social work tended to believe that formal 
intervention was a good thing, and recommended highly interventionist sentences for 
those with minor criminal offences, or minor family, developmental or adolescent 
problems.  This led to SERs becoming a major push factor into care and custody 
(NAJC, 1978).  
 
CHEs and other residential child care provision 
 
In anticipation of the implementation of the Act, approved school staff explored how 
they would transfer to working in community homes. Benger (1969) wanted to ensure 
they were only sent ‘treatable’ cases, and wanted the borstals and senior approved 
schools retained for the ‘untreatable’. Pruden (1969) echoed this, while Burns (1969) 
and Gaskell (1969) wanted the retention of the classifying schools to observe and 
assess children before they were sent to a CHE. This seemed to fit uncomfortably 
with the DHSS view that the Act would bring ‘establishments for delinquents out of 
their isolation’ (Cooper, 1969), and their blueprint for three new CHEs using a 
therapeutic environment (DHSS, 1970).  
 
The heads of the approved schools, who were now transformed into heads of  CHEs, 
but otherwise providing the same service, found themselves dealing with new 
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managers from the newly created SSDs, who were inexperienced in management and 
very dependent on the expertise of the heads (see West Midlands CRPC, 1980). They 
also now had the power to decide whether to accept referrals, whereas before they had 
had to take whoever the court ordered to them, and as early as 1972 were being 
accused of being selective in their intake (J. G., 1972), even from within their own 
ranks (Wilkinson, 1972). They were also accused of refusing admission even when 
the assessment centre had specifically recommended that particular school (Burns, 
1975), refusing to take black young people (Harrison, 1975), or operating racial 
quotas (Burns, 1975), and refusing to accommodate children during school holidays 
(Burns, 1975).  Rea Price (1978a) argues that they ‘demonstrated their new-found 
independence and worked off their resentment by setting rigid criteria as to the type of 
children they would accept’, and cites research by Tutt for the London Boroughs’ 
Children’s Regional Planning Committee [hereafter CRPC] that 20 per cent of urgent 
requests for CHE placements by social workers were rejected by schools.  Of the 80 
per cent accepted only 55 per cent completed the planned placement (see also Allen, 
1974; Brown, 1974; Wootton, 1978). 
 
Given that the schools had long challenged criticism of their failing success rates by 
claiming that they got the young people when they were too young, ‘too late, for too 
short a time, and with the wrong attitude’ (Burns, 1973), they were able to use these 
new powers to refuse the older, more difficult referrals (usually the more persistent 
offenders), and to alter their intake to a younger and less delinquent one.  Thorpe 
(1983a: 76) argued that the 1969 CYPA allowed the ‘emerging professional group’ in 
residential social work ‘to enter the juvenile justice and child care systems and to 
exploit it for its own…ends’. However, Giller (1983) suggested that the CHEs were 
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unwilling to carry out a distinctive role in the juvenile justice system, instead adopting 
a policy of negativism: stating who they would not help, rather than what they could 
do. 
 
This left social workers who held care orders with a dilemma. The courts were 
making care orders on young people, expecting them to go into the former approved 
schools, and social workers could not find a placement for them. Inevitably some 
were returned home. Whereas reoffending by young people in approved 
schools/CHEs was dealt with by courts in the CHEs area, often different to the one in 
which the young person lived and where the original care order had been made, 
reoffending while placed at home led to them coming back before the same 
magistrates who had made the original care order (as pointed out by Baroness 
Faithfull: Hansard, 1977g). Magistrates seized on what they saw as evidence of their 
sentencing being undermined by SSDs, and went public, criticising ‘the young social 
worker, who to some of us looks no different from the children themselves’ (Berlins 
and Wansell, 1974a: 82: see also Morgan, 1978a: 96 - 97).  
 
The CHEs claims of receiving more difficult young people continued to be made 
despite research indicating that 10 per cent of those sent to approved schools received 
the order on their first appearance in court, and the average number of court 
appearances  of those in approved schools was only two (Field et al., 1973). Cawson 
(1981: 26ff) found that boys committed in 1975 were ‘remarkably less delinquent 
than were approved school committals … as committal to care for delinquency is 
being used as a first or early resort’, and Millham et al. (1975b: 6) that ‘what success 
these schools had were almost entirely with boys who should not have been there’. 
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Stacpoole (unpublished manuscript) noted the massive problems of winding up 
approved school finances, with their liabilities to repay grants to the Home Office, 
which probably distracted them from caring for children. 
 
The creation of the CHEs out of the approved schools was seen as an ideal 
opportunity to try and change the way they worked, and a great deal of DHSS 
attention was given to try and develop a more therapeutic and caring regime in place 
of the previous punitive ethos, though the new Social Work Service of the DHSS had 
little of the authority over the schools of the old Inspectorate (Stacpoole, unpublished 
manuscript). A series of papers was issued from the centre, the most influential of 
which was Care and Treatment in a Planned Environment (DHSS, 1970). This 
document was ridiculed within the approved school system, being dubbed the ‘yellow 
peril’ (see Approved Schools Gazette throughout 1969 - 1970; Baple, 1969), on 
account of the colour of the cover, and the threat it was seen to pose. 
 
Norman Tutt (personal interview) told me that this report had been written by a Home 
Office psychologist and was ‘seen as the major plank of policy for the first three or 
four years’ as part of ‘a desperate need to reform the approved schools’. He said its 
agenda was driven by Barbara Kahan, the Deputy Chief Inspector, who, when she had 
been the Children’s Officer in Oxfordshire, had refused to send children in care to the 
approved schools, so she had ‘a personal agenda in the Social Work Service 
Development Group’. Tutt thought that reform was necessary  
‘because it was frankly chaotic. I was working in St Gilbert’s in Worcestershire 
in 1971, when the county council took over the school when the Children and 
Young Person’s Act came in, and I remember being phoned up by a social 
worker saying they wanted to place a child in the school. I said, well “Why? Do 
you know what this establishment is about?” And he answered “no, not really, 
you’re a children’s home” to which I said “yes, of a sort”. Clearly nobody had 
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a clear idea of how these CHEs were going to fit in’. 
 
‘I then went to Northamptonshire. They had these three approved schools which 
they were lumbered with and I was recruited to run them. They were quite 
separate from the rest of the child care service, with a very odd management 
structure. One was chaired by Sir Hereward Wake, another by Lady Hesketh. 
While the local authority had three members on the management committee they 
made little impact’. 
 
There was a lot of conflict between the DHSS and the CHE heads, partly because 
there seemed to be a custodial role demanded by magistrates and public opinion, and 
a treatment role coming from the DHSS (Giller, 1977). There was also, according to 
Norman Tutt, ‘local authority pressure on the DHSS for guidance as to what to do 
with the CHEs’. The Social Work Service Development Group of the DHSS ‘put huge 
amounts of time and effort into the CHEs, developing models of service such as 
Druids Heath and arranging huge residential conferences’ around the country, said 
Chris Sealey: (personal interview), trying to promote a new philosophy of care 
(DHSS, 1973a; 1973b; 1975a; 1975b; 1976a; 1976b) and ‘to re-orientate attitudes’ 
(Kahan in DHSS, 1973a: 62). Its Director regularly wrote articles for the Approved 
Schools Gazette trying to persuade the schools to change (Cooper, 1968a; 1968b; 
1970; 1973; 1977), but Norman Tutt thought that ‘the DHSS Social Work Service and 
approved school staff were talking very different languages ... the Department was 
beating its head against a brick wall’. Senior DHSS officers questioned the 
dominance of control (Hodder in DHSS, 1976a: 11 - 14), and tried to change the style 
of management within the schools (DHSS, 1977c; 1978a; 1979). Headmasters at these 
events continued to claim that the current intake was more difficult than in the past 
(Lally in DHSS, 1976a).  
 
Henri Giller carried out his doctoral research into the CHEs in the 1970s (Giller, 
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1981). He told me (personal interview) that the vision for the CHEs was  
‘very much a civil service vision about what a therapeutic community or 
environment ought to be, how it could be discharged, the physical setting in 
which it should be deployed … with minor exceptions, that vision was being 
rolled out in an old estate, and most CHE staff did not share this vision’. 
 
The placement of Foreign Office staff in the DHSS following their expulsion from 
Uganda, including John Stacpoole, brought a fresh perspective and something of a 
challenge to the Department, and the incorporation of former children’s officers such 
as Barbara Kahan and Joan Cooper and the appointment of women Inspectors ‘was in 
contrast to the stuffy male Home Office where children’s services had resided’, 
according to Roger Bullock when reflecting on that period (personal interview).  
 
The Under-Secretary in charge of this part of the DHSS from April 1973 was John 
Stacpoole, who told me that, on arrival in the department, he was given no clear 
policy guidance and that he found services in confusion following uncoordinated 
reorganisation (Stacpoole, unpublished manuscript). He was in the process of writing 
his biography, so had been reflecting on this period carefully. He said that on arrival 
he found that: 
‘the Act had shot the approved schools dead, or  if not dead into agony because 
they knew that they had lost their standing and all that anybody wished to do 
was to get rid of them somehow, as no one wanted to pay the costs of them. The 
DHSS wanted to sell them but nobody wanted to buy them …. The approved 
school machinery was breaking down … because of the shortage of places they 
had begun to reduce the period of time people spent in them. The Inspectors and 
heads had agreed a period of 15 months, which was totally against the theory of 
the schools (personal interview). 
 
In 1975, according to Norman Tutt (personal interview) he ‘was invited to a 
secondment to the DHSS to deal with the CYP Act’, something that was to have 
serious consequences for youth justice policy after this.  Chris Sealey, an Inspector in 
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the DHSS in the late 1970s, found the Social Work Development Group trying hard to 
develop IT but also struggling to keep residential care for young people, in CHEs, on 
the map: ‘It became a bit of a standing joke – whatever the SWDG touched was the 
kiss of death’ (personal interview). 
 
Even though the Community Homes Regulations of 1972 contained no requirement 
for the recording of absconding from the CHEs, making comparisons with the 
approved schools almost impossible, Clarke (R., 1980: 114) showed that the 
‘unshakeable belief’ in the schools that ‘absconders were of a distinct personality 
type’ continued. 
 
Faced with the refusal by CHEs to accept referrals, local authorities began to place 
these children in ordinary small children’s homes, at much lower cost (Rea Price, 
1978: 209 suggests £3,000 per annum as compared to £20,000), and to develop 
specialist foster care (see below: page 123), which meant that the number resident in 
the CHEs remained constant (Table 16).  
 
The Care Order dilemma 
 
The Act had intended that a juvenile court would only be able to make a care order on 
young offenders under 14 if there was combined proof of committal of an offence, 
and of the need for care and control. This was under section 1(2)(f) of the Act. 
However, section 7(7) of the Act allowed a care order to be made solely on the basis 
of an offence by young people over 14, on the assumption that the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility was being raised to 14. The decision by the Conservatives not 
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to raise the age of criminal responsibility to 14 meant that 10 to 13 year olds now 
became liable for a care order for offending under section 7(7). 
 
The 1969 CYPA: other unintended consequences 
 
Prior to the 1969 Act, the lead responsibility for young offenders had been placed 
within the Home Office, albeit in their Children’s Department. The transfer of 
responsibility to the DHSS did not take account of the loss of the support services 
available within the Home Office, particularly the research department, and the first 
few years of the new services developed with little accurate data back-up. At the same 
time, so Parker and Giller (1981) argued, there continued to be little interest in 
juvenile delinquency from the sociological academe, leaving it to the 
social/psychological and child care traditions.  McConville (1981) also noted that, 
while there had been a 300 per cent increase in juvenile custody in the past 20 years, 
most criminological research had failed to offer any solutions to the problem. While 
the Home Office Research Unit now turned its attention to adult crime, the new 
DHSS took on juvenile offenders, voluntary child care, statutory child care, and local 
authority reorganisation, in an area where priorities were confused and lines of 
communication tangled and broken. What research was commissioned by the DHSS 
focused upon child development, treatment regimes and the CHEs. There was no 
research at all into IT, and the first initiative here was eventually taken up by the 
Department of Education, in setting up the National Youth Bureau and giving it the 
brief of disseminating information about IT (something it was to do extremely well: 
their 1985 bibliography (Skinner, 1985) listed over 1000 publications on IT: all 
available in the NYB library and available on loan from them) further linking IT to 
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youth work (e.g. Dieppe, 1973; Jones, R., 1975).  
 
The social work figures that had joined the DHSS were ‘tarnished with too close an 
association with Labour’ for the new Conservative government (Millham et al., 1978: 
30), while the sudden death of Derek Morrell in 1969, one of the architects of the 
CYPA, who had seen the Act, together with the Seebohm implementation, as ‘the 
most important statute that has been passed for generations’ (Justice of the Peace, 
1970a), and had ‘discounted all that training schools held dear’ (Millham et al., 
1975b), was a major blow (P D James confirmed that he was very influential in the 
Home Office (personal interview)). Morrell had a vision of IT developing from his 
understanding of community development (Nellis, 2010). It was only by the late 
1970s that the DHSS and Local Authority SSDs began to appreciate and understand 
the new pattern of provision that existed, and the relationship between juvenile court 
sentencing and SSD practice and provision (Parker and Giller, 1981). 
 
Even the new professional organisations that were created consequent to the 
restructuring of the social work profession gave little attention to young offenders, 
ironically given that this was many of their members’ main area of work. Neither the 
National Institute of Social Work, nor the Central Council for the Education and 
Training of Social Workers [hereafter CCETSW], published anything relevant to 
young offenders or IT at any time in their almost 30 year existence (Nellis, 1996), and 
never understood or appreciated that ‘juvenile justice was the one social work success 
story of the 1980’s’ (Nellis, 1992: 148). One of the new weekly journals that 
developed out of the professional restructuring, Community Care, waited until its 11th 
issue before publishing anything on young offenders (Robinson, 1974). The new 
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professional organisation, the British Association of Social Workers [hereafter 
BASW], also gave little attention to offenders or IT until the mid-1970s.  
 
The early days of IT 
 
The Appendix to Children in Trouble was clearly abolitionist in intent: once adequate 
community support facilities were available attendance centres were to be abolished; 
once short-term residential IT was available, DC was to be abolished, via ‘abolition-
through-transformation’ (Nellis, 1991a: 35). Slack (1972b), for example, clearly 
thought that once IT was available then the 60 junior attendance centres would be 
closed. 
 
The failure to abolish attendance centres, DC’s and borstals, and their continued 
expansion as magistrates lost confidence in the social work profession, led to serious 
uncertainty about the role of the most innovative new sentence: Intermediate 
Treatment. The 1968 White Paper had blurred the role, at one stage suggesting that 
providers could opt out of working with those ordered to do IT (Thorpe, 1983a: 77), 
and  the government itself had seemed fairly vague as to what it would entail during 
the Committee stages of the Act, citing  a centre at Northope Hall, Leeds, as the main 
example, and including attendance centres, youth clubs, dramatic and musical 
activities, community service, weekend centres, adventure playgrounds, harvest and 
holiday camps and outward bound as elements of IT (Hansard, 1969a: col. 389).  The 
Home Secretary said that the object of IT was to give ‘access to resources which are 
denied to many children from poorer backgrounds’, which would include normal 
constructive activities for young people of their own age, such as adventure training 
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or a harvest camp’ (Hansard, 1969h). An American example, the Boston Citizenship 
Training Scheme, had been championed by the Magistrates’ Association (see Nellis, 
1991), but was then neglected as a model in the 1970s developments.  
 
As a result, instead of developing as a service for serious young offenders, as the 1969 
Act had intended, but who were being locked up and thus  not available for IT to work 
with, IT developed as a service for children ‘at risk’, who were known to social 
workers for reasons other than offending. As Haines & Drakeford (1998) said, the 
client group was poorly defined and variable, and restricted to a younger age group 
living in the community. It also had ‘no clear theoretical basis nor a precise method 
for application’ (Ostapuik, 1982: 148), and a ‘desperate shortage of ideas’ (Sparks & 
Hood: 1968: 7 - 11). The term itself seemed to ‘embrace a bewildering number of 
different and sometimes competing concepts’ (Allard, 1976), while ‘definitions of 
what IT could or should be abounded’ (Pitts, 1979: 17 - 18). Most of the thinking and 
development of IT was being carried out by social work practitioners, and many of 
the authors cited below were such practitioners. 
 
A Home Office Circular in 1971 linked IT to camps and adventure courses, and tried 
to provide a route for probation officers to do IT by allowing them to claim back the 
cost of such IT from social services if it was activity with young people on 
supervision orders allocated to the probation service (Home Office, 1971a). The early 
IT specialists in social services often came from a youth work background (see 
Haines & Drakeford, 1998: footnote 5 on p. 242), and were often based in residential 
establishments (Adams et al, 1981: 49) and the early IT Regional Plans, which the 
CRPC’s were required to publish, were little more than ‘unimaginative catalogues of 
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names of organisations and youth groups’ (James, 1981):  a list of local youth 
facilities, from youth clubs to cadet forces (see Paley, 1974; Paley and Thorpe, 1974: 
14ff; Hunter, 1976). The Yorkshire IT programme, for example, contained 33 
residential courses and 981 day and evening courses, most seeming to reflect ‘healthy 
body, healthy mind’ (Stein, 1973; Youth in Society, 1973).  It was not surprising that 
the Community and Youth Service Association could condemn social workers 
involvement in IT (IT Mailing, 1979), believing that the youth service should be the 
main provider. BASW thought that the main focus of IT would be attendance at a 
youth club and called for more youth clubs to be opened (Bamford et al, 1972). The 
first article on IT in New Society, for example, (Chapman, 1970), said that it was ‘an 
intriguing variety of adventure courses and leisure pursuits’ with an emphasis on 
‘challenge and adventure’, and an early article in Social Work Today saw it as a 
‘social education experience’ open to anyone - and their friends (Dove, 1974). Hinton 
(1974) mentioned rock-climbing and flute lessons, while Elliott (1981b: 92) listed 
falconry, disco’s, remedial education, community service, work training, 
photography, garage mechanics, drama, cookery, sewing, sport, discussion groups and 
expeditions as coming under the concept.  She described it as ‘the container into 
which many conflicts, much confusion and a myriad of misconceptions about the 
treatment of delinquents have been poured’ (ibid: 95). Similar lists were presented by 
Carter (1973).  
 
DHSS attempts to promote IT at this time also reflected uncertainty about what it was 
and was not (see DHSS, 1972a; Tutt, 1976c:  Preston, 1982). John Stacpoole told me 
that he had been introduced to the concept by Barbara Kahan, and he had seen it as 
encouraging and helping young people by linking them with sympathetic adult 
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organisations such as the police, football teams and boxing clubs. The early DHSS 
guide to IT in 1972 never even mentioned delinquency (Adams et al, 1981) and a 
demonstration project suggested that it was for ‘those whose difficulties are not so 
great’ aged between 0 and 18, with holiday schemes being the major need (DHSS, 
1973c). At a conference in 1974, the Head of the Social Work Service Development 
Group, Joan Cooper (1976), could define IT as ‘an experience to promote growth and 
development in all aspects of human personality’, and a panel of DHSS officers ‘were 
agreed that Intermediate Treatment should not be regarded as an alternative to 
residential care ‘ (DHSS, 1976d).  
 
The Government’s decision to ask the CRPC’s to produce plans for Community 
Homes also took all their attention away from IT (Adams et al, 1981).  
 
IT, then, was ‘initially seen as a youth service activity and a community resource’ 
(Blagg and Smith 1989: 47). Mays saw it as ‘an ideal boys club with a strong family 
atmosphere’ which would include ‘not only a variety of adults… [but]…also women 
(sic) helpers and colleagues’ (Mays, 1970: 13). IT workers, argued Mays, would take 
referrals from other social workers of children on ‘family case loads’, and involve the 
children in evening groups and short residential trips. Walker (1968), the Children’s 
Officer for Lancashire, saw it as adventure holidays in the Lake District, Stevenson 
(1971) suggested its’ essence was groupwork and ‘creative play’, while Baddeley 
(1969; 1970) felt that junior attendance centres and ‘army youth teams’ were proven 
models of IT. Raynor (1977) promoted psycho-drama. Writers in the social work 
weeklies (e.g. Morris, P., 1975a and 1975b; Knight, 1975; Manning, 1977) focused on 
residential adventure activity and summer camps in the grounds of CHE’s, or model 
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aeroplane building (Miller, D et al, 1986).  
 
In 1973 David Thorpe saw IT as ‘a specialised social work enterprise aimed at those 
who are deemed too deviant to benefit from conventional youth club facilities’ 
(Thorpe, 1973a), suggested it could be done via residential experiences (Thorpe, 
1973b), and had IT workers engaging in casework, groupwork and community work 
(Thorpe & Horn, 1973). Both Thorpe (1976c) and Tutt (1976e) were still promoting 
an activity and adventure model of IT as late as 1976, prior to their dramatic 
conversion to a very different notion of IT. {Thorpe (1983a: 78) said that he was 
unable, in 1974, to recognise that ‘needology’ in IT was partly the cause of the 
increase in custody]. Ford (1975: 119), a leading magistrate, thought IT would include 
‘dramatic societies, folk clubs … dog clubs, pigeon clubs, art, groups, music 
societies’. Tony Latham, the architect of ‘Pindown’ (Levy & Kahan, 1991: p. 18, Para 
3.48), had an IT project promoted by the DHSS including art, gardening, woodwork, 
hairdressing, cooking, camping and fishing. Ray Jones wanted it to be part of a 
‘comprehensive social work approach’ within a systems model (Jones, R., 1976). A 
special issue of the DHSS magazine, Social Work Service (1976) devoted to IT 
included lots of descriptions of residential programmes and daytime activities, 
including one in Coventry which ‘excludes children with serious behaviour disorders’ 
(Jaques, 1976), and the Personal Social Services Council, with a CHE headmaster on 
its study group, saw it as being only to avoid ‘inappropriate’ placement in residential 
care, and offered a model for ‘intensive IT based in the residential setting’. (On the 
early days of Intermediate Treatment, see Thorpe (1978a) and Blagg and Smith 
(1989: 87 ff).  
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Prins (1972), a child psychiatrist, suggested IT was ‘compulsory benevolence’, but 
deemed it unsuitable for the disturbed, disruptive, manipulative, immature and those 
with identity problems. Teaching staff defined IT as ‘groupwork counselling’ run by 
teachers (Aplin & Bamber, 1973); youth workers as ‘cooking and karate’ (Manning, 
1976); probation officers as handicrafts, judo and community service (Rowntree, 
1971) or river-craft, football and youth clubs (Carpenter and Gibbens, 1974).  
 
Richard Kay had become the Director of the Rainer Foundation in 1978. Looking 
back at that period he told me that his predecessor as Director, Ron Howell 
 ‘said he had done a lot of work with Alice Bacon and claimed to be influential 
on the development of the 1969 Act. Rainer had closed down residential 
establishments and set up the Rainer Centre in Lewisham, mixing depraved and 
deprived youngsters. It had a small residential unit and evening activities, like 
trampolining. I couldn’t make sense of what it was trying to achieve – there 
seemed to be a theory that those ‘at risk’ got ‘into trouble’ because they were 
‘deprived of experiences’. However, there was an off-site unit as an alternative 
to school which was very good. Rainer also had Hafod Meurig’ (a residential 
outward bound centre in Snowdonia), ‘which had changed from offering 
individual packages to young Freddie from Lewisham, who had been put on a 
train and ended up there for a month, staying there and having an experience – 
changed because authorities were no longer sending individuals away – and it 
turned into a centre for groups, to give them positive experiences to make up for 
deprivation in their lives. Groups of probation officers and social workers 
would take groups of children away for a week to do activities – it was a bit dire 
– social workers sitting down, saying ‘can I go home’ as they had no clear role, 
didn’t know why they were there as the staff from Hafod Meurig did the work 
with the children’ (personal interview). 
 
(For an account of the ‘adventure’ activities provided by the Rainer Foundation to 
boys on probation see Day, (1964)) 
 
Only 20 supervision orders with intermediate treatment requirements had been made 
by 1974 (Baddeley, 1974). It could justifiably be claimed that by 1976 the traditional 
concept of IT was ‘slowly sinking in some uncharted mass’ (Billis, 1976: 11), and the 
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official version of IT: the co-ordinated use of existing community facilities, especially 
those of the youth service, to work with delinquents as part of their youth work, had 
been superseded by a social work practitioner view involving the development of 
specialist facilities delivered by local authority social workers (Nellis, 1991), though 
often  as ‘a social worker’s hobby, an unpaid, spare-time activity with only a marginal 
existence’ (Paley, 1979). Bill Utting (personal interview), looking back at that period, 
pointed out that ‘IT did not have a great deal of opportunity to work with offenders at 
the heavy end’, but that the media were starting to portray it as a let-off: ‘lessons for 
flute playing being paid for by local authorities because of an offence’.  
 
As Haines and Drakeford (1998: 38) were to claim some 20 years later: 
‘It is quite difficult to find a precise official definition of what IT was supposed 
to be … .In reality it was the activities that actually comprised IT that came to 
be its defining characteristics … .It simply meant working directly with children 
… almost anything that social workers, probation officers, youth workers etc. 
did directly with young people could be, and was, called IT’. 
 
The Expenditure Committee Report 
 
The Report of the Sub-Committee of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee, 
on the 1969 CYPA, was published in 1975 (House of Commons, 1975a). It argued 
that while: 
 ‘the proportion of all crimes committed by the 10 to 17 year old age-group has 
increased only marginally … we accept … that young people in this age group 
are increasingly involved in serious crime’ (ibid: vi)  
 
and identified ‘a small minority’ of persistent young offenders ‘who need strict 
control and an element of punishment’ (ibid: xllx). The report acknowledged that no 
Act of Parliament could be expected to influence juvenile offending, and found that 
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some of the criticisms of the CYPA were based on misapprehensions, such as the 
belief that there was less secure accommodation available when there was actually 
more; that absconding was increasing when there was no evidence to support this; and 
that approved schools had been secure when they were not. It noted the increase in 
custodial sentencing, limited only by the availability of beds. It considered IT 
schemes to be ‘often inadequate and the quality uneven’ (ibid: vii), and recommended 
increasing the role of probation in the juvenile court, the creation of a ‘secure care 
order’, a short DC sentence for as little as two days, retention of attendance centres, 
secure wings in CHEs, specialisation in social work in juvenile delinquency and court 
procedure, and a large increase in secure accommodation. It suggested that the CHEs 
should retain their power to refuse admissions, and should be adapted to provide day 
care and after care. Its conclusion was that the major failing of the CYPA was its 
failure to differentiate between children needing care, welfare, education and support 
and ‘the small minority who need strict control and an element of punishment’ (ibid: 
xiix). 
 
Submissions to the Committee took up two large volumes of evidence, and provide an 
excellent snapshot of the tension between magistrates, police, justices’ clerks, local 
authorities, social workers, residential care staff and others (House of Commons, 
1975b).  
 
Sentencing of juvenile offenders: 1969 to 1976 
 
Tables 17 to 32 document the actual outcome of the Act on police cautioning and 
sentencing patterns in the courts. It was only in the mid-1970s that the actual patterns 
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of sentencing following the Act were identified, with the rise in DC sentences and 
committals to Crown Court by magistrates’ courts with a recommendation for borstal, 
being seen (Social Work Today, 1976).  
 
Before looking at specific sentences in more detail, it is worth noting that Tables 17 to 
27 are continuations of Tables 1 – 11, allowing comparison of sentencing before and 
after the 1969 CYPA was implemented. What stands out is the rising number of 
convictions of young men aged 14 to 16 during the whole period, from 86,818 in 
1971 to 94,400 in 1976 (Table 20), and the increase in punitive disposals of these, 
both proportionately (Tables 21 and 22) and absolutely. For boys aged under 14 the 
conviction numbers were stable. The number of girls and young women who were 
dealt with remained small (Tables 24 and 26), with very few punitive sentences given 
to them. 
 
 
Cautioning 
 
Cautioning rates rose sharply between 1970 and 1971, and then stabilised at a higher 
level.  Whereas 25 per cent of all arrests before the 1969 CYPA were cautioned, by 
1975 it was 49 per cent (67 per cent for under 14s and 13 per cent for 14 - 16 year 
olds) (Hough, 1977). Tables 15, 16, 28 and 29 show this.  
 
Absolute and Conditional Discharges 
 
The increase in the use of conditional discharges for both age groups and both genders 
stands out in Tables 17 to 27. It may have been the case that magistrates’ unhappiness 
with the expansion of cautioning of offenders could have resulted in reduced use of 
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the more lenient disposals available to them, but this does not seem to have happened. 
Even the use of absolute discharge, almost a message to the police that they should 
not have brought the case to court, was maintained. 
 
Attendance centres 
 
Attendance centres were only available for males at this time, and Table 20 shows a 
dramatic increase in their use, from 3,788 in 1971 to 6,182 in 1976, which continued 
to be the case when allowances are made for rising numbers of convictions (Table 21) 
and increased cautioning  (Table 22). This may have reflected the strong campaign 
against the government’s intention to abolish them, which had attracted a lot of 
attention. 
 
Fine 
 
Despite not fitting into any of the discussions about juvenile justice, the fine 
continued to be the most common disposal for young offenders, making up over 50 
per cent of all court disposals for 14 - 16 year old males and over 40 per cent for 
females. It was less used with the younger age group. 
 
Probation 
 
Following the implementation of the 1969 Act, the number of probation orders passed 
by courts  fell from 51,000 in 1970 to 31,000 in 1971 (Hansard, 1976g).  By 1974 the 
probation service was holding 21,500 supervision orders under the 1933 and 1969 
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CYP Acts (Home Office, 1976a). There was also a significant fall in the number of 
SERs submitted to juvenile courts by probation officers following the implementation 
of the Act (Davies, 1974). 
 
Supervision orders 
 
As a new sentence, which did not really replace a previous option open to the courts, 
the supervision order got off to a good start, with over 18,000 made in the first year 
that they were available (Tables 17, 20, 24 and 26).  However, magistrate 
disenchantment with social workers may be the reason why the proportionate use of 
them fell for all four groups. 
 
Care orders 
  
The care order was the sentence on which most of the debate was focused, and its 
slow adoption is seen in the tables, mainly at the expense of a rise in custodial 
sentencing. In no case was it ever to rise much above 10 per cent of disposals, which 
was disappointing given the role that had been allotted to it in the government’s 
thinking.  
 
Custody 
 
Richard Kay (personal interview) had worked in the borstal system between 1969 and 
1973. He said that he noted at the time the decline in the number of previous offences 
that new arrivals to borstal had: ‘many were coming in with none or one previous. I 
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couldn’t make sense of this inside the borstal system’. 
 
Tables 20 and 23 show the dramatic rise in sentences to DC and borstal of young 
men, with DC numbers rising from 2,475 in 1971 to 5,388 in 1976, and Borstal 
sentences from 1,116 to 1,907, which is also reflected in prison department figures of 
receptions into custody (Table 30), which rose from 3,037 to 6,599 during the same 
period. This increase put so much pressure on the prison system that in August 1975 
the government increased the remission that young offenders could earn for good 
behaviour in junior DCs from one-third to a half, in order to reduce overcrowding 
(Hansard, 1975e). 
 
Care and Custody 
 
Combining the figures for those sentenced to care and those sentenced to custody 
provides an overall number of sentences in which the courts intended that the young 
person was removed from home as a punishment, and show the most important 
feature of sentencing: a doubling of the number of boys and young men sentenced to 
be removed from home between 1964 and 1976, from 6,281 to 12,781 (Table 31), and 
a fourfold increase in that for girls and young women, from 273 to 1,043 (Table 32).  
That this was happening during the debate about leniency of the system, childhood 
impunity and loss of magistrates’ powers is hard to understand. 
 
Departmental Responsibility 
 
Nellis (1991) suggested that the development of IT was part of a Home Office attempt 
  91 
to take over responsibility for youth work from the Department of Education. 
However, one way of looking at the period from 1969 to 1991 is to consider whether 
the transfer of lead responsibility for juveniles to the DHSS from the Home Office by 
the 1969 CYPA had had any impact on the development of policy over the next two 
decades.  
 
Until the 1969 Act, the Home Office had held lead responsibility for most areas of 
juvenile justice, including the approved schools, the probation service (who provided 
support to young offenders and reports to courts), the attendance centres, DCs and 
borstals. The local authority Children’s Departments had some involvement with non-
offenders placed in approved schools, but the Children’s Department of the Home 
Office was clearly the lead agency. David Faulkner told me that the Children’s 
Inspectorate of the Home Office was very powerful, but he believed that ‘professional 
leadership was lost after 1969’ (personal interview).  
 
According to Callaghan’s biographer (Morgan, 1997: 299) Harold Wilson ‘had laid 
down that the revamped and expanded SSDs, given to Crossman in 1968, should take 
over the Children’s Department from the Home Office. But Callaghan resisted this’, 
and Callaghan and Crossman ‘had reached a kind of informal political agreement that 
the transfer would not occur’ while Callaghan was at the Home Office. Hall (1976: 
xiii and 83) also notes that there was disagreement between the Home Office and the 
DHSS about the remit of the Seebohm Committee. Callaghan (1987: 235), writing 
more than a decade later, regretted the Home Office’s loss of the Children’s 
Department, and states that he resisted Crossman’s attempt to transfer them to social 
services ‘strongly and successfully’. During the debate on the 1969 Bill in the House 
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of Lords Earl Jellicoe had raised concerns about the transfer (Hansard, 1969b: col. 
1143). When the Conservative Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, completed the 
transfer at the start of 1971 (see Slack, 1972a) Callaghan was sharply critical, and 
says in his memoirs that he made representations to Maudling not to do so (Callaghan, 
1987: 235), and in a lecture in 1983 he (Callaghan, 1983: 9 - 10) lamented that the 
Home Office ‘lost its work for children in need of care … [which] … has to my 
everlasting regret been swallowed up by the [DHSS]’. Interestingly, during the 
passage of the 1969 Act, only Quintin Hogg had suggested that child care should not 
remain with the Home Office (Hansard, 1969h: 1198).  
 
P D James told me that the 
‘idea was that the Home Office was responsible for courts, public control, 
immigration and criminal legislation and was not the suitable government 
department to deal with children … responsibility was transferred from a 
government department that had a lot of experience to one that had virtually 
none’ (personal interview). 
 
 
While P D James had no recollection of any inter-departmental rivalry, Joan Cooper 
(1983: 110) describes the clash between the Home Office and DHSS over their remit 
for juveniles as ‘a fierce one in Whitehall terms’. Interviewed by Nellis (1991: 120 – 
121 and 426), she told him that when the Home Office Children’s Department moved 
to the DHSS and became the Social Work Service, it had to play down children’s 
issues in the wider agenda, something that John Croft also said to me (personal 
interview). Croft (2002) also felt that the Home Office ‘lost a human face’ when it lost 
the Children’s Department. Haxby (1972: 174ff) thought that the Home Office had 
tried to undermine IT in its guidance to the 1969 Act. 
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John Stacpoole was the Under Secretary of the Social Services side of the DHSS from 
1973 to 1979, responsible for the Children’s Division that had moved over from the 
Home Office. He told me that those who had transferred from the Home Office to the 
DHSS with the Division ‘saw it as a terrible misfortune’ and there was some 
resistance to the new management. He felt that ‘many people in the Home Office 
regarded the 1969 Act as an undesirable relaxation of useful ways of dealing 
forcefully with dangerous children’. He felt that Phyllis White (P D James), his main 
liaison with the Home Office, though broad minded, was one of them. He thought that 
her boss, John Chilcot, was naturally more liberal, but he saw little of him. One of 
Stacpoole’s most significant acts was to press for someone like Norman Tutt to join 
his department ‘in order to strengthen the children’s division’ (personal interview: 
see also Stacpoole, unpublished). 
 
John Croft was at the Home Office at the time of the move, but transferred to the 
Home Office Research Unit and avoided the actual transfer to the DHSS. He told me 
that the Inspectorate were sympathetic to the move to the DHSS, while sorry to leave 
the Home Office. He noted that there was no focal point in the DHSS for juvenile 
justice research, and the Home Office no longer commissioned research on the 
treatment of juveniles, as they saw this as the DHSS responsibility, even though they 
were not fulfilling it. However ‘the Home Office never lost control over the criminal 
justice system in respect of anything, including juveniles … responsibility never left 
the Home Office’ (see also Croft, 2005). 
 
During the sitting of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee in 1974 Frank 
Hooley MP noted that: 
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‘what is happening is that you have a penal apparatus in the juvenile field which 
is administered, directed and controlled by the Home Office. A great many of 
the consequences of its decisions … then have to be executed, carried out, or 
borne in one way or another by a totally different department of State and, 
indeed, by a different section of government, namely local government (House 
of Commons, 1975b: Q. 408 pp. 93 -94). 
 
John Chilcot, of the Home Office, told the Committee that ‘I was very sorry when we 
gave up the responsibility for children’ (ibid: Q 409: p. 95), while John Stacpoole said 
that juvenile delinquents were not the main concern of DHSS civil servants, nor were 
several sections of the 1969 CYPA, and the main responsibility of the children’s 
department of the Home Office had been deprived children (cited by Thorpe et al., 
1980: 9). 
 
Summary 
 
By 1976, few of the aims of the 1969 CYPA had been achieved, and in many ways 
the unintended consequences of the legislation, aided by partial and selective 
implementation, had led to the worst of both worlds: a massive increase in punitive 
sentencing of juveniles into residential care and custody alongside a public perception 
that the Act had resulted in undue leniency. The civil servants in the new DHSS 
focused most of their energy on trying to reform the approved schools/CHEs, and the 
abolitionist intent behind the Act had been lost due to the political and public hostility 
to the Act and towards young offenders. It would have been foolhardy for anyone to 
try and promote an abolitionist perspective at this time. 
 
The retention of borstal, DC and the attendance centres, together with an unclear 
sense of what IT was meant to be, resulted in the co-option of IT into a youth work 
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agenda rather than a juvenile justice agenda, with extensive lists of youth projects that 
could be included in IT programmes, and an absence of the intended use of IT as a 
condition of a supervision order (which would have situated it higher up the 
sentencing tariff). Meanwhile the CHEs continued to operate almost unchanged and 
resistant to efforts to reform them, and the new social work profession, despite 
spending a lot of its time working with juvenile offenders, actually gave little 
professional or theoretical attention to this group and focused on the wider 
implications and consequences of the Seebohm report and local government 
reorganisation. 
 
The most positive outcome of the Act during this period was the development of 
cautioning practice by the police, in particular in some areas where they had begun to 
talk to other agencies. 
 
In terms of Kingdon’s model of change, the window of opportunity to promote an 
abolitionist perspective had not been seized, no entrepreneur had tried to seize the 
initiative, and no scandal occurred that focused attention on the need for change. In 
fact, the Act itself was being portrayed as a scandal and there were strong demands to 
return to the pre-1969 situation.  
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Chapter 3 
 Seeds of Change:  1976 to 1981 
 
Between 1976 and 1981 IT and juvenile justice began to change, setting the structure 
for the radical transformation that was to follow the 1982 CJA. This chapter considers 
several elements that contributed to that change. 
 
The 1976 White Paper 
 
In its response to the Expenditure Committee report (Home Office et al., 1976) the 
Labour government argued that ‘the framework provided by the Act … remains a 
fundamentally sound one’ (ibid: 1), and pointed out that approved schools were never 
secure, had poor success rates and high absconding rates. It suggested that magistrates 
should be allowed to make a secret recommendation to local authorities that a child 
should be placed in secure accommodation, and then be allowed to ask for regular 
update reports on the child’s progress. It was opposed to proposals by the Expenditure 
Committee to let courts choose which agency held supervision orders, against short 
DC sentences, and favoured retention of attendance centres. It supported the 
development of ‘professional fostering’ and IT. The Minister of State at the DHSS, 
Roland Moyle, gave wholehearted support to IT (Whitehouse, 1977), seeing it as an 
‘alternative to custody’ (Social Work Today, 1977), though the Home Secretary, 
Merlyn Rees, said that ‘it is impossible’ that an increase in alternatives to custody 
‘could produce such a dramatic reduction in the number of young people whom the 
courts feel must be given a custodial sentence’ as to divert funding from prisons to 
community projects (Cited in New Society, 1978). 
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The White Paper also seemed to give renewed vigour to the critics of the Act in 
Parliament. In a House of Lords debate on juvenile crime (Hansard, 1976b) Baroness 
Young claimed that the Act ‘is regarded as a failure by almost everyone’, and called 
for more alternative sentences, as magistrates ‘only’ had supervision orders and care 
orders at their disposal. Lord Wigoder and Baroness Macleod added criticisms of the 
Act. The House of Lords was to continue to criticise the Labour government on ‘law 
and order’, with eight debates between June 1977 and January 1979, all of which gave 
space to the critics of the CYPA. Ironically, many of these debates were tabled by 
Lord Longford, one of the main creators of the Act (see Hansard, 1977f; 1977g; 
1977h; 1978e; 1978f; 1978g; 1978h; 1979a). Similar comments were also made in the 
Commons (Hansard, 1978a), and in the press by Morgan (1978b), a leading 
campaigner against the Act, and by Singer (1979), a magistrate. 
 
For the first time, there was some public defending of the CYPA in the Lords by 
people like Baroness Faithfull (Hansard, 1977g: col. 679) and The Countess of 
Loudoun (Hansard, 1978h: col. 956). 
 
The government continued to maintain that the 1969 Act was ‘fundamentally sound’ 
(Deakins, 1978) and to defend it, with the Secretary of State for Social Services, 
David Ennals, particularly positive (Social Work Today, 1978a).  Brynmor John, a 
Minister of State at the Home Office, pointed out that recorded juvenile crime had 
started to fall (Hansard, 1977e), and that the situation before 1969 was poor (Hansard, 
1978d).  Alex Lyon, another Home Office minister, told the critics that there were 
now more young people in CHEs than there had been in approved schools (Hansard, 
1978d).  
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In 1976 the government brokered an agreement between local authorities and the 
Magistrates’ Association that any child placed on a care order would be sent away 
from home (Turner, 1976; Social Work Today, 1978c and 1978d). Further Meetings 
between the Magistrates’ Association, local authority organisations and BASW were 
promoted by the government to try to sort things out (Community Care, 1978), which 
began to lead to agreement that the Act was working well for most offenders, though 
the organisations agreed to differ on specific areas (AMA et al., 1978; Hansard, 
1978d; Municipal Review, 1978; The Magistrate, 1978; Tutt, 1979b). John Stacpoole 
told me about a conference of magistrates and Directors of SSDs, held at Moorfields 
Hospital, which David Ennals had chaired and Merlyn Rees also attended, and which 
may have been the one referred to above: 
‘it ended in setting up a working party with representatives of the magistrates 
and local authorities, who asked the Minister to appoint a chairman. I was 
proposed and accepted. We met eight times. The local authorities produced a 
description of their current practice which proved to be satisfactory to the 
magistrates. The magistrates were unwilling to acknowledge this in the working 
party’s report, and no conclusions seem to have been published. However, the 
objective had been achieved. There was an improvement in relations between 
the local authorities and the magistrates, whose lead the police always followed 
(personal interview).  
 
Sir William (Bill) Utting went to the DHSS in 1976, where he told me that he found 
that he was involved in ‘earnest negotiations locally with magistrates over the 
indication we could give them that local authorities would do as the magistrates 
wanted with supervision orders and care orders’ (personal interview). With hindsight 
it was his view of the meetings mentioned above that the DHSS was trying to pacify 
magistrates and ‘also trying to advise local authorities, in their dealings with 
magistrates, to be as accommodating as possible’. He talked about John Stacpoole as 
a vigorous campaigner on behalf of children.  
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In 1977 the government scaled down plans for the provision of more residential 
accommodation for children, though remained committed to increasing secure 
provision (DHSS, 1976c; 1977e; Hansard, 1976a). Section 37 of the Criminal Law 
Act of 1977 (HMSO, 1977a) gave courts the power to impose requirements in a 
supervision order in criminal proceedings, and to impose sanctions for breach of these 
requirements.  
 
Overall, though, it could be argued that the Labour government from 1974 to 1979 
gave little attention to juvenile offending or child welfare. The issues are significantly 
absent from any of the diaries and memoirs of cabinet ministers and their civil 
servants of this period (Brown, G., 1971; Wilson, 1979; Castle, 1980; Stewart, 1980; 
Henderson, 1984; Wilson, 1986; Callaghan, 1987; Healey, 1989; Short, 1989; Benn, 
1989; 1990; Gordon-Walker, 1991; Jenkins, 1991; Owen, 1991; Dell, 2000; 
Donoughue, 2004 and 2008). There is also nothing in the biographies (Morgan, 1992; 
Pimlott, 1992; Ziegler, 1993), or academic discussion of the period (Foot, 1968; 
Holmes, 1985; Donoughue, 1987; Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1990). The Labour 
party seemed to show little interest in its own policy intentions of the 1960s or its own 
creation of the 1969 CYPA, and issued only one, very narrow, policy paper referring 
to this area (Home Office, 1978a).   
 
David Faulkner, who was at the Home Office at this time, told me that he had no 
recollections of juvenile justice being a Home Office interest under the 1974 - 79 
Labour government: ‘some of us would have liked to see the rest of the ‘69 Act 
enacted, but there was no sense of any political interest in this (personal interview}. 
Loraine Gelsthorpe reflected that ‘it was as though they had given in to the 
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Conservative party on juvenile justice’ (personal interview). Norman Tutt (personal 
interview) told me that at the time ‘there was a real feeling between 1976 and 1979 in 
Labour not wanting to be seen as soft on crime. David Owen opposed raising the age 
of criminal responsibility to 12, for example’. However, Labour did derail the 
campaign for abolition of the 1969 CYPA that had developed under the auspices of 
the House of Commons Expenditure Committee report, and it would be interesting to 
speculate on the development of youth justice policy at the time if the Conservatives 
had been the party in power.  
 
In their own review of the 1969 CYPA and the state of juvenile justice in the 1970s 
the Conservatives developed their commitment to a ‘short sharp shock’ DC, modelled 
on military prisons, for ‘a minority of hardened young thugs, who openly laugh and 
thumb their noses at the whole working of the juvenile courts’ (Whitelaw at Hansard, 
1977e: col. 340; Conservative Political Centre, 1977), and continued to call for the 
restoration of punitive powers to magistrates (Hansard, 1977e col. 428; 1978c; 
1980b). 
 
These criticisms were assisted by an influential attack on the CYPA from Patricia 
Morgan (1978a), bringing together many of the criticisms made by magistrates and 
others. Somewhat contradictorily, she saw the Act as heralding a move away from 
custody (ibid: 35ff), then documented the resulting increase in care and custody (ibid: 
95ff) without any comment. She incorrectly claimed that social services had the 
power to decide on who appeared in court (ibid: 44) and made no mention of the role 
of the police. 
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Sentencing: 1976 to 1981 
 
Tables 33 to 42 continue the series shown in Tables 1 to 11 and 17 to 27 showing 
sentencing patterns between 1977 and 1981. The most significant feature is the fall in 
numbers of boys, girls and young men being sentenced in court (from 23,447 boys 
aged 10-14 in 1977 to 17,747 in 1981 and from 97,606 young men aged 14 – 16 to 
88,874 in the same period), despite the idea that there had been an ‘explosion of 
police prosecutions of trivial offences’ (Rohrer, 1982). However, an increase in 
cautioning rates, shown in Tables 43 and 44, mean that, in order to identify actual 
trends in sentencing, the percentage tables 34, 35, 37, 38, 40 and 42 become more 
important, especially for the younger age group. 
 
Cautioning 
 
There was little change in cautioning practice in these years, as is shown by Tables 43 
and 44. Some research indicated that the decision to caution had replaced previous ‘no 
further action’ by the police (Priestley et al., 1977; Parker et al., 1981), something that 
Ditchfield (1976)  had identified during an earlier period, and anxieties had been 
raised that it was having a ‘net-widening’ effect: bringing more young people into 
formal systems of social control for behaviour that had previously been kept out of the 
formal system (see Cohen, 1985; Rutter and Giller, 1983: 72 - 79). If this was the 
case, then known juvenile crime could have been falling even more than the figures 
suggest.  
 
Studies also began to show the trivial nature of many of the offences for which 
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juveniles received cautions, and how cautioning practice varied (Gawn et al., 1977; 
Mawby et al., 1979; Landau, 1981; Fisher and Mawby, 1982; Mott, 1982 and1983a; 
Landau and Nathan, 1983).  Evidence also began to accumulate that first offenders 
given cautions had lower reoffending rates than those prosecuted (Bennett, 1979; 
Taylor, 1980; Mott, 1983a).  
 
Actual data on cautioning practice in a particular area are available from the 
Metropolitan Police, and it is worth considering these in more detail. Tables 45 and 46 
show how consistent were the numbers of juveniles dealt with by the juvenile bureaux 
and how consistent was their decision making, with around 60 per cent prosecuted 
and 33 per cent cautioned each year. 
 
Home Office Circular 49/1978 (Home Office, 1978b) recommended the citing of 
cautions at a subsequent court appearance, in order to ensure uniformity of practice 
across the country (as it had been discovered that some police forces did provide this 
information to the courts and other police forces did not), and Circular 211/1978 
(Home Office 1978c) asked for views about the expansion of cautioning, clearly 
favouring inter-agency involvement. In a debate on this Circular in the House of 
Lords, the Home Office minister, Lord Belstead, gave a strong statement of 
government support for cautioning. This generated additional attention to the Juvenile 
Liaison schemes (Draper, 1979). Responses were presumably positive, as the 1980 
White Paper (Home Office et al., 1980) encouraged inter-agency consultation, and a 
1982 Circular (Home Office 1982a) encouraged health service involvement in the 
inter-agency discussions. 
 
  103 
Absolute and Conditional Discharges 
 
Discharges continued to be used for both genders and age groups appearing in court at 
a consistent level throughout 1977 - 1981: being used for 34 per cent of boys under 14 
(Table 34), 39 - 40 per cent of girls under 14 (Table 40), 18 – 19 per cent of young 
men aged 14 – 16 (Table 37) and 28 – 30 per cent of young women ages 14 – 16 
(Table 42). Unfortunately, there is no available data on the proportion of offences 
which were given a conditional discharge that were ‘breached’ and dealt with again 
should the offender reappear in court, but their consistent use would suggest that 
magistrates maintained confidence in them. 
 
Attendance centres 
 
Despite the intention, in the CYPA, to phase out attendance centres, by the end of the 
1970s they had expanded from 71 to 99 (Tutt, 1982a: 12), and were being used for 
more offenders even though the overall numbers sentenced was falling, with an 
increase from 2,833 boys under 14 in 1977 to 3,081 in 1981 (Table 33) and from 
6,863 young men aged 14 - 16 to 10,607 in the same period (Table 36). Dunlop 
(1980a), noting the campaign by magistrates for their retention, studied a sample of 
589 boys aged 14 to 17 who were sent to the centres in 1977, and found that 60 per 
cent of them completed the order with less than two absences and without reoffending 
(Dunlop, 1980b), while only four per cent were returned to court for non-attendance 
or non co-operation. However 29 per cent re-offended during the period of the order, 
which was likely to have been no more than a three month period (Dunlop, 1980a). Of 
these, a quarter received a DC sentence for their subsequent offence, showing how 
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courts reacted to those who did not respond to a previous order. It is a pity that this 
group was not followed up further. 
 
Fines 
 
The use of fines for young offenders began to fall absolutely and proportionately 
during this period, falling from 51 per cent of disposals of young men in 1977 to 45 
per cent in 1981, but there is no evidence as to why this was happening. 
 
Supervision orders 
 
Tables 33 to 42 indicate that supervision orders seemed to have regained credibility 
with magistrates, with their percentage use actually increasing for young men, from 
11 per cent of disposals in 1977 to 13 per cent in 1981 (table 37).  What little research 
there was on them in the 1970s showed that general social work with young offenders 
sentenced to these orders was not given much priority and was fairly haphazard. 
Webb & Harris (1984), in a study of 971 supervision orders made on 14 to 16 year old 
males in six counties of England and Wales, found that in almost a third of cases 
social workers took over 28 days to make a first contact, and that only 12 per cent 
identified a clear strategy for delivering the order in the SERs which had 
recommended the supervision order. There was also a lack of action for non-
cooperation (Harris and Webb, 1983) with supervision. 
 
A five-year follow up of all supervision orders made on young people in Devon 
between 1977 and 1978 (238 to SSD and 42 to probation) found that 58 per cent did 
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not reoffend during the order and 68 per cent were deemed to be successful 
(Tibbenham & Stephens, 1983), though it was not clear what the prior offence history 
was. 
 
Developments in the Probation service 
 
Having chosen to remain outside the local authority system after the 1969 CYPA was 
implemented, the probation service had to re-think its role with young offenders. 
Several leading commentators on and practitioners in the probation service tried to 
discuss this (Mathiesen, 1976; Haxby 1978; Burbidge, 1979), but there seemed little 
wider interest in working with young offenders in the service. As young people who 
had been the responsibility of probation under fit person orders were discharged from 
the CHEs the service had a decreasing proportion of children and young people on its 
caseloads, as social workers picked up responsibility for the new care orders. 
 
Care orders 
 
From the Tables, it can be seen that the proportion of offenders receiving care orders 
began to fall for both age groups and sexes between 1977 and 1981, from nine per 
cent to seven per cent of boys aged under 14 (Table 34), from three per cent to two 
per cent of young men aged 14 – 16 (Table 37), from nine to eight per cent of girls 
(Table 40) and from seven to five per cent of young women (Table 42).  
 
Around 45 per cent of Giller and Morris’s sample (1981b) received their care orders 
on a first court appearance, and 73 per cent of these had no previous caution or 
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conviction. Almost 50 per cent had been known to social services for less than 12 
months. Bullock et al. (1985a) looked at a sample of 56 young people in care in five 
local authorities in 1980, finding that half of them had only committed minor 
offences, and that they moved placement every seven months on average. These 
findings were little different to those of Cawson (1981), who had looked at the 
placements of all 497 offenders given 7(7) care orders in July 1975, and found two 
thirds were placed in residential care on the day of the order. A third of the care orders 
were made on first offenders and 60 per cent on first or second offence, despite 68 per 
cent not having previously being cautioned and the offences often being trivial. A 
third of her (1981) sample were committed to care without any attempt to find a non-
residential option. 
 
 
Residential child care in the late 1970s 
 
Chapter 2 (see above: pages 73ff) documented the attempts to change the approved 
schools into CHE’s by the DHSS in the early 1970s. Around 1976 attitudes in the 
department began to change. Interpreting this with hindsight, Norman Tutt (personal 
interview) told me that  
’people began to think differently, thinking “there is an alternative here”. 
Instead of trying to change these schools (and to be fair Barbara Kahan was 
one of the leading people who still believed that you could create a decent 
establishment if only you tried hard enough, and she and I parted company on 
this) we can just stop the kids going to these establishments. Then it really all 
moved up a gear with Nic Stacey in Kent in 1976. Spencer Millham had done 
some work on North Downs approved school in Kent, funded by the DHSS. 
Then the Social Work Service had held one of those 3 day conferences to try and 
change the views of staff and everything, and it ended up with clearly very little 
change in attitude and Nic Stacey was getting very frustrated, as there were all 
sorts of problems with absconding and some local residents (including various 
knights of the realm) complaining to him and he decided he was going to close 
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it down. Lo and behold I was sent with John Stacpoole to see Nic Stacey 
allegedly to try and persuade him not to close it, whereas in fact we tried to do 
everything to protect him while closing it’. 
 
Nic Stacey himself told me (personal interview) that he believed, looking back, that 
the closure was directly due to the development of the  Kent special fostering service 
for delinquents (see below: page 123): 
‘North Downs was the worst place there was – it was a springboard to borstal 
or prison. When the head heard that I intended to close the school he said that I 
wouldn’t dare, and if I tried I wouldn’t succeed. It had an independent 
committee of well-meaning middle-class people who saw it as a boarding school 
like the ones they sent their own children to. What they completely failed to 
understand was that kids who go to boarding school are loved and supported, 
with parents making enormous sacrifices for them, and it was in the culture of 
the middle-class. If you put a whole lot of unloved, insecure, poor children with 
low self esteem all together they exacerbate each others’ problems. The 
Committee found this difficult to see’. 
 
‘So I then extended the special fostering service throughout the whole county, 
and closed practically every  community home and many children’s homes, even 
though we had 2,500 children in care. We did the special fostering terribly well, 
with support groups of experienced foster carers, 24 hour social worker 
support, and training and short-term residential family support centres for 
breakdowns. The social workers who were writing court reports on young 
people were instructed by me to always recommend alternative to custody 
sentences and advocate for children to be placed in the special fostering scheme 
and not sent to custody. Soon the court themselves were asking if we had more 
places as they wanted children to go to the special fostering scheme rather than 
into custody’. 
 
 
Stacey claimed that there was no interference in his decision to close the CHEs from 
the Home Office or the DHSS. According to Norman Tutt (personal interview) the 
closure of North Downs  
‘was a real watershed, because once somebody closed an approved school that 
changed the views in the department very quickly. I sat in hours of meetings 
with legal advisers wrangling as to how we could stop local authorities closing 
CHEs, which was the official line, but then there was also a fairly subversive 
group in there saying that we should not push that line too hard, and if 
authorities were prepared to close them then let them do it’. 
 
Tutt went on to say that David Thorpe convinced Barbara Kahan that there were 
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alternatives to CHEs, and she agreed to fund some alternative to custody events,  
which the voluntary sector were claiming that they could provide, if the department 
put some funding into it. 
 
Giller and Morris (1981b) considered the placement of 79 young offenders on 7(7) 
care orders in inner London in 1978 and 1979, and found that 68 per cent spent some 
time in an Observation and Assessment [hereafter O&A] centre. Within six months 20 
were in CHEs, 18 in other residential settings, 15 in O&As, four in custody, and 15 at 
home, four of whom were there awaiting placement. Only 11 had been placed at home 
as a placement. They suggested that care orders seemed to be being used as first 
resorts, over half of which were requested by the parents, and as a means of 
identifying problems, not resolving them. They found little relationship between all 
the factors and characteristics of the young people, other than that a serious criminal 
record led to a CHE placement. Re-offending occurred in the sample placed in 
residential care, but not by those left at home. Around six per cent had over five 
placements in the first six months. In their analysis they used the concept of ‘what 
kind of case is this?’ as a means of describing social work practice, which they found 
to be ill at ease with theory and uninformed by practice evidence, each social worker 
seeing their own practice as atypical when in fact it was routine, and not seeing that 
their own role was meant to be to work with the offender and the family to try and 
prevent the child being removed from home.. If it was seen as a ‘care’ case, then a 
psychological interpretation was used; if as a ‘delinquent’ case then a sociological 
explanation. Any client that did not accept the social work interpretation was then 
seen as undeserving. Working with delinquents was seen by most social workers as 
mundane, routine and unrewarding. 
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Zander (1975) considered 224 young offenders committed to care, and found that 102 
went straight to an institution, 62 went home due to a lack of an available placement 
and 39 went home as a positive placement. Clearly the evidence did not support the 
popular belief that most children sentenced to care were returned home, and that 
social workers were undermining the courts’ decisions. 
 
 These studies and others also highlighted the continuous movement of children and 
young people in care. Almost 10 per cent of Cawson’s (1981) group had had over five 
placements within the first nine months; only 11 per cent of a group of children in 
long term care studied by Yule and Raines (1972) had had only one placement, and a 
10 per cent sample of children in care of Birmingham SSD in March 1979 found that 
28 per cent had had over seven placements, 16 per cent over 10 placements, and seven 
per cent over 12 placements (Sutton 1981). According to the Children’s Legal Centre 
[hereafter CLC] (1983) 17 young people in care had been transferred to borstal in 
1979 - 80, despite never having been convicted of an offence.  
Loraine Gelsthorpe, reflecting back, felt that those working in residential care: 
‘did not understand that they removed children from a context that they had to 
go back to, and that residential care could create as many problems’ (personal 
interview). 
 
Observation and Assessment Centres 
 
Before the 1969 Act, each region of the country had a ‘classifying school’ which 
allocated those on approved school orders to the ‘appropriate’ school. These had been 
set up in the early 1940s, and were ‘permitted’ by the 1948 Children Act (Reinach et 
al., 1976). The 1969 CYPA saw them as essential, and required each local authority to 
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set up its own observation and assessment facility. Many adapted existing remand 
homes or reception centres for this purpose. Ironically, this in itself reduced the 
influence of the regional classifying schools, which had become specialist O&A 
centres.  
 
The old classifying schools had exerted a significant influence on the approved school 
system, and had developed a large range of sophisticated assessment instruments to 
try and identify the child or young person’s needs.  Unfortunately, this was 
‘complemented by a rather cavalier approach to the actual process of allocation’, and 
placements of children were usually determined by age and the availability of 
vacancies in the approved school system (Millham et al., 1975a: 52).  
 
Young offenders sentenced to a 7(7) care order (for an offence), for which magistrates 
assumed that they would then be removed from home and placed in a CHE, therefore 
usually found themselves initially placed in the new local authority O&A centre. 
However, as Rushforth (1978: xi) commented, assessment of a child’s ‘“response to 
training” is a problematic concept since there is no generally accepted definition 
either of training or of response to it’. 
 
Concerns were raised about the practice of these new local authority O&A centres. 
Fells (1971) saw them as using ‘quasi-medical’ terms to try and appear more 
professional than they really were, and questioned the value of assessment outside the 
normal home situation. Sutton (1981) claimed that the O&As ‘reified’ behaviour: that 
they made assumptions that the problems of behaviour that brought a child to the 
notice of social services were ‘things’ that the child carried around with themselves, 
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which were ‘context-free’ and ‘permanent’ rather than part of the process of the 
interaction between the child, the environment and the intervening agency. The young 
person’s behaviour in the unnatural setting of a local authority O&A centre was 
somehow being seen as a useful guide as to how they would behave in the 
community, or in another different residential setting.   
 
There was no standard guidance on assessment, procedure, methods, theoretical base 
or practice. The actual experience of being assessed depended upon the type of centre, 
the theoretical framework they used, and often the ideological beliefs of the centre 
manager (Hoghughi, 1978a). At one centre children were actually encouraged to run 
away, so indicating ‘the exercise of choice and responsibility … this in itself being a 
relevant observation … [which] also allows the acting out of rejecting or aggressive 
behaviour’ (Porteous and McLoughlin, 1974).  
 
A study in Surrey (Surrey SSD, 1979) found that only 13 per cent of admissions to the 
O&A centre were actually for assessment, and that most were unplanned emergency 
admissions. In Cheshire, 29 per cent of 87 children in the O&A went to a placement 
of a different type to that recommended (McGrath, 1979), and within 12 months of 
discharge only half of the children were living in the placement to which they had 
been placed. Similar findings were found in Hampshire (Reinach et al., 1976). 
Millham (1991) claimed that it was possible to forecast the outcome of the O&A 
assessment at the moment of entry.  
 
A study of the files of 76 boys in residence at Risley Hall CHE by Millham (1975), 
and research at North Downs CHE in Kent (Millham et al., 1975b), found that the 
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assessments of the O&A Centres were less systematic than those carried out by the 
classifying schools, and were often contradictory, that the offences that led to the care 
order were unexplored, and that the assessments were culturally biased. ‘Conclusions 
on suitable treatment seem to have virtually disappeared’, said Millham et al. (1975b: 
16). They noted a ‘new puritanism’ about boys sexual behaviour in the reports, and  
‘If pupils are not aggressive, they are withdrawn; if they seek out staff, they are 
attention-seeking; if they are friendly, they become ingratiating …. Whatever 
his behaviour, it tends to be interpreted in a pejorative way’. 
 
Giller and Morris (1981b) found that social workers expected residential assessment 
to lead to a residential placement, and felt undermined by the O&A centre when they 
did not confirm the social worker’s original expectation.  Evidence began to 
accumulate that the young person who responded positively to the residential living 
experience in the O&A was likely to be recommended for long-term residential 
placement, while the young person who disrupted the assessment process had a 
greater chance of returning home to live (Porteous and McLoughlin, 1974; Reinach et 
al., 1976). A suspicion began to develop that some young people understood this and 
acted accordingly. 
 
In the mid-1970s, there were almost 200 O&A centres, with around 5000 places 
available (Hansard, 1977a: see also Table 47 in the appendix). Some educational 
psychologists working in the O&A Centres also raised concerns, such as Brown & 
Sawyer (1978) and Moss & Sutton (1981), questioning the relevance and validity of 
psychological test scores in the residential setting. 
 
Community Homes with Education in the late 1970s 
 
  113 
The declining success rate of the approved schools has already been discussed in 
chapter 2 (see above: pages 49 ff) though it must be acknowledged that some of this 
may have been due to improved recording and follow-up systems.  By the time of 
their conversion to CHEs in 1972, reconviction rates of the approved schools had 
reached 66 per cent over a two year follow-up period (Paley and Thorpe, 1974; 
Cavadino, 1980; NAJC, 1981). The evidence suggests that the CHEs were actually 
receiving a less problematic intake in the later 1970s, as the more difficult 15 year old 
boys were being sentenced to borstal, while increasing selectivity by CHEs meant 
more rejections of referrals of problematic young offenders (Millham et al., 1978: 45). 
Yet despite working with a younger and less delinquent clientele in the 1970s, with 
more power to choose their inmates, and greater power to place the difficult child and 
absconder into the expanding secure accommodation provision, these success rates 
did not seem to improve. However, given the greater mix of reasons for being in 
CHEs than in approved schools it was not possible to obtain comparative data 
specifically on those placed in CHEs on care orders for offending.  
 
Thorpe et al.’s (1979b) study of the Rochdale juvenile justice system showed a 
reconviction rate of 66 per cent for first offenders placed in CHEs, and found that 
offending increased in number and seriousness after the making of a care order. Those 
who did offend after a CHE placement were also more likely to receive a custodial 
sentence than similar youngsters living at home, almost as if they were being 
punished for not accepting the CHE placement. Young people who completed their 
CHE placement without difficulty then seemed to go through a ‘readjustment phase’ 
after discharge, which their peers living at home had already gone through, so that 
their offending ‘peaked’ at a later age than their peers. Their older age when re-
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offending could then lead to less sympathy and elicit more punitive consequences 
from the court (Thorpe et al., 1980).  
 
This increase in offending by boys placed in CHEs was partly due to absconding. In 
order to get back to the parents, from whom the child had been removed against his 
wishes, offences of theft, taking of motor vehicles, or railway offences would be 
undertaken  to cover the distance between the CHE, usually in a rural area, and home, 
usually in a town or city. The survival of an absconding episode also depended upon 
not being caught, which in itself prevented the child from living at home, and led to 
‘survival’ offences while living on the street, often with others in a similar situation. 
Absconding rates were reported as up to 50 per cent at St Vincent’s CHE on 
Merseyside (Lally in DHSS, 1976a). 
 
For the first time, research began to demonstrate that the proportion of young 
offenders who actually completed the planned length of placement in a CHE was very 
low, with huge variations between different CHEs in their ability to deliver the 
programme they had planned on admission (Tutt, 1976b and 1976d; North West 
CRPC, 1980; Giller, 1981). Tutt (1976a) pointed out that, in one CRPC area, only 58 
per cent of committals actually completed their placement, showing that for the 1974 
intake eight per cent went to DC, four per cent to borstal, 18 per cent absconded 
permanently (though there is no information about what happened to them 
subsequently), three per cent were excluded and four per cent transferred. In London, 
45 per cent of senior boys in CHE failed to complete their planned stay (Rea Price, 
1976), and 57 per cent of the boys in CHE of all ages (LBCRPC, 1977).  
One of the main claims of the CHEs was that they provided a high quality of 
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education, but this was seriously questioned in a report by school inspectors 
(Department of Education and Science, 1980), who found an inadequate curriculum, 
poorly resourced, ‘haphazard … fragmented, irrelevant, non-progressive and 
undemanding’ educational programmes, making little use of their local environment, 
with a lack of science teaching and maths equipment, few social education 
programmes and lack of attention to careers advice. Surprisingly, there was little 
integration between school and residential life and little evidence of a proper 
diagnosis of learning disabilities.  
Concerns about physical brutality in CHEs, just as in the former approved schools, 
also began to surface again, with the DHSS having to issue a paper about the misuse 
of corporal punishment (DHSS, 1978a). 
By 1976, there were 5,595 CHE places available (Hansard, 1977c), and this rose to 
7,066 in 1980 (DHSS, 1981a). The DHSS estimated that there were 6,700 young 
people in CHEs who were on criminal care orders on the 31st March, 1979 (Hansard, 
1981a). DHSS figures for numbers in residence on the 31st March of each year are 
given in Table 47, but this includes those sentenced for non-criminal reasons and 
those in voluntary care. 
Secure accommodation 
 
A continuing campaign within the CHEs for more secure places for an allegedly more 
difficult clientele found a ready audience with magistrates and the Government (see 
Hoghughi, 1978b), as has been referred to earlier (see above: pages 45, 64, 65, 86 and 
99), despite there being almost no evidence to back up the claim (Millham et al., 
1978). The Howard League (1977) challenged this campaign, pointing out that there 
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seemed to be too many functions being assigned to the secure units, and calling for a 
maximum of 300 to 400 places across the country. One of the first publications of the 
new DHSS had been on secure accommodation (DHSS, 1971a), and a significant 
proportion of new money for juvenile justice went into these expensive facilities. For 
example, in response to a call for more secure places by Robert McCrindle MP, Home 
Office minister Alex Lyon announced that there were plans for 1,738 more secure 
places in local authority expenditure plans, and also announced a further £2 million in 
government grants for another 480 places (Hansard, 1975a), but MPs still continued 
to demand increases (see Hansard, 1976c; 1976d; 1976e). By 1977 there were 200 
secure beds in the CHE system (Hansard, 1977b), so that ‘each year more children 
endure a period under lock and key than at any time since … 1908’ (Millham et al., 
1978: 1). CHEs were also allowed to develop ‘closed rooms’ or ‘small units’ that 
were locked, and by the end of the decade there were over 500 approved secure 
places, justified by a rhetoric of treatment (Barlow, 1978; Millham et al., 1978; 
Cawson and Martell, 1979; McCreadie, 1981; CLC, 1982).  
 
Yet there seemed to be little difference between those in secure units and those in 
CHEs (Bullock, 1979), with many of those referred to secure units settling in open 
placements while waiting for the decision from the secure unit. Bullock (1979) 
described the secure units as ‘a riot shield for ineffective open institutions’. There 
were a ‘small group of children “going in circles” around the child care system’ 
(Cawson & Martell, 1979: 178), and those refused admission were also found to do 
better than those accepted! (Cawson & Martell, 1979: 212). 
 
Youth Treatment Centres [hereafter YTC] for the serious young offender and those 
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the CHEs rejected, were first proposed in a report of the Working Party on Severely 
Disturbed Children and Young People in Approved Schools in 1968 (CLC, 1982), and 
the first two were opened at St Charles, Essex, in 1971 and at Glenthorne, 
Birmingham in 1976, but were soon to have their own problems. In 1977 concern was 
raised in parliament about St Charles YTC, where a member of staff had had sex with 
a child, and staff were placing bets for the residents and taking them out to pubs 
(Hansard, 1977d). A DHSS Report on St. Charles acknowledged a good quality of 
care but said that it had a lack of coherent treatment principles (Payne et al., 1979; 
Manning, 1979). 
 
Research into the secure units suggested that the expansion of capacity created its 
own demand. Cawson and Martell (1979) found that the young people in them were 
becoming younger and less delinquent. Millham et al. (1975a) suggested certain 
approved schools and CHEs ‘created’ problem children, generating violence and 
absconding and provoking referrals to the more secure establishments. Their later 
research (Millham et al, 1978) confirmed this, and suggested that there was little 
difference between the population of the secure units in the mid-1970s and that of the 
approved schools in the 1960s. Only 15 per cent of those in secure units had been 
convicted of grave crimes, but 70 per cent had had a series of residential placements 
from which they repeatedly absconded. There seemed little to challenge Millham et 
al.’s (1978: 186) conclusion that ‘demand for security reflects the requirement of 
inadequate open institutions rather than the needs of difficult children’.  
Custody 
The period saw a continued increase in the number of young people being sentenced 
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to DC, from 5.757 in 1977 to 6,221 in 1981, despite a fall in the total number 
sentenced (see Tables 36 and 37), though borstal sentences began to fall. Table 48 
shows prison department figures for admissions (which are substantially lower than 
sentencing figures (Table 36 and 49) which could be due to successful appeals by 
some of those sentenced), though both show the same trends. 
 
In the early 1970s reconviction rates for junior DCs reached 73 per cent (Crow, 1979; 
Graham, 1979). On Merseyside, 66 per cent of all juveniles sent to DC in the two 
police divisions covered in Parker et al.’s study (1981) re-offended within 14 months. 
Despite beliefs that a DC sentence was only awarded to repeat offenders who had 
failed on other sentences, the evidence suggests that this was not the case (Fludger, 
1976 and 1977; Ellis, 1978; Millham et al., 1978; Lewington, 1979; Thomas, 1980; 
Lupton and Roberts, 1982). 
 
Research into borstals also continued to show growing reconviction rates, reaching 81 
per cent of inmates under 17 by 1977 (Crow, 1979; Graham, 1979), despite the 
population in borstals becoming less dangerous, less delinquent and less difficult 
(Spiers, 1977). These reconviction rates, argued Tutt (1980a: 15), hardly supported 
the view that magistrates could identify those who would benefit from custody. 
 
Care and Custody 
 
Tables 49 and 50 bring together figures for those sentenced to care or custody, and 
show that this peaked in 1978, with over 13,000 boys and young men and 999 girls 
and young women receiving such sentences. 
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The development of juvenile justice system monitoring 
 
There had already been some research that started to see a child’s progress through 
the juvenile court in ‘system’ terms. As early as 1975, Cawson (1981) had argued that 
‘putting children into an official system for dealing with delinquents in itself creates a 
greater likelihood that they will remain in that system’, and had expressed surprise at 
the high level of reoffending by those sent to CHEs ‘given the low level of initial 
delinquency’. Giller and Morris’s (1981a) study of care orders in Inner London 
mentioned earlier (see above page 108)  had found that 45 per cent were made on the 
first, usually minor, offence, and 80 per cent went straight to a residential setting. 
Subsequent offending while absconding led to borstal and DC sentences. May (J., 
1980) studied all 1,070 care orders and supervision orders made in Warwickshire 
between 1971 and 1976, finding that they were  made on an average of between three 
and five offences, including offences taken into consideration, and often on the first 
appearance in court, with 21 per cent of the offences having a value of under £10. He 
found no link between the characteristics of young people and their placement, and 
was to recommend the closure of all CHEs, their conversion to IT centres, and the 
development of professional fostering. This research was highly influential, 
Warwickshire becoming the first local authority to stop using CHEs (Cliffe & 
Berridge, 1991). 
 
The late 1970s began to see the application of computer monitoring of juvenile justice 
systems at the local level. For example, Parker et al. (1980; 1981; Parker, 1981) 
provided a devastating analysis of the juvenile justice systems operating in two 
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neighbouring areas in Merseyside, documenting ‘the idiosyncrasies and 
contingencies’ of the selection process (i.e. which juveniles to proceed against, and in 
what way), such that ‘juveniles from the same backgrounds … charged with similar 
offences, are subjected to quite different court regimes, and receive widely different 
sentences’ (ibid: 2) as a result of different process decisions. By observation of court 
sessions, follow up studies of a sample of 100 offenders, group work with some of 
them, and interviews with the offenders and their families, Parker et al. claimed that 
the juvenile justice system was not understood by its key participants, had no 
legitimacy, and was class biased in its outcomes. A large amount of what they saw as 
‘trivia’ was pushed into the court arena, and often then thrown out by the magistrates 
(ibid: 44). In one court, the Liverpool City juvenile court, families and children were 
treated with respect, legal representation was encouraged, and a wide range of 
sentencing options were attempted before resorting to custodial options. In the 
neighbouring court on the outskirts of the city, which they called ‘Countywide’ (but 
was Skelmersdale), there was little respect for offenders or their parents, legal 
representation was denied, and sentencing was highly punitive, operating ‘against 
both the “best interests of the child” and the principles of natural and criminal justice 
simultaneously’ (ibid:  243). Different social work agencies (probation and social 
services) had very different approaches to young offenders, and different attitudes to 
sentencing (as reflected in their SERs), though their input was judged as marginal by 
the researchers (ibid: 244). Their final sentence was to become a major rallying point 
of the youth justice movement: ‘to receive juvenile justice is to receive a personalised 
political message’ (ibid: 251). 
 
Parker et al.’s documentation of the amount of ‘trivia’ dealt with by the juvenile 
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justice system was supported by other research, such as that of Priestley et al. (1977), 
Thorpe et al. (1979a), Arnold (1980), and Mawby and Fisher (1982), and found to be 
similar to the offences committed by those in approved schools (Millham et al., 
1975a), and CHEs (Hoghughi, 1973). Parker et al developed a notion of a sentencing 
‘tariff’ or ladder which offenders climbed up as their offending was repeated, or 
became more serious. Figure 2 shows how this was operationalised. 
 
Bill Utting, from his employment at the DHSS some 20 years earlier than my 
interview, referred to the operation of the juvenile tariff, telling me that ‘our whole 
approach was to keep young people out of the sausage machine, on the basis that 
once they got in they would never get out’ (personal interview). 
 
Research  had  begun to show how social workers, writing their SERs, were actually 
recommending the orders that magistrates were making (e.g. Parker et al., 1981), 
suggesting that the conflict between the magistracy and the social work profession 
may have been more political than practical.  Mott (1977) found that there was a 90 
per cent take up of all SER recommendations and Priestley et al. (1977) a 90 per cent 
take-up of recommendations for supervision orders. Reynolds (1982), in a study of 50 
juveniles placed on supervision in one SSD in 1977, found a 75 per cent take-up of all 
recommendations, and a 95 per cent take up of those for supervision orders or care 
orders. 
 
Parker et al.’s study also looked at welfare cases that were dealt with in the same 
court rooms, showing that two-thirds of those proceeded against as ‘care’ cases also 
received care orders, and went to the same institutions as those receiving the care  
  122 
Figure 2: The Juvenile Criminal Tariff 
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orders for offending. This city (Liverpool) had 2000 children in care in 1979, of 
which 800 were in residential care. 
 
The development of specialist fostering for offenders 
 
In the mid-1970s, national attention began to focus on a special initiative in Kent to 
place young offenders with specialist foster carers trained to deal with delinquents and 
paid a higher fostering allowance than the norm (Knight, 1976; Hazel & Cox, 1976).  
Nic Stacey was the Director of Kent Social Services between 1974 and 1985 and told 
me (personal interview) 
‘Nancy Hazel came to me and put forward the idea of professional fostering for 
teenagers. Up to then it had been pre-puberty children who were fostered, on a 
pittance. It was her idea but as the Director I was able to ensure that the funds 
were there to launch it. I got the Sainsbury Trust to provide £50,000 or so and 
got Kent Social Services Committee to back it. We paid a professional fee to 
people to foster teenagers – two teenagers in placement equalled a reasonable 
wage such as a teacher would earn, but was still around half the price of a 
single CHE placement. Many people said that it wouldn’t work – that the carers 
were just in it for the money, and had no idea how difficult these children would 
be to look after, to which I said that was what most of us did our jobs for. We 
started a pilot scheme with Nancy and two social workers and a dozen foster 
carers. After a couple of years I got Lord Snowden to do a TV documentary, and 
we never had any difficulty recruiting foster carers after that. He showed that 
three-quarters of the delinquents who went to approved schools or CHEs re-
offended within two years, whereas only one quarter of ours did so, and this 
gave us great, positive national publicity’. 
 
Brand (2008) provides a detailed account of Stacey’s role in the above. In the 
definitive account of the special placement scheme (Hazel, 1981), the influence of a 
small group of key people and a crusading spirit are seen as essential to the success of 
the project, which was heavily influenced by developments in Massachusetts (see 
below: pp. 281 - 289) and learning theory, together with the critique of secure 
accommodation by Cawson. Hazel (1978) was to be very clear that this was a ‘deep 
end’ project working with the most serious offenders only. 
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Lessons from Massachusetts  
 
While the Massachusetts initiative will be discussed in more detail later (see below: 
pp. 281 - 289) it is important to note that the closing of the training schools in that 
State, and the development of a wide range of community based initiatives in their 
place, was highly influential on some IT practitioners, and was strongly promoted in 
England and Wales by people like Andrew Rutherford (1974b; 1984b), and Norman 
Tutt (Ohlin & Tutt, 1979) and given attention by  Klare (1973), Cooper (1976), 
Briggs (1975), Madge (1976), Burns, (1976) and Kenney (1978). Andrew Rutherford 
(personal interview) told me that, during and after his time as an Assistant Governor 
in the borstal system, he had spent time in America as a researcher, and gave evidence 
to NACRO’s (1977) inquiry chaired by Peter Jay, which had been very impressed by 
developments in Massachusetts and the work of Jerry Miller, the main person 
involved. Lloyd Ohlin, the leading researcher of the Massachusetts experience, 
addressed the 1979 National IT conference (Thorpe, 1979b), and Rutherford was to 
promote the Massachusetts experience further at the 1982 National Intermediate 
Treatment Federation [hereafter NITFED] conference (Sharron, 1982a). On several 
occasions Rutherford brought Miller over to the UK to address conferences. 
 
A Children’s Rights perspective 
. 
Towards the end of the decade, a ‘children’s rights’ approach to the juvenile justice 
system developed, around a ‘back to justice’ philosophy (see Freeman, 1983), which 
was initially based on concern about the low number of juveniles with legal 
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representation when being sentenced in the juvenile courts.  In 1969 (Morris, 1983), 
before the implementation of the CYPA, only three per cent of children in juvenile 
court had been represented.  
 
A new organisation, Justice for Children was to lead this debate, calling for a 
limitation of compulsory state intervention in the lives of children, equating 
‘involuntary treatment’ with ‘punishment’, and asking for attention to what children 
do not what they are (Morris et al., 1980: see also Geach, 1978; Geach & Szwed, 
1978; Giller and Morris, 1978; Szwed & Geach, 1979; Tutt, 1979a; Morris & Giller, 
1979, 1980 and 1983a; Taylor et al., 1980). The organisation also attacked SERs as 
‘smears’, claiming that they were ‘character assassinations’ of the child and the 
parent, full of value judgements, unsubstantiated assertions and stereotypical 
assumptions unsupported by the evidence, that were not shown to the child, parent or 
the child’s solicitor (Freeman, 1981: 220 – 222). Loraine Gelsthorpe told me that she 
initiated the organisation’s focus on girls and young women (personal interview). 
 
Justice for Children were also critical of O&As (Sutton, 1978), and called for 
determinate (fixed length) supervision and care orders (Lacey, 1980). They advocated 
a much stronger role for legal professionals, and called for the need to ‘penetrate the 
rhetoric of benevolence’ (Morris & Giller, 1983b). Paul Cavadino, reflecting on the 
late 1970s, told me that (personal interview): 
‘there was disenchantment among practitioners with the value, and 
indeterminacy, of the care order .... It was particularly pernicious that there 
was no proportionality between the restrictions on liberty and the indefinite 
care order – when the offence could be a very minor one – this was 
disproportionate punishment. There was a strong feeling that the care order 
didn’t have a place in criminal proceedings. This led to the ‘justice’ lobby’. 
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Bill Utting (personal interview), also looking back, felt that ‘the care order operated, 
at times, in a completely disproportionate manner to the gravity of the offence’. 
 
This interest in ‘justice’ for children would lead to IT being associated, (wrongly, in 
my view) with the punitive ‘justice’ model of corrections in some of the criticisms of 
IT (see below pp. 326 and 368). 
 
Developments in IT, and the Lancaster model 
 
The official attitude to IT in the mid-1970s continued with the same themes as 
previously. A detailed DHSS guide to IT planning (DHSS, 1977b) said nothing about 
offenders, though two papers in a DHSS publication at the same time suggested the 
need to evaluate the ratio of offenders in residential care to those in custody (Thorpe, 
1977b) and that ‘intermediate treatment is to do with reducing delinquency’ (Tutt, 
1977). A Circular in 1977, that took three years to prepare according to Stacpoole 
(unpublished manuscript), was designed to clarify ‘misunderstandings’ (DHSS, 
1977d). He writes  
‘I made the development of IT the main priority of the branch concerned with 
juvenile delinquency. It was not easy. Few colleagues in other divisions and 
branches understood the idea. Our main circular was held up for three years by 
a departmental policy of eliminating ‘unnecessary circulars’. However, David 
Ennals’ first priority when he arrived as Secretary of State was a circular 
promoting IT, and we had it drafted and issued it. He backed IT with a series of 
conferences, and the creation of the IT Fund’ (John Stacpoole, personal 
correspondence). 
 
A Welsh Office publication in 1977 promoted groups and camps as IT (Welsh Office, 
1977); another in 1979 mentioned playschemes, playbus, swimming and cookery 
(Welsh Office, 1979); and a conference report from the previous year (Welsh Office, 
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1978) suggested a two week residential placement at the start of any IT order. Smith 
(J., 1977), a future Director of Social Services, pronounced IT as ‘dead’ in 1977. 
 
A DHSS guide to 28 IT projects in 1977 (DHSS, 1977f) was strongly criticised for  an 
‘enormous confusion of objectives, methods and selection’, with a lack of connection 
with the 1969 CYPA and its assumptions that there was a link between the ‘attitudes’ 
of children and their behaviour (Thorpe, 1982). 
 
A national IT forum was told that the aims of IT were compensation, education, 
destigmatization and animation (Rhodes and Waddicor, 1978). More (1978: 8) said 
that IT ‘talks like social work but looks like youth work’. One strong theme was the 
notion that IT involved groupwork (Waterhouse, 1978), whatever was to be actually 
done in the groups. The Journal of Social Welfare Law (1978) felt that 
‘intermediate treatment is developing in practice as a general facility for 
carrying out group work with problem children, rather than for implementing a 
court order made as a result of delinquent behaviour’. 
 
Harbert (1976) thought that ‘all children’ needed it. Adams (1978) suggested that 
there was an inherent confusion between the notion of individualised approaches to 
treatment, and the notion of non-stigmatising treatment, both of which seemed to 
underlie the thinking in the Act. The former seemed to imply a social work role and 
the latter a youth work role. A similar conclusion was reached by Kellmer-Pringle 
(1977) in an overview of different forms of IT. Reinach & Roberts (1980) found high 
levels of non-attendance at IT groups, no clear ownership, ad hoc selection of children 
and poor liaison with the court or social workers. Davies (B., 1979) was concerned 
that IT did not address poverty, unemployment or racism, and felt that it needed to be 
much clearer about its aims (Davies, 1978). 
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Others, many of them practitioners, were trying to get IT to work in a more focused 
way with actual offenders, and not just those seen as ‘at risk’ (Andrews, 1976; 
Thorpe, 1976b; Simpson, 1979). A Report by the Personal Social Services Council 
(1977) advocated the concept of ‘intensive intermediate treatment’ as a way to reduce 
custodial sentencing. As early as 1974, the NYB had published the first of David 
Thorpe’s contributions to the re-development of IT, offering a ‘continuum of care’ 
with different levels of involvement over 10 stages of increasing levels of delinquency 
(Paley and Thorpe, 1974), a vision way ahead of that of the DHSS (Nellis, 1991). At 
this time Thorpe was a social work practitioner in Nottingham, before he became an 
academic. However this had still involved, according to Thorpe (1983a: 78), the 
professionals ‘drawing up plans for a whole new range of methods of social control, 
without first ensuring that existing methods would be withdrawn’, such that IT was 
‘being swamped’ by the ‘jargon of child-saving’: ‘at risk’, ‘prevention’, ‘disturbance’, 
‘disadvantage’, ‘deprivation’, ‘care’, and ‘treatment’. In 1977 Thorpe was advocating 
analysis of IT using Kelly’s Repertory Grids (Thorpe, 1978b). 
 
Towards the late 1970s some new ideas began to develop in IT. In 1976, Islington had 
decided not to commission a secure unit but to invest in IT instead, only to be 
attacked for ‘abandoning’ young offenders (Morris, P, 1976). One of the first local 
authorities to publicise its plans for a new approach was Norfolk, who were planning 
to develop IT as an alternative to care and custody and close their CHE, with the full 
support of Conservative councillors and the chair of the juvenile bench (Turner, 
1980). Home Office Minister Lord Belstead gave a strong statement of government 
support for IT, citing the government’s investment in the national IT conference in 
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Sheffield (see below: page 141), and announced provision of a grant to NACRO to 
promote IT as an alternative to custody (Hansard, 1979a). 
 
Thorpe (1977a) had already introduced the concepts of ‘decarceration’ and 
‘decriminalisation’, while Tutt (1978b) advocated that IT began to develop clear 
alternatives to DC and borstal, in reaction to the law and order lobby, police, 
magistrates and the judiciary (Pearson, 1978). Thorpe and Tutt were both recruited to 
the faculty of the Centre for Youth, Crime and Community [hereafter CYCC] at 
Lancaster University (Harbridge, 1980) and were to use this base to initiate the most 
significant change in IT practice. Many IT practitioners in local authorities themselves 
began to develop practice and promote their work through the weekly professional 
journals such as Social Work Today and Community Care. 
 
According to Andrew Rutherford (personal interview) Tutt’s move to Lancaster was 
‘crucial: people began to think systematically’. Initially they began to highlight 
national patterns, such as the steep rise in juvenile custody between 1971 and 1977 
(Paley and Green, 1979). Then, by applying computer models to local juvenile justice 
systems (Thorpe, 1981b; Tutt, 1981d), they began to document actual juvenile justice 
practice at the local level. In Rochdale, for example, they found that only 16 per cent 
of 132 care orders made by the juvenile court had not been recommended in the SER 
(Thorpe et al., 1979b).  
 
To study the phenomena in more depth, they devised a ‘care and control’ test, based 
on the assumption that residential care was only required if: 
A) the offence implied a public danger 
  130 
B) the child was a danger to themselves 
C) there was no home that could be worked with 
D) the child or young person had special educational, psychiatric or 
medical needs that could only be met in residence. 
 
This test was ‘failed’ by 89 per cent of those given care orders in Rochdale (Thorpe et 
al., 1979a; 1979b), 90 per cent of those in Wakefield (Thorpe, 1979a; Thorpe et al., 
1979a), and 78 per cent of those in Sefton (Arnold, 1980), when applied by local 
juvenile justice workers to the data. Similar results were found in Northampton 
(Redmond-Pyle and Stevens, 1981), Basildon (Thorpe et al., 1979a; Community Care, 
1980); Newcastle (Community Care, 1981a; Newcastle, 1987), Stockport 
(McLaughlin, 1988) and Buckinghamshire (Sheratt, 1979). 
 
The BASW published an influential report in 1978, accusing the social work 
profession of not exercising its powers responsibly. This report encouraged more 
social work involvement in cautioning, a policy of never recommending care or 
custody, and of helping young people to appeal against care and custodial sentences 
(BASW, 1978). The report had the fingerprints of David Thorpe and colleagues all 
over it, and contained two appendices using their research. 
 
Loraine Gelsthorpe was employed by the CYCC at Lancaster and placed in Hounslow 
SSD to research the local juvenile justice system from 1985 (see Gelsthorpe, 1985b). 
She told me that: 
‘Hounslow had been persuaded by the Centre for Youth Crime and Community 
that residential care was not a good thing. They were very aware of the cost. 
Part of my role was to look at alternatives to help them see what was happening 
and decision making on the ground and to put forward some suggestions with 
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regard to alternatives to custody or care, but also alternatives to prosecution, 
which was why the Metropolitan Police were involved in the study. At that time 
there wasn’t much awareness of the importance of police decision making’ 
(personal interview). 
 
She was also looking at how Hounslow’s IT service worked 
‘It attracted people at risk of being placed in residential care, but also children 
at risk of being sentenced to custody. One of the problems was that those two 
groups got jumbled up (which was also one of the benefits!). Part of my 
research was to help Hounslow look at the difficulties of children who had 
perhaps been put on an IT project because they were at risk of being placed in 
care, subsequently committing an offence and being seen thereafter by 
magistrates as high risk offenders not because of their criminal record but 
because they were involved in an IT group with other children who were 
offenders …. No one had predicted the disadvantages of having one strategy for 
the two groups. 
 
‘Hounslow mixed them – the troubled and the troublesome – and tried to do 
some very imaginative work with which I was very impressed. It was very 
creative (personal interview). 
 
The Lancaster group brought their ideas together in the highly influential book Out of 
Care (Thorpe et al., 1980). In the foreword Tutt argued that ‘the way to keep children 
out of institutions is to have a policy of keeping children out of institutions’ and that 
‘a firm commitment to a policy of decarceration can and does work’. They claimed 
that the current situation was the worst of all possible worlds: ‘people have been 
persistently led to believe that the juvenile criminal justice system has become softer 
and softer, while the reality has been that it had become harder and harder’ (ibid: 8). 
They brought together the results from their several local studies, documenting the 
level of recommendations for care and custody by social workers, the failure of the 
‘care and control test’, the low value and seriousness of many of the offences, the low 
number of previous convictions of those sentenced to care and custody, and the rapid 
escalation of offenders from care to custody. They concluded that residential services 
actually promote delinquent careers (ibid: 94). 
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The CYCC then developed more detailed guides for monitoring local juvenile justice 
systems (Redmond-Pyle, 1982), and offered consultancies to local authorities to help 
them develop services. This was linked to growing awareness of the financial 
consequences for local authorities of the long-term cost of a CHE placement. The 
consultancies proposed a range of ingredients: 
  
1. An Assistant Director of Social Services responsible for juvenile justice. 
2.  Area IT Officers based in every social work office, who ‘managed’ the 
response to delinquency in that area, wrote SERs, developed cautioning, acted 
as court officer, held supervision orders and care orders on offenders, and 
monitored the local juvenile justice system. 
3. Area IT groups. 
4. An IT day centre as an alternative to a residential placement where school 
attendance was the issue. 
5. ‘Gatekeeping’ (see Giller & Tutt, 1985) of SER recommendations for care 
orders or custody made by social workers, at Assistant Director level. This 
required all social workers to submit their reports to a ‘gatekeeping panel’, at 
which they had to justify their recommendations against known research into 
the effectiveness of care orders, custody and individual institutions. 
 
An early example of the application of this model was in Basildon (Thorpe, 1981c), 
where the number of care orders for offending was reduced from 15 in 1978 to two in 
1979. 
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Building on these results, the CYCC went on to argue (Thorpe et al., 1979c) that 
‘systems management’ was necessary, which separated practice issues and process 
issues, and in which inputs to the system were subject to ‘gatekeeping’. Initially 
working with local authorities that did not themselves have CHEs, but bought their 
CHE placements from other providers (so did not have to worry about the staffing and 
redundancy implications of a reduction in CHE placements), the Lancaster team were 
able to help these authorities reduce CHE placements and develop local alternatives 
(Thorpe, 1983b). Sefton, for example, moved from being the local authority with the 
most offenders in CHEs to being one of the lowest just 12 months later (Thorpe, 
1983b). 
 
In Basildon the IT team became the first police referral point and provided the court 
officer for social services, in order to ‘gatekeep’ entry into the system (prior to this, 
the local authority ‘court officer’ was usually an administrative post rather than a 
professional one). Over a half of those appearing in court in Basildon and Rochdale 
for the first time had not received a caution. In Basildon they also found that 32 per 
cent of care orders were made on the first court appearance, 29 per cent on the second 
and 26 per cent on the third, with 48 per cent of these being recommended by the SER 
author. Those sentenced without SERs had a high custody rate. In Rochdale there 
were 19 recommendations for borstal or DC. Two-thirds of those sent to CHE re-
offended, 20 of them then being sent to custody. A half of those in CHE absconded. 
 
Rogowski, (1980) began to promote IT as ‘delinquency management’ to be reserved 
as an alternative to incarceration (Rogowski, 1982), while the DHSS began to help to 
promote the Lancaster model, inviting the academics (Tutt, 1981c) and the 
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practitioners from the model programmes (Ritchie, et al, 1981) to give presentations 
at a series of regional conferences (e.g. DHSS, 1981c), even though senior civil 
servants would make comments about ‘the unfortunate polarisation of residential and 
community provision’ (Hodder, at page 2 of DHSS 1981c). 
 
Others began to describe projects in a way that they could be replicated (Vincent, 
1979) and promoted IT as an alternative to residential care (Vincent, 1980), in which 
agencies collaborate (Vincent, 1980 section 2).  
 
However, there was substantial opposition to the Lancaster model and to the changing 
nature of IT. Beresford (1979) argued for a ‘community development’ approach  for 
IT instead, and Beresford & Beresford (1980), responding to Harbridge’s account of 
the CYCC, accused the Lancaster team of ignoring problems of ‘powerlessness, 
unemployment, inadequate housing, police harassment and unsatisfactory schooling’ 
in their approach, which would make it ‘more possible’ for local authorities to avoid 
change by giving them a ‘smokescreen’. In response David Smith (1980), one of the 
Lancaster team, acknowledged that setting limited objectives and developing focused 
policies would leave large areas of need untouched, but thought that this was better 
than a decision to ‘settle down and wait for the revolution’. Undeterred by Smith’s 
response, Beresford & Beresford were to go on to issue a savage attack on IT for not 
dealing with poverty and deprivation, and on IT day centres (which the Inner London 
Education Authority had provided widely for pupils deemed to be too disruptive in 
ordinary schools) for not providing a full educational curriculum and not influencing 
schools to change. They argued that these centres actually discouraged schools from 
reforming by offering them the opportunity to ‘wash their hands of unwanted 
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obligations’ (Beresford & Croft, 1982). They suggested that the rising trend in care 
and custody was ‘likely to continue’, so IT should be a source of special education, 
also focusing on being ‘a response to urban problems’, combining practice with 
‘critical discussion, action and campaigning’ (Beresford & Croft, 1981), and should 
be addressing ‘the fierce cuts in housing, social security, recreation and other 
services’ (Beresford and Croft, 1983). Probably their most extreme statement on this 
was   
‘we have heard how Wakefield’s SSDs switch to IT has led to a dramatic 
reduction of juveniles in custodial care, but what that actually means in terms of 
the lives and behaviour of young people and others, remains unclear’ (ibid: 20). 
 
This provoked a response from Behan (1983) that workers in Wakefield were more 
concerned with preventing the experience of imprisonment than ‘to compensate for 
the deprivation caused by unemployment, powerlessness and inequality’, a similar 
comment by Rock & Gildersleeve (1983) and a statement from Denne (1983b) that 
‘the kids are very glad that we didn’t wait for the revolution’. 
 
There was also substantial debate about what IT was to become, with the Lancaster 
group at one extreme and the youth work or community development model (e.g. 
Ward, 1977; Leissner et al, 1977), at the other. Thorpe’s early outline of the model 
had been attacked from within the residential child care field, who saw IT as a 
complement to residential care, not an alternative (Hudson, J, 1976), and challenged 
him to prove that children were in CHE’s unnecessarily (Patrick, 1976), which had 
led to his development of the ‘care and control’ test. Those applying the ‘care and 
control’ test in CHE’s argued that most of the boys would fail in the community if 
placed back there, and would then return to CHE (Darbyshire et al; 1980), while girls 
CHE’s were needed ‘to prevent pregnancy and VD’ (Derbyshire et al, 1981). Others 
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promoted a wide range of activities under the IT label (e.g. Leggatt, 1979), suggesting 
it should be a universal, preventive service targeted at high risk areas, and that a focus 
on delinquency would neglect ‘those adolescents who are deprived or distressed but 
who are not delinquent’ (Jones, R., & Kerslake, 1979: 99; Jones, R., 1980). Richards 
(1976) wanted it to focus on children in residential care, developing alternatives for 
them. There were still accounts of IT projects such as one that ‘had its origins in 
social workers observing broken and rusty bicycles strewn across gardens and 
children becoming bored during school holidays’ (Raynor, R., 1979), and a strong 
lobby for outdoor pursuits as a form of IT (e.g. Hills, 1980). Downie and Ames 
(1981) identified 6 models of IT: treatment; containment; occupational; 
compensatory; youth club; and community work, all with their own advocates and 
philosophies. 
 
NITFED was formed in April, 1978 (Social Work Today, 1978b) as a forum for IT 
practitioners, ‘becoming a more important reference group for IT practitioners than 
their employing departments’ by filling a vacuum left by social services management 
(Nellis, 1991: 322). Even within the NITFED, though, there was a developing conflict 
over what IT was, which would eventually lead to a split and the founding of the 
Association for Juvenile Justice [hereafter AJJ]. A flavour of the debate can be gained 
by following correspondence and articles in Community Care in the summer of 1979 
(Addison, 1979; Beresford, 1979; Gildersleeve, 1979; Jones, R., 1979; Murphy, 1979; 
Patrick, 1979; Whitlam, 1979). Some argued that if, as the Lancaster group wanted, 
IT was basically a penal measure, then it should not be the responsibility of social 
workers (Jones, R., & Kerslake, 1979: 99). Yet attempts to encourage youth service 
involvement in IT also met with hostility (LBCRPC, 1981 cited in Community Care, 
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1981b). Steve Bell, the cartoonist, dubbed IT as ‘indeterminate treatment’ (Bell, S., 
1980). 
 
In the late 1970s government financial support for all forms of IT began to show a 
dramatic increase, with grants to voluntary organisations increasing from just £17,000 
in 1976 - 77 to £50,000 in 1978 -79, £230,000 in 1979 – 80 and £404,000 in 1980 - 81 
(Hansard, 1981b). A substantial part of this was awarded to intensive IT schemes such 
as the Junction Project in Lambeth, which were to become pioneers of this new way 
of working with young offenders in the 1980s, and with which future minister 
Virginia Bottomley, then working in a local child guidance clinic, told me that she 
was involved, in her role as a juvenile court chairman (personal interview). Helen 
Edwards, now Director-General of the Criminal Justice Group in the Ministry of 
Justice, was a worker at this project from 1980. She told me that it was 
 ‘meant to be a prototype of the alternative to custody model’ by the DHSS, 
with ‘a clear drive by enlightened civil servants, Archie Pagan and Neville 
Teller. They wanted to know whether you could provide a credible alternative to 
custody and whether it would have an impact on custody’ (personal interview). 
 
In addition, since 1978-79 government grants of over £200,000 a year to the IT Fund, 
a charity created by the DHSS, were also distributed to the voluntary sector.  
According to Norman Tutt (personal interview) the Fund had been set up ‘to fund 
high risk activities and equipment at arms length from the Department, so the 
Department would not get in trouble if it went wrong’. This grant-giving body had 
been set up following a conference at the Civil Service College in Sunningdale. John 
Stacpoole told me that the dinner at the conference was a ‘social disaster … Prince 
Charles was there, looking for funding for his Prince’s Trust but anxious not to allow 
it to be confused with criminal organisations or concerned with criminals’. In 
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addition, local authority expenditure on IT had gone up from just under £1 million to 
over £4 million in the same period. 
 
Paul Cavadino (personal interview) also said that there was an awareness, in the late 
1970s, about the cost to local authorities of residential care and court-ordered care 
orders, and that NACRO floated the idea of local authorities being charged for the 
cost of DC and borstal sentences, so ‘creating a financial disincentive to 
recommendations for custody’. 
 
The 1980 White Paper 
 
The return of a Conservative Government in 1979 generated new expectations of a 
change in legislation and the overturning of the CYPA. Within months of taking 
office the government  issued a White Paper, Young Offenders (Home Office et al., 
1980) which reflected their new theme of punishment (see Tutt, 1981a: 248ff; 
Rutherford, 1981). This proposed to introduce residential care orders (so that courts 
could insist on a residential placement, in the same way that they had been able to 
make approved school orders before the 1969 Act), ‘specified activities’ as conditions 
of supervision, shorter DC sentences under a more punitive regime, a new sentence of 
Youth Custody [hereafter YC] in place of borstal, fines for parents, community 
service for 16 year olds and the giving of IT powers to probation. However, it also 
noted the four-fold increase in juvenile custody as ‘disturbing’, and said that ‘the 
government attaches the greatest importance to the use in appropriate circumstances 
of alternatives to custody’. The paper also had some sympathy for ‘diversion’, and 
supported the concept of ‘caution plus’ voluntary IT: 
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‘All the available evidence suggests that juvenile offenders who can be diverted 
from the criminal justice system at an early stage in their offending are less 
likely to offend than those who become involved in judicial proceeding’ (Home 
Office et al., 1980). 
 
Tougher regimes in DCs: the ‘short sharp shock’ 
 
The tougher regimes at DCs were introduced without waiting for primary legislation, 
being implemented via a Circular (Home Office, 1980a) containing guidance to 
magistrates not to change their sentencing practices. Announcing the Circular in the 
Commons (Hansard, 1980c) Home Secretary William Whitelaw said: 
‘Pilot projects will commence on 21 April at New Hall and Send Detention 
Centres. The regime … will be based on physically demanding work, primarily 
farming, market gardening and the servicing and maintenance of the centres, 
education and physical education, drill sessions, parades and inspections. Staff 
will be expected to be firm but fair, to require high standards of work and 
behaviour from inmates but also to continue to take a close personal interest in 
their well-being’. 
 
 
The state of juvenile justice at the start of the 1980s 
 
The failure of most of the recommendations of the Expenditure Committee to be 
accepted by the government seemed to contribute to an acceptance in some circles, if 
somewhat grudging, that the 1969 CYPA was there to stay and attempts began to try 
to improve its operation.  
The early problems of the CYPA had led to much greater academic attention to 
juvenile justice than ever before in England and Wales, and a series of studies were 
published which began to show how the system actually operated, such of those of 
Parker et al. (see above pages 119ff). The first of these raised serious concerns about 
the reality of the ‘justice’ experienced by children and young people (see Priestley et 
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al., 1977; Fears, 1977). Others began to document a large increase in imprisonment of 
young offenders at a much higher rate than the increase in recorded juvenile crime. 
Morris & Giller (1981a: 87) suggested that ‘secure accommodation is increasingly 
used to bolster a fundamentally flawed programme of social work intervention’, with 
DC sentences up 231 per cent between 1970 and 1978 and borstal recommendations 
up by 112 per cent, while supervision orders fell by nine per cent. 
 
This was confirmed by official research by the DHSS (1981a) showing a fivefold 
increase in DC sentences since 1965 (only a fifth of which could be put down to 
increased offending), a tenfold rise in borstal sentences, and falls in care orders, 
though at any one time there were almost 19,000 children subject to 7(7) care orders 
for offending (Parker et al., 1981). This research also pointed out that half of all care 
orders, 16 per cent of DC sentences and three per cent of borstal sentences were made 
on first offenders. 
 
The Jay report for NACRO (see above: page 124) noted that there were over 12,000 
young offenders in institutions on any single day, and 43 in special hospitals 
(NACRO, 1977: 6). The report cited the borstal reconviction rates of 79 per cent, and 
DC reconviction rates of 70 per cent, and also referred to Lancaster’s research 
showing that sentencing was becoming more severe, and social work activity with 
young offenders being reduced (ibid: 15). DC receptions of juveniles had risen from 
1,923 in 1969 to 4,378 in 1975, and borstal from 747 to 1,583 over the same period 
(ibid: 16). This report also noted, for the first time, the rising proportion of black 
young people in custody, and claimed that some institutions were operating informal 
racial quota systems.  
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The NACRO report went on to consider three options, one of which was 
decarceration (NACRO, 1977: 49). It also recommended restricting courts’ sentencing 
powers (ibid: 43) via proposals which were finally to be inserted into the 1982 CJA. 
 
NACRO also began to develop a new strategy, as Paul Cavadino told me (personal 
interview): 
‘It became clear in the late 1970s that in a lot of cases when young people were 
going into residential care or custody that this was in line with the 
recommendations in their SERs and that social workers and probation officers 
were instrumental in the process that led to custody, so changing the nature of 
practitioner practice was clearly crucial and as important as changing 
government policy and the media discussion. We therefore formed New 
Approaches to Juvenile Crime, with NACRO, BASW, ADSS, ACOP and NAPO 
as members. It was chaired by Lady Faithfull. We saw it as a counter to the 
emerging short sharp shock and secure/residential care order debate – a more 
positive and constructive approach’. 
 
The new government continued its strong commitment to IT by sending a large 
number of Ministers and civil servants to the first national IT conference, attended by 
800 people (Community Care, 1979b; Pryce, 1979; Social Work Today, 1979; DHSS, 
1980a). Chris Sealey described this to me as ‘an extraordinary event … involving 
massive local authority hospitality’ (personal interview). Harding (1979) saw the 
conference as a ‘serious, last ditch attempt by the DHSS’ to urge local authorities to 
focus on young offenders. Patrick Jenkins (Home Office minister) suggested at the 
conference that child care services were an integral part of the law and order agenda, 
and Leon Brittan (also a Home Office minister) outlined government thinking that 
there were two types of offenders, the great majority, for whom community based 
disposals were appropriate, and a ‘relatively small minority’ who needed punishment 
(Social Work Today, 1979; DHSS, 1980a: 35 - 38). Successive Ministers spoke in 
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favour of alternative to custody programmes (Thorpe, 1979b), and the government 
stated in parliament that expenditure on IT should not be reduced (Hansard, 1979b). 
The DHSS Minister, Sir George Young, continued to offer support for  
‘the development of intermediate treatment, special fostering and other 
community-based schemes …. It is not satisfactory that so many juveniles 
should be sent to residential units of one kind or another’ (Hansard, 1980a). 
 
A change of regime at the Magistrate’s Association also seemed to indicate more 
sympathy for IT, with acceptance of IT as an alternative to residential care (Acres, 
1978).  
 
By the end of the 1970s  
‘more young people experience(d) a spell of security than at any time since 
1908 yet the child care population was getting easier to manage, were less 
difficult, with less previous residential experience, fewer offences and younger. 
It was actually proving difficult to find the ‘hard nuts’’ (Millham, 1981). 
 
Tutt summarised the period between 1969 and 1982 neatly: 
‘The formal policy context had thus changed substantially in the past decade. 
The decade started with a formally expressed faith in the ‘treatment model’ 
with arrangements made for professionals to decide on the treatment of 
delinquent children, for treatment programmes to be indeterminate and 
flexible in order to respond to the changing and developing needs of the child, 
and for the child to be protected from the stigma of contact with adult 
offenders. It ended with almost a complete reversal in formal policy with a 
return of decision-making power to the magistracy, determinacy of sentencing, 
diversion away from social work agencies and less differentiation between 
children and adult offenders’ (Tutt, 1982a: 7). 
 
Departmental responsibility  
 
Norman Tutt is one of the few people who has written about departmental rivalry at 
the time (Tutt, 1980a), indicating that there was a battle between the DHSS and the 
Home Office over the contents of the 1980 White Paper (Tutt, 1980b). He noted that 
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the first policy statement on young offenders by the new Conservative government 
was by a Home Office minister, not one from the DHSS (Tutt, 1979c). In interview he 
told me: 
‘The Home Office never let go of children’s services – never released 
delinquency – still had an interest in it all the time. There was an 
Interdepartmental Committee on juvenile offenders that was chaired by the 
Home Office … and the Home Office had a stifling grip on juvenile offending 
throughout the 1970s. The Home Office is being lent on all the time by the 
police and the Magistrates’ Association, and the Home Office were constantly 
leaning on the DHSS in the Interdepartmental Committee. I remember one 
occasion when the DHSS went along with the Home Office to meet the juvenile 
offender committee of the Magistrates’ Association. John Stacpoole said “This 
is just like going to see my old headmaster for the cane. The DHSS turned up 
and got a really good thrashing” and the Home Office fed that a lot’. 
 
‘The DHSS were in a very difficult position: they were said to be the lead 
department but the Department of Education, the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department and the Home Office had bigger stakes in dealing with delinquency. 
Ministers in the DHSS were also happy to allow the other departments to take 
the lead, as delinquency often led to a whipping. David Owen (DHSS Minister) 
was a medic, with little interest in young offenders’. 
 
‘A lot of the Home Office research was produced to embarrass the DHSS – 
there is no doubt about that. I can remember meetings where the DHSS were 
trying to divert Home Office research, telling the Home Office that it wasn’t 
going to do us any good’. 
 
Henri Giller received funding from the DHSS for a study of young offenders in the 
late 1970s (Giller & Morris, 1981b) and told me (personal interview) that there were 
‘frictions’ between the DHSS and the Home Office around residential care and 
custody at this time.  
 
Thorpe et al. (1980: 10) said that ‘the DHSS civil servants devoted their time and 
energy to providing places in institutions; the Home Office civil servants concluded 
by declaring them ineffective’. Chappell (1981) noted that the DHSS funding and 
support to the Junction Project and the IT Fund (see above page 137) ‘seems at odds 
with’ the Home Office agenda. 
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Chris Sealey joined the DHSS as an Inspector in the late 1970s, where he found ‘it 
was always said that the Home Office fought tooth and nail to keep children’s 
services rather than let them pass to the DHSS’ (personal interview).  
 
Yet there was full input from both departments into the 1979 National IT conference, 
though with different emphases (see above: page 141). The 1980 White Paper was a 
Home Office paper and would lead to more interest in juvenile justice in the Home 
Office as this was turned into legislation. 
 
Summary 
 
By 1981 the hostility to the 1969 CYPA had died down and people seemed to be 
learning to live with it. A fall in the numbers of young offenders being sentenced and 
an increase in cautioning rates had taken some of the pressure off the courts, and 
while custodial sentencing was still very high it was past its peak. There had been 
little change in CHEs, despite the best efforts of the DHSS to reform them, and 
instead new ideas were starting to be aired to reduce their use. Various demonstration 
projects were showing alternative ways of working with young offenders in the 
community, and there was greater awareness of what was actually happening to 
young offenders at local and national levels. IT still had a strong component based on 
youth work models and youth work practitioners, but a sometimes acrimonious debate 
had begun about its role, with the CYCC becoming more influential as the results of 
its local studies and with their recommended models of practice being publicised. IT 
practitioners were starting to form their own professional associations and moving 
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away from social work and youth work camps, and were producing a massive 
literature on IT in its various forms. 
 
In terms of Kingdon’s model, the political stream had led to government proposals to 
introduce a range of new punitive sentences, but there was little other policy change 
and no windows of opportunity had opened up. The CYCC could be seen as 
entrepreneurs who were promoting their ideas, but they had not been adopted widely. 
There was anxiety about the way that policy and practice would go under the new 
government, and a new Criminal Justice Act was being developed. The Home Office 
and the DHSS both seemed to want a role in the development of policy. 
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Chapter 4 
The Start of the Decarceration Years: 1982 - 1987 
 
Almost all commentators considered that the election of the Conservative government 
in 1979 would lead to a major increase in custodial sentencing of young offenders. 
Ironically, the result was actually the opposite, and this chapter will attempt to 
document how this came about. Debate about cause and effect will be covered in a 
later chapter.    
 
The Conservative Government had come to power on a manifesto of getting tougher 
on juvenile offenders.  Their election manifesto had promised to revise the 1969 
CYPA to give magistrates the power to order residential and secure care orders on 
juveniles. Windlesham (1993: 152) cites six commitments circulated by the 
Conservative Research Department to candidates a week before the election, which 
included a commitment  to toughen the regime in DCs ‘as a short sharp shock to 
violent young thugs’, and to encourage more use of shorter prison sentences for less 
serious crimes. Their first Queens Speech promised legislation to ‘strengthen the 
powers of the courts in England and Wales in relation to young offenders and 
juveniles’. However, an early paper from the DHSS (1981d: 38) asked local 
authorities to protect their expenditure on IT, and DHSS guidance in 1982 (DHSS, 
1982a) on the new CJA also promoted supervision orders and IT. Home Secretary 
Whitelaw told a House of Commons Committee inquiry into the prison service that 
‘we have concluded that the public interest would not suffer from a diminished use of 
imprisonment’, and that there was scope for a ‘significant reshaping of sentencing 
policy’ using non-custodial penalties (House of Commons, 1981). 
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Whitelaw announced the new, tougher regimes in DCs, in line with the manifesto 
commitment, at the first Conservative party conference after the election. He received 
a standing ovation, and the proposals were welcomed by the Prison Officer’s 
Association [hereafter POA] and the Magistrates’ Association (Community Care, 
1979a) even though ‘one of Whitelaw’s endearing handicaps was that when his heart 
was not in something, it showed’ (Windlesham, 1993: 159). By 1981 he was reported 
as being concerned that many offenders actually enjoyed the experience (Rutherford, 
1981). According to David Faulkner, Whitelaw 
‘admitted that the short sharp shock was all a very big mistake, and that he was 
driven into it by the politics of Margaret Thatcher. There was also a serious 
political drive behind the tougher regimes’ (personal interview).  
 
 The 1982 CJA 
 
The 1980 White Paper (discussed above at pages 140ff) was enacted in legislation as 
the 1982 CJA (HMSO, 1982a), which abolished borstals and replaced them with 
Youth Custody Centres [hereafter YC] and gave magistrates the power to directly 
sentence young people to them, rather than, as before, having to refer the case to the 
Crown Court ‘with a recommendation for borstal training’. The Act also included the 
power to make a residential care order on young people already on care orders for 
offending who re-offended (i.e. removing the discretion of SSDs on placement, which 
Robert Kilroy-Silk called ‘a monumental irrelevance’ (Hansard, 1982a: col. 327). The 
Act reduced the length of DC sentences to a minimum of two weeks; made it possible 
for magistrates to impose restrictive conditions to supervision orders (all previous 
conditions had been enabling ones); and included a new ‘specified activity order’ in 
which magistrates could state the activities that should be involved within a 
supervision order or IT programme. 
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The government also accepted an amendment to the Bill (at a late stage) preventing a 
custodial sentence on an offender aged under 21, which became section 1(4) of the 
Act: 
‘unless it is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is 
appropriate because it appears to the court that he is unable or unwilling to 
respond to non-custodial penalties or because a custodial sentence is necessary 
for the protection of the public or because the offence was so serious that a non-
custodial penalty cannot be justified’ (HMSO, 1982a s.1 (4)), 
 
though it believed that its ‘principles are unexceptional’ and that court of appeal 
guidance was a better means of achieving the objective (Hansard, 1982b and 1982h), 
and: 
‘The Government have throughout sympathised with the intention behind the 
amendments, but we take the view that they place no further effective 
restrictions … because they reflect accurately the existing principles by which 
the court already exercise their sentencing jurisdiction custodially’ (Hansard, 
1982d col. 512). 
 
One of the reasons why it did not see this as a significant concession was a belief that 
all those receiving custody had long previous criminal records (Lord Elton, personal 
communication). The amendment had been developed and promoted by the 
Parliamentary All Party Penal Affairs Group [hereafter PAPPAG] (Cavadino, 1982) 
which was supported by NACRO (Vivien Stern, personal interview). It was hailed by 
Windlesham (1993: 9) as PAPPAG’s ‘greatest achievement’.  
 
Paul Cavadino (personal interview) told me that he had drafted the amendment for 
PAPPAG: 
‘I lifted it straight out of the 1980 White Paper, which said something like 
“government thinks you should only pass a custodial sentence on young people 
if it was for public protection or the offence was so serious” – it was putting 
words to this – the argument was that this is only saying what the government 
believes …. It was intended to put the government in a position where if it was 
resisting it then it would appear to be resisting a statutory formulation of what 
it had said in the White Paper that it believed. But it did resist it – only after it 
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was defeated did it agree not to reverse it’. 
 
Windlesham (1993: 168ff),  gives a detailed account of the parliamentary passage of 
the amendment showing how it was carried in the Lords despite government 
opposition, and how the government did not attempt to overturn it later.  
 
The Labour party said that they were ‘opposed to the imposition of a custodial 
sentence on any offender under 17 years of age’ during the Third Reading of the Bill 
(Hansard, 1982b: col. 411). Yet they still had little interest in this area, and blueprints 
for ‘Labour’s Britain’ totally ignored juvenile justice (Kaufman, 1983). Lord Soley, as 
Clive Soley, was then a MP, and a former probation officer who became chair during 
the 1980s of the Labour Campaign for Criminal Justice, but he was unable to offer me 
any sense of Labour party policy in this area in the 1980s when I interviewed him in 
2007 (personal interview). 
 
Most commentators believed that the 1982 Act would increase custodial sentencing 
(Kettle, 1981; NITFED, 1982; Hansard, 1982a; 1982e; 1982f: cols 14 and 26; 
Farrington, 1984: 86; Muncie, 1984; Hill, 1985). Rutherford (1983) raised fears about 
the likely impact, though was to tell me in interview that the Act had shown that 
people outside government could make a difference. Reflecting back on that time, he 
thought that Thatcher’s own position was pretty loose: ‘she believed in the short 
sharp shock but did not have a carefully thought out view on youth crime’ (personal 
interview).  
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Section 1(4) of the 1982 Act: restrictions on custody 
 
The 1982 CJAs restrictions on custody ‘gave the emerging juvenile justice specialists’ 
the opportunity and grounds for challenging custodial sentences (Haines & Drakeford, 
1998), but initially, Section 1 (4) of the Act seemed to have little impact. The 
Government’s own views of its likely ineffectiveness were echoed by the Justice of 
the Peace magazine (1983b), who cited Lord Elton in support of their argument that: 
‘it may be doubted whether the new statutory restrictions upon the use of custodial 
sentences … adds anything to the mental processes of the courts’, and that they were 
unlikely to ‘have much practical impact’.  David Faulkner said that: 
‘the government did not attach much importance to that clause because we 
thought it was what should have been happening anyway’ (personal interview). 
 
Burney (1985), drawing on research in 12 court areas in the first 6 months of June 
1984, where 293 custodial orders were made on 14 - 20 year olds, found that section 
1(4) was widely flouted by courts when first implemented (Burney 1986). The 
magistrates and clerks that she interviewed almost all claimed that the criteria only 
reflected existing practice, and she found that the decision was made first, and then 
the reason for custody sought afterwards, though in 60 per cent of cases the full 
reason was not given. She concluded (Burney, 1986) that ‘opponents of the whole 
idea of statutory limitations on sentencing discretion may be feeling justified’. The 
other main piece of early research was by Reynolds (1985), which echoed that of 
Burney, and provoked an editorial in the Criminal Law Review (1985) urging the 
Court of Appeal to consider the legislation and issue guidance. 
 
Despite their initial lack of impact, however, the criteria did seem to have an effect as 
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time went on, and as the Court of Appeal began to consider some test cases. In 1985, 
Gibson (1985) suggested that despite the findings of Burney and Reynolds, the higher 
courts were starting to give guidance on s.1(4). Campaigning organisations were 
calling for people to come forward with test cases (Chard, 1985a) and offering 
appeals strategy guidance (Johnson & Green, 1985). The AJJ, for example, had set up 
a working party on appeals, and NACRO offered regular briefings and journal articles 
showing that very few appeals resulted in higher sentences, such as that by Stanley 
(1988) who showed that between 50 and 60 per cent of appeals against juvenile 
custodial sentences between 1980 and 1986 resulted in variations of sentence, of 
which between 55 and 74 per cent were varied to a community sentence. Only 
between two and six per cent of appellants received a more severe sentence. In 
Rochdale, 70 per cent of appeals against custody were successful (AJJUST, 1984a: 4). 
In Kent (where Stanley was based in the early 1980s) 41 out of 234 custodial 
sentences between 1984 and 1987 were appealed, 36 of which resulted in a lower 
sentence (CSV Kent, 1987). Various other authors published articles highlighting case 
law and appeal court rulings in this area, such as Dodds (1986; 1987). David Faulkner 
was to acknowledge to me that the impact of section 194) over time ‘was very 
significant, and it was extended to young adults in the 1988 Act’ (personal interview). 
 
Tougher regimes in DCs: the ‘short sharp shock’ 
 
In the first two and a half years following their implementation, about 7,800 young 
people experienced the ‘new’ short sharp shock regime (Hansard, 1984b). Even in the 
early days of implementation, the tougher regimes did not find favour with many 
prison officers, and the POA became a surprising critic of them (Tutt, 1981b; Justice 
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of the Peace, 1983a; Muncie, 1990), telling the Home Office in a confidential memo 
that they found it ‘impossible to sustain the purely negative approach’; that the regime 
was negative, demoralising and detrimental (Social Work Today, 1982a), and urging a 
‘fundamental reappraisal’ (Hansard, 1982g). The annual conference of the POA heard 
concerns that physically disabled boys and persistent offenders were being sent to 
DC, despite Home Office guidance that they were inappropriate for them (Slack, 
1982).  
 
Stephen Shaw was Director of the Prison Reform Trust [hereafter PRT] from 1981 to 
1999, after being at NACRO and the Home Office Research Unit, and was the Prisons 
and Probation Ombudsman at the time of interview. While acknowledging that PRT 
were not specialists in juvenile justice (I personally drafted several of their juvenile 
justice papers) he told me that the short sharp shock was  
‘a ludicrous experiment … a farce … silly … boys marching up and down to 
Willie Whitelaw’s paramilitary beat. Most kids actually enjoyed it. It stopped 
people sleeping through imprisonment - it was macho and consistent with their 
own values … it just didn’t stop them committing crime. The POA emerged from 
it quite well. They were realistic, and the Prison Service mitigated some of its 
worst excesses’ (personal interview). 
 
He noted that Margaret Thatcher’s autobiography almost ignored crime, with just one 
reference to the Strangeways riots, and that this gave a lot of freedom to Whitelaw 
and his successors. He referred to a ‘symbolic moment’ at the 1981 Conservative party 
conference, at which Edwina Currie had waved some handcuffs around and Whitelaw 
was very badly received:  
‘I remember officials in the Home Office telling me that Whitelaw had come 
back very shaken because he had been barracked, and the wish to use prison 
parsimoniously became more difficult to trumpet’ . 
 
Whitelaw’s successor as Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, had already, when a junior 
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minister, committed himself to the tougher regimes in DCs, convinced that it was 
possible ‘to identify the relatively small minority for whom a deterrent sentence 
makes most sense’ (Brittan (1979) cited by Tutt, 1980a and Tutt, 1982a: 5). 
 
John Croft, who was an Inspector in the Children’s Department of the Home Office 
and later head of the Home Office Research and Planning Unit, told me that the Home 
Office research into the short sharp shock DCs was ‘entirely a set-up’ and ‘a waste of 
time: we knew it wasn’t going to work and Whitelaw had no faith in it’ (personal 
interview). The research found that over 50 per cent of junior trainees were 
reconvicted within 12 months (Thornton et al., 1984). Yet 20 per cent of the inmates 
had no previous convictions, over 50 per cent fewer than three previous convictions, 
around 15 per cent had already had previous custodial experience, and over a half had 
previously been in residential care. The offenders were sentenced for mainly ‘non-
violent acquisitive offences’. Most of the staff considered that the regime was actually 
easier than before, and inmates said that they enjoyed the drill and found the regime 
less stressful. The report showed that many inmates had a history of self-injury, 
psychiatric treatment and emotional problems, and led NACRO to comment that the 
‘findings hardly match up to the stereotype of the hardened young thug’ for whom the 
regimes were meant to be designed (NACRO, 1985a). Yet in 1985 the tougher 
regimes were extended to all DCs, with an instruction that more of the less attractive, 
less rewarding, more menial, unproductive and degrading work should be carried out 
(see Brittan, 1985).  
 
In 1984 a Prison Inspectorate report on Send DC, the first short sharp shock, was very 
critical (Community Care, 1984a), and two years later, in a report on Usk YC & DC 
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(Her Majesty’s Chief Inspectorate of Prisons, 1986) the Inspectorate raised concern 
about ‘practices which might be construed as intimidating’ and stating that: 
‘There is a thin dividing line between acceptable briskness and legitimate 
demands for high standards in performance on the one hand and intimidation or 
humiliation on the other’. 
 
This followed a Prison Inspector witnessing violence by a prison officer, leading to 
the incident being raised in parliament (Hansard, 1985a). 
 
In the end, the tougher DCs would become accepted as ‘the high peak of illogical 
penal policy’ (Adams, 1986) and would be allowed to disappear from the penal 
landscape before the end of the decade. According to Lord Hurd there were ‘political 
difficulties’ in saying that it was a mess, but it was ‘allowed to wither’ (personal 
interview). 
 
Local Authority Circular 83/3 [hereafter LAC 83/3] 
 
In early 1983 the DHSS issued a Local Authority Circular (DHSS, 1983a) LAC 83/3 
that was to transform juvenile justice practice. It made funds available for voluntary 
sector organisations to apply for, in order to develop ‘Intensive IT’ as ‘a direct 
alternative to a custodial sentence’ (Hansard, 1983a). The DHSS already had a history 
of providing grants to voluntary organisations for programmes for juvenile offenders 
as an alternative to custody, having provided £35,000 in 1977 -78, £758,000 in 1981 - 
82 and an estimated £900,000 in 1982 -83 (Hansard, 1982c). These had often been for 
pioneering projects such as The Hammersmith Teenage Project (Covington, 1980), 
and the Junction Project in south east London (see above: page 137 and Chappell, 
1981). Stone (1984) provided a detailed account of the actual operation of the 
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Junction Project, claiming that it reduced DC sentences from 59 to 33 between 1978 
and 1984, YC sentences from 31 to 16 over the same period, and care orders for 
offending from 90 to just four (Farrell, 1985). 
 
Alongside the direct funding of projects via LAC 83/3, the Government also gave a 
substantial grant to NACRO to monitor the effect of the grants, and to provide a 
development service to the projects, which resulted in a much more systematic 
approach than may otherwise have been likely. The ‘Juvenile Offender Team’ set up 
with this funding provided a range of guides to steer practice in the government 
direction (e.g. NACRO, 1985b). Helen Edwards was one of three Juvenile Offender 
Team staff, and according to her the combined role of development and monitoring of 
projects was quite new at that time. She told me that NACRO was invited to comment 
on the design and content of project bids which were submitted to the DHSS for 
funding. One of the principles behind the funding was that each project should be 
supported by a local inter-agency body, and the voluntary organisation receiving the 
funding was often in a ‘good position to bring agencies together’ (Helen Edwards: 
personal interview). Baroness (Vivien) Stern was Director of NACRO at this time. 
She told me in interview that her memory did not go back to that time, but did feel 
that the LAC 83/3 initiative was 
 ‘a good thing: there’s nothing like putting a bunch of activists out in the field 
and telling them to do something and giving them the license to do it and then 
telling them “well done … if a small group of dedicated activists know how to 
do things they can be very effective’. 
 
Much debate has ensued about the reasons why the government offered this funding 
to voluntary organisations rather than to local authorities. Part of the reason was that 
the main thrust of the central government approach to local government was aimed at 
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reducing local government’s power and role, so it would have been contradictory to 
then give local government the lead role in this area. There were also complications 
with the Rate Support Grant (the funding mechanism whereby central government 
funds were passed on to local authorities) which would have made direct grants to 
local authorities complicated (Blagg and Smith, 1989: 104 and see Haines & 
Drakeford, 1988: 243). As Chris Sealey told me, there was ‘antipathy’ towards local 
authorities at this time in Government (personal interview). Bill Utting (personal 
interview) developed this, saying that he doubted LAC 83/3 was designed to be 
innovative:  
‘politically, local authorities were in disfavour with central government 
generally, and with some of the Ministers in the DHSS as well. Social Services 
Departments got through the 1980s relatively unscathed, because the DHSS was 
protecting them, but it couldn’t restore their image in the eyes of ministers. 
Local authorities were regarded as a crowd of incompetents, who, if you gave 
them the money they would waste it. There was also the treasury’s dislike of 
specific grants to SSDs as well’. 
 
For Richard Kay of the Rainer Foundation, who provided several LAC 83/3 projects, 
the reason for funding via the voluntary section was that voluntary organisations  
 
‘would be agents for change, get change in quickly and develop new projects, 
whereas if they gave this money to local authorities it would disappear. It saw 
voluntary organisations as agents for change (personal interview). 
 
 Andrew Rutherford (personal interview) thought that the department had also been 
influenced  
‘by the Massachusetts notion of incentives to special projects … the DHSS saw 
an opportunity, a chance to build a bridge between central and local 
government by incentivising them, via IT: to some of us IT meant taking 
people out of institutions, not complementing and adding to institutions …. IT 
as part of a strategy of decarceration, and this was now being considered at 
the DHSS’. 
 
There seems to be a general consensus that the role of Archie Pagan was crucial. He 
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had been a Colonel in the armed forces, serving in Malaya, prior to joining the DHSS. 
Coming in as ‘a direct entry principal (without a civil service background) … a great 
maverick’ (Norman Tutt: personal interview). He was the lead civil servant behind the 
LAC 83/3 initiative, and Henri Giller (personal interview) stressed to me that Archie 
Pagan had bought into the new consensus about what IT should be. In terms of 
Kingdon’s model of policy change, he can be seen as a policy entrepreneur using a 
window of opportunity and a funding opportunity in the DHSS. 
 
One of the conditions of funding was that the projects were required to set up inter-
agency committees, either as direct management committees of newly created 
voluntary organisations, or as steering committees with an advisory role within an 
existing charity or voluntary organisation. This enabled all the agencies involved with 
young offenders to have a forum at which they met and shared information and 
research. Many projects were able to get justices clerks, for example, on to their 
committees, and in 1986 the Lord Chancellor gave magistrates permission to join 
them (NACRO, 1989b), leading to 75 per cent of projects having magistrates on their 
committees and 90 per cent on the executive committees, often chairing them 
(NACRO, 1989b). Senior police officers also sat on 70 per cent of Committees. 
 
By April 1984, 62 schemes had been approved for funding, most offering either 30 or 
36 places, with a total of 2000 places available between them (Hansard, 1984c). The 
small nature of the staff teams (usually only three or four people) encouraged 
innovation and a lot of the development in practice came from practitioners rather 
than from academics or policy makers. The early monitoring reports from NACRO 
(1986a) suggested that project areas were making lower than the national average 
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number of care orders and less use of custody (8.8 per cent as opposed to 10 per cent 
nationally), that those young people still receiving custody were not very serious or 
persistent offenders, and that they seemed little different to those sentenced to attend 
the projects. It concluded that ‘projects are able to work with some of the more 
persistent young offenders in the community’. The DHSS told a House of Commons 
Committee that ‘early indications suggest a significant reduction in custodial 
sentencing in the areas where projects have been set up’ (House of Commons, 1987: 
67 - 68). Home Office researchers (Graham & Moxon, 1986) also noted the impact of 
the LAC 83/3 schemes, alongside ‘as many again funded from other sources’, 
specifically noting the reduction in custody from 18 to zero in Basingstoke, a fall of a 
third in the first year of the Well Hall Project in Greenwich, and a 95 per cent fall in 
custody in Southend. Alongside the increase in cautioning, which despite filtering 
minor cases from court had not led to an increase in the custody rate, they concluded: 
‘this suggests that the provision and take-up of realistic and effective 
alternatives to custody, combined with diverting substantial numbers of 
juveniles from prosecution, may have a feedback on levels of juvenile 
offending’.  
 
By 1987, the LAC 83/3 projects were reporting a custody rate of 7.7 per cent as 
opposed to a national one of 11.5 per cent. Between 1985 and 1986 custodial 
sentencing in the project areas had fallen from 578 males and eight females to 248 
males and five females (NACRO, 1987a).  In Kent, custody fell from 157 to 62 
between 1983 and 1986 (Community Care, 1987). 
 
In total, over the 6 year life of LAC 83/3, 110 projects received funding, the total cost 
to the government being £13 million (NACRO, 1989b). NACRO (1989e) concluded 
that it was ‘a major contribution to the reduction of custodial sentencing of juveniles’, 
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leading to a ‘marginalisation of the role of custody in the juvenile criminal justice 
system’. They claimed that their monitoring had ‘consistently shown that the projects 
… have been successful in offering community-based programmes which have 
enjoyed the confidence of sentencers and provided credible alternatives to custody’ 
(NACRO, 1989b: 3). 
 
The projects had also seemed to have a significant effect on recidivism. After two 
years, only 15 per cent of the participants in projects had reappeared in court for 
further offences (NAJC, 1993). 
 
In the final report of the Initiative (NACRO, 1991a), and at a conference to promote 
this report (NACRO, 1990a), NACRO were able to get the Minister of State, Virginia 
Bottomley, to claim that ‘it has proved that serious and persistent offenders can be 
managed and supervised without recourse to institutions’. Custody figures in project 
areas had fallen from 6,135 in 1983 to 1,835 in 1989, and care orders for offending 
from 1,796 to 146. 
 
The Woodlands project 
 
Richard Kay said (personal interview) that when he arrived at the Rainer Foundation 
he found 
 ‘no clear sense of purpose’. Then Mrs Baring came to Rainer. She was 
disgusted by SSDs and probation sending young people away on ‘treats for 
hooligans’ while there was nothing stopping young people going into custody’.  
 
The Baring Foundation thus funded the Woodlands project. Richard Kay had met 
Chris Green (one of the Lancaster CYCC team),  who subsequently accepted the post 
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of Director of the Woodlands project, and his evidence chimed with Kay’s experience 
of being a borstal governor, Barings’ concerns and the Personal Social Services 
Councils’ advocacy for alternatives to custody:  
 
‘we were looking round for a model and a programme that would be acceptable 
to magistrates by addressing offending that would also address the other issues 
that young people face’ (Richard Kay: personal interview). 
 
Kay also thought that the Woodlands project in Basingstoke had offered Archie 
Pagan, a very useful model for what became the LAC 83/3 programme (personal 
interview), and Andrew Rutherford also felt that the fact that Woodlands was 
voluntary sector funded by the Baring Foundation, ‘a very powerful family and 
business … conservative … offering respectability’, was very influential on the 
DHSS. 
 
The clerk to the magistrates in Basingstoke, Bryan Gibson, had been very influential 
in setting up this project, and told me a lot of its history (personal interview), as did 
Pauline Owen, who started work at the project in 1981 and became its Director 
(personal interview). Rutherford (1986a: 136 – 147), publicised its work and the role 
of Chris Green, who set out to put the theory he developed at the CYCC into practice. 
Using system management approaches, offence focused individual and group work, 
and incorporating the local magistrates into the project, Woodlands aimed to establish 
a ‘custody-free zone’. Whereas in 1980 eighteen young people under 17 had been 
sentenced to custody, within two years of the project’s establishment in 1982, the 
number was down to two. The project then claimed that it had reduced custodial 
sentences for young people from 20 to nil between 1981 and 1983 (Laurence, 1984).  
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Gibson, Owen and Rutherford all reminded me that the project was independent of 
social services, submitted independent reports to courts on referred offenders, and 
‘had to challenge social worker’s SER’s all the time’, according to Owen. She said 
that 
‘this independence was really important – we couldn’t have written separate 
reports, we couldn’t have had the courts ask for separate reports, without the 
support of the Justices – Margaret Baring was a very senior magistrate at that 
time, had been chair of the juvenile bench - a lot of the magistrates were old-
style Tories and were incredibly helpful: they took Woodlands under their wing 
and supported us. They wanted to do good and were fundamental to our 
success’. 
 
‘Our relationships with local social services teams started off appallingly badly 
– it was just as well that we were all qualified and had reasonably good degrees 
– it was just as well that we were all bright, and had some nous about us, as it 
would have been easy to get flattened. Chris Green was a brilliant manager: 
very visionary, very inspirational. Richard Kay was prepared to stick his neck 
out and push the boundaries. In the early days I can remember meeting the Area 
Director of Social Services … he didn’t want anything to do with us and we had 
to go and talk to his staff and say “we’ll bring you back into court and we’ll 
question you, your report, your evidence and your assessment” if they did not 
co-operate with us’. 
 
A new Area Director was more supportive, as were magistrates, court clerks, the 
Chief Probation Officer (John Harding) and the new Director of Social Services. 
Pauline Owen continued: 
‘you had to be really passionate – to fundamentally believe that kids weren’t 
born delinquent. We ran training sessions for local social workers and local 
probation officers, who were ordered to attend by John Harding. We ‘used’ 
successful kids in these sessions’. 
 
‘we also had good local solicitors, and socialised with them outside work. Some 
of them became volunteers in the project, and some local police officers 
volunteered’. 
 
Woodlands offered a two-stage programme: alternative to borstal and alternative to 
DC, and an internal school for excluded young people. Pauline Owen said 
‘if magistrates were thinking of either of these they asked us for a report. This 
quickly grew into us doing reports if there was even a thought of a risk of DC, 
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borstal or 7(7) care. 
 
Pauline Owen stressed the importance of Andrew Rutherford’s book, Growing Out of 
Crime, and told me that ‘we sent copies to local area offices’.  She described her time 
at Woodlands as  
‘the best five years of my working life. We were all over the place, involved with 
the DHSS, NACRO, the Howard League and the Magistrates’ Association. We 
agreed that we would never, ever turn down an opportunity to sell what we are 
doing. The marketing opportunities while we were going so well were just too 
good to miss. We had passion, energy and commitment’. 
 
IT in the early 1980s 
 
Haines and Drakeford (1981: 48) argued that the key elements of the Lancaster model 
were:  
the triviality of most juvenile crime  
the notion of growing out of crime 
labelling theory 
up-tariffing of offenders 
the view that institutions were schools of crime 
net-widening and 
radical non-intervention. 
 
The model ‘recognised that changes in sentencing trends are the cumulative product, 
over time, of many small changes in individual cases’ and that the ‘operation of the 
criminal justice system comprises a whole series of decisions, and that as individuals 
pass through the system each decision has implications for future courses of action 
and future decisions’ (ibid: 49), so ‘aggressive system management’ is justified. 
  163 
Another feature of IT practice in the 1980s in local authorities and the LAC 83/3 
settings was the use of social skills exercises to help young people address their 
behaviour, initially using material developed from the raising of the school leaving 
age in the 1970s (Priestley et al., 1978; McGuire and Priestley, 1981), then expanded 
to look at social work skills (Priestley and McGuire, 1983), and then specifically at 
offending behaviour (Priestley et al., 1984; Priestley and McGuire, 1985). These were 
part of the wider development of cognitive-behavioural interventions with offenders, 
using social learning theory and social skills training (see Hollin, 1990; Jones, D., 
1987). Manuals for IT groupwork were produced full of exercises (e.g. Ball & Sowa, 
1985; 1989). Lancaster issued a highly theoretical justification and guide to this 
approach (Denman, 1982).  
 
Also heavily influential was the notion that young people ‘grew out of crime’, and 
that some interventions could delay this maturation process, first put forward by the 
Cambridge delinquency development researchers (Osborn and West, 1980) and 
developed by Rutherford (1986a), though its origins lay in Edwin Schur’s notion of 
‘radical non intervention’ (Schur, 1973). This began to undermine the ‘longstanding 
and apparently indestructible faith that young offenders are best cured’ by removal to 
institutions (Cawson, 1984) and led to notions of ‘minimum feasible intervention’ 
(Raynor, 1985), and a revisiting of labelling theory.  
 
However, scepticism about IT generally and about the Lancaster model in particular 
continued into the 1980s. Muncie (1984: 174 -175), for example, equated IT with 
‘widening the net’, which he saw as its ‘main function’. Despite this, though, the 
locus of the debate about IT began to change, away from the political arena and into a 
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battle for the ‘soul’ of IT, with the new focus on offending being challenged by those 
who wanted a much wider youth work perspective (e.g. NYB, 1985) or ‘community 
social work’ (Holman, 1983). 
 
Jones (R., 1984a and 1984b), initiated a debate about what he called  ‘the new 
orthodoxy’, criticising the ‘evangelical zeal’ of those who wanted IT to be focused on 
offenders, rather than a ‘broadening of social work practice to assist deprived young 
people’, from a ‘base within social work and youth work’. He provoked a massive 
response (see Jones, D., (1984) and other letters responding to Ray Jones in the same 
issue of Community Care).  
 
Eventually, the NITFED started to split as a result of these conflicts, with some 
regions disaffiliating (Social Work Today, 1983; Ross, 1983). At the 1983 conference 
Norman Tutt called for an ‘advocacy’ strategy (Edwards, 1983), but the Lancaster 
model was challenged: Kerslake (1983; 1984a), for example, said that social workers 
recommended custody because they lacked the space, time and resources to carry out 
IT, and highlighted the confusion of the role of IT workers in adverts for vacancies 
(Kerslake, 1984b). Kerslake (1987) was to return to his criticisms three years later, 
suggesting that focusing on offenders was ‘exclusivity and evangelism’, depriving 
other adolescents of services, and inflating the problem of juvenile crime – if such 
crime is minor, petty and transient, as was argued, then why focus resources on it? He 
also felt that the creation of specialist juvenile justice teams was removing expertise 
from social work teams. He provoked a response from Bateman (1987), that while 
offending is petty, the consequences for young people can be serious, and that 
intensive IT was a strategy in which ‘content … is secondary to form’: once the 
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young person received the community sentence all sorts of issues could be tackled 
which would not be dealt with if the young person received a custodial sentence, 
whether or not they were included in the SER. 
 
Others adopted a more ‘political’ critique of the Lancaster model. Beaumont, a senior 
NAPO official, advocated a strategy of resistance and counter-argument against the 
moral panic over youth crime, rather than the development of more intensive IT 
(Beaumont, 1985). Some argued that change was impossible. Ely (1985: 134 - 136) 
for example, suggested that ‘overcrowding in Youth Custody is such that there would 
have to be an unrealistically large reduction in numbers there before any substantial 
saving … was achieved’, and that ‘no government can change the content of juvenile 
justice policy’ (my emphasis). 
 
Some projects claimed that they had a strategic ability to change sentencing patterns. 
In Wakefield, applying the Lancaster model (Salzedo, 1981) CHE placements fell 
from 45 to one between 1979 and 1982 (Community Care, 1982). In Rochdale 7 (7) 
care orders reduced from 72 to 11, with DC and borstal sentences also falling. In 
Corby, care and custody disposals fell from 18 per cent of sentences on all young 
people appearing in court in 1980 to eight per cent in 1983 (Thorpe, 1994). In 
Newcastle, care and custodial sentences fell from almost 14 per cent of all sentences 
in 1985 to seven per cent (after appeals) in 1987 (Newcastle, 1987). 
 
In Greenwich, the Rainer Foundation’s Well Hall Project claimed that it had reduced 
custodial sentencing by a third, with 75 per cent of their offers of places to courts as 
alternatives to custody accepted (Jones, D., 1987). The CSV schemes in Kent believed 
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that they had helped to reduce care and custody from 157 in 1984 to 47 in 1987 
(Stanley, 1987). A Children’s Society diversion scheme in Merthyr Tydfil claimed it 
had reduced court appearances by 40 per cent (De’Ath, 1988); custody in Coventry 
reduced by 50 per cent over three years; custody in Knowsley (another Children’s 
Society project) fell from 43 to seven between 1985 and 1987, and in Bedwellty from 
25 to four. One of the first schemes to claim success, that in Halton, Cheshire 
(Longley, 1985), reduced custody from 46 in 1983 to 20 in 1984. These were 
particularly significant as these patterns were not happening in areas of the country 
without local authority or LAC 83/3 intensive IT projects, such as Middlesbrough and 
Greater Manchester, where custodial sentencing remained high. 
 
Drawing from these experiments, Denne (1983a: see also Vincent, 1979) offered a 
clear statement of the philosophy underpinning the new IT practice: 
 prevention is ineffective 
 offending is transitory 
 whatever the sentence, the proportion reoffending is the same 
 offending continues in residential care, and may even escalate 
 residential care reduces long term life-chances 
 over-reaction to offending can lead to a criminal career 
 the juvenile justice system is interdependent 
 IT must be clearly planned 
 Most of the key juvenile justice decisions can be influenced by social workers 
 There are four key decision points: 
   juvenile liaison bureau 
   SER 
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   departmental case conferences 
   senior management policy. 
 
From another perspective, Rutherford, drawing heavily on the Woodlands project in 
Basingstoke (1986a: 14 – 15), suggested a new ‘developmental approach’ to youth 
crime, with four basic propositions: 
1. ‘the principal sources of support and control for young people are in the 
home and the school.  
 
2. When formal intervention is invoked this should … be focused primarily 
on enhancing the strengths of home and school.  
 
3. Only in the most exceptional cases should formal intervention separate a 
young person from developmental institutions, and any period of 
separation should be kept to the minimum … 
 
4. Formal interventions, especially when using incarceration, are disruptive 
…. First, the normal growth and development of the young person is 
threatened. Second, the capacity for developmental institutions to be 
effective is weakened’. 
 
 
He argued that ‘the welfare approach inevitably leads back into incarcerative 
institutions’ (ibid: 17), and promoted his underlying message that children ‘grow out 
of crime’ if interventions support the developmental approach and do not undermine 
it. Rutherford also developed the concept of ‘spontaneous remission’ to account for 
young people’s desistance from crime.  He set out ‘fundamental steps’ for the policy:  
 
1. a reversal of financial incentives that favour incarceration 
2. a cut back on the use of incarcerative institutions before setting up new 
community programmes 
3. awareness of the interconnectedness of decisions in the criminal justice 
process 
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4.  close attention to the linkage between criminal justice arrangements and 
developmental institutions 
5.  recognition of the vested interests that will resist decarceration (Rutherford, 
1986a: 166 – 170). 
 
Three years later (Rutherford, 1989) he was to stress how important developments at 
the local level were, with changes happening in the individual court or petty sessional 
division, promoted by basic grade workers, who focused on ‘process rather than 
programme’, using inter-agency collaboration to promote the anti-custody ethos, 
backed up by the campaigning of bodies like the AJJ, NACRO and the Howard 
League. He felt that it was important that these strategies had the support of the 
Magistrates’ Association, who had developed more confidence in intensive IT and 
been influenced by the failure of the short sharp shock DCs (see above pages 151ff). 
 
The Lancaster researchers moved on from their initial critique of juvenile justice 
systems to argue that there was a link between the use of care and the use of custody, 
with entry to one system becoming a push factor into the other. As the CHEs took 
younger and less delinquent young people, the next stage of the tariff for these young 
people would be custody (Thorpe, 1984). Barry Brown, an educational psychologist 
in a CHE in London, even developed with colleagues  a ‘systems input index’, which 
seemed to show that young offenders’ progress through the juvenile justice system 
could be measured solely by the negative impact of the inputs of services and 
placements received (personal information from Barry Brown). 
 
Other research from the influential Personal Social Services Research Unit suggested 
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that IT could produce savings for the public sector as a whole (Robertson et al., 1986), 
by reducing the wider costs of custody and care at national and local levels. This 
could have influenced the rise in local authority expenditure on IT from £6 million in 
1980 - 81 to £17.5 million in 1985 - 86, added to which was the £3.5 million DHSS 
expenditure under LAC 83/3 in 1985 - 86. The DHSS grant to the IT Fund had risen 
over the same period from £256,000 to £500,000, and their other grants to voluntary 
organisations had remained around £400,000 (Hansard, 1986b; 1987g). 
 
Home Office Minister David Mellor pointed out that ‘a delinquent phase in 
adolescence is not always followed by a career of crime thereafter’, that courts were 
using custody earlier and more frequently, and gave the first ministerial praise to the 
development of intensive IT: 
 ‘I am pleased to say that local authorities are increasingly developing intensive 
and structured programmes of intermediate treatment designed specifically as 
alternatives to youth custody or detention centre’,  
 
which were ‘not a soft option’ (Hansard, 1983b).  
 
Rob Allen (personal interview) was the Director of the Redlees IT centre in 
Hounslow in the mid-1980s, and said that  
‘there were a number of aims. I don’t think it was just about keeping kids out of 
custody – the care strand was also important. We did end up working with some 
kids who had no criminal offences at all but were at risk of going into care for 
other reasons’. 
 
The Association for Juvenile Justice 
 
The launch of the AJJ in early 1984 was to generate a climate of support for its three 
opening words: ‘Divert! Decriminalise! Decarcerate!’ (AJJUST, 1984a) over the next 
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few years. It created an important focus for practitioners working in small and often 
isolated teams. In its first newsletter it set out its aims to ‘dramatically reduce the need 
to lock up young people whilst offering better protection for society’ (AJJUST, 
1984a) and raised concerns about the quality of SERs and school reports, the role of 
solicitors and the government delay in  publishing the research into the tougher DCs. 
The decision of the Home Secretary to ignore the research was raised in the second 
issue (AJJUST, 1984c). Its inaugural event had Andrew Rutherford, Paul Cavadino, 
David Smith and Geoff Pearson as speakers, with Rutherford suggesting a ‘ball and 
chain award to the county with the highest use of secure accommodation’ (AJJUST, 
1984d). Its total opposition to custody was to be its most positive feature, issuing 
press releases against the short sharp shock and developing a petition to the Home 
Secretary (AJJUST, 1984d; 1984e). 
 
Key members of the AJJ would be influential in the development of wider youth 
justice practice. Ross (1984) was one of the first to question the dominance of 
groupwork in IT practice, for example, while Denne was to be in a position to 
commission important studies on ‘transcarceration’ (see below: page 159). However, 
in its early years the AJJ provided a forum for strong opposition to the LAC 83/3 
projects from those working in the local authorities that had already invested their 
own funds into such schemes, a feature of AJJ history which has subsequently been 
ignored. 
 
Youth Justice Strategies, 1982 - 1987 
 
As early as 1982, Tutt (1982b) was arguing that policy changes at the local level 
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could have an effect on national policy, and this period is characterised by the 
development of practice and policy in each local authority area, independent of 
central government thinking. For example, local authority representation in the 
juvenile court was often transferred from an administrative officer to a juvenile justice 
practitioner, with a change of role from being an administrative servant of the court to 
a role that positively tried to influence court sentencing practise and acted as an 
advocate for young people.  Worrall & Souhami (2001: 120) acknowledge the ‘heroic 
enterprise’ in which juvenile justice workers recovered their credibility in courts 
while retaining commitment to the welfare of young people. In interview, Tutt told 
me that  
‘it was no use just saying to people that they need to keep kids out of custody – 
they also needed the skills to do so. We tried to develop models of practice that 
would allow practitioners to do something with the kids. While activities had 
their place, you also needed to do something about the offending behaviour, 
because that was why the kids were there’. 
 
The new Specified Activity Order programmes permitted by the 1982 CJA were 
developed and promoted as a focused alternative to custody programme, and these 
new “SAS” (Specified Activity Scheme) programmes were sometimes offered to 
courts as a condition of a deferred sentence. Newham Alternatives had used these, 
having 46 people on deferred sentences, 42 of whom subsequently received a 
community sentence, and two of the four who received custody were released after an 
appeal against the custodial sentence (Hall, 1977). 
 
The LAC 83/3 projects also began to submit their own reports to court on behalf of 
young offenders referred to them, at times even challenging the contents of the SER 
prepared by the local authority. In Kirklees, the KEY project found resistance from 
‘punitive’ social workers and probation officers to refer to the project, so bypassed 
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them by linking with defence solicitors and getting them to urge an alternative 
assessment by court, with a report from KEY (Feeny & Wiggin, 1990). 
 
Andrew Rutherford told me (personal interview) that the advocacy role adopted by 
youth justice practitioners was crucial, arguing day to day in courts with packages that 
made sense and that people were receptive to. 
 
Following the implementation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in 1985, 
which required all juveniles to have an ‘Appropriate Adult’ with them when being 
interviewed by the police, youth justice teams began to undergo training and develop 
expertise in this role, giving them early contact with an offender before they appeared 
in court. This could then be used to develop continuing relationships with the offender 
and also allow monitoring of the progress of the case from its earliest point. There 
were also developments at local level around cautioning, SERs, school reports etc 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
Cautioning 
 
The decade had begun with a strong endorsement of cautioning from the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981: 164), who said ‘we believe that the time 
has come for the use of the formal caution to be sanctioned in legislation and put on a 
more consistent basis’. Their own research had found that police force cautioning 
varied from 0 to 58 per cent of those dealt with (Gemmill & Morgan-Giles, 1980). 
Tutt and Giller (1983) also noted wide variations between the 15 police forces they 
studied in organisation, practices and rates of cautioning. This variation was linked to 
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local policy, local crime patterns, and the proportion of first offenders arrested 
(Laycock & Tarling, 1985a; 1985b). 
 
Mott (1983b) proposed ‘instant cautions’ for first offenders and reservation of inter-
agency consultation for recidivists. Tweedie (1982) found that a more formal caution 
was more effective than the advice-type caution, and Osgood (1983) found no 
relationship between the effectiveness of a caution and the subject’s offence history. 
 
Some research began to show how cautioning rates could be changed through inter-
agency involvement. In a scheme in Birmingham (Lynch & Barron, 1983) a 
probation/police scheme reduced charging of offenders referred to a juvenile liaison 
scheme from 68 per cent of those arrested in 1979 to 27 per cent in 1982. In Exeter 
(Stephens & Forrest, 1983; Lunn, 1987) an inter-agency cautioning initiative created a 
dramatic fall in prosecutions. Chris Stanley (personal interview) mentioned the 
importance of Exeter and Northampton as models for good practice. Most of this 
development was initiated by juvenile justice or IT practitioners, who gradually 
persuaded other practitioners and eventually agency managers to support the 
developments. 
 
David Mellor told a BASW conference that ‘80 per cent of juveniles cautioned by the 
Met did not re-offend within two years’ (Community Care, 1984b). In 1984 the Home 
Office issued a consultation document ‘Cautioning by the Police’ (Home Office, 
1984b) with a clear steer, acknowledging 
 ‘chief officers of police … acceptance of the importance of effectiveness and 
consistency in the use of the caution. The Government believes that the caution 
has an important role to play as an alternative to prosecution – particularly in 
the case of juveniles’ (Hansard, 1984a). 
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 It referred to a Conference of Chief Police Officers in 1977 who had agreed that 
cautions should be cited in juvenile courts, and that this meant that there needed to be 
more uniform criteria. Responses to the 1984 consultation must have been favourable, 
as they were followed by a Circular promoting cautioning (Home Office, 1985a), 
encouraging consultation by the police with other agencies around the decision as to 
whether to caution. Thorpe (1994) suggested this was the first explicit statement by a 
government inviting the police to share their powers with other agencies. The Circular 
led to the establishment of formal ‘cautioning panels’ in many areas, where the police 
shared with social services and other agencies the details of all arrested young people, 
and invited comments on the best course of action to deal with them (caution or 
prosecution). To try to encourage the police to increase cautioning, youth justice 
teams developed ‘caution plus’ programmes, in which a youth justice practitioner 
visited the young person and family and did some short term work on offending 
behaviour and its consequences. Practitioners in Northampton seized on it (Hinks and 
Smith, 1986a) as ‘one of the most progressive circulars issued by the Home Office in 
living memory’. 
 
In addition, cautioning was given a boost by the introduction of the Crown 
Prosecution Service [hereafter CPS]. During the passage of the Prosecution of 
Offences Bill, which set up the CPS, commitments were given in Parliament that the 
CPS would give special consideration to juveniles, and the development of their 
‘Code of Practice’ supported the use of cautions and caution plus as an alternative to 
prosecuting juveniles (CPS, 1988). 
 
Cautioning was not supported everywhere. Sarah McCabe, of NAJC, at the BASW 
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1984 young offenders’ conference, urged that care was taken in its development 
(Social Work Today, 1984). The CLC was also critical (Singh, 1985) on the grounds 
that it reduced children’s’ rights to deny an offence and face trial. From the 
magistracy McKittrick & Eysenck (1984a and 1984b), raised concern about the lack 
of public accountability or legal advice (as did McCabe, 1984) for those accepting a 
caution, believing that it would lead to a reduction in deterrence, and a lack of 
concern with guilt or innocence. Kidner (1985) was concerned about young people 
being given multiple cautions, but otherwise was positive about the 1985 Circular. 
Bottomley (1985) considered the Circular ‘inadequate’, and Hullin (1985) was totally 
opposed. Gray (1986) thought it was reducing the role of the courts and draining 
resources from courts’ sentencing options. 
 
However, the main thrust in the 1980s was to encourage local involvement, while 
continuing to call for a clear national policy (Cavadino, 1985; Gelsthorpe, 1985a; 
Tutt, 1986b). The publication of ‘league tables’ of police force cautioning rates (Tutt 
& Giller, 1983; Giller & Tutt, 1987) was designed to encourage those with lower 
cautioning rates  to feel less anxious about increasing the amount of cautioning in 
their area. 
 
Henri Giller, one of the main researchers into cautioning at this time, told me 
(personal interview) that the development of cautioning plus reflected ‘a convergence 
of view between police and juvenile justice practitioners’, which he thought was 
partly due to police officers doing degree and masters courses at University which 
brought them into contact with social workers and juvenile justice practitioners. 
Tables 51 and 52 show the development of cautioning, with the actual numbers in 
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Table 51 becoming more significant when declining conviction rates are included. 
Cautioning rates for 10-13 year old boys rose from 70 per cent of all disposals in 1982 
to 81 per cent in 1986, for females of the same age from 88 per cent to 94 per cent, 
while for young men aged 14 – 16 the rates increased from 36 per cent to 53 per cent 
over the same period, and for young women from 62 per cent to 79 per cent. By 1986 
young people of all ages were more likely to be cautioned than prosecuted. 
 
This pattern was repeated in London, with a steady increase in cautioning between 
1982 and 1984, and the adoption of the ‘instant caution’ in 1984, as shown in Tables 
53 and 54, with the result that less than half of all those processed were prosecuted. 
 
Follow up research by the Home Office (1993e) into those cautioned in 1985 found 
that 80 per cent had no criminal history, and ‘only about 19 per cent of these were 
convicted’ in the next two years. 
 
SER policy 
 
A study in Portsmouth (Social Work Today, 1982b) found that a high proportion of 
first offenders received DC sentences, often on the recommendation of their social 
worker. NACROs (1982) Community Alternatives to Young Offenders project carried 
out studies in seven different areas of the country, finding that 81 per cent of 122 care 
orders, 36 per cent of 187 DC sentences, and 50 per cent of 108 borstal sentences 
were recommended in the SERs. Other local studies around the country found similar 
results, such as those by the DHSS (1985a; 1985b) in Yorkshire, Green et al. (1983) 
in Lewisham, Bradden (1983)  in Lambeth, Raynor & Milburn (1988) in a Welsh 
authority in 1984, Bilson (1986) in another Welsh local authority, Parker et al. (1989) 
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in 4 Midlands courts in 1985, Stafford and Hill (1987) in Birmingham, Whitehead & 
Macmillan (1985) in the North East, and Osborne (1984). 
 
Research into the inmates of Whatton DC by probation officer practitioners who were 
based there (Thomas, H., 1980; 1982; Millichamp & Thomas, 1982; Millichamp et 
al., 1985; Thomas & Wilbourne, 1985) found that many of the inmates had actually 
been recommended for custody in the SER; that a large number had received a care 
order or supervision order on their first or second court appearance, and few had been 
recommended for IT as an alternative to custody. There were similar findings about 
inmates of the Youth Custody wing of Leicester prison (Tongue, 1984). 
 
This range of research led to the notion of ‘up-tariffing’: that social workers were 
pushing offenders up the sentencing tariff into more punitive disposals by using IT in 
a welfare way, which the courts then interpreted as having failed as a criminal 
sanction, creating a ‘conveyor belt to custody’ (Thorpe, 1981a). This argument was 
supported by a study in Manchester that showed that, during a shortage of social 
workers, which led to a lack of SERs being prepared, sentences became less serious 
(Sharron, 1982b). This then led to a policy in Manchester and elsewhere of not 
preparing reports on first offenders. Tutt (1984b) argued that the absence of a report 
seemed to down-tariff, as it led the magistrates to assume that the offence was 
‘normal’. Giller (1986) argued that SERs ‘only served to heighten magistrates’ 
anxiety about the offender’. Rob Allen (personal interview) acknowledged this: 
‘looking back on it, there were possibilities of some kind of contamination. We 
were working in heavy end IT, and were trying to manage the system and trying 
to reserve our option for the kids most at risk of custody or care, but those at 
risk of coming into care may have had IT involvement on a different basis, so 
management of the system was flawed by that twin-track approach and there 
was a risk of up-tariffing’. 
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Nellis, (1987) however, argued that up-tariffing was a myth (see below: page 358). 
 
Accordingly, a clear policy approach to SERs was deemed necessary, and various 
guides were produced. Following the 1982 Act, the Home Office issued two new sets 
of guidance on their contents, and supported the idea of report authors making 
recommendations on various sentencing options and their likely impact on the 
offender.  The DHSS (1981c) had promoted SERs as ‘effective negotiating documents 
which secure the best possible deal for the offender’, and in 1987 produced a guide to 
report content and style (DHSS, 1987b). NAPO’s AGM in 1983 adopted a policy of 
never making a recommendation for custody (NAPO Newsletter, 1983).  
 
SER ‘gatekeeping’ developed, in which report recommendations were questioned and 
challenged by colleagues (Griggs, 1988). Pauline Owen, of The Woodlands project in 
Hampshire, said that their reports were ‘gate kept’ by three people and could involve 
up to five days of discussion (personal interview).  Geoff Monaghan (questionnaire 
submission) noted that 
‘The quality of court reports was maintained at the highest level. In the past, 
individual report authors considered themselves quite independent and were 
defensive regarding team gatekeeping etc. This altered and it was necessary for 
all to accept considerable scrutiny of reports’. 
 
Various attempts were made to expose the rhetoric used in SERs to guide the 
magistrates towards custody: 
‘a supervision order is unlikely to bring a halt to K’s criminal behaviour, in 
which case the court might decide that a custodial sentence is more appropriate’ 
(Bradden, 1983: 69). 
 
‘the court take a firm line …’ (Bradden, 1983: 76) 
 
‘Social work help in this case has been and would continue to be ineffective’ 
(Bradden, 1983: 81). 
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The column ‘just welfare’ in ‘AJJUST’, the magazine of the AJJ, was a regular 
feature from the first issue (see AJJUST, 1984b; 1984e: 2), highlighting other 
statements like these. In the second issue (AJJUST, 1984c) they announced ‘a 
competition for the most punishing carer of 1984’. 
 
However, some disagreed with the notion of turning SERs into strategic documents 
campaigning on behalf of the offender. Bottoms and Stelman (1988), writing more for 
a probation audience, opposed turning them into ‘pleas of mitigation’, and while 
opposed to recommendations for custody being made, felt that the use of the language 
of ‘alternatives to custody’ was inappropriate, as it linguistically gave primacy to 
imprisonment, emphasised the negatives of community sentences (what they are not), 
led to a search for credibility with the court and a loss of attention on the needs of the 
offender, produced unintended consequences, and could lead to ‘up-tariffing’. There 
was also concern within the magistracy. Gray (1987) voiced strong opposition to 
policies against recommending custody, arguing that magistrates felt ‘manipulated’ 
by report authors, who also no longer were able to put the case for shorter custodial 
sentence lengths than the magistrates were initially thinking of imposing. 
 
By the late 1980s, many SERs had changed from being punitive to being advocative, 
with a clearer specificity and focus and with tariff-based recommendations, as part of 
a much more structured approach to juvenile justice work as advocated by NACRO, 
the AJJ, the CYCC and others. When these were submitted alongside additional 
reports from LAC 83/3 projects, they could have a cumulative effect. 
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School Reports and SER’s 
 
Attention also began to focus on the influence of school reports to court on offenders. 
Concern about the style and content of these reports had a long history - even before 
the 1969 CYPA they had been accused of being ‘character assassinations’ (Kirk, 
1968). As social workers began to try and use their SERs as strategic documents, 
concern began to grow about the separate influence of school reports (Ball, 1981). 
Parker et al. (1987 and 1989) had found school reports to be very influential on 
magistrates in the Midlands, much more than SERs, though this may have been 
something particular to the courts that were studied as their findings were not 
common in other areas of the country. Research commissioned by NACRO (Ball, 
1983a; 1983b; NACRO, 1988a) found wide variation in practice between different 
juvenile courts, but suggested that school reports were often not shown to family, 
defendants or their legal representatives, especially when they contained negative 
comments about the family and home circumstances.  This led to NACRO, the AJJ 
(AJJUST, 1984a) and others promoting a change of practice (Dunn, 1985), to such 
effect that the government amended the juvenile court rules to encourage disclosure of 
the reports to children, parents and legal representatives (Hansard, 1986c). 
 
Appeals against custody 
 
 A formal ‘appeals strategy’ against custodial sentences also began to develop, and the 
AJJ announced that they were looking for test cases (AJJUST, 1984e: 3; 1985a: 3 - 4; 
Chard, 1985b) which they could support, in order to structure the powers of the 
juvenile court. This particularly focused on the interpretation of section 1 (4) of the 
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1982 Act (see above page 150ff).  
 
Paul Cavadino (personal interview) saw this appeals strategy as one of the key 
features of the 1980s, referring to  
‘the growing interest among practitioners, who were leading on drawing young 
people’s attention to their right to appeal … that was reinforced by the criteria 
for custody in the ‘82 Act. It took time to have an impact, but there was a good 
mechanism at NACRO, AJJ and NITFED for getting out information which 
practitioners were able to draw on’. 
 
Sentencing patterns 1982 to 1986 
 
Tables 55 to 64 continue the structure of the tables in previous chapters for a later 
date. The most significant item in all the tables is the dramatic fall in the total number 
of juveniles being sentenced in court. Tutt (1986a) noted a 26 per cent fall in findings 
of guilt against children under 17 between 1977 and 1984. The number of boys aged 
10 to 13 sentenced in court fell by a half between 1982 and 1986, from 15,765 to 
7,105 (Table 55), while girls of this age were disappearing from the court (Table 61), 
falling from 1,802 to 594 over the same period The percentage tables show a fairly 
stable pattern in sentencing, with an increase in conditional discharges balanced by 
the fall in fines. There is a declining association between cautioning and the use of 
discharges (absolute and conditional), which caused Bottomley & Pease (1986: 57) to 
suggest that it could be a result of net-widening, but could also mean that courts had 
forgotten how trivial most trivial offences are, and continued to make conditional 
discharges consistent with the court culture. 
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Attendance centres 
 
Surprisingly little attention was given to the attendance centres in the 1980s. 
Gelsthorpe & Morris (1983), suggested that 
 ‘the staff clearly want Attendance Centre Orders to be given to the younger and 
less criminally experienced offender and have been actively involved in 
persuading magistrates to act in this way’,  
 
even though the government presented them as an alternative to custody. Gelsthorpe 
& Tutt (1986), in a study of 471 orders made in six areas, suggested that there was 
confusion about their purpose and who they were for, and found that they were used 
as an alternative to fines or supervision orders rather than as alternatives to custody. 
The number of young people being sent to them declined substantially during this 
period:  from 2,942 boys under 14 in 1982 to 1,377 in 1986 (Table 55) and from 
10,801 young men aged 14 – 16 in 1982 to 6,386 in 1986 (Table 58), though they 
retained their percentage of sentences (Tables 56, 59, 62 and 64). 
 
Probation 
 
What little attention was specifically given to juvenile offenders in the probation 
world tended to be critical of the new strategies of juvenile justice practitioners. Stone 
(1984), for example, viewed the campaign by Tutt for a correctional curriculum with 
‘considerable scepticism and hostility’, and felt it generated expectations which were 
ultimately unfulfilled. Lacey (M., 1984) criticised the ‘conceptual muddle’ that was 
IT. A report into the failure of a  probation project in Inner London aiming to increase 
the use of probation orders by Crown Courts  seemed almost proud of this failure, 
claiming that it confounded the ‘myth’ that changes can occur through alteration in 
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probation practice (ILPS, 1988).  A resolution to the 1983 NAPO conference equated 
day centres with ‘day prisons’ (Vanstone, 1985). Drakeford (1983) argued that ‘The 
real power to reduce the numbers in custody lies in political decisions to decriminalise 
certain categories of offences and to restrict the power of sentencers’. 
 
However, some probation areas seemed willing to adopt a different approach 
modelled on what was happening in the LAC 83/3 areas, such as Warwickshire 
(Kemshall, 1986), and a Joint Report by the Association of Chief Officers of 
Probation  [hereafter ACOP], NAPO and the Central Council of Probation 
Committees (ACOP et al., 1987) suggested increasing probation involvement with 
young offenders. 
 
Meanwhile the attention of the probation service was to be diverted towards other 
issues. In 1984 the Home Office had set a series of national objectives and priorities 
for the probation service, which called for a focus on non-custodial measures, and a 
reduction in the production of SERs in care and civil work (Home Office, 1984a). 
This was to be the start of major government attempts to change the probation service 
from a welfare agency with a social work value base to a criminal justice agency. 
 
Supervision orders 
 
As the tables show, the proportion of offenders given supervision orders was to 
remain fairly stable during this period, with between 16 and 19 per cent of 10 – 14 
year old boys and 13 to 15 per cent of young men (Tables 56 and 59) though these 
figures may mask a dramatic change in the type of supervision orders being made, as 
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now many of them would have been with the addition of IT or Specified Activities as 
a direct alternative to custody. 
 
Care orders 
 
Use of the 7(7) care order for offending had fallen from 6,000 a year in the 1970s to 
under 1,000 in 1987 (Tables 37, 55 and 58), and only 21 residential care orders were 
made in 1986 (Jones, D., 1989b and 1990; Harris, 1991). This was partly due to 
strategic decisions by SSDs not to recommend them to courts, often replacing them 
with intensive supervision orders. Applications of the ‘care and control test’ during 
this period also continued to show concern. Gelsthorpe (1984) applied the test in five 
different authorities, and reported ‘failure’ rates from 70 per cent to 93 per cent. Some 
lamented this: Reynolds & Williamson (1985: 33) called it ‘an extreme over-reactive 
swing against local authority institutional care’. 
 
The decline in the number of care orders made was to have an inevitable impact on 
the number of children and young people in the CHE sector, and on O&As, as set out 
below. 
 
Observation and Assessment 
 
In the early 1980s community based assessment began to develop, using a variation of 
the ‘care and control test’. This was based on the view that residential assessment was 
only necessary if the young person was assessed as likely to fail to appear in court 
during the assessment period. In Wandsworth, 85 per cent of children in O&A centres 
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were deemed to fail the test, and a policy of assessment while placed at home 
developed (Dennington and Gildersleeve, 1982a; 1982b). This was supported by  the 
report of a DHSS Working Party (DHSS, 1981e) chaired by Norman Tutt, that 
suggested that there was too much investment in buildings and not in staff; 
recommended that no child should be admitted to residential care solely to be 
assessed, and that it was better to have a community assessment in a normal living 
situation. It recommended a 30 per cent reduction in residential places in the O&As 
over the next four years. Chris Sealey told me that his first task on joining the DHSS 
was the responsibility for this working group, which he saw as: 
 ‘attempting to prop up a failing system’, with members on the working group, 
such as Masud Hoghughi, the headmaster of Aycliffe Regional Assessment 
Centre and secure unit ‘trying to propose a pseudo-scientific approach to 
assessment, which was flawed in that context …. Assessment centres were 
delivering these wonderful assessments which meant nothing because they were 
assessing children in a particular context and when you looked at where the 
kids went, it was to the same place they always had, governed by the availability 
of a vacancy’ (personal interview). 
 
Between 1980 and 1985 the number of O&A centres fell from 195 to 140, while the 
average number of places per centre fell from 50 to 30 (Hansard, 1986a). As Table 65 
shows, the actual number of young people resident in the centres on the 31st March 
fell from 4,600 to below 3,000 between 1982 and 1987. As they were often a stepping 
stone to a CHE placement this would also have an effect on CHE numbers. 
 
Residential child care 
 
The fall in those resident in CHEs was even more dramatic: from 4,200 in March 
1982 to under 2,000 in March 1987 (Table 65). Half of the CHEs had closed between 
1974 and 1984: ‘one of the few successful attempts to close institutions in our social 
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history’, said Tutt (1984c). Those working in CHEs had begun the 1980s making the 
same defences of their provision as in the previous decade, such as claiming that the 
intake was more delinquent, and that community based services could not possibly 
meet the need that the CHEs provided for, while attacking IT proponents as ‘idealistic 
academics’ who were ‘brainwashing’ the public (Kibbler, 1981), and not really part of 
the ‘community’ (Fogarty, 1981).  Hyland (1993: 60), a former headmaster and 
defender of the CHEs, suggests that they were trying to inculcate values ‘no longer 
held so firmly by society’. Seventeen Heads of CHEs and O&As in the North West 
blamed the inner city riots in Liverpool and elsewhere on the cuts in CHEs (Bailey et 
al., 1981), as would Hyland (1993: 138) a decade later.  
 
A Social Services Inspectorate inspection of CHEs was very critical, finding children 
‘uncared for’ and that the ‘general level of comfort was disturbingly low’ (DHSS, 
1985c). Bill Utting (personal interview) thought that the CHEs were perceived as 
inappropriate for offenders: ‘a child care approach seen as unjust on the one hand 
and too soft on the other … the CHEs did not have the resources, skills or personnel 
to work with delinquents’. Ironically, he thought that taking delinquents/difficult 
children and young people out of it may have been the saving of the child care 
system.  
 
West (1982: 158) concluded his review of juvenile justice by saying that ‘it is 
noteworthy how often juveniles considered unmanageable in one residential setting 
are found to be no particular problem’ in another. Millham et al. (1986) noted how, 
when children in long term residential care were asked who was special to them, they 
would name individual members of staff, but care staff asked the same question never 
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mentioned a child or young person. 
 
Conflict within the schools and between the schools and the regional planning 
networks also developed during the 1980s, with Barnardo’s, one of the larger 
independent providers, withdrawing from the regional planning system in 1983 
(Hudson, 1983).  
 
Rob Allen (personal interview) thought that the decline in use of CHEs was ‘half 
financial and half ideological’, based on the damaging research from Millham et al., 
absconding rates, a failure to provide what placing agencies wanted, a sense of 
children’s rights, and budget pressures on local authorities. For Andrew Rutherford 
(personal interview), it was a result of their bad press, the evidence of brutality and 
physical abuse, that had meant that ‘courts ran out of patience with them’, but he did 
not see their closure as part of any decarceration strategy. Norman Tutt referred to the 
dilemma facing local authorities, and his amazement about how little social work 
practitioners really knew about the CHE: 
‘to make alternatives work you had to close CHEs, and re-direct their money, 
and not redeploy the staff from the CHE, as they would make sure it didn’t 
work, as Massachusetts had shown’ (Norman Tutt: personal interview). 
 
Henri Giller (personal interview) offered me a collection of reasons for the decline of 
the CHE:  
a consensus that IT was a viable alternative; the new group of practitioners 
trying to influence the flow of young people into the criminal justice system; the 
development of systems monitoring; diversion and cautioning plus were 
changing the flow of kids into the courts and criminal justice system and the 
available pool of kids that could be sent to CHE, and the costs of CHEs to a 
local authority, with unit costs rising as the flow of entrances fell’. 
 
For John Pratt (personal correspondence) the decline in the use of CHEs was because 
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they were  
‘too expensive; the lack of trust/confidence in social workers to deal with 
delinquents; the feeling that there was a real difference between delinquents 
and orphans or abused kids’ {despite the 1969 Act equating them}’the open-
ended nature of care orders, so that they could be more punitive than a short 
DC sentence’. 
 
 
Secure units 
 
Despite the growth in secure accommodation from the mid-1970s, there was no 
mention of secure accommodation, or the rights of children living in them, in the 1969 
Act (Tutt, 1984a), creating something of a legal vacuum. During the 1980s evidence 
began to accumulate that showed that young people sentenced to the longest sentences 
(under s. 53 of the 1933 CYPA) for grave crimes often had a history of loss, abuse, 
grief and trauma, and were not the young thugs of popular imagination (Bullock et al., 
1990; Boswell, 1996). The use of this sentence also began to increase (Giller & 
Richardson, 1987), from 85 in 1980 to 172 in each of 1986 and 1987 (NACRO, 
1988b). 
 
Redhill secure unit told a CLC inquiry that the main criterion for referral was that the 
young person had been an ‘unmitigated nuisance’ (CLC, 1982). Attempts to tighten 
admission criteria in the 1982 CJA seem to have had little initial impact on 
admissions (Laethen, 1984), nor did lobbying (e.g. CLC, 1983) to the House of 
Commons Social Services Committee inquiry into Children in Care, which paid little 
attention to offenders. 
 
Blumenthal (1985), an architect, visited secure units and expressed shock at their 
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claustrophobic nature, and the lack of educational and recreational facilities. He also 
concluded that the treatment regimes fell far short of their claims, and that the heads 
restricted information, instead making assertions without any evidence. He suggested 
a culture of blame for failure: staff blame the children; the Department of Health 
blame the staff; whereas Blumenthal blamed the institutions themselves. 
 
Children were also being held in secure accommodation in National Health Service 
[hereafter NHS] facilities on mental health commitments, and there were concerns 
about the reasons for this (NHS, 1986). Research in the adolescent units of the NHS 
found that most of the referrals to them were better helped in the community 
(Steinberg et al., 1981). 
 
Custody 
 
Early studies of the working of the 1982 Act suggested that magistrates were not 
making much use of the short two week sentences to DC, but were flexing their 
powers to sentence to YC for the first time, so that average sentence lengths were 
going up (NAJC, 1984; NACRO, 1984a; 1984b; Home Office, 1985c; 1986a). This 
was despite a specific message from the Home Office not to do this (see above: page 
139). To achieve this, magistrates had to sentence to over four months custody, and 
the result was an explosion of sentences of ‘four months and one day’ (Muncie, 
1990), with custody being given earlier in young peoples’ offending careers (Home 
Office, 1985b). In the first six months after the Act was implemented youth custody 
sentences increased by 70 per cent, but average DC sentence length fell from 13 to 10 
weeks (Home Office, 1984h). though the increase in YC numbers was matched by a 
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decrease in DC sentences. The Home Office (1983c) issued a Circular to remind 
magistrates not to use the shorter DC sentences now available instead of community 
sentences. In November 1983, plans were announced to change some DCs into YC 
centres because of the shortage of places in the latter (Hansard, 1983c; Home Office, 
1984c).  
 
However, the growth in sentencing of young people to custody that had been seen 
over the last two decades finally came to a halt, and then began to decline (Table 58). 
Prison department figures on receptions reflect this trend (Table 66). 
 
The Home Office issued guidance to YOIs telling staff not to try and influence 
magistrates’ or judges’ sentencing practice, as there was no evidence that earlier 
sentencing in a criminal career would reduce reoffending. It also said that it was 
wrong, when courts phone up about a vacancy ‘to be told … that the court is welcome 
to send as many more offenders as it can find’ (Probation Journal, 1983). According 
to Andrew Rutherford, ‘DC Governors were ringing up courts begging for young 
people, as the DC’s were being closed by default’ (personal interview). 
 
 By 1987, the Government could state that ‘evidence suggests that custody should be 
used sparingly and as a last resort for younger offenders if they are to be diverted 
from recidivism’, (HMSO, 1987a: Para. 8). 
 
By January 1985 DC occupancy levels had fallen to 59 per cent of capacity, and 
between March 1986, when Send was closed, and August 1987 eight DCs were 
closed, with a further two closed the following year, leaving only 10 of the original 20 
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institutions open (Hansard, 1987c; 1988c; Muncie, 1990).  
 
Care and Custody 
 
Table 67 combines sentences to care and to custody, showing a remarkable fall in the 
number of young men sentenced to orders that would have removed them from home, 
from 10,256 in 1982 to 5,476 in 1986. 
 
The number of girls and young women removed from home also declined 
substantially, from over 500 in 1982  to below 200 in 1986 (Table 68), though here a 
rapid decline in the use of the care order is counterbalanced by an increase in 
sentences to custody. 
 
Scandals 
 
The deaths of eight young people in a Scottish Young Offender Institution over a five 
year period (Scraton & Chadwick, 1985; Killeen, 1986) increased attention on the 
treatment of offenders south of the border as well. Between 1981 and 1986 nine 
prison officers in DCs were dismissed and a further 23 suspended (Muncie, 1990). 
Allegations of inmates being slapped in the face, punched in the stomach for refusing 
to address an officer as ‘sir’, and for poor performance in the gym, led to a police 
investigation (Bottomley & Pease, 1985). A youth alleged that he had been beaten-up 
five or six times by staff  in DC (Childright, 1984b), which provoked other ex-inmates 
to write to the press (Childright, 1984c). The CLC began to collect a dossier of 
statements alleging assaults, verbal and racial abuse and infringement of other rights, 
such as letters to parents being torn up (Childright, 1985a; 1986a; 1986c). Gerry 
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Bermingham MP raised concern about ‘allegations of mistreatment’ at five DCs 
(Hansard, 1985b). A serving probation officer in DC alleged that she had witnessed 
physical assault, humiliation, racist abuse and censorship of her own reports 
(Childright, 1986b). In 1986, both young people and probation officers at Hollesley 
Bay reported physical assault, racial abuse and denial of inhalers to asthma sufferers 
(Hansard, 1987d; Childright, 1988).  
 
Concern was also raised about the treatment of young people in Langton House, an 
independent adolescent mental health facility, by Time Out magazine, and by the CLC 
(Childright, 1984a), who alleged the use of deprivation of food and restricted family 
access as punishments for behaviour, and forcible use of drugs (see Fennell, 1992). 
 
However, most of the people I interviewed or corresponded with did not see these 
scandals as influential on policy developments (Chris Sealey; David Faulkner; 
Richard Kay; Loraine Gelsthorpe; Stephen Shaw; Chris Stanley; Henri Giller; John 
Pratt; Lord Hurd).  The exceptions to this were Paul Cavadino, who thought that they 
did contribute to the phasing out of DC, and praised the CLC for its skilful lobbying; 
Rob Allen, who said that ‘Childright used to be required reading’; and Rod Morgan, 
who thought that ‘they contributed to the view in the Home Office that custody made 
people worse’. 
 
Departmental responsibility  
 
Bill Utting (personal interview) told me about working, from the DHSS, with the 
Home Office in the 1980s:  
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‘I can remember grappling with the Home Office … about things like residential 
care orders and secure care orders, because they seemed startled with the fact 
that not every child was in care because of delinquency, so their original 
proposals were that any child in care who committed, in their eyes, a ‘further’ 
offence would be eligible for a residential care order …. I can recall being in 
meetings with senior Home Office officials who simply did not understand the 
traditions of the care system, even though it had only left their responsibility 10 
years before’. 
 
Virginia Bottomley agreed with my suggestion that the Home Office had tried to 
retain control over juvenile offenders through the 1982 Act (personal interview), and 
Vivien Stern thought that the Home Office’s stealing of the agenda from the DHSS 
‘was a very crucial factor’ in the development of legislation. Baroness Faithfull had 
argued that the Criminal Justice Bill showed the disagreement between the two 
departments during the Bill’s passage in the Lords (Hansard, 1982f: col. 47). Bill 
Utting thought that the inability of the DHSS to counter this was partly because of the 
external pressures on the DHSS:  
’30 per cent staff cuts, re-emergence of child abuse, and the review of child care 
law. We were also not able to make the case for the Home Office not to see 
juvenile justice as part of its criminal justice responsibilities’. 
 
Chris Stanley was at NACRO in the 1980s, and did not sense any co-ordination 
between the Home Office and the DHSS. He felt that LAC 83/3 was solely influenced 
by Norman Tutt and Archie Pagan at the DHSS (personal interview). Richard Kay 
(personal interview) noted that the funding that Rainer received from the Home 
Office for its probation hostel was very narrow and circumscribed, and that they 
would never have been able to deliver something as creatively as the DHSS delivered 
LAC 83/3. Rob Allen, who went to NACRO in 1988 after managing a juvenile justice 
centre in Hounslow, and then to the Home Office, said (personal interview)  that he 
did not think that LAC 83/3 and the 1982 Act were ‘joined up in advance. I think they 
became joined up later. The DHSS was as interested in reducing residential 
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placements as it was in penal custody’. 
 
From the Home Office perspective, David Faulkner had been there since 1959, and 
saw no tension between the two departments. He said that 
‘a lot of the drive (on juvenile justice) was in the DHSS during the period of IT, 
diversion and minimum intervention. In the Home Office we were entirely happy 
to have Health to make most of the running and to help where we could …. At 
the Home Office we would have been keen to see prison custody for juveniles 
abolished, and it was within the political horizon of the time’ (personal 
interview). 
 
Norman Tutt told me that (personal interview) 
 
‘Prison Governors were telling the Home Office at the time of the 1982 Act that 
they did not want to receive young offenders. There was a feeling (with some 
evidence that this was true) that many Directors of Social Services were happy 
to let kids go to prison as it saved on their budgets, and so there was lots of 
pressure on the DHSS from the Home Office to sort out these SSDs and take 
their fair share of expenditure’. 
 
Chris Sealey saw the LAC 83/3 initiative as a clear attempt by the DHSS to gain 
influence over juvenile offenders after the 1982 Act, as did Bill Utting:  ‘departments 
don’t like losing business to other departments’. Henri Giller told me that ‘Archie 
Pagan was very much of the view that he had acquired LAC 83/3 money from the 
Treasury, and it was to stop any escalation of custody under the 82 Act’. This was 
something that Rutherford (1989: 28) had suggested, describing LAC 83/3 as ‘an 
effort by DHSS to regain some of the young offender ground that had over the years 
been lost to the Home Office’. 
 
In retrospect, it does seem that during the 1970s the Home Office had not supported 
the DHSS agenda, and possibly at times put obstacles in its way. The return of the 
Conservative government in 1979 provided an opportunity which was seized by the 
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Home Office, and initially the agenda was dominated by the 1982 Act, which was a 
Home Office piece of legislation The LAC 83/3 initiative appears to have been a 
reaction to this by a maverick civil servant (Archie Pagan) at the DHSS as part of an 
attempt to have some influence on policy, and it was fortunate for young people that 
this proved so successful that the Home Office was willing to adopt it and develop it 
further as the DHSS and its successors  ceased to be involved. 
 
Summary 
 
By the middle of the decade, there was mounting evidence of a change in direction 
throughout the juvenile justice system. The number of juveniles cautioned was rising, 
alongside a substantial drop in the total number cautioned and convicted. Custodial 
sentencing was falling at a substantial rate, with DCs closing down, and the number 
being sentenced to ‘care’ was also dropping, with CHEs being sold off to become 
other forms of institutions. The Intensive IT projects set up through the DHSS 
initiative and by local authorities were starting to claim remarkable changes in local 
sentencing patterns, and IT practitioners were showing an ability to work with serious 
and persistent offenders in the community, adopting a much more proactive stance in 
court and acting as advocates for young offenders.  
 
In terms of Kingdon’s model of change, several policy entrepreneurs (Archie Pagan at 
the DHSS;  Norman Tutt and his colleagues at the CYCC; various national charities 
such as the Rainer Foundation, CSV, Barnardo’s, and local entrepreneurs who put 
together  small voluntary organisations to attract LAC 83/3 funding)  had used the 
window of opportunity provided by the DHSS wanting to share in the policy agenda 
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and not allow the Home Office to marginalise them completely, to  start a major 
change to the way that children and young people were sentenced in court. 
 
The Home Office was also starting to acknowledge and promote community 
sentencing. Stephen Shaw told me that  
‘there was a clear Home Office view that the benefits of incarceration are much 
exaggerated, and prisons are difficult to run if you’re not well resourced, with 
treasury resistance to more funding. Whitelaw and Hurd worked with that 
trend’ (personal interview). 
 
According to David Faulkner, the  
 
‘Government was sympathetic on the whole, though it was below the notice of 
Ministers … we went along with it and were ready to support it … it was 
convenient to have fewer children in custody. John Patten saw LAC 83/3 as a 
success story and influenced Douglas Hurd to the view that falling crime and 
falling custody go together’ (personal interview). 
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Chapter 5:  
 
 Consolidating Decarceration: 1987 - 1992 
 
The Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (1987) had suggested that 
‘except for the dangerous offender custody should as a general rule not be imposed on 
juveniles and young people under 18’. It had received evidence from the Home Office 
citing the success of Massachusetts, the Woodlands project, and Northampton (House 
of Commons, 1987: Q. 37). The Magistrates Association (1987: 3) debated a motion 
at its 1987 AGM that no child under 17 ‘should be received into prison as a prisoner’, 
which despite being defeated would not have even been debated a few years earlier. 
In a debate on ‘Prisons and Alternatives to Custody’ in the House of Lords (Hansard, 
1988d) Lord Hutchinson said that the way forward for young adult offenders is clear: 
‘it is the route pioneered by the intermediate treatment initiative for juveniles begun 
by the DHSS’ which had led to ‘an unequivocal and substantial reduction in juvenile 
crime and custody’. In the same debate Lord Henderson referred to ‘the great DHSS 
initiative’. The stage was set for another development of the juvenile justice practice 
of the past decade. 
 
The 1988 CJA 
 
The 40 year experiment of DCs, in a range of guises, came to an end in 1988, when 
the CJA of that year (HMSO, 1988b) merged them with YCs to create a new sentence 
of ‘Detention in a Young Offender Institution’ [hereafter YOI]. The debates on the 
Criminal Justice Bill were significant for the praise that Home Office Minister John 
Patten (who had been at the DHSS during the launch of the LAC 83/3 initiative) 
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heaped on intensive IT and the DHSS funding for it (Hansard, 1988a: see cols 434; 
453; 475; 710), and evidence from Chris Butler MP that Governors of the YCs were 
complaining that the centres were only half full and were more difficult to run than 
when full (ibid: cols. 440 - 443). The Act also further tightened the restrictions on 
custody that were in section 1(4) of the 1982 Act by amending it under section 123. 
Paul Cavadino thought that this was very significant (personal interview):  
‘this reinforced the effectiveness of the criteria … increasingly brought it home 
to magistrates that they had to take the criteria seriously – that if they made 
custodial sentences outwith the criteria they would be overturned on appeal’. 
 
By 1987 it was possible for people to start calling for the abolition of custody for 
juveniles (NACRO, 1987b; PRT, 1988), based on the ‘unparalleled success’ (PRT, 
1993) of juvenile justice practice. Virginia Bottomley MP, shortly to become Minister 
and then Secretary of State for Social Services and responsible for children’s welfare, 
called for the end of prison department custody for young offenders in the report of a 
Children’s Society (1988a) committee that she chaired until becoming a Minister, and 
asked the government in Parliament ‘should we not bring penal custody for those 
under 18 to an end?’ (Hansard, 1987b). She told me (personal interview) that her 
name could not be on the report initially as she had just become a minister, but 
Douglas Hurd gave his permission. Chris Sealey said that ‘we got so close to ending 
custody for juveniles when Patten was at the Home Office … it was quite 
extraordinary’.  
 
Giller (1986) pointed out how few children under 14 were now entering the court, 
citing only 46 in Newcastle-upon-Tyne and 28 in Surrey over a six month period, 78 
per cent of whom received absolute discharge, conditional discharge, fines or 
attendance centre orders. He used this information to call for the abolition of the 
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juvenile court.  
 
As the decade developed, ‘intermediate treatment’ as a specific concept lost its 
meaning, becoming more commonly replaced by ‘juvenile justice’ in job titles and the 
more general practice literature. 
 
Punishment in the Community 
 
The genesis of a new approach to sentencing, according to Dunbar and Langdon’s 
(1998: 86 - 98) excellent account of the 1991 Act and its consequences, was a 
ministerial meeting held at Leeds Castle in September 1987 (Home Office, 1987e). 
This considered a paper containing proposals to delay the imposition of a first 
custodial sentence on young offenders on the grounds that serving one custodial 
sentence led to further custodial sentences. It also proposed that the government 
should challenge the view among magistrates that a custodial sentence would be most 
effective the earlier it was imposed, and questioned the use of  custody for minor 
offenders as a result of a number of previous convictions. David Faulkner (the senior 
civil servant who is seen as the main author of the Act: see Rutherford, 1996: chapter 
4),  set out ‘a programme that builds on successes already achieved with juvenile 
offenders’, comparing the sentencing of 16 year olds in the juvenile courts with the 
sentencing of 17 year olds in the magistrates’ courts. He noted that diversion of 
juveniles from the criminal justice system had not led to increased offending, and 
‘while recorded crime generally has been going up, crime committed by juveniles … 
is now actually falling’. He argued that a similar approach towards 17 - 20 year olds 
was now needed, involving more cautioning, development of non-custodial disposals 
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by the probation service, and targeting of SERs. He suggested that the government 
should ‘encourage and if necessary fund the development of local strategies for 
dealing with young adult offenders akin to those successfully developed for 
juveniles’. In drafting the above Faulkner drew on a Note from Rita Maurice, the 
Director of Statistics (ibid: note of 11.9.87) that  
‘the falls in 1986 in cautions, court proceedings and prison receptions were 
greatest for the youngest offenders and only a small part of that difference was 
attributable to demographic factors’. 
 
John Patten told the seminar that he was sceptical about non-custodial alternatives  
‘except insofar as young offenders are concerned … experience in dealing with 
those up to and including the age of 16 showed that it was possible to divert a 
substantial number of juveniles from custody without there being any 
consequent rise in crime in this age group. An attempt should be made to extend 
the approach to the 17 and 18 year olds’.  
 
David Faulkner suggested that this tied in well with the government’s wish to 
encourage people to stand on their own two feet, as custody tended to increase 
dependence. The seminar foresaw a prison population crisis by 1989 unless something 
was done (ibid: note from David Faulkner dated 1.10.87), and likely probation 
hostility to its proposals (ibid: note by David Faulkner 5.10.87), and set up a working 
party under David Faulkner ‘looking at how supervision in the community might be 
improved with the clear subsidiary objective of reducing the prison population’ (ibid: 
note from Sir Brian Cubbon dated 19.10.87). By early November John Patten, in a 
memo to the Home Secretary (ibid, dated 2.11.87) said he was expecting Faulkner’s’ 
proposals for ‘a programme of prevention, training and diversion from custody for 
actual and potential young offenders’ which came up with the concept of ‘punishment 
in the community’. This was then explained to Conservative MPs by John Patten, and 
to the judiciary by senior civil servants, in early 1988, and made publicly available in 
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September 1988 (Patten, 1988a; Home Office, 1988a), as a Green Paper. These ideas 
were eventually to lead to the 1991 CJA (HMSO, 1991b).  
 
The Green Paper, Punishment, Custody and the Community (Home Office, 1988a) 
claimed that ‘a spell in custody is not the most effective punishment’ as it reduces 
responsibility as offenders ‘are not required to face up to what they have done’. 
Instead ‘their liberty can be restricted’ in the community. It said that ‘making young 
people face up to their offending and its consequences has been one of the most 
successful features of the intermediate treatment schemes for young offenders’, and 
‘most young offenders grow out of crime … even a short period of custody is quite 
likely to confirm them as criminals’. It introduced the concept of ‘just deserts’ for 
offenders. 
 
In interview Lord Hurd told me that he could not recollect a decline in custody of 
young offenders during his period as Home Secretary (1985 - 89), and that this was 
not a real intent of the policy, nor was there ‘any specific imperative’ from youth 
justice experience. However, after the 1987 election he felt he  
‘had more time to think philosophically, as to how to explain to the 
Conservative party conference that prison was not a magic cure for crime and 
had great disadvantages’, and that to ‘find ways of punishing people while 
safeguarding the community without locking them up or removing their 
responsibilities  was much more complicated. That phrase in the White Paper, 
that prison is just a way of making people worse, did summarise the message’  
(personal interview). 
 
The ideas in the Green Paper were then developed at a Home Office conference at 
Ditchley Park (Home Office, 1989f), where John Patten suggested ideas of 
sufficiency and proportionality in sentencing. It was noted that ‘prison is an 
expensive, wasteful means of dealing with offenders’, and that ‘punishment in the 
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community’ should be the norm. 
 
This led to a White Paper in February 1990, Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public 
(Home Office, 1990a) setting out the wider philosophy within which the government 
intended to legislate. This said that ‘nobody now regards imprisonment, in itself, as an 
effective means of reform for most prisoners’, and that prison is ‘an expensive way of 
making bad people worse’. Accordingly,  
‘so far as possible, young offenders should not be sentenced to custody, since 
this is likely to confirm them in a criminal career … since 1983, the number of 
young offenders under 17 sentenced to custody has been halved and there has 
been no discernible increase in the number of offences committed by juveniles’.  
 
The White Paper also said that ‘in all parts of the country there are good, demanding 
and constructive community programmes for juvenile offenders who need intensive 
supervision’. 
 
Another Home Office conference at Shrigley Hall in July 1990 (Home Office, 1990h) 
heard David Faulkner refer to ‘the reduction in known offending amongst juveniles’ 
and a fall in the proportionate use of custody for them, but was also presented with 
highly sceptical comments from David Thomas about the impact of section 1(4) of the 
1982 Act and about the overall philosophy of the White Paper. 
 
Patten believed that intensive IT had shown some success, which he repeatedly put 
forward during the passage of the 1988 CJA, and was to continue to promote 
(Hansard, 1989b; 1990a; Patten, 1992). In 1987 he said (Hansard, 1987a): 
‘it is the government’s policy to encourage more use of non-custodial measures 
for offenders under 21. There has been a positive response to this approach with 
juvenile offenders under 17, and the government are considering how the use of 
such measures might be developed for 17 to 20-year-olds’. 
  203 
He announced grants to NACRO and National Children’s Homes [hereafter NCH] to 
develop alternatives to custody for that age group (Hansard, 1988b). He told the 
Probation Journal that ‘IT has been a rip-roaring success … we are trying to build on 
that kind of approach’ with older offenders (Stone & Patten, 1988), and made it clear 
that ‘punishment in the community’ was building on work done to reduce the number 
of juveniles sentenced to custody (Patten, 1988b).  This was echoed by Douglas Hurd 
(1988) in an address to magistrates, in which he said that the use of custody for 17 to 
20 year olds ‘contrasts sharply with the success we have had in reducing the number 
of juveniles who receive custodial sentences, particularly since the development of 
intermediate treatment schemes’. Similar messages were promoted by David Faulkner 
(1986; 1987).  
 
In interviews with me both Lord Hurd and Loraine Gelsthorpe acknowledged David 
Faulkner’s role, Hurd saying that Faulkner had opened up the Home Office to 
influences from outside, did a lot of listening and acted as umpire (personal 
interviews). Rod Morgan, later to become Chair of the Youth Justice Board at the time 
that I interviewed him, told me (personal interview) that 
‘In the1980s, David Faulkner had a discussion group throughout most of the 
decade which, as far as I can fathom, was unique in civil service history, in the 
sense that he decided to have this group that met approximately every two 
months, half of whom were insiders, civil servants, engaged in policy, and half 
of whom were external, researchers who had an interest in this area of policy. 
We used to meet at NACRO and we took it in turns – insider and outsider - to 
introduce a discussion as to an aspect of policy. That group discussed most of 
what emerged as the Criminal Justice Act 1991, for about 5 years. Members 
included myself, Andrew Ashworth, Tony Bottoms, Vivien Stern, Andrew 
Rutherford, David Downes and others. A lot of the so-called ‘justice’ principles, 
which informed the Act, were thrashed out in that discussion group. This group 
had always been viewed with suspicion in Whitehall’. 
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In interview, Faulkner said that he was 
 ‘trying to introduce some coherent principles into sentencing, rather than just 
to reduce the prison population, which is how it came to be perceived. The 
things I would like that period to be remembered for were the idea that you deal 
with crime as much as, if not more outside the criminal justice system, 
alongside attempts to reinforce ideas of due process, fairness and consistency’. 
 
Opposition to ‘Punishment in the Community’ from within the probation service was 
voiced even before the proposals were published (Allan, 1988), with Beaumont 
(1988a) calling them ‘a major transformation in ethos and working principles’, and 
Celnick (1988) claiming that they would not reduce the prison population, something 
reiterated in NAPO’s immediate press statement on the day of publication of the 
Green Paper (NAPO News, 1988c). Beaumont (1988b) argued that the reduction in 
custody for young offenders was due to demographic fall, a fall in youth crime and 
increased cautioning, and not because of intensive community sentences. Allan (1989) 
argued that there was no similar consensus about sentencing in the adult courts to that 
in the juvenile courts, and Cameron (1988) that the only way to reduce custody was 
via restrictions on sentencers. Stopard (1990) echoed this, saying that the proposals 
left little scope for probation. Mathiesen (1988) said that it was ‘ill-advised to try to 
imitate in the community the characteristics of custody’. 
 
NAPO saw the proposals as an attack on probation officers and an ‘irrelevant evasion 
of the real issues … wrong solutions to the wrong problems’, which would actually 
increase custody, not reduce it.  They argued that the ‘key factor’ in the declining use 
of custody for juvenile offenders 
‘has been the reduction in the number of offenders passing through the courts, 
partly because of demographic changes and partly because of increased use of 
cautioning’ (NAPO, 1988: 17) 
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and this would be more difficult to achieve with young adults. The government were 
‘inconsistent’, ‘afraid’, and ‘purposeless’, said NAPO (1988), and the editor of their 
journal wrote an ‘obituary’ for probation (Stone, 1988). As ‘intensive probation 
schemes have been unsuccessful in the past’ the new proposals were unlikely to 
reduce the use of custody, according to their assistant general secretary (Fletcher, 
1988; NAPO News, 1988a), and were more likely to increase custody (Social Work 
Today, 1990a; 1990b).  
 
In 1988, the NAPO Annual Conference voted to oppose and campaign against 
‘Punishment, Custody and the Community’ (NAPO News, 1988b) following  
recommendations from their National Executive Committee for a ‘campaign of 
straightforward opposition’ (NAPO News, 1988d), and a lobby of parliament was 
deemed successful (NAPO News, 1989).  In 1989 they launched a ‘Hands Off The 
Probation Service’ campaign (Fletcher, 1989). Over 1,000 probation officers lobbied 
MPs against the Criminal Justice Bill (Social Work Today, 1989a). John Roberts, 
NAPO chair, told their national conference that the government was trying ‘to 
replicate the aims and philosophy of custodial sentencing in the community’, and that 
punishment in the community ‘will not reduce the prison population’ but be ‘a 
tripwire into custody’ (Social Work Today, 1989b), a claim he was to repeat in 1990 
(Social Work Today, 1990c), and which was echoed by Fletcher (1990). In 1990, the 
union again voted to campaign against punishment in the community and ballot for 
industrial action, a national day of action and another lobby of parliament (NAPO 
News, 1990; Social Work Today, 1990c). Cameron (1991) recommended that 
probation officers refuse to cooperate with the 1991 CJA, something that NAPO then 
threatened to carry out (Downey, 1992).  
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In contrast was the more sympathetic response of ACOP to the proposals (ACOP, 
1988) who invited John Patten to come and speak to them. This led to conflict 
between ACOP and NAPO (Geary, 1988), with NAPO issuing a press release 
attacking the decision of ACOP (NAPO News, 1988e) to meet with Patten. 
 
Lord Soley felt that NAPO  
‘made several very deep strategic mistakes – oppose almost anything that was 
designed to reduce the prison population on the slightly purist ground that 
prison shouldn’t be used anyway …. If you want to reduce your influence on 
either political party in power, then stick your fingers in their eyes whenever 
they try to introduce reforms designed to reduce the prison population …. 
NAPO was not seen as a pressure group with a good sense of reality’ (personal 
interview). 
 
 
Lord Hurd told me that he was upset and surprised by the reaction of the probation 
service: 
‘it was perverse – they were in favour of the main approach but didn’t want 
their own “purity” affected – grown up people have to live past that point. As a 
result they took themselves out of the main argument’ (personal interview). 
 
 
David Faulkner told me that he 
 ‘never understood probation service hostility to the 1991 Act … part of the 
problem was the way it was sold politically … as being more punishment than 
less. Barbara Hudson, for example, was hostile to the Act, but in the light of 
what happened afterwards I think she would now think that proportionality can 
work and was intended to work as a limitation to custody. The aim had been to 
get probation centre stage and have it taken seriously’ (personal interview). 
 
For Frances Crook, Director of the Howard League (personal interview) it was the 
conflict between NAPO and ACOP which was remembered from this time, and the 
totally ineffective Central Council of Probation Committees. Norman Tutt said that, 
apart from Hampshire and Manchester, probation were ‘very marginal’ to juvenile 
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justice: ‘the idea of intensive supervision was an anathema to many in the service’ 
(personal interview). 
 
Barry Sheerman MP was the Labour Party’s shadow Home Affairs spokesman at that 
time, but said that he inherited little policy from his predecessors, other than a small 
policy base within the Labour Campaign for Criminal Justice pressure group. He said 
that he had little knowledge of what had been happening in juvenile justice in the 
1980s and the decline of the CHEs. He told me that the party was sympathetic to 
punishment in the community, and that there was a cross-party wish (‘a culture’) to 
reduce custody and develop alternatives. He thought that the Conservatives had 
developed the concept of ‘just deserts’ in order to appeal to traditional Tory values, 
and invented the notion of punishment in the community ‘because they were trying 
out things that their traditional supporters would be worried about’ (personal 
interview).  
 
Ministers grew increasingly frustrated with probation opposition to the Bill, with John 
Patten criticising ‘dialectical linguistic arguments’ about what probation officers were 
actually doing (Jarvis & Patten, 1989), a focus on ‘semantics, not reality’ (Patten, 
1990), and hang-ups about language (Stone & Patten, 1988). He was himself 
immediately accused of ‘playing with words’ by NAPOs assistant general secretary 
(Beaumont, 1990). The civil servant with lead responsibility for probation, after the 
passage of the Act, attacked the service for what she called its whingeing, doom-
mongering, self-destructiveness, self-righteousness, arrogance and inwardness, with a 
belief that it was the only service with ethical standards (Drew, 1992).   
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Lorraine Gelsthorpe thought that 
 ‘probation was still holding on to the idea of the importance of working with 
offenders who were still seen to be in need – a residual social work philosophy 
within probation, whereas social work with young offenders had bought into 
system management. But probation also liked working with fewer young 
offenders, though many also resented the takeover of this work by SSDs’ 
(personal interview). 
 
The 1991 Criminal Justice Act 
 
The ideas contained in Punishment in the Community were implemented in the 1991 
CJA. The new Home Secretary, David Waddington, introduced the Bill: 
‘we are in many respects setting out to extend over the whole age range the 
requirements imposed on the courts so far as young offenders are concerned in 
the Criminal Justice Acts 1982 and 1988, requirements which have already led 
to substantially fewer young people being given custodial sentences … we 
expect our proposals to lead to a fall in the use of imprisonment and therefore to 
a fall in the prison population’ (Hansard, 1990b: cols 139 – 140). 
 
He told me that he had ‘a very easy ride in parliament’ (personal interview). 
 
The Act created a new sentencing structure in which custody could only be used if the 
offence was serious or to protect the public from serious harm. Non-custodial 
penalties would become ‘community sentences’ and would also be seen as 
‘punishment’, commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. For juvenile 
offenders, the minimum age for custody was raised to 15, and 17 year olds were 
brought into the juvenile justice system for most purposes. 
 
Many saw the Act as revolutionary. For Ashworth (2001: 62) it was the ‘first coherent 
legislative structure for English sentencing …. What many commentators have 
regarded as a veritable feast of sentencing law’. However, it was to be overturned 
very quickly, as set out in Chapter 6 (see below: pages 225ff). Ashworth said that it 
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was ‘devoured by the judiciary’ as if it was ‘a rather significant amuse-bouche, with 
the Court of Appeal destroying some provisions through wrecking interpretations’. He 
also noted that David Thomas, responsible for instructing the judiciary on the Act, 
saw it as ‘a largely irrelevant exercise in teaching grandmother to suck eggs’ (ibid: 76, 
citing Thomas, 1992). Kenneth Baker, replacing Waddington as Home Secretary, 
responded to a parliamentary question asking ‘is not it apparent that the soft approach 
that has been advocated by the so-called experts for years has patently failed, that the 
day that we abolished approved schools and borstals was a sad one’ with the rejoinder 
that ‘it is easier to help them grow out of crime if they are kept out of custody’ 
(Hansard, 1991b). 
 
Looking back, Lorraine Gelsthorpe noted that: 
‘Hurd, Waddington and Clarke all seem quite liberal in putting a positive frame 
on desert and proportionality. The Act was seen as a de-escalating, down-
tariffing thing. They did not bargain for magisterial and judicial practice which 
circumvented the best intentions …. There did seem to be a link between 
juvenile justice and just deserts philosophy – the 91 Act was about managing 
the prison population in a way similar to juvenile justice’ (personal interview). 
 
Cedric Fullwood (personal interview) did not think that the 1991 Act was influenced 
by juvenile justice, but by concern about the rising adult prison population. In contrast 
Andrew Rutherford (personal interview) considered that ‘juvenile justice was leading 
what might happen to adults’. This was certainly the view of one of the leading 
practice guides to the Act (Leng and Manchester, 1991: 2 and 14), who suggested that 
the new sentencing framework ‘seeks to build on this experience with young 
offenders and to extend it to adults’, and that the restrictions on custodial sentencing 
in the 1982 and 1988 Acts ‘have led to substantially fewer young offenders being 
given custodial sentences’. 
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Sentencing of juvenile offenders: 1987 – 1992 
 
Throughout this period the trends identified in the earlier parts of the 1980s continued 
and are set out in Tables 69 to 76. The number of known juvenile offenders had fallen 
from 176,000 in 1985 to 99,000 in 1989 (Barclay & Turner, 1991). The number 
sentenced to custody continued to fall, despite the abolition of the care order, such 
that less than 2,000 children and young people were removed from home as a 
sentence (Tables 69, 71 and 82). Cautions continued to rise and the number taken to 
court to fall, to the extent that to present percentages for disposals of those cautioned 
and sentenced become meaningless. Within court, the proportion fined fell at the 
expense of other community sentences. 
 
Cautioning 
 
Cautioning continued to increase nationally (Wilkinson & Evans, 1990). While Table 
77 shows that the number of young people cautioned remained fairly steady between 
1987 and 1992, with 79,700 males aged 10 – 16 cautioned in 1987 and 84,600 in 
1992, these figures mask the increase in the percentage of known offenders cautioned 
due to the fall in arrests, as shown in Table 78, such that 90 per cent of boys, 71 per 
cent of young men, 98 per cent of girls and 89 per cent of young women who were 
arrested and charged were now being cautioned.  There continued to be major 
variations between police forces, and there was a national increase in the cautioning 
of adult males from four per cent of cautions and convictions in 1981 to 10 per cent in 
1988 (Evans & Wilkinson, 1990). 
 
In 1988 the Metropolitan Police (1988) supported developments in cautioning and 
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issued guidance for multi-agency panels, and the development of cautioning in 
London can be shown in Tables 79 and 80, with less than a half of all those dealt with 
being prosecuted. 
 
A Home Office paper in 1988 encouraged the expansion of cautioning to adult 
offenders (Home Office, 1988b). There was continuing concern about cautioning 
from some legal commentators (e.g. Sanders, 1986; 1988), criticism from probation 
(Roche, 1986)  and from some magistrates (Browning, 1987; The Magistrate, 1987; 
1988; Magistrates Association, 1988: 4; Block, 1989; Grimshaw, 1989; Rose, 1989; 
Widdowson, 1989) with some seeing it as a threat to the existence of the juvenile 
court, making the court ‘an endangered species … what must a juvenile do, and how 
many times, before he is brought to court?’ (Biggins, 1987). In 1988 the AGM of the 
Magistrates Association (1988: 4) called for restrictions on cautioning. Some thought 
that cautioning panels were taking over the power of the juvenile court (Grimshaw, 
1989). 
 
Savage (1988) marshalled the arguments against inter agency cautioning well:  
1. society actually wants more punitive sentencing 
2.  retribution, deterrence, public protection and reparation to society were not 
given cognizance in the diversionary framework 
3. police were being ‘forcibly encouraged’ to caution, against their instincts 
4.  cautioning is class biased  
5. young people are under pressure to admit offences in order to get a caution 
and avoid trial 
6. caution-plus should be processed through the courts  
7. there is no limit to the number of cautions a juvenile can receive  
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8. it is creating ‘alternative courts’ and an end to the role of juvenile courts, 
which should be given the power to caution formally.  
 
Savage’s article provoked a strong response from two of the leading members of 
NACRO’s YOT (Burgin & Anderson, 1988).  
 
Evans (1991) noted strong hostility to cautioning from police and magistrates in 
Northampton, where cautioning schemes were at their most advanced (The special 
circumstances of Northampton will be discussed more fully later: see below: pages 
357ff). 
 
The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE, 1990; 1992) claimed that more ethnic 
minority young people were prosecuted than cautioned when compared to non-
minorities, and that this was not due to offence seriousness or offence history. Only a 
half as many Afro-Caribbean youths admitted the offence as did white youths. (The 
Commission did not seem to understand that there was a link here: a caution could not 
be given unless the accused admitted the offence: if more black youths denied the 
allegation then less of them were likely to be cautioned). 
 
A Home Office Circular of 1990 (Home Office, 1990b) set out national standards for 
cautioning and supported the involvement of social services and probation in the 
development of cautioning strategy and objectives with the police in juvenile liaison 
panels. It supported cautioning plus and saw the courts as a last resort. In this, it was 
responding to very positive support for cautioning from the Association of Chief 
Police Officers [hereafter ACPO] (1989: cited in NACRO, 1992a) and the Magistrates 
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Association (1990).  
 
The decade ended with a strong statement in support of cautioning and caution plus 
schemes from the Home Affairs Committee (House of Commons, 1990: Vol. I) in 
their enquiry into the CPS, where the CPS themselves (CPS, 1989; 1990: 17 and 25), 
the Metropolitan Police, NACRO, and the Howard League all gave evidence in 
support of cautioning, though NACRO had some reservations about caution plus 
(House of Commons, 1990, Vol. II: Q268 ff).  
 
Absolute and Conditional Discharges 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the use of discharges continued to be one of the most popular 
sentences used by magistrates, whereas with the growth in cautioning they could well 
have been used less, if magistrates had believed that young people had already been 
given a chance in the past. So 52 per cent of boys aged under 14 who appeared in 
court were discharged (Table 70), and 35 per cent of young men aged 14 – 16 (Table 
72), while 67 per cent of the 244 girls under 14 who appeared in court were 
discharged (Table 74) and 57 per cent of those aged 14 – 16 (Table 76). 
 
Attendance Centre 
 
The Attendance Centre also remained popular, being given to a greater proportion of 
sentenced offenders than in the past, with 20 per cent of boys and 15 per cent of 
young men receiving this disposal in 1992, up from 19 per cent and 13 per cent 
respectively (Tables 70 and 72) 
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Fine 
 
The decline in the use of the fine, from 16 to 10 per cent of boys under 14 and from 
32 to 16 per cent of young men aged 14 – 16 between 1987 and 1992 (Tables 70 and 
72) may have been due to the economic crisis facing the poorer classes during the 
Thatcher governments, and recognition by magistrates that many of those that were 
before them, and their families, were already living in poverty. SERs would often 
mention family income and urge the court not to impose additional financial hardship 
on the family. 
 
Probation 
 
By the late 1980s, the probation service had ceased to have much involvement with 
juvenile offenders, with statutory supervision now being held in the main by SSDs.  
Raynor (1996) noted that equivalent developments to work with juveniles never took 
off in probation service work with adults, suggesting that this was because probation 
officers had more autonomy, which meant that ideas such as a policy on SER 
recommendations encountered resistance. The probation service was also slow to 
adopt information management systems. He pointed out that probation officers were 
sceptical of government initiatives to reduce custody, believing that they were being 
‘set up to fail’, and that their discussions on Punishment in the Community were more 
concerned with its punitive rhetoric than with the underlying strategy, becoming even 
more confused when they saw that the 1991 CJA was clearly designed to reduce 
imprisonment. 
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Within the probation service, there were some misgivings about what was happening 
in juvenile justice. Cedric Fullwood, for example (personal interview) told me that:  
‘while I was supportive of probation officers advocating for alternatives to 
custody, this was not to the extreme of having a policy of total opposition to 
custody, and one of the big debates that I had was to convince magistrates that 
probation would recommend custody when appropriate’. 
 
He also referred to cautioning schemes for juveniles ‘allowing 10 or 11 cautions 
before taking a young person to court’, which was to become a major part of the 
criticism of cautioning in the 1990s. 
 
Section 1(4) of the 1982 Act 
 
Bodies such as NACRO continued to publicise case law and data around appeals  
against custodial sentencing and Court of Appeal guidance on the application of 
section 1(4) Updating his earlier data (see above: page 151) to 1989 Stanley (1992) 
demonstrated that throughout the decade between 62 and 74 per cent of appeals 
against DC sentences resulted in a community sentence, 24 to 43 per cent of appeals 
against YC sentences, and 58 per cent of appeals against sentences to a Young 
Offender Institution [hereafter YOI]  (see NACRO, 1989f). 
 
By 1991 the criteria restricting custodial sentencing in the 1982 CJA were being cited 
as influential on government thinking as they developed the 1991 CJA (Cavadino M., 
1991).  
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Social Enquiry Reports 
 
By the late 1980s, SERs had become strategic documents for many youth justice 
practitioners, comfortable with making direct suggestions to magistrates about the 
most appropriate sentence (see Bell, 1990). Yet a study in Manchester towards the 
end of the decade still found that 47 per cent of those receiving a custodial sentence 
did not have an alternative offered in the SER (NACRO, 1990b), and noted a boy 
being recommended for custody as ‘he is an irish traveller’! A follow up report a year 
later (NACRO, 1992b) found the same lack of recommendations, or even sentencing 
to custody without an SER being prepared. Declan Kerr (personal interview) told me 
that he had joined NACRO’s Juvenile Crime Team in Manchester in 1989, where the 
aim was to try and change the culture, as part of which they had commissioned this 
survey, with  support from Cedric Fullwood, the Chief Probation Officer at the time:  
‘You’d get SERs that said “we have no alternative to offer to custody as this 
young person has exhausted everything” but then you’d look through their 
record and they had had very few sentencing options’ (Declan Kerr: personal 
interview). 
 
(In my own job at the time, I had tabled a House of Commons question through Barry 
Sheerman MP, the answer to which identified  that 23 per cent of all young people in 
England and Wales receiving custodial sentences emanated from the juvenile courts 
in Greater Manchester (Hansard, 1989a). 
 
School reports 
 
The campaign to improve the quality and change the style of school reports to courts 
did not succeed everywhere. McLaughlin (1988) found that 30 per cent of school 
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reports in Stockport juvenile court recommended custody.  Brown (1991) found that, 
though magistrates expressed negative views about school reports, they still gave 
them weight, assuming the author knew the child better than the SER author. 
McLaughlin (1990) discovered that 89 per cent of school reports were still not being 
shown to parents or children, while Macmillan (1991) assessed that schools input into 
juvenile liaison panels in Cleveland tended to be very negative. 
 
Supervision orders 
 
The proportion of supervision orders made by the courts suggested that magistrates 
retained confidence in them, with an increase between 1987 and 1992 from 14 to 17 
per cent of sentences on boys aged  under 14 (Table 70) and from 15 to 19 per cent 
for young men aged 14 to 16 over the same period (Table 72). A large proportion of 
these would have been with IT, supervised activities or directions to attend LAC 83/3 
projects, but this data was not collected in such a format. 
 
Care orders 
 
Home Office Minister David Mellor said that ‘it is inappropriate that care should be 
used as a punishment in criminal courts’ (Community Care, 1988), and the care order 
as a sentence was abolished by the 1989 Children Act. Tables 69 and 71 show that the 
continual decline of its use in the early part of the decade continued throughout the 
1980s, so that by the time it was no longer possible to order it (following 
implementation of the 1989 Children Act), its use had already withered away. In an 
inquiry into residential child care, Utting (1991:11) found that the proportion of 
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children in the CHEs on 7(7) care orders fell from 55 per cent in 1980 to 15 per cent 
in 1990. 
 
Residential child care 
 
Just as the use of the care order declined, so the placement of children and young 
people in CHEs, for whatever reason, also continued to fall (Table 81), and various 
CHEs requested the Home Office to take over their running (David Faulkner: 
personal interview), to which the Home Office showed no interest. It has only 
recently come to light that the DHSS Inspectorate had investigated a large number of 
complaints of physical and sexual abuse in the approved schools and CHEs, which 
may have led to their reluctance to defend them (A large number of files in the 
National Archives in sections BN 29 and BN 62 have recently been released after 
being kept confidential for 30 years, yet a large proportion of them have been 
withdrawn from release because they contain investigations of abuse). Warwickshire 
decided in 1987 to move out of the use of all forms of residential care completely 
(AJJUST, 1987), following its earlier decision not to use CHEs (see above: page 119). 
 
Secure units 
 
An Inspection of YTCs found a ‘lack of a single, clear authoritative … treatment 
model at St. Charles’ (Social Services Inspectorate, 1988). A series of studies of the 
YTCs commissioned from the Dartington Social Research Unit also raised concerns 
about their functioning (see Millham et al., 1989; Bullock et al., 1998). In 1991, 
following an independent inquiry, the government made a Ministerial Statement on St 
Charles’ (Hansard, 1991a) in which it admitted the injection of sedative drugs without 
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consent, a prolonged and unjustified use of separation, exclusion of a young person 
from her own review, and stated that a separate SSI report had stated that these were 
not isolated incidents, blaming poor management of the centre (see Fennell, 1992). 
The Dartington research found the YTCs to be dominated by ‘lack lustre, temporary, 
crisis driven palliatives’, which were not needs-led, though very few of the young 
people behaved in unexpected ways and their outcomes were predictable. They 
commented on the arrogance of the management at St Charles, who created the crises 
referred to above.  
 
A government report disclosed long-standing problems at Aycliffe secure unit in 
Durham, the largest children’s home in the country that included 44 secure beds 
(HMSO, 1994b), following an Inspection by the Social Services Inspectorate which 
had noted heavy use of physical restraint, and a ‘confrontational culture’, and 
indicated that there was no evidence to justify the claim by the institution that the 
residents were becoming more difficult to manage. 
 
Custody 
 
By 1990 the number of young offenders  sentenced to (Table 83) and admitted to 
custodial institutions during the year had fallen below 2,000 for the first time, 
dropping to under 1500 admissions in 1992 (see Table 82). On the 30th June, 1989 
only 590 juveniles were in prison (Barclay & Turner, 1991), and there were more 
closures of juvenile institutions. 
 
In 1991 the Home Secretary abolished detention in a YOI for 14 year old boys, as it 
had already been removed for 14 year old girls and the government was being 
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threatened with a sexual discrimination case (Fielding & Fowles, 1991a). 
 
In Hampshire, where parts of the Woodlands model were being implemented across 
the whole county and not just in Basingstoke, custodial sentences fell from 185 in 
1981 to seven in 1991, while the large city of Southampton had no custodial sentences 
between 1988 and 1991 (Wade, 1992 and 1996). 
 
As Bottomley & Fielding (1986) argued, by 1986 there developed ‘unprecedented 
disquiet’ about institutions for young offenders. This was to continue over the 
following years, with child deaths in custody (Grindrod & Black, 1989; AJJUST, 
1990), poor regimes and conditions (Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1989; 
1991; Fielding & Fowles, 1991c; HMSO, 1991c), racism (Fielding & Fowles, 1991b) 
and suicides (Fielding & Fowles, 1992).  
 
Care and custody 
 
The abolition of the care order did not result in a compensating increase in sentences 
to custody, and by 1992 the total number of children and young people removed from 
home for offences had fallen to 1,753  (Tables 83 and 84). The number of young 
women sentenced to custody also dropped dramatically over this period, reaching just 
31 in 1992 (Table 84). 
 
Departmental Responsibility 
 
From the mid-1980s the DHSS began to focus its energy on a major review of child 
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care law, which would eventually lead to the 1989 Children Act (Maclean & 
Kurczewski, 2011) give a detailed account of the development of this piece of 
legislation). This freed up space for the Home Office, which regained control of 
juvenile justice policy. However, the presence of John Patten at the DHSS during the 
early 1980s and his experience of intensive IT and the LAC 83/3 initiative would 
inform Home Office policy when he went there, and was highly influential in the 
development of the 1991 CJA. From this time onwards juvenile justice policy was to 
reside solely with the Home Office. 
 
Juvenile Justice as the 1991 CJA was implemented in 1992 
 
By 1992 some very strong claims for juvenile justice were being put forward based on 
the decline in young people entering the juvenile court, with the Howard League 
claiming that ‘the success of formal cautioning of juveniles by the police … 
represents one of the most striking features of criminal justice practice in England and 
Wales over recent years’ (House of Commons, 1990: Vol. II: 93 - 94). According to 
Bill Utting (personal interview) 
 ‘by 1990 the DHSS would claim that the IT programme (LAC 83/3) had been a 
distinct success and was claiming credit for the reduction in the prison 
population and levels of delinquency …. Diversion, cautioning and IT had made 
a major contribution to this’.  
 
Attempts were being made to apply the lessons of IT to child care (Bilson and Thorpe, 
1988; Kerslake and Cramp, 1988) and the adult criminal justice system (Ball, 1988; 
NACRO, 1989c; Holt & Wargent, 1989).  
 
Giller (1989a) concluded that the decline in custody could be attributed to ‘enhanced 
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professional practice’ rather than legalistic changes. IT was also assessed as cost-
effective, and was seen as developing alternative to custody provision ‘in spite’ of 
financial pressures and incentives (Knapp & Robertson, 1989). 
 
Others were trying to target those areas which still sentenced young people to 
custody, such as in the North West, where the IT Fund arranged a series of events 
designed to promote the development of alternative to custody schemes and provide 
funding for them.  
 
Shaw (1987) felt that ‘in the case of juveniles’ the abolition of imprisonment ‘is 
actually within our grasp’. NACRO (1991b) suggested abolishing custody for 15 year 
olds, planning to abolish it for 16 and 17 year olds, and extending juvenile justice 
practice to young adults (NACRO, 1989d). The AJJ (1990) called for the ‘total 
abolition of prison department custody for juvenile offenders’. Rutherford (1992b: 
139) saw juvenile justice as being ‘at the dawn of a new and promising era’, in which 
optimistic and confident practitioners were shaping events. 
 
The Audit Commission (1989a: 44) advocated extending the lessons of juvenile 
justice to young adults, and the Penal Affairs Consortium (1989) suggested extending 
the statutory restrictions on custody to adults, making them ‘similar to those for young 
offenders’. 
 
Gibson & Bell (1992) began to detect a rise in youth custodial sentencing in early 
1992 but the statement that ‘an important thrust of Government policy … has been to 
increase the effectiveness of community penalties and ensure that custody is used only 
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when necessary, especially for young offenders’ (Home Office, 1991a) still seemed to 
indicate a commitment to avoiding custody when necessary.  
 
However, between 1989 and 1992 official crime rates increased by 40 per cent, which 
Downes and Rock (2011), citing Dickinson (1994) and Wells (1995), link to the 
recession, even though this was not accepted by the Conservative government, who 
denied a link between crime and unemployment, instead believing that the crime rate 
was linked to personal morality, inadequate parenting, poor discipline in schools and 
increased opportunities for crime. While there was no clear evidence of rising juvenile 
crime, there was growing media and public belief that this was also increasing. 
 
Summary 
 
By 1992 it appeared that the lessons of juvenile justice had been learnt by government 
and were being applied to adult offenders, with a belief that it was possible to reduce 
crime and recidivism by implementing community sentences for many serious adult 
offenders. The disappearance of custodial institutions for juvenile offenders seemed 
possible, while the removal of the care order for offending had had no impact other 
than the continual closure of CHEs. DC’s had gone, and many former young offender 
institutions in the prison system had been converted to adult prisons, showing that a 
decarceration policy could realise significant financial savings. Decisions about 
arrested juveniles were being shared with a range of agencies by the CPS, and their 
code of practice strongly discouraged prosecution of young offenders. While the 
concept of ‘intermediate treatment’ was going out of fashion, many of the models that 
had evolved from it were part and parcel of everyday juvenile justice practice, even 
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though the 1991 CJA changed the language. Organisations like the AJJ and NACRO 
seemed to have the ear and respect of government and many juvenile justice 
practitioners considered that they were just one more push away from total abolition 
of juvenile custody, except for grave crimes. 
 
In terms of the Kingdon model of change,  the problem stream and the political stream 
had combined: there was an acceptance/recognition by government that there was a 
solution to  the problem of juvenile crime that was effective and cost saving, 
providing an opportunity to close down institutions and re-allocate their use. Media 
seemed sympathetic as well. David Faulkner  had seized the window of opportunity to 
convince the Home Secretary and his deputy Minister that the developments in 
juvenile justice could be transferred to the rest of the criminal justice system and form 
the basis of the 1991 CJ Act.  
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Chapter 6 
 Youth Justice in England and Wales 1993 - 1996: The Return of 
Incarceration 
 
Initially, the 1991 CJA led to a real fall in custody of about 20 per cent (see Gibson et 
al., 1994a), even though it  was never allowed to settle, becoming castrated by the 
1993 Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act (HMSO, 1993), and virtually overturned by 
the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (HMSO, 1994a). In early 1993 a 
Ministerial Statement announced plans for a secure training order for children aged 
over 12 and for giving magistrates the power to sentence directly to secure 
accommodation (Hansard, 1993), which was followed by calls for the overturning of 
the 1991 CJA.  
 
NAPO did not feel able to give any credit for the fall in custody to the 1991 CJA, or 
the use of alternative to custody sentences, but instead suggested that it was due to 
demoralisation of the police, cuts in police overtime, and a fall in prosecutions 
(Fletcher, 1993). They launched a campaign for higher wages for probation officers 
because they had to implement the Act (Napo News, 1993a), noting that the 1991 Act 
was in trouble due to the governments’ lack of commitment to it (Schofield, 1993). 
However, too late, this attitude then changed, as they criticised the Home Office for 
amending the Act with the 1993 CJA, belatedly acknowledging that  the 1991 Act had 
‘introduced a coherent legislative framework for sentencing’ (NAPO News, 1993b). 
 
Following the murder of a child, James Bulger, by two 10 year old boys, ‘the most 
major shift towards punishment in youth justice policy this century’ (Littlechild, 
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1997: see also Asquith, 1996) was embarked upon, and it became ‘a turning point in 
penal sensibilities’ (Liebling, 2008). Haines & Drakeford (1998: 108) note the 
‘remarkable repudiation by government’ of an approach that had been ‘painstakingly 
assembled and happily endorsed by that same government’, and how the actions of 
those following the government’s own advice were ridiculed. Michael Howard, 
determined not to be embarrassed at a Conservative party conference like his 
predecessors as Home Secretary, claimed that ‘prison works’. His agenda was helped 
by a media campaign to undermine the 1991 CJA (which had contained the notion of 
fines being related to the offender’s income, not the offence, which had really upset 
the political right), which highlighted case examples of children who seemed to be 
outwith the police’s powers: ‘rat boy’, ‘balaclava boy’ and ‘bail bandits’ became 
common public enemies. 
 
Windlesham (1996) attributed a great deal of the undermining of the 1991 Act to Lord 
Chief Justice Taylor, who had (Taylor, 1993) told a Scottish Law Society conference 
in 1993 that Scotland’s legal system’s greatest advantage was to have been spared the 
1991 Act. He argued that courts ‘should be concerned with deciding what sentence 
ought to be imposed rather than what sentence they are allowed to impose’. Setting 
out a powerful argument in favour of custody, he criticised the 1991 Act for creating 
‘a sentencing regime which is incomprehensible or unacceptable to right-thinking 
people generally’ and which had ‘emasculated’ the courts, preventing them from 
imprisoning a hard core of serious and persistent young offenders. Politicians should 
leave sentencing to the judges, he argued, and in an important Court of Appeal 
decision (R v Cox (1993) 2 All E R 21) he allowed ‘public opinion’ to be a relevant 
factor in sentencing decisions.  
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Windlesham (1996: 34) described the 1993 Act as ‘a victory for the judges’, pointing 
out that the successors to Douglas Hurd and John Patten (David Waddington and 
Kenneth Clarke) lacked any commitment to the 1991 Act, and created the framework 
that Michael Howard was subsequently able to build on.  
 
In interview, both Cedric Fullwood and Rod Morgan told me that Waddington had 
considered that David Faulkner was too powerful, and moved him away from his role.  
Rob Allen told me that Kenneth Clarke did not like the 1991 Act and thought the 
philosophy behind it ‘was all wrong’ (personal interview), as, according to his 
biographer (McSmith, 1994: 208), ‘the law discouraged any penalty more serious than 
a reprimand for a child under the age of sixteen caught committing a petty offence’. 
He also responded to police complaints about a small number of persistent young 
offenders.  
 
The highly publicised resignation of some magistrates over the 1991 Act (though 
Windlesham reckoned it to be only between 12 and 30) fed into the changed political 
climate. The Government accepted only one opposition amendment to the 1993 Act, 
while accepting over 200 of its own, and then Howard built on this groundwork to 
push the 1994 Act through parliament, with little opposition from Labour, following 
their change of policy on crime (see Windlesham, 1996, chapters 1 and 2). Defence of 
the 1991 Act by Faulkner (1993) fell on deaf ears. 
 
A significant document reflecting the change of mood at this time was a Report by the 
Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (1993a) on juvenile offenders. 
The Committee seemed to accept that juvenile crime was rising, and structured the 
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report accordingly, referring to ‘public concern about the level of juvenile crime’ and 
‘the apparent inability of the criminal justice system to deal adequately with it’ (ibid: 
7). Yet, according to the evidence submitted by the Home Office (House of 
Commons, 1993b: 1 - 41), the amount of crime juveniles were known to be 
responsible for had ‘fallen sharply over the last decade’, partly due to demographic 
change and an increase in informal warnings, but ‘there has been a real fall in the 
number of juvenile offenders … in part the product of policy changes introduced by 
the government’. They also said that ‘cautioning has proved successful’, with 87 per 
cent of those cautioned not reconvicted. Only 15 out of 36 police forces who 
responded to a questionnaire had ‘informal warning’ systems, and there was little 
evidence of repeat cautioning, with only three per cent of young offenders having 
received more than two cautions. Local community based sentencing initiatives 
‘almost certainly contributed to the substantial fall in the number of juvenile offenders 
under 17 receiving custodial sentences’. Whereas under 18 year olds had made up 26 
per cent of known offenders in 1981, in 1991 they only accounted for 17 per cent, 
while a 32 per cent fall in known offenders aged 10 – 17 could not be explained by 
demographic factors. The sharpest fall was for 10 – 13 year olds, for whom the 
numbers in the population did not change between 1985 and 1991.  
 
This explanation for the fall in juvenile crime was supported in evidence to the 
committee by the Howard League for Penal Reform (ibid: 140 – 153), The Justices 
Clerks Society (ibid: 154 – 155), NACRO (ibid: 161 – 170), NAPO (ibid: 173 – 176), 
NCH (ibid: 182 – 190), NITFED (ibid: 191 – 192), PRT (ibid 199 – 202), and the 
Standing Committee for Youth Justice (ibid: 215 – 220). 
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However, the new shadow home secretary, Tony Blair, and shadow home affairs 
spokesman Alun Michael told the committee that it was difficult to believe Home 
Office evidence that offending by young people was falling, and said that the claims 
that juvenile justice policy had been a recent success ‘simply does not ring true’ (ibid: 
66). 
 
ACPO submitted very influential statistics (House of Commons, 1993b: 63 - 73) 
which claimed that there was a major increase in juvenile offending, opposed 
cautioning, and called for a punitive residential disciplinary sentence for a growing 
hard core of persistent young offenders, to replace the vacuum created by ‘the 
abolition of remand homes (and) approved schools’, a call repeated in evidence from 
the Police Federation (ibid: 73 – 77), and the Council of HM Circuit Judges (ibid: 125 
- 126). ACPO’s reasoning was based on the following:  
 
1. the number of crimes reported to the police had increased 
2. the proportion of detected offences known to be committed by juveniles had 
fallen from 32 per cent to 22 per cent, but ‘the actual numbers are significantly 
higher’  
3. the proportion of juveniles in the population has fallen by 25 per cent; 
therefore if they had been born they would have committed 75,900 more 
crimes  
4. the proportion of reported crime detected had fallen from 37 per cent to 30 per 
cent between 1980 and 1990, so ‘assuming that the reduction occurred across 
all crime, irrespective of the age of the offender … the true rate of offending 
{by juveniles} has probably increased by 54 per cent’.  
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The confused nature of these arguments have been exposed by Rutherford (1999) and 
Sampson (1993), yet the Committee argued that they could not be ‘dismissed out of 
hand’ (House of Commons, 1993a: 9 - 10) and concluded that the solution to the 
statistical confusion was that there had been a massive rise in persistent young 
offenders.  
 
The Government also began to take more heed of bodies like Crime Concern, who 
were promoting a youth crime prevention agenda rather than direct work with 
adjudicated delinquents, arguing that this had ‘served to divert attention and resources 
from primary and secondary prevention’, which they defined as modification of 
criminogenic conditions in the physical and social environment, and early 
identification respectively (Bright, 1993: see also Findlay et al., 1990; Gill, 1992; 
Crime Concern, 1992 and Graham & Smith, 1993). 
 
A piece of research by the Home Office (Graham and Bowling, 1995) was seized on 
to justify many of the changes. This large self-report study of young people aged 14 – 
25 suggested that ‘growing out of crime’ was a simplification, as self-reported 
participation in property offences increased with age. Young men were not achieving 
independence, responsibility and maturity by the age of 25, because of delayed entry 
to the world of work due to the economic recession. Despite criticism that this 
research did not disprove the notion that young offenders grow out of crime 
(Cavadino et al., 1999: 183) it became part of conventional wisdom. 
 
Helen Edwards offered me some reasons why she thought that the culture changed, 
including the campaign about ‘bail bandits’ by the police (also mentioned to me by 
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Cedric Fullwood), the media portrayal of ‘balaclava boy’, the case of Jamie Bulger, 
the rhetoric on ‘prison works’, the politicisation of law and order, and the way that the 
victims movement ‘was portrayed by the media’.  She felt that this ‘changed the 
whole climate’, and generated a fear of crime disproportionate to its reality (personal 
interview).  Lorraine Gelsthorpe blamed it on  
‘media mischief … and the judiciary and magistrates felt that their powers and 
discretion had been curtailed … plus the Bulger case and the failure to look at 
what powers did exist to deal with grave child crimes. There was also the 
politicisation of criminal justice, with the parties trying to outsmart, outdo each 
other in terms of toughness’. She also thought that this needed to be seen in 
context of a ‘late modern social transformation, a culture of risk and 
globalisation, and British politicians looking to the USA rather than to Europe 
… the Netherlands, for example … because of political allegiances’ (personal 
interview). 
 
Vivien Stern thought that a  
 ‘consensus approach was replaced by a confrontational and politicised 
approach and the use of crime as a way of getting political brownie points … 
once a certain sort of right wing conservatism swept America it didn’t take long 
to jump over here …. What was interesting in juvenile justice was that the 
Thatcher government did you well for a number of years and there was a 
delayed effect of the new ideologies, but eventually even juvenile justice 
succumbed under Michael Howard’ (personal interview). 
 
Bill Utting blamed the change on the  
‘media-driven detestation of young offenders, picking on isolated cases and 
trying to persuade the public that this was the norm’ (personal interview). 
 
For Richard Kay, part of the reason for the collapse was that  
‘LAC 83/3 was built on sand. There was too much money sloshing around and 
even Rainer was guilty of applying for it! New schemes were starting all over 
the place, but there was little space for developing good models, and after a 
while confidence began to collapse – the rhetoric got ahead of the reality – 
there were no built-in evaluation systems in many projects – we were not good 
at demonstrating what worked. Also the reason for the brittleness of the 
initiative was because it was based so much around key people and we did not 
have models of what works clarified. Even within Rainer the Foundation and 
the IT Fund were not joined up and went their separate ways’. 
 
For Paul Cavadino, the 1991 Act ‘was very much in line with’ the thinking of the 
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1980s, with restricted criteria for custody, and ‘the early stages resulted in a 
substantial dip in the use of custody’. But then the political climate changed, and  
 
‘public discussion about young offenders changed round. The Bulger case was 
a key determinant even though it was irrelevant to the issues …. Home 
Secretaries from Ken Clarke onwards were not committed to the ’91 Act – to 
defending it – in fact they rubbished it. But the biggest thing was the change in 
climate. They were no longer, as John Patten, David Faulkner and Douglas 
Hurd had done, going out and selling the idea that there should be a more 
sparing use of custody, based on the evidence. Instead there was a media 
climate harsher towards young offenders and a political climate with Home 
Office ministers who were not prepared to take the same line. Then from when 
Michael Howard became Home Secretary the whole thing changed to ‘Prison 
Works’ (personal interview). 
 
According to Barry Sheerman, the fact that the Conservatives very nearly lost the 
1992 election was the significant reason for change, as the government set out to 
revise its policies feeling that it had become out of touch (personal interview).  
 
For David Faulkner, ‘the police will always bring about a juvenile crime crisis when 
they perceive a government attack on them’ (personal interview), though later in the 
interview he suggested that the main cause was Black Wednesday, when the financial 
markets collapsed:  
‘the point at which the Government lost so much credibility, coupled with 
Maastricht and the split in the Conservative party which had to be mended by 
finding some issue that would unite the party and was politically attractive. 
They had the excuses of the Bulger case and the police campaigns around 
offending, and the press gave Michael Howard the political platform to do what 
he did’. 
 
Faulkner (1995: 63) was scathing about the new approach in his writing: 
 ‘the Government moved from the approach described earlier [the 1991 Act] … 
to one which relied on law enforcement, and especially the disabling effects of 
imprisonment and the supposed deterrent effect of conviction and punishment 
more generally, as the principle means of tackling crime. This approach paid 
little attention to prevention, to the social and economic circumstances in which 
crime becomes prevalent, or to the influences which affect a person’s behaviour 
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or pattern of life. It relied more on its popular appeal than on any process of 
consultation or evidence of its likely success. It was an approach which was 
deeply pessimistic in its view of society and of human nature; it was dangerous 
in the encouragement it gave to oppressive forms of policing and to the arbitrary 
administration of justice; it was divisive in risking the creation of an excluded 
and criminalized underclass; and it was operationally precarious in the strain it 
placed … [on] … the criminal justice system’. 
 
Stephen Shaw (personal interview) believed that 
 
 ‘Tony Blair’s repositioning of the Labour party on law and order was very 
successful in political terms. It required the Tories to respond. Police crime 
figures showed rises in crime, and Blair was really excited by the fact that every 
quarter the rising crime figures showed how badly the Conservatives were 
doing’. 
 
Rob Allen thought that the police used their power to create a moral panic over youth 
crime as a tactic to divert Kenneth Clarke from his wish to reform the police. As a 
result 
 ‘the alliance of toleration for juvenile justice collapsed – the police went off – 
the politicians went off – leaving juvenile justice practitioners high and dry. 
Juvenile justice didn’t take enough care to protect its philosophy and support’. 
 
I asked Paul Cavadino to comment on the Labour Party’s views in the early 1990s, 
and he said that,  
‘from the point where Tony Blair and Jack Straw replaced Barry Sheerman as 
shadow Home Affairs speakers, they became involved in a Dutch auction to 
sound tougher than Michael Howard’ (personal interview). 
 
 
In retrospect, Andrew Rutherford (personal interview) felt that the 1991 Act may not 
have been necessary, as what had happened with juveniles in the 1980s had not 
needed legislation. It created an  
‘Aunt Sally, allowing Baker, Clarke and Howard to attack the 1991 Act as if it 
had been brought in by the opposition … which in a sense it had, as civil 
servants had brought ministers along’. 
He considered that the decision by Tony Blair to join with Kenneth Clarke in 
attacking the 1991 CJA was crucial: ‘a very cynical attempt to use crime for political 
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purposes’, which provided the grounds for ‘the unholy alliance of Blair and Howard’. 
 
For Henri Giller (personal interview), the fragility was because there had been no 
consolidation of the gains, there remained poor practice around supervising offenders, 
inconsistent delivery of programmes and a lack of quality projects. Frances Crook 
thought that an often ignored aspect of this was the fact that Labour’s criminal justice 
thinking was dominated by fundamentalist Christians (Alun Michael, Jack Straw and 
Tony Blair), who had a simplistic Christianity that was punitive and unforgiving 
(personal interview). Rod Morgan said that (personal interview) 
‘I think that the labelling perspective was largely abandoned or forgotten in the 
1990s … a downside of the managerialist framework, which led to profound 
disincentives to doing things which would have been constructive, and the 
introduction of incentives to do things which I believe are destructive …. So the 
police get rewarded for arresting kids now … and that is sucking a lot of people 
into the system, even though we learnt in the 70s and 80s that this will be 
criminogenic’. 
 
For Norman Tutt (personal interview), the main reason for the change in policy 
towards young offenders in the mid-1990s was to do with media pressure about 
individual cases, such as ‘rat-boy’, and a manufactured crime wave of Taking and 
Driving Away:  
‘the police were constantly feeding stories to the media about, for example, an 
eight year old boy driving a stolen car whose feet couldn’t reach the pedals, and 
other mythological characters created by the police. The Labour party then 
started to try and outdo the Conservatives on law and order, starting a law and 
order spiral’. 
 
Research into ‘persistent young offenders’ (Hagell & Newburn, 1994; Newburn & 
Hagell, 1995) found that they were very few, and that there was little point in 
imprisoning them, as those who met the definition would have ceased to be persistent 
by the time that they were sentenced. However, this was too late to change the tide of 
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policy. 
 
Sentencing 1993 to 1997 
 
After 1993, Criminal Statistics included 17 year olds with young offenders (as the 
1991 CJA had brought 17 year olds within the new youth court) so, it is not possible 
to provide comparative data for 14 to 16 year olds to compare with previous chapters. 
Tables 89 to 93 provide comparative data for those under 14 and Table 94 calculates 
custodial sentencing of under 17s from a variety of Home Office publications. 
 
Cautioning 
 
The Government  set out to reduce the cautioning of young offenders after 1993, and 
persuaded the CPS to revise its Code of Practice to newly state ‘Crown Prosecutors 
should not avoid prosecuting simply because of the defendant’s age’, and to drop 
‘youth’ as a criterion of the ‘common public interest factors against prosecution’ 
(CPS, 1994a; 1994b: Para 6.5 and 6.8), thereby removing juveniles from the ‘category 
of vulnerable people’ for whom there would normally be a presumption of diverting 
from court (Ashworth & Fionda, 1994; Ball, 1994: 496). Yet the CPS had stated in its 
evidence to the Home Affairs Committee (1993b: 61) that it still supported the spirit 
of the cautioning guidelines, and wanted them made statutory (see also CPS, 1992); 
the Magistrates Association had also supported existing policy. 
 
 The Government issued a new Circular (Home Office, 1994f) criticising multiple 
cautioning, informal warnings, and urging police not to share their decisions on 
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prosecution or cautioning with other agencies. This also followed a legal appeal 
against the decision by the police to overrule a decision of a cautioning panel to divert 
an offender in Kent which gained widespread publicity. This was based in Michael 
Howard’s constituency, and may have increased his hostility to cautioning (R v Chief 
Constable of Kent and another ex parte L (a minor) All E Law Reports [1993] 1 All 
ER 758 - 771: see Uglow et al., 1992; Tregilgas-Davey, 1993). Ball (1994) suggested 
that this put the clock back 30 years (and see NACRO, 1993), while the Penal Affairs 
Consortium (1993; 1994) noted the success of cautioning between 1982 and 1992 and 
suggested that  any rise in informal warnings was unlikely to have had any significant 
impact.  
 
The ‘discovery’ of ‘multiple cautioning’ as an issue was significant, as research 
commissioned by the Home Office itself (Evans, 1991: 608) had concluded that 
‘although there are some areas where juveniles might receive a significant 
number of cautions, say five or six, a general norm is that they tend to be 
prosecuted after two’. 
 
A few years later Evans (1994: 566) sarcastically noted ‘the lack of any relationship 
between government policy, its own research and professional advice’, and observed 
that there was still no hard evidence of multiple cautioning, with under four per cent 
of those cautioned receiving more than two cautions, and low use of informal 
warnings other than in Northampton.  
 
Norman Tutt (personal interview) wondered if the decline of cautioning was due to 
two concerns from opposite ends of the political spectrum: ‘fear from magistrates 
about their powers being usurped’ and ‘liberal concerns that some kids got cautions 
who would not have been found guilty’. 
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Ironically, research into those cautioned in 1985, 1988 and 1991 found that it had very 
high success rates, with 85 per cent of those cautioned not convicted over the 
following two years, while only three per cent had multiple cautions in 1985 and eight 
per cent in 1988 (Dulai & Greenhorn, 1995). Looking at the first of these cohorts, 
Keith (1992) found that 87 per cent of young people cautioned in 1985 were not 
convicted for two years, and that this declined with age, being 89 per cent for 10 - 13 
year olds and 84 per cent for 14 – 16 year olds. 
 
Cautioning of those under 14 is shown in tables 92 and 93, showing a small absolute 
and proportionate decline in cautions as a total and proportion of all disposals for both 
boys and girls, as the new policy was implemented. 
 
Community Disposals 
 
 
Conditional discharges and supervision orders for boys aged 10 – 14 continued to 
hold their level and percentage of sentences (Tables 89 and 90), while the use of fines 
and attendance centre fell slightly. The number of girls dealt with (Table 91) was so 
small that percentages can be misleading, but again conditional discharges and 
supervision orders make up the bulk of sentences 
 
Custody 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 94, the trend of the last decade was reversed, and a steady 
increase in custodial sentencing of young offenders began. Custodial sentences rose 
from 1603 to 2600 between 1993 and 1996, and continued their rise thereafter. The 
decarceration of juvenile offenders therefore came to an end. In chapter 9 various 
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explanations of how and why this occurred will be considered. 
 
Summary 
 
The 1991 Act, which had promised so much, proved to be a false dawn, as it was 
emasculated before it was properly implemented and a more punitive mentality 
returned. Decarceration no longer had any friends in influential places, as both main 
political parties fought to prove themselves tougher on offenders than the other. In 
terms of Kingdon’s model, a new set of policy entrepreneurs, politicians, leading 
police officers and the media all seized a window of opportunity to transform the 
debate and practice. Juvenile justice practitioners were unable to respond to this on 
the national stage, though still managed to have influence in local areas (for example, 
as youth court officer in East Sussex I contributed to maintaining a custody-free zone 
for juvenile offenders between 1993 and 1998 in a large petty sessional division). 
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Chapter 7 
 Decarceration: Theory and Practice 
 
There have been several attempts to develop theoretical approaches to ‘decarceration’, 
‘deinstitutionalization’ or ‘reductionism’. This chapter will consider those situations 
in which a concerted attempt has been made to theorise a strategy to decarcerate or 
deinstitutionalize a portion of the incarcerated population, consider the concept of 
‘abolitionism’ and some of its critics, and give a short account of one attempt to apply 
an abolitionist strategy in the UK. 
 
Andrew Rutherford and Reductionism 
 
In his book on ‘the reductionist challenge’ Rutherford (1984a) argued that ‘only when 
used as a last resort does the prison serve a function which is useful and legitimate …. 
if prison is to be a last resort it must be regarded as a scarce resource’ (ibid: 17), and 
claimed that this is one of the fundamental tenets of a decarceration strategy. He noted 
the importance of impacting on decisions ‘at the front of the process’ (ibid: 26) and 
identified two general conditions for successful reductionist strategies: a profound 
scepticism about imprisonment by key decision makers, and ‘the responses to crime 
by officials’ in the criminal justice process (ibid:  145 – 146).  He raised the problem 
of the risk of ‘net-widening’ (see below: page 243), and suggested four strategies that 
can be used to achieve reductions in the prison population:  
 
the packaging of alternative sanctions so that they appeal to sentencers  
financial incentives to change sentencing practice  
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legislative restrictions on sentencers and  
reduction in prison capacity (see also Rutherford and Morgan, 1981).  
 
He argued that strategies are likely to be most successful if they start at ‘the deep 
end’, with the most serious offenders and those most at risk of custody. 
 
In another paper (Rutherford, 1992a) he noted the need for the support of other 
academics to sustain the ‘de-escalation’ that had been achieved through juvenile 
justice practice in England and Wales.  
 
Rutherford was heavily influenced by his period working in the USA where he had 
been involved with Jerry Miller and the Massachusetts initiative (see below pp. 281 - 
289) and his later involvement with the Woodlands project in Basingstoke. His 
analysis influenced, and was influenced by, juvenile justice practice in England and 
Wales. Particularly influential on juvenile justice practice were his notions of action at 
the ‘front end’ and the ‘deep end’; the development of scepticism about imprisonment 
by  key decision makers, which youth justice practitioners were particular influential 
in developing; the importance of influencing the responses to crime by officials, 
whereby the police and later the CPS were convinced of the value of cautioning and 
diversion by juvenile justice practitioners; the importance of packaging alternative 
sanctions to appeal to sentencers, which was one of the strengths of the LAC 83/3 
projects submitting their own reports to court; and the value of fiscal incentives, 
which was exactly what the LAC 83/3 initiative was. The first edition of his Growing 
out of Crime provided a model programme that local projects could adopt and adapt to 
their local situation, and many did so. 
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Norman Tutt 
 
Drawing heavily from his research into and involvement with juvenile justice, Tutt 
(1978b) suggested a career pathway for alternative strategies:  
• the appearance of a crusader  
• the development of a sympathetic stereotype of the offender  
• the establishment of myths: both favourable and unfavourable  
• generalization and  
• conflict with the established professional authorities.  
For an alternative to become established he suggested that there needed to be several 
necessary key features:   
 
• the networking of services, so that the alternative is able to attract referrals 
 of its targeted clientele  
• flexibility of funding  
• central or local government commitment and  
• a ‘deep-end’ strategy, in which the alternative takes on and copes with the 
 most difficult clients. 
 
Tutt was very influential on the development of juvenile justice practice, as is 
highlighted throughout this thesis. He championed local authorities who tried to 
change internal practice, contributed to some of the key research through the CYCC at 
Lancaster, was readily available to address conferences and events throughout the 
country, and was able to draw on his experience of working within government as 
well as outside it. Particularly influential were his notions of developing a more 
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sympathetic stereotype of the offender, which was taken up in LAC 83/3 project 
reports, and the willingness to challenge other professionals on behalf of the juvenile 
offender. 
 
Stan Cohen 
 
Stan Cohen has written widely on social control, the justice movement and 
decarceration strategies. He noted how, in the 1970s ‘the rhetoric of reform became 
abolitionist’, and the slogans specifically destructive (deinstitutionalization, 
decarceration), with officials in Britain, the USA and Europe all using concepts of 
abolition and decarceration, ‘with varying degrees of enthusiasm’ (Cohen, 1979a and 
Cohen, 1985: 83). He felt that 1973 was ‘the peak of the deinstitutionalization 
movement’, citing the National Advisory Commission view that ‘States should refrain 
from building any more state institutions for juveniles; States should phase out present 
institutions over a five year period’ which he considered was based on a mixture of 
humanitarianism, pragmatism and expediency (Cohen, 1977a: 219). Adopting the 
perspective of ‘revisionist history’, that is  ‘scepticism about the professed aims, 
beliefs and intentions of the reformers, concern with analysis of power and its effects, 
curiosity about the relationship between intentions and consequences’ (Cohen & 
Scull, 1983: 2), he was to produce a devastating critique of alternatives which has 
stood the test of time (see Innes, 2003). His work was heavily influenced by Austin & 
Krisberg’s (1981) study of over 1,200 diversion programmes in the USA, costing over 
$112 million, which claimed that all attempts at diversion and decarceration failed. 
They felt that the non-incarcerative options were transformed to serve criminal justice 
system values and goals other than those of reducing custody, and concluded that 
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‘progress in alternatives will remain frustrated until reforms are more carefully 
implemented’ (Austin & Krisberg, 1982: 374). 
 
For Cohen, decarceration may lead to non-intervention, benign neglect or the 
reproduction in the community of the coercive features of the institutions, blurring the 
boundaries between ‘where the prison ends and the community begins’ (Cohen, 
1979a: 344). This results in ‘thinning the mesh and widening the net’ and a shift in the 
techniques and focus of social control (ibid: 346 - 347). The language of ‘social 
control talk’ is actually diametrically opposed to the ideological justifications from 
which it is supposed to be derived, and ‘patently … at odds with the reality’ (Cohen, 
1983: 103). He suggested that agents of control are ‘colonisers’, moving from the 
closed institutions to the new territories in the community, so that ‘the destructuring 
and abolitionist elements in community ideology are largely illusory’ (ibid: 113). For 
him, ‘deinstitutionalization hardly affects the original problem’ (ibid: 114). Despite 
the development of decarceration thinking, and ‘community alternatives’, Cohen 
believed that the old institutions would still remain and new forms of community 
control expand; while the focus of control would be dispersed and diffused, the 
boundaries blurred, and the criminal justice system not weakened (Cohen, 1985: table 
1: pp. 16 - 17). He claimed that ‘any reforming impetus becomes absorbed by the very 
institution it attacks’ (Cohen, 1977a: 222). 
 
Cohen accepted that the initial assault on the prisons ‘originally’ led to a decline in 
some rates of incarceration, and ‘undoubtedly some programs of community 
treatment are genuine alternatives to incarceration’ (Cohen, 1979a: 360; 1979d), such 
that abolition ‘became common talk even in the heart of the control system itself’ 
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(Cohen, 1979d; 1985: 33), but 
‘the original structures have become stronger; … the reach and intensity 
of state control have been increased; … centralization and bureaucracy 
remain; professions and experts are proliferating dramatically …’ (ibid: 
37). 
 
However, he suggested, the overall result is that there is an increase in the total 
number of deviants entering the system in the first place, many of whom are new 
deviants who would not have been processed previously, so the net of social control is 
getting wider, there is an increase in the overall intensity of intervention (the net is 
getting denser), and the new agencies supplement but do not replace the original set 
of control mechanisms (the net is different).  
 
This concept of ‘net-widening’ was to become part of the conventional wisdom 
around decarceration from then on,  promulgated by Lerman (1975), Matthews 
(1979), Austin & Krisberg (1981), Chan & Ericson (1981), Hylton (1982), Warren 
(1984), Lowman et al. (1987a), and Scull (see below: page 246), but  has been 
seriously challenged by McMahon (1990) for being based on ‘metaphor and evocative 
images’ rather than statistical evidence. She considered that it had led to the notion of 
‘impossibilism’ which would undermine all attempts to develop alternatives to 
custody. 
 
Cohen supported his theory by drawing on the evidence of diversion programmes and 
incarceration rates, which, apart from Massachusetts (see below: pages 281 - 289), 
were held to show that rates of incarceration  increased despite the development of 
‘alternatives’, and that most diversion had the unintended consequence of actually 
diverting into the system, not out of it. This was because programmes selected those 
  245 
easiest to work with and who were most likely to produce successful results, rejecting 
those that they did not want to work with and pushing them nearer to incarceration 
(Cohen, 1985: 44ff). 
 
Cohen clearly had some concerns about how his message would be and has been 
operationalised. Ryan (1985) for example declared Cohen’s message as being very 
depressing for abolitionists, who were faced with ‘radical amnesia’, and Sim (1992) 
claimed that abolitionists had been ‘caricatured’ and the hard work that they did to 
support and advise offenders and their families was ignored. Cohen acknowledged 
that a ‘deep end strategy’ may be possible and cautioned against ‘analytical despair’ 
and ‘adversarial nihilism’, for ‘there were (and are) notable instances of destructuring 
reforms and community alternatives which have succeeded’ (Cohen, 1985: 240). Even 
‘unintended consequences’ may be for the good, and good things can happen in spite 
of, or even because of, net-widening (Cohen, 1985: 241 & 255). In his introduction to 
a pamphlet by Radical Alternatives to Prison [hereafter RAP] he criticised RAP for 
‘the automatic condemnation of any alternative to traditional imprisonment on the 
grounds that disguised coercion is worse than open coercion’ (Cohen, 1980b: 3). He 
accepted that ‘the alternative to prison is not no control or no intervention, but is some 
form of control or intervention’ (his italics), and applauded the project for being 
extremely sensitive to the problems posed by trying to be a genuine alternative (ibid: 
4). He proposed that ‘abolition’ should follow an ‘attrition’ strategy involving a 
moratorium on new building, decarceration and then ‘excarceration’: preventing new 
entries into the institutions (Cohen, 1979d). Elsewhere, he was concerned that the 
debunking of alternatives to custody could be undermining the changes which the 
debunkers actually wanted to happen (Cohen, 1983: 103). This was prescient. Others 
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were to adopt his arguments with far less thought: Palumbo et al. (1992), for example, 
claimed that ‘alternatives to incarceration inevitably lead to net-widening’ (my 
emphasis). 
 
Looking back, Cohen (1989) was critical of academics’ dismissal of concern with 
success and failure of interventions as ‘correctionalism’, and of having naïve views of 
the concept of social control. 
 
While generally seen as theoretically unsympathetic to attempts to develop 
alternatives to incarceration, Cohen’s notion of ‘net-widening’ was influential on 
juvenile justice practice in the sense that practitioners were consistently careful in 
trying to avoid it (see below: pages 341 ff). His concern about projects being absorbed 
into mainstream services was also taken on board, such that many projects ceased to 
exist once their aims had been achieved. 
 
Andrew Scull 
 
The most popular and influential critique of decarceration was that of Andrew Scull, 
which he developed in a wide range of publications (see Scull, 1976; 1977; 1981a; 
1981b; 1981c; 1982; 1983; 1989; 1990). His focus was on mental health rather than 
criminal justice, but his theoretical arguments cover both. He noted how the 
pessimism about institutions was matched by the optimism about community based 
alternatives (Scull, 1983: 152) and attacked decarceration as ‘a new “humanitarian” 
myth’ (ibid: 153), ‘built on a foundation of sand’ (Scull, 1977: 1). Accordingly, the 
whole basis of the decarceration strategy was part of a ‘fundamental transformation in 
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the social organisation of advanced capitalism’ (Scull, 1977: 12) in response to ‘the 
changing exigencies of domestic pacification and control under welfare capitalism’ 
(Scull, 1976: 211). This made segregative modes of social control in institutions far 
more costly and difficult to justify, such that ‘the opportunity costs of neglecting 
community care in favour of asylum treatment … rose sharply’ (Scull, 1977: 135). He 
suggested that a growing fiscal crisis for the state had led to attempts to curtail 
expenditure on problem populations, and non-institutional techniques became more 
attractive. Decarceration thus became politically irresistible, supported by the political 
right as a cost saving exercise: as a transformation of ‘social junk’ into a profitable 
commodity (Scull, 1977: 150); and by the political left as part of a critique of 
institutions, a belief in individual rights of the incarcerated, and a naïve view of 
community care (Scull, 1977: 147). A deliberate policy of running down the 
institutions had then led to scandals, which were then taken as evidence for the need 
to close them (Scull, 1977: 71). He asserted that the reducing numbers in mental 
hospitals were not due to new drug treatments, as was sometimes claimed, but to 
administrative policies prior to the introduction of the new drugs, and that there was 
no real evidence of community support for decarceration, and no available treatment 
in the community (Scull, 1977: 101), with community mental health programmes a 
‘fig leaf for the failures of public policy’ (Scull, 1990: 310). Deinstitutionalization had 
been little more than a transfer of people from state to private institutions, ‘providing 
an ideological figleaf with which to camouflage a policy of malign neglect’ (Scull, 
1989: 9),  the asylums being replaced by ‘the sidewalk psychotics’ (Scull, 2006: 204), 
and the policy supported by an ‘odd mixture of zealots and penny-pinching 
politicians’ (ibid: 29). He believed that ‘for neither the mentally ill nor the criminal 
has the outcome matched proponents’ expectations and intentions’ and  ‘the impact on 
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those subject to it has been far different than its supporters intended and claimed’ 
(Scull, 1981a: 6). For the mentally ill, ‘what has changed is the packaging rather than 
the reality of their misery’ (Scull, 1984a: 174).  
 
Looking back a quarter of a century later he would claim that ‘“community treatment” 
of the mentally ill had in reality mostly corresponded to a policy of neglect and 
abandonment of the chronically crazy’ (Scull, 2006: 204). 
 
Scull considered that there was not much evidence to justify deinstitutional 
correctional programmes, and that tinkering with the criminal justice system in a 
radically unjust society ‘is unlikely to advance us very far’ (Scull, 1977). He 
acknowledged, in later work, particularly in the ‘Afterword’ of the second edition of 
his book, that his original thesis was more applicable to the mentally ill than to 
criminal justice (Scull, 1983; 1984a see also Scull, 1982: 105), in response to 
comments and reviews of his work (see Minor, 1978; Figlio and Jordanova, 1979; 
Cohen, 1979b) and that his original argument was too deterministic and 
oversimplified in its link between the advent of welfare capitalism and the fiscal 
crisis.  
 
In his rarer publications that were specifically linked to criminal and juvenile justice, 
rather than mental health, Scull (1982; 1984b) also gave a negative verdict on 
deinstitutionalization, suggesting that ‘neglect is cheaper than care’, but then cited 
Massachusetts as a ‘spectacular exception’, though he was critical of the decision in 
Massachusetts to develop alternatives after closing the institutions (Scull, 1977: 53, 
101 and 142).  Whereas for the mentally ill decarceration led to neglect, he argued, for 
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the criminal it had led to heightened control (Scull, 1984a: 178), to non-intervention 
dressed up as community treatment (ibid), and the meaning of ‘diversion’ had shifted 
from ‘diversion from’ to ‘referral to’, leading to more intervention and control and the 
blurring of the boundaries between guilt and innocence (Scull, 1984a: 180; Scull, 
1991: 30). Voracious diversion programmes led to expansion of social control (Scull, 
1982: 110), intentionally avoiding due process and presuming guilt, with the ‘modest 
illusions about the possibilities of humanizing’ the system.  
 
Scull’s analysis had little influence on juvenile justice practice in England and Wales, 
partly due to its focus on mental health in the USA, and partly because it did not seem 
to link to actual practice in the juvenile justice system in this country. 
 
Thomas Mathiesen and Abolitionism 
 
‘The term “abolitionism” stands for a social movement; a theoretical 
perspective; and a political strategy; is devoted to a radical critique of the 
criminal justice system and committed to penal abolition’ (de Haan, 1990: 
9). 
 
‘Abolitionism goes beyond the limits of the accepted canons of thinking, 
showing to us the new horizons and novel approaches to traditional social 
institutions and phenomena’ (Lasocik et al., 1989: 5). 
 
‘a dream that will never come true’ (Bianchi, 1989: 15). 
 
Thomas Mathiesen (1974a; 1974b; 1980a; 1980b; 1986; 1989) has offered the most 
radical perspective of all, with his notion of ‘abolition’. According to this theory (or 
‘perspective’: see Scheerer, 1986) all ‘alternatives’ must, to be real alternatives, 
compete with the existing system, and contradict it. Otherwise they simply further 
justify the continuation of the penal system by ‘reforming’ it, giving it more 
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legitimacy. All strategies must therefore focus on the long-term goal of abolition (see 
Mathiesen & Roine, 1975), and even short term objectives must be undermining of 
the existing system. Drawing heavily on pressure group activities in the penal system 
in Norway, and on campaign groups in Scandinavia which, he argued, all had 
abolitionist goals (see Mathiesen & Roine, 1975), he focused on the successful 
campaign to prevent the creation of juvenile ‘detention centres’ in Norway modelled 
on British experience (see Mathiesen & Roine, 1975; Ward, 1986), and the abolition 
of a residential care school. He argued that the abolitionist goal must always be 
‘unfinished’, constantly having to hold on to the ground gained to prevent the re-
emergence of the institution (Mathiesen, 1980a: 231ff). One of the tactics he 
described is an ‘exposing’ policy (ibid: 110), part of what he called ‘negative 
reforms’, which are ‘changes which abolish or remove greater or smaller parts on 
which the system in general is more or less dependent’ (ibid: 202). Elsewhere 
(Mathiesen, 1974b) he called these ‘short-term reforms’, which must always 
challenge the penal system and avoid creating new forms of social control. These are 
in contrast to ‘positive reforms’ which are those which help the system function more 
effectively. He continually warned about the dangers of campaigning groups having 
to compromise their position in order to be taken seriously, and then becoming 
another part of the establishment. (For an excellent example of this see Ryan’s 
account of the history of the Howard League for Penal Reform in Britain (Ryan, 
1978)). 
John Holt (1985) offered an abolitionist perspective on juvenile justice and an 
abolitionist agenda for IT, on the grounds that the ascendancy of law and order 
politics around the short sharp shock had reduced IT to a position in which it now just 
preceded custody on the ‘tariff’ rather than acted as a replacement for it. 
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Mathiesen’s notions of ‘negative reforms’ and the ‘unfinished’ were influential on 
juvenile justice practice, and there was a strong abolitionist perspective in the AJJ and 
NACRO that helped to influence practice and make people aware of not engaging 
with positive reforms. 
A Foucauldian perspective 
Various followers of Michel Foucault have developed his conception of 
‘governmentality’ to suggest that political power is exercised through a multitude of 
agencies and techniques in terms of ‘political rationalities’ and ‘technologies of 
government’, and can provide a means of analysing the ambitions and concerns of the 
social authorities (such as youth justice practitioners) who try to ‘administer’ the lives 
of individuals (see Rose, 1993; Smart, 2002: 130).  The notion of ‘rationalities’ comes 
from a definition of ‘rational’ as ‘any form of thinking which strives to be relatively 
clear, systematic and explicit about aspects of “external” or “internal” existence, 
about how things are or how they ought to be’ (Dean, 1999: 11). For Foucault, then, 
there is ‘a multiplicity of rationalities, of different ways of thinking in a fairly 
systematic manner, of making calculations, of defining purposes, and employing 
knowledge’ (ibid). By their ‘actions at a distance’ (Latour, 1987: cited by Miller, P & 
Rose, N, 1990) which rely upon ‘expertise’ (which is defined by Miller and Rose 
(ibid) as the social authority ascribed to agents and forms of judgements based on 
claims to specialist truth and power) the lives of young offenders can be regulated by 
the reports to court, advocacy and day to day work with offenders on court orders. 
Foucault proposed that governmentality has become the common ground of all 
modern forms of political thought and action:  
‘an ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
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the calculation and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal 
form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security’ (Foucault, 1979: 20).  
 
This notion of ‘government’ is ‘a plurality of forms of government’ which also 
applies to “‘governing” a household, souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious 
order, a family’ (Foucault, 1979).  Dean (1999: 2 and 10) suggests that it is a general 
term for ‘any calculated direction of human conduct’, and the study of ‘the conduct of 
conduct’, of ‘any attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our 
behaviour according to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends’. Gordon 
(1991) has defined this as a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the 
conduct of person(s). Dean expands this to define it as  
‘any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity 
of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of 
knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, 
aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a 
diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes’ 
(Dean, 1999: 11: see also Stenson, 1993b, who sees ‘social work’ as being 
concerned with the conduct of conduct). 
Rose (1996) offers a slightly different approach, suggesting that ‘governmentality’, in 
the sense in which the term was used by Foucault, is  
‘the deliberations, strategies, tactics and devices employed by authorities for 
making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to exercise good 
and avert ill’ (Rose, 1996: 328).  
In another article, he (Rose & Valverde, 1998: 554) says that by ‘government’: 
‘we mean an analytical focus upon the formulation and functioning of 
rationalized and self-conscious strategies that seek to achieve objectives or 
avert dangers by acting in a calculated manner upon the individual and 
collective conduct of persons’. 
The approach asks ‘How is government possible?’ (Foucault, 1984). However, ‘the 
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very existence of a field of concerns termed ‘policy’ should itself be treated as 
something to be explained’ (Miller, P & Rose, N, 1990: 3), even the notion that 
juvenile offending is a ‘problem’. While  
‘policy studies tend to be concerned with evaluating policies, uncovering the 
factors that led to their success in achieving their objectives or, more usually, 
deciphering the simplifications, misunderstandings, miscalculations and 
strategic errors that led to their failure’ (ibid: 4) 
a Foucauldian perspective is not concerned with this, but with the fact that this is a 
characteristic of governmentality. The notion of ‘evaluation’ is itself a key concept to 
be investigated: why is there a belief that government can experiment, learn, evaluate 
and improve? The study of policy needs to be located within a wider field in which 
conceptions of the proper ends and means of government are articulated. 
A historical approach is needed to understand the ‘development of the science of 
government’, which Foucault believed was driven by the discovery of ‘statistics’ and 
concerned with the management of a population via discipline (Foucault, 1979). 
Researchers need to engage in ‘archaeology’ – the analysis of the systems of 
unwritten rules which produces, organises and distributes the ‘statement’: the 
‘authorised utterance’ that is found in the ‘archive’, which is ‘an organised body of 
statements’ (see Mills, 2003: 23), and in ‘genealogy’ – exploring the workings of 
power and describing the ‘history of the present’ and how it describes events in the 
past without making causal connections, which exposes how the human sciences are 
associated with technologies of power (Smart, 1985: 48, cited by Mills, 2003: 25). 
The task of a Foucauldian analysis ‘is to describe the way in which resistance operates 
as a part of power, not to seek or promote or oppose it’ (Kendall & Wickham, 1999: 
51). 
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Within this approach,  
‘the government of ... a child ... becomes possible only through discursive 
mechanisms that represent the domain to be governed as an intelligible field 
.... Before one can seek to manage a domain ... .it is first necessary to 
conceptualize a set of problems and relations ... which is amenable to 
management (Miller & Rose, 1990:  6 – 7)  
(by ‘discourse’ is meant a technology of thought – the technical devises of writing, 
listing, numbering and computing, though Mills (2003: 54) suggests that Foucault 
uses the concept in different ways. Mills defines it as ‘a regulated set of statements 
which combine with others in predictable ways’, such that a ‘discourse’ becomes 
‘truth’ only if it is accepted by those in positions of authority).  
Power should therefore be viewed as a matter of networks and alliances through 
which ‘centres of calculation’ exercise ‘government at a distance’, using chains of 
actors who ‘translate’ power from one location to another (Miller, P & Rose, N, 
1990).  An analysis of the development of policy (such as this thesis) should therefore 
not be concerned with questions of historical or social causation and explanation, but 
should ‘isolate programs, rationalities and technologies’ and investigate the forms of 
‘discourse, knowledge and subjectivity’: 
‘our studies of government eschew sociological realism and its burdens of 
explanation and causation. We do not try to characterise how social life really 
was and why.... Rather we attend to the ways that authorities in the past have 
posed themselves these questions’ (Rose, N & Miller, P, 1992: 177). 
Gutting (1989: 6) claims that Foucault has shown how bodies of ‘knowledge’ are 
inextricably interwoven with techniques of social control, providing ‘a mode of 
thought that subordinates (subjectivity) to structural systems’ (Gutting, 2005: 8). 
Researchers should therefore study ‘the techniques and tactics of domination’ 
(Foucault, 1980: 102), and of how ‘normalizing mechanisms’ develop (Foucault, 
1980: 107), where ‘normalisation’ is defined as ‘a kind of ... alliance between forms 
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of expertise’ (Rose & Valverde, 1998: 549). They should also study how ‘regimes of 
practices’ develop which may try to colonize and subjugate other regimes (Dean, 
1999: 21). Within this view, sociological accounts about ‘the net of social control’ etc. 
fail to understand the nature of modern power (Garland, 1997), which ‘relies on 
constant supervision and control of individuals in accord with a certain concept of 
normality’ (Bevir, 1999: 66).  There are no prescribed standards: ‘all an analytics of 
government can do is to analyse the rationalities of resistance and the programmes to 
which they give rise’ (Dean, 1999: 37). An analysis of government, in the 
Foucauldian sense, will  
‘examine the diverse ways in which ... political and other authorities ... have 
sought to establish the legitimacy of particular systems and techniques of 
government’ and of how these ‘can be shaped and guided in order to produce 
desirable objectives’ (Rose, 1993: 200). 
 
Foucault, and Rose, use a notion of ‘liberalism’ to refer to government since the start 
of the eighteenth century in Europe and North America whose main characteristics are 
positive knowledge and documentation of knowledge, self-government by 
individuals, the authority of expertise, the questioning of government and the 
socialisation of society towards concepts of individualism and responsibility (Rose, 
1993: 217). Rose (1996: 331: my emphasis) admits that these are ‘the novel 
mentalities and strategies of government that I have termed “advanced liberal”’ and 
identifies the development of new ways of governing ‘conduct’, focused on the 
‘affiliated’ and the ‘marginalised’, which involved the intensification of direct, 
disciplinary, often coercive and carceral interventions (ibid: 340). All this is linked by 
Rose to notions of a ‘risk society’ (see Beck, 1992) with professionals concerned with 
managing risk through risk identification, risk assessment, risk management, 
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professional responsibility for the clients’ future behaviour, professional regulation, 
minimum service standards, performance targets and auditing. O’Malley (1992) 
thought that there are two notions of power distinguished by Foucault, which are the  
disciplinary one for the regulatory control of the population, and a bio-political one 
‘an anatomo-politics of the human body’ (Foucault, 1979: 139) used for regulatory 
controls of sexuality and reproduction.  
Foucault (1977: 271), in his historical account of the development of the French penal 
system in Discipline and Punish, had asked why, despite its failure, the prison 
continues to exist, and says that this is because it is ‘deeply rooted’, embedded in the 
wider disciplinary practices that are characteristic of modern society, carrying out 
‘certain very precise functions (ibid): ‘They tell us that the prisons are overpopulated. 
But what if it were the population that were being overimprisoned?’ (Foucault: press 
conference, cited by Macey, 1994: 258, itself cited by Mills, 2003: 19).  Attempts to 
reform prisons are seen as futile, and instead its functioning should be criticised 
(Eribon, 1991: 231 cited by Mills, 2003: 20 - 21).  The history of penal reform is seen 
as 
 ‘the history of the dispersion of a new mode of domination called ‘disciplinary 
power’: a power exercised through techniques of objectification, classification 
and normalization, a power deployed through the whole social body (Lacombe, 
1996: 332).  
Garland interprets this as meaning that ‘delinquency is useful in a strategy of political 
domination because it works to separate crime from politics, to divide the working 
classes against themselves, to enhance the fear of prison, and to guarantee the 
authority and powers of the police’ (Garland, 1986: 863). 
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Jacques Donzelot 
There have been surprisingly few specific applications of a Foucauldian perspective 
to juvenile justice, though Simon (1994: 1384) considered the American juvenile 
court as a ‘modernist technology of power’ and explored ‘the specific technologies of 
power that are in play, and their genealogies’, in the juvenile justice system in the 
USA (ibid 1363). Donzelot (1980) applied a Foucauldian analysis to the role of state 
intervention in family life in France, including an analysis of the role of the juvenile 
court, but this is a very different system than that in England and Wales. He uses a 
‘genealogical, functional and strategic’ method (Deleuze, 1980) to show the 
‘dependencies and complementarities’ that ‘governing’ of the ‘family’ by its ‘head’ 
depends upon (ibid), isolating ‘pure little lines of mutation’ which form the contour, 
surface and milieu of the ‘social’ and the ‘family’ (ibid). 
Donzelot addressed his work to Marxists, feminists and psychoanalysts, as he 
believed that these are three forms of discourse that ‘implicitly converge’ at the 
family. For Marxists, child protection laws, he argues, are a ‘crisis of the bourgeois 
family’, and family law was for ‘social categories that combine a difficulty in 
supplying their own needs with resistances to the new medical and educative norms’ 
(Donzelot, 1980: xxi). The state’s concern was with the freedom that working class 
children enjoyed, so ‘medical, educative and relational norms’ were introduced 
‘whose overall aim was to preserve children from the old customs, which were 
considered deadly’ (ibid: xx). For feminists, patriarchal domination is the concern, but 
the transformation of the family actually had the active participation of women, who 
applied the new medical and educational norms (ibid: xxii ff). For psychoanalysis, 
despite its role ‘as the basis of the most accomplished representations of 
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phallocentrism ... patriarchalism and sexual racism’ it had supplied responses to 
managing conflictual relations and maladjustments that are regulatory and 
noncoercive. 
He goes on to develop a history of childhood which has been put together by himself, 
Foucault and Deleuze (ibid: xxv) which examines the ‘domain of mentalities and their 
evolution’ (ibid: xxv) in which the family is seen as 
 ‘a moving resultant, an uncertain form whose intelligibility can only come 
from studying the system of relations it maintains with the sociopolitical level. 
This requires us to detect all the political mediations that exist between the 
two registers, to identify the lines of transformation that are situated in that 
space of intersections. Following these lines of transformation, we see the 
contours of a form of sociality gradually taking shape, one that will furnish a 
tangible surface, an effective plane for understanding the present-day family’ 
(ibid: xxv). 
An historical account then takes the reader through the creation of foundling 
hospitals, the employment of domestic nurses, the role of house-servants in child care, 
medical texts on child-rearing and the educational and medical care of children, the 
movement of families to the city, the role of convents, the growth of brothels, a 
concern to restore marriage in the working classes, the domestic labour of women, 
moral decline, the role of philanthropy, the growth of social housing, the development 
of a concept of childhood as ‘protected liberation’ and ‘supervised freedom’ in the 
bourgeois family, and concern with the ‘excessive freedom’ of the working class 
child. Donzelot suggests that the development of the role of the ‘head’ of the family  
was part of the attempt to restore discipline and power within the family, with 
philanthropy for the poor being used as a ‘depoliticizing strategy’ around assistance 
and medical-hygiene poles. The philanthropic strategies of moralization and 
normalization via schooling and child protection laws were part of this, but then there 
was the emergence of a new philanthropic pole converging threat to children and 
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threats from children, which clashed with the notion of ‘parental authority’. As a 
result, the notion of the ‘morally deficient family’ was developed giving new roles to 
magistrates and children’s doctors. 
Through this, the child is ‘judged’ and given to the penal administration; they consign 
the child to a protective society; they return the child to the family under 
‘supervision’; and if the family does not meet the expectations of the supervisor the 
child can be removed and placed in a ‘centre’ or even a prison. Thus there was a 
neutralization of parental authority leading to a ‘procedure of tutelage’ linked to 
public assistance, juvenile law, medicine and psychiatry (ibid: 89). Under this 
‘tutelary complex’ a new series of professions - judicial, psychiatric and educative - 
develop under the common banner of social work using ‘psychiatric, sociological and 
psychoanalytic’ knowledge (ibid: 96 - 99). The French juvenile court is then 
described (ibid: chapter 4), containing the robed judge, philanthropists, with educators 
often bringing the cases, with prosecution and defence roles relegated to the 
background, and in which there is a large role for child psychiatry and child guidance 
clinics,  in which medical reports are common, and which dealt with 150,000 
‘predelinquents’ each year and facilitated social aid to 650,000 children, and in which 
650,000 children were referred to child psychiatry. Few are incarcerated and such 
sentences are often suspended. 
While there are some similarities in England and Wales to the court described by 
Donzelot (such as the dematerialization of the offence (ibid: 110) and the concern 
with symptoms rather than actual deeds) the juvenile justice system in England and 
Wales, particularly after the implementation of the 1969 CYPA, was much more 
adversarial, gave clear roles to defence and prosecution and imprisoned more, while 
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psychiatric and psychological input into the court was minimal. It is therefore difficult 
to transfer Donzelot’s analysis to the themes of this dissertation. 
Nikolas Rose 
Rose has applied a Foucauldian perspective to the role of psychology and its 
application to child welfare (Rose, 1989: 2), claiming that 
 ‘the most obvious manifestation’ of how ‘governments and parties of all 
political complexions have formulated policies, set up machinery, established 
bureaucracies and promoted initiatives to regulate the conduct of citizens by 
acting upon their mental capacities and propensities’ has been ‘the child 
welfare system ... the juvenile justice system ... and the education and 
surveillance of parents’. 
 
Within this perspective, an ‘expertise of subjectivity’ developed so that to ‘adjudicate 
upon a child accused of a crime now requires scrutiny and evaluation of family life’ 
(ibid: 121). In this analysis, the failure of the 1969 CYP Act was ‘not explicable in 
terms of a simple reactivation of a punitive mentality’ but by a ‘shift in the techniques 
for governing the family and its troublesome offspring’. Social work was about 
‘implanting the techniques of responsible citizenship’ (Rose, 1993: 293 - 294). 
It is hard to find an analysis of the ‘failure’ of the 1969 CYP Act that puts it down to 
‘a simple reactivation of a punitive mentality’. Rose also adopts the Marxist analysis 
of Gough (1979) as the ‘correct’ interpretation of the development of the welfare 
state, which was that it was designed to preserve political and military power, govern 
labour, and maintain inequality, and also accepts Platt’s (1969) view that all child care 
reformers had hidden agendas, without giving any sense that both these analyses are 
contested ones, or that Platt’s work was specifically focused on North America. 
Hagan & Leon (1977) analysed historical juvenile justice data from Canada and found 
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no basis for the links implied by Platt between the reform of the juvenile justice 
system, alleged increases in juvenile imprisonment and capitalist interests in the child 
labour market (see also Lauderdale & Larson (1978) and Hagan & Leon (1978)). 
Rose also gives psychology a much larger role in juvenile justice in England and 
Wales than was ever the case, and a larger role for ‘psychodynamic social casework’ 
than existed after the mid-1960s.  
Discussion of the Foucauldian perspective 
Garland (1997: 174) claims that the notion of governmentality ‘offers a powerful 
framework for analysing how crime is problematized and controlled’, but that it 
shows an  apparent hostility to causal analysis and explanation, contains 
terminological confusion, and ‘tends to neglect the expressive, emotionally-driven 
and morally-toned currents that play such a large part in the shaping of penal policy’ 
(ibid: 202). In an earlier article (Garland, 1986) he had pointed out that Foucault’s 
concern  was with ‘power in the abstract’ rather than with concrete politics and the 
actual people they involve, and with the way that power relations are organised, rather 
than with the individuals or groups who dominate or are dominated. But he has 
concerns with Foucault’s historical account in Discipline and Punish, his questioning 
of the motives of reformers (Foucault, 1977: 82), and the absence of any evidence 
cited for some of Foucault’s assertions. Garland claims that Foucault’s ‘reluctance to 
acknowledge the role of any values other than power and control (Garland, 1986: 876) 
or control and domination (Garland, 1990b) tends to a neglect of the forces that put up 
opposition to the disciplinary practices that Foucault had identified, such as 
liberalism, the legal profession, the judiciary, the use of due process, the rule of law 
and a concern with individual rights.  Foucault has also denied the humanitarian 
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values and sensibilities of reformer (Garland, 1992), such that ethical values and 
compassion become just ‘incidental music’ and euphemistic covering devices for new 
forms of power. The unintended consequences of the prison and imprisonment are 
therefore taken by Foucault as the intended ones (Garland, 1990b). 
Rawlinson & Carter (2002) have summarised a range of concerns raised by historians 
about Foucault’s approach to history, based around his impenetrable style, the 
avoidance of narrative, an ambivalence towards ‘truth’, errors in historical facts, 
neglect of relevant historical studies, and questionable historical explanations. Dupont 
& Pierce (2001) are also critical of Foucault’s use of history and historical sources, 
Braithwaite (2003) called Foucault an ‘appalling historian’, and Porter (1990: 48) 
considered that Foucault’s historical sense of the carceral society was not ‘especially 
applicable’ to England. Geertz (1978), reviewing Discipline and Punish, saw it as ‘a 
kind of whig history in reverse’, while Fine (1979) suggested that Foucault’s notion of 
the prison as the most intense manifestation of disciplinary power was difficult to fit 
with the actual failure of the prison to achieve most of its aims.  Hindess (1997)  
raised concern that Foucault used the term ‘political’ as it were equivalent to a certain 
concept of ‘governmental’, saw politics as a practice of liberation, and claimed that 
‘Foucault’s account of the liberal rationality of government is seriously incomplete’. 
Mills (2003: 7) points out that the complexity and contradictory nature of Foucault’s 
work means that caution is necessary in trying to use or apply it. Attempts to apply a 
Foucauldian notion of ‘risk’ to young people have not been very successful to date 
(see Mitchell et al, 2001; Hannah-Moffat, 2005). 
Stenson (1993a)  suggests that Rose & Miller (1992) adopt a rather simplistic notion 
of the police, seeing them as ‘simply a component of a centrally organised ... 
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Leviathan’, and O’Malley et al (1997) were concerned that the notion of 
governmentality renders government programmes as univocal, overly coherent and 
systematic, ignores political engagement and resistance to the governments ‘vision of 
government’, viewing politics simply as ‘mentalities of rule’ leading to a study of the 
replies ‘given by rulers to questions they pose themselves’ (ibid: 510). O’Malley 
(2008: 454) has also criticised the governmentality perspective for having a focus on 
the ‘ideal’ knowledge of plans to govern rather than being concerned with or 
explaining the details of actual implementation and their effects, and from resiling 
‘from pronouncing on the reality  or otherwise’ of the ‘imaginaries’ of the ‘problem’. 
His article was proposing experiments in ‘risk’ relative to drug harm minimisation 
and he quotes an anonymous peer- reviewer of the article who asked what the point 
was of such experiments as the country is in the grip of the culture of control and such 
experiments are no longer feasible. He concludes that ‘nothing is more 
disempowering than theoretically driven pessimism’ (ibid: 468).  
The ‘Foucault-inspired project’ offers no reason for taking a moral view, or a 
campaigning position, or to criticise existing policies or propose reforms (De Lint, 
2006). The Foucauldian is not on anyone’s ‘side’, in the context of Becker’s (1967) 
call for academics to take a moral stance. The experiences of prisoners are ignored 
(Kruttschnitt & Vuolo, 2007) and alternatives to prison are seen as programmes that 
continue to ‘govern’ those subjected to them and that do not challenge formal 
regulation, as ‘subjects act upon and discipline themselves without direct state 
intervention’ in a ‘paradoxical’ exercise of ‘freedom’ that still meets the goals of the 
state (Brigg, 2007). There is no scope in the Foucauldian analysis for variation in the 
scale and character of punishment, as if all countries, all ‘government’ were equally 
punitive.  
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Foucault’s work has become associated with  the development of a wider, mainly 
French based concept of ‘postmodernism’, alongside other philosophers such as 
Derrida, Lacan and Lyotard (Epstein, 1997), one of whose major stances is that there 
is no such thing as ‘truth’. Hobsbawn (1993) has described this as a ‘new threat to 
history’, whereby it is claimed that all ‘facts’ claiming objective existence are simply 
intellectual constructions, such that there is no difference between fact and fiction. 
Gross & Levitt (1998: footnote 8: p 265) claim that ‘many professional historians’, 
and even admirers of Foucault, view Foucault’s historical accounts as ‘novels’. This 
‘free floating relativism’ (Wheen, 2004: 84 – 85: citing Foucault, 1988: 15, and see 
Ryan, A., 1993)  could lead, for example, to Foucault’s admiration of the ‘beauty’ of 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime in Iran, in which the absence of free speech and human 
rights are admired as ‘exercises in irony and textual ambiguity’, where ‘saying one 
thing that means another ... (is) ... a necessary and highly prized additional level of 
meaning’ (Foucault, 1988: cited by Wheen, 2004).  
The ambiguity of much of this work, including Foucault’s,  results in the need for 
every term to be re-defined, while common terms are given different meanings and 
definitions, with ‘a tendency to confuse the technical meaning of words ... with their 
everyday meaning’ (Sokal & Bricmont, 1998: 242). This has come under increasing 
criticism, with some arguing that it is a deliberate strategy. Weinberg (1996) claims 
that ‘they do not seem to be saying anything that requires a special technical 
language, and they do not seem to be trying hard to be clear’. Gross & Levitt (1998: 
71) refer to the ‘realm of idle phrases’, and Sokal & Bricmont (1998) suggest that ‘if 
the texts seem incomprehensible, it is for the excellent reason that they mean precisely 
nothing’. Sokal tested his ideas by submitting a paper to one of the postmodernist 
journals, making nonsensical scientific claims and statements couched in the language 
  265 
of postmodernism (Sokal, 1996a), which was accepted after peer review. His 
exposure of this hoax (Sokal, 1996b) created an extreme reaction from some 
postmodernists, with claims that Sokal had links to ‘Nazi science’ (Aronowitz, 1997), 
was ‘longing to put women back in the kitchen’, and to joke about ‘faggots’ (Robbins, 
1996). Sokal’s attempts to explain what he was trying to do have promoted a major 
debate (see http://physics.nyu.edu/sokal/#papers). A similar attack on historians of 
education who choose not to use a Foucauldian perspective was made by Coloma 
(2011: and see the rejoinder by Butchard, 2011). 
The Foucauldian perspective does not lend itself to the juvenile justice culture of the 
decarceration years, in which the focus was not upon coercive, disciplinary and 
carceral interventions but its opposite, or to the notion of the risk society put forward 
by Rose (see above: page 255), when the goal involved juvenile justice practitioners 
taking serious professional risks in order to keep children out of institutions. 
However, It is possible that the development of the ‘new penology’ (Feeley & Simon, 
1992) and risk management perspectives in youth justice could have led to some of 
the changes in juvenile justice after 1993 (as argued by Rose (2000: 331 - 332)), and 
more generally in social work practice (Kemshall, 2010), which after 1989 had little 
interest or involvement with young offenders. 
De Haan 
De Haan (1987; 1988; 1989)  provided a critical appraisal of abolitionism, arguing 
that it ‘has enlarged its scope by considering prison abolition as an instance of the 
more encompassing form of penal abolition’ (1988: 434). In order to gain credibility 
he felt that there was a need to make it difficult to justify punishment and to show that 
there are other ways of dealing with crime, as abolitionism only makes sense if it 
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implies that one can conceive a social order without institutionalised, state-inflicted 
punishment. He also criticised abolitionists for assuming too easily that they held a 
morally superior view. 
In his next paper De Haan (1990: 84) argued that the long term nature of the 
abolitionist strategy ‘turned out to require more patience than most abolitionists 
seemed to have’.  For him, abolitionism is based upon the moral conviction that social 
life should not and cannot be regulated effectively by criminal law, and that other 
ways to deal with problematic situations, behaviours and events should be developed. 
These should have a minimum level of coercion and interference with the personal 
lives of those involved, and a maximum amount of care and service for all members 
of society (De Haan, 1991: 203). He saw the origin of abolitionism in the campaign 
for the abolition of prison and the penal system, for prisoners’ rights and penal 
reform, and in a critical theory and praxis concerning crime, punishment and penal 
reform, and accepted the value of ‘negative reforms’ in the political strategy. 
However, his interest in the development of non-criminal justice system responses to 
crime took the focus off abolition of custody and towards restorative justice and 
mediation schemes.  
Left realism and the abolitionists 
Within criminology, a serious academic debate developed between the so-called ‘left 
realists’ and the abolitionists. The realists, notably Jock Young, Roger Matthews and 
John Lea, had set out to offer a new agenda for the left of British politics which ‘took 
crime seriously’ (Young, 1987; 1988: 174ff), most directly expressed in a popular 
paperback, What is to be done about Law and Order ( Lea & Young, 1984). They 
criticised those they called ‘left idealists’ (ibid: see also Young, 1979; 1991; 1992a; 
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1992b; Lea and Matthews, 1992) for ignoring the fact that crime was a problem for 
the working class, women and racial minorities, instead believing  
‘that property offences are directed against the bourgeoisie and that violence 
against the person is carried out by amateur Robin Hoods in the course of their 
righteous attempts to distribute wealth’ (Lea & Young, 1984: 262). 
They accused the ‘idealists’ of believing that crime occurs among working class 
people as an inevitable result of their poverty as the criminal sees through the 
inequitable nature of society and commits crime to redress the balance. Young (1979) 
even cites a paper by Gordon (1971: 59) in which it is claimed that prison has no 
deterrent effect on the working class, as life in prison is so similar to life outside. 
When its theories conflicted with a Marxist analysis, these left idealist criminologists 
stopped theorising and changed their study to other areas, such as the sociology of 
law, and ignored crime (Young, 1986). 
The ‘realist’ approach, according to Matthews (1992: 75 - 76) and Young (1986: 21 - 
22) stresses that alternatives to custody have to be ‘competing’ and ‘realistic’. By 
realistic is meant that 
• it accepts that crime really is a problem, and is intra-class and intra-racial 
• sanctions adequately expresses the level of public disapproval 
• sanctions are no more intrusive and burdensome than incarceration, both 
personally and socially 
• alternatives are designed and directed at specific populations, with clear 
guidelines laid down for their implementation 
• it believes that the media distort the reality of crime 
• alternatives fit into the existing structure of sanctions 
• sanctions provide adequate public protection 
• it is concerned with victims and their relationship with the offender 
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• sanctions have an educational, reintegrative and socially relevant role. 
 
Mathiesen’s notion of abolitionism was a particular target for the left realists. 
Abolitionism was too idealist, focusing on social reactions to crime and ignoring the 
need to explain criminal behaviour (Young & Matthews, 1992). Matthews and Young 
(1992) claimed that abolitionists did not support any expansion of services, or the 
defence of some aspects of state provision, the maintenance of formal criminal justice 
agencies or of more accountable police and prison systems. Matthews (1979) believed 
that the ‘growth of so-called alternatives to prison … does not endanger the existence 
of prisons … but reinforces their existence’ (ibid: 112), and deinstitutionalisation 
‘only reflects the phenomenal form of changing control practices in the post-war 
period’ (ibid: 116). He also (Matthews, 1989: 131) considered that Mathiesen’s 
distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reforms is difficult to sustain in practice 
and can be an impediment to transforming existing penal institutions, and  he accused 
the abolitionists of a reluctance to spell out objectives, thereby avoiding the problem 
of co-option but damaging the process of mobilizing social and political support. He 
suggested that there was a clear choice between abolishing prisons – a ‘deep-end’ 
strategy, and reducing intake – a ‘shallow-end’ strategy (ibid: 132), which would 
suggest that there is a conflict between the abolitionist perspective of Mathiesen and 
the reductionist perspective of Rutherford, a point he made more forcefully a few 
years later, saying that reductionism and abolitionism are ‘deeply opposed’ 
(Matthews, 1992), and that abolitionism can easily slip into anarchism and is too 
sympathetic to informalism. On the other hand, a left realist perspective is an 
alternative to both abolitionism and reductionism, neither of which is politically 
viable, and lead to ‘impossibilism’. 
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Young (1987) also took issue with the abolitionists, claiming that they ‘eschewed 
criminology as a subject in its own right’ (ibid, 351) and that he parted company 
‘from much of the critique from the abolitionist camp’ (ibid 354 – 355). Lea (1992) 
claimed that abolitionists ‘like to imagine that the criminal law is quite redundant’, 
and Matthews that ‘even as an ideal rather than a reality abolitionism makes little 
sense’, as custodial sentences may be beneficial to offenders and the general public, 
especially if prisons could be transformed ‘into a more relevant and constructive 
sanction (Matthews, 1987: 393). Yet abolitionists would oppose this, as it would be a 
‘positive’ reform (Matthews, 1989: 130). 
Matthews argued that community care was a complement to incarceration, not a 
substitute for it (Matthews, 1979: 101), and as the cost of institutions are fixed, then 
community care must be an additional cost (ibid: 105), something that he accuses 
Scull of not realising, because of Scull’s flawed ‘functionalist metaphysics which fail 
to analyse capitalism as a dynamic contradictory whole’ (ibid: 111).  He attacks 
supporters of decarceration: ‘the decarceration argument is built upon the very 
dubious presupposition that all those convicted of indictable offences should naturally 
and automatically be incarcerated’ (ibid 104) though cites no evidence of anyone ever 
arguing this. In reality, decarceration ‘only reflects the phenomenal form of changing 
control practices’ (ibid: 116). 
Within juvenile justice, left idealism had little hold: practitioners still had enough 
contact with the families of juvenile offenders to be aware of the impact of their 
offences on their victims, who were often neighbours and as poor as they were. 
Practitioners also had contact with victims as part of caution plus and diversion 
schemes which brought young offenders and their victims together. It was the left 
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criminologists who ‘rediscovered’ victims and who had ignored them for several 
decades. 
RAP and PROP 
 
One of the few attempts to actually implement an abolitionist strategy, outside 
Scandinavia, was in the UK, where Radical Alternatives to Prison (RAP) was formed 
in 1970 (see Kane, 1972; Ryan, 1976), whose fundamental beliefs included the view 
that ‘incarceration in a prison is destructive and inappropriate both for the individual 
and for society’ (RAP, 1972: 16 and see Bolt, 1972). RAP provoked hostility from the 
establishment, an anonymous correspondent for the Prison Service Journal (1972) 
accusing their Westminster rally that attracted 500 people of using ‘people’s goodwill 
and integrity … for other purposes than that of penal reform’. They believed that 
alternatives to prison only placed more people in the claws of the criminal justice 
system, and aimed to ‘eradicate the concept of incarceration’ (Abolitionist, 1979) via 
the ‘total abolition of the prison structure’ (Ryan, 1978: 113), though they could also 
compromise, offering a reductionist strategy in their evidence to a government inquiry 
(RAP, 1979), and twelve alternatives aimed at different groups of offenders (RAP, no 
date). They campaigned strongly against the rebuilding of Holloway prison (Ryan, 
1978: 101ff; Sim, 1994), the implications of the Official Secrets Act in prisons 
(Cohen, 1977b) and the development of ‘control units’ in prisons (Christian Action 
Journal, 1976; Coles, 1977). RAP were influential on NAPO’s campaign against the 
preparation of SERs on those pleading not guilty (Ryan, 1978), and set up their own 
demonstration project, Newham Alternatives to Prison (see Bann, 1977; Ryan and 
Ward, 1989), which worked with 40 convicted adults on deferred sentences from 
Crown Courts (as local magistrates refused to co-operate with them: see Ryan, 2003: 
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63), only four of whom subsequently went to prison for the offence which was 
deferred (Ryan, 1978).   
 
RAP had a young offenders group (Christian Action Journal, 1977) which was very 
critical of DCs (Ward, 1981). By 1979 their declared aim was the complete abolition 
of imprisonment for all but the most dangerous five per cent of the current prison 
population (Christian Action Journal, 1979). According to Ryan & Ward (1992), at its 
inception RAP was not abolitionist, ‘but it quickly became so’. Ward (1982) argued 
that, while supporting penal reform, RAP always aimed to ‘show up its inherent 
limitations and contradictions’, but later supported the defence of liberal, welfare-
oriented alternatives (Ward, 1989).  
 
A predecessor of RAP in Britain was the Preservation of the Rights of Prisoners 
[hereafter PROP], set up in 1972, one of whose initial ‘statements of intent’ included 
‘to … take action to bring about the eventual abolition of all prisons and the 
substitution of alternative methods of dealing with offenders’ (see Klare, 1972). Its 
launch demonstration involved 9,000 prisoners in 27 prisons, despite having only 100 
active members, and Thomas Mathiesen flew in to advise them (Taylor, 1972; see 
also Fitzgerald, 1977: 137; Ryan and Ward, 1989 and Ryan, 2003: 49 - 55). PROP 
had a clear abolitionist statement of intent (Fitzgerald, 1975a), and despite 
organisational crises still adhered to their core principles, issuing a ‘Prisoner’s 
Charter’ in 1973 with 24 demands (Cohen, 1973). Fitzgerald (1977: 186) documents 
the rise and fall of the organisation, and the lack of support from academics and penal 
reformers. PROP submitted evidence to the May inquiry, enraging the Justice of the 
Peace (1979), who judged it as ‘marred with exaggeration, one-sidedness and even 
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paranoia’. 
Whither Abolitionism? 
In a detailed critique of abolitionism, Downes (1980: 76) offered the prescient 
suggestion that ‘a similar campaign in the U.K’ to that described by Mathiesen. 
‘would probably take as high priorities the abolition of the youth prison sector’, 
though he recognised that ‘It may well be that a strategy evolved in Scandinavia has 
little hope of successful transplantation to the larger and more heterogeneous societies 
such as Britain and the U.S.’ (ibid: 78). His analysis of the pitfalls of abolitionism 
included concern that it ruled out many positive  innovations in penal reform, citing 
the Barlinnie prison experiment in Scotland (see Boyle, 1977); that it ignored the 
potential of moves towards abolition  that do not fit with its militant ethos; that it can 
lead to neglect of needy groups; that it ignored societal reaction to deviants; that the 
overriding concern with prisoner’s rights neglected the fact that the granting of rights 
could be the ultimate legitimation of the system;  and that the concept of the 
‘unfinished’ was too vague and nebulous, such that it even ruled out alternatives to 
prison.  
Abolitionism has therefore come under sustained attack, and almost disappeared in 
modern criminal justice and criminological texts. Part of the problem seems to have 
been that it offered little intellectual scope for continuous theoretical development, 
and the ambitious criminologist needed to go elsewhere for status-enhancing 
contributions to theory.  Abolitionists were dismissed as utopians and idealists (Davis, 
2003), and Fitzgerald & Sim (1982: 164) argued that Mathiesen’s concept of positive 
and negative reforms was not always helpful for campaigners. As a result 
‘abolitionists are now regarded as sociological dinosaurs, unreconstructed 
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hangovers from the profound but doomed schisms of the late 1960s, who are 
marginal to the ‘real’ intellectual questions of the 1990s. Like Marxism, 
abolitionism appears to have been left behind on the sandbank of history’ (Sim, 
1994: 263). 
 
The danger of this is that good and useful ideas can go out of fashion at the expense of 
the search for the ‘new’, something that I develop later (see below: pages 378ff). At a 
practical level, the notion of abolitionism did not lend itself to most penal reform 
campaigns, being too abstract for them. For example, The American Friends Service 
Committee (1971: 23 -24) considered proposals for abolition as ‘exercises in label 
switching’ and ‘destructive of thought and analysis’, and Lowman et al. (1987b: 10) 
said that decarceration was ‘little more than benign abandonment’, while Kelk (1995: 
4 footnote 7) thought that it was ‘predominantly utopian, and for that reason 
theoretically weak’. For Goldson (2005: 85) ‘making a case for abolition is quite 
distinct from challenging the very legitimacy of social control in more general terms’. 
Stolwijk (1988) thought abolitionism was utopian and unrealistic, while Steinert 
(1989) said that ‘to become an abolitionist, the idea of prison reform must have been 
abandoned’. Van Swaaningen (1989) distinguished between abolitionism as a 
criminological perspective and as a social movement, linking criminal abolitionism to 
the anti-psychiatry movement, which has also been criticised as being idealistic, 
unrealistic and theoretical, but has been able to influence practice. 
The result was that abolitionism became sidetracked into conflict resolution, dispute 
resolution (see Steinert, 1986) and restorative justice, and lost a great deal of its core. 
Morris (1976), in writing ‘a handbook for abolitionists’, includes victim restitution, 
dispute and mediation centres, community assistance projects, day fines, suspended 
sentences, victim empowerment, sex offender treatment programmes and community  
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crime prevention as examples of work for abolitionists. 
 
David Garland and the culture of control 
 
Arguing that ‘recent developments in crime control and criminal justice are puzzling 
because they appear to involve a sudden and startling reversal of the settled historical 
pattern’, Garland (2001: 3) suggested that the change in attitudes to imprisonment 
could offer an explanation for the growth in penal populations worldwide, as modern 
criminal justice practices ‘pursue new objectives, embody new social interests and 
draw upon new forms of knowledge, all of which seems quite at odds with the 
orthodoxies that prevailed for most of the last century’ (ibid: 3). He identified the 
indices of change as being the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, the re-emergence of 
punitive sanctions and expressive justice, changes in the emotional tone of crime 
policy, the return of the victim, the emphasis on public protection, the growth of a 
new populism with the downgrading of research and knowledge, the reinvention of 
the prison to serve incapacitative and punitive functions, the growth of rational choice 
theory, the expanding structures of crime prevention and community safety, the 
commercialisation of crime control, the new managerialism and a perpetual sense of 
crisis. 
 
While most of his analysis can be accepted, it is significant that Garland tended to 
neglect developments in juvenile justice in his broad explanations and account, and it 
is difficult to see how his analysis can be applied to the reduction of imprisonment of 
juveniles in many countries in the 1980s and early 1990s. Often his broad approach 
fails to distinguish between different jurisdictions, so that all the different European 
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systems and the USA are treated as similar.  
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has explored a range of mainly theoretical approaches to decarceration, 
and their relevance to both the analysis and the experience of the changing nature of 
juvenile justice practice in England and Wales between 1980 and 1993. While 
practitioners were often aware of these theories and ideas, most of the impact was 
incidental: no specific project attempted to apply a pure form of any of these theories 
to practice. In Chapter 8 I will consider some more specific examples of decarceration 
that achieved a measure of success, and their relevance to the juvenile justice story. 
Before this, it is necessary to return to the historical account, showing how and why, 
after 1992, decarceration in juvenile justice stalled and started to be reversed. 
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Chapter 8 
Decarceration in Practice: Lessons from the Netherlands, Canada, 
Finland, Massachusetts and mental illness and learning disability 
provision in the USA, UK and Italy 
 
As has been shown above, there are a wide variety of opinions about the feasibility of 
any decarceration strategy, from the pessimism of Scull, left realists and the 
postmodernists to the more optimistic views of Rutherford and Mathiesen. It is 
therefore worth looking at some examples of decarceration in practice, not only in 
criminal justice but also in adult mental health and learning disability services, where 
there are some interesting comparisons with and divergences from youth justice 
strategies. 
 
The Netherlands 1950 – 1975: reducing prison populations 
 
In the Netherlands, between 1950 and 1975, the prison population fell from over 
6,500 to under 2,500 (with more than half of these unconvicted: Heijder, 1974). In 
1970, only 35 sentences of over three years imprisonment were passed by all courts 
(Christie, 1994: 43 - 44), and only 149 in 1977 (Tulkens, 1979), with waiting lists 
prior to admission. This is attributed to an ‘attitude of mind’ (Baring, 1976), 
prosecutorial diversion (Rutherford, 1984a: 136 – 145; 1986a: 26ff), short sentences 
(Steenhuis et al., 1983), and the work of a small group of influential experts 
(Rutherford, 1996: 130). Prisons were being closed as their number of inmates fell 
below the ‘economic operative minimum’ (Heijder, 1974). Hulsman et al. (1978) 
noted that there was a reluctance to resort to criminal sanctions, but when these were 
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used sentences were short, and  there was also ‘relative mildness’ in other parts of the 
criminal justice system, such as the atmosphere at trial and the relationships between 
inmates and their guards. 
 
Downes (1982; 1988) has provided the most detailed analysis of the Netherlands 
situation, what he called ‘a classic example of decarceration in the penal sphere’ 
(Downes, 1988: 58), in his detailed discussion of ‘why the prison population of The 
Netherlands has been progressively reduced over virtually the whole of the post-war 
period’ (ibid: 5). He echoed Rutherford in saying that ‘It is difficult to exaggerate the 
importance of the public prosecution service … in the shaping of judicial sentencing 
policy’ (ibid: 13), before considering and mainly dismissing a series of alternative 
explanations: economically driven ones (see Scull, 1977); the growth of the ‘carceral’ 
society (see Foucault, 1977 and Cohen, 1979a; 1985); the limits of prison capacity 
(see Blumstein and Cohen, 1973); a Dutch culture of tolerance; a pragmatic ‘politics 
of accommodation’ in which all the key political elites bargain to support  the policy 
(see Johnson & Heijder, 1983); a restrained media;  fortuity (see Hulsman et al., 
1978); a liberal  judicial culture; and  a powerful rehabilitative ideal (Downes, 1988: 
ch. 3: pp. 56 – 101). His main conclusion was that the decarceration trends were best 
accounted for by ‘variables closely connected with the actual accomplishment of 
sentencing by the prosecutors and judges themselves’ (ibid: 101), in particular a 
massive programme of pre-trial diversion initiated by the state prosecutors which took 
the strain of a rising crime rate away from the courts and prisons, instead placing the 
absorption of this on the community (ibid: 193). In particular, he believed in the 
influence of the “Utrecht school”, in which a coalition of academics, politicians and 
prosecutors with like-minded beliefs were able to influence policy and practice to 
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create a liberal sentencing culture (see also Bianchi, 1975: 52 - 54). Other influences 
were the aftermath of war, which created an urge to reform, and a favourable political 
context (Downes, 1998). Buikhuisen (1989) noted that many politicians and judges 
had been imprisoned during World War II, generating a suspicion of imprisonment in 
their minds. In Kingdon’s terms, this could be seen as an example of a window of 
opportunity seized by politicians and judges already suspicious of imprisonment. 
 
However, the low numbers in custody in Holland were not sustained over the next 30 
years (see Van Swaaningen & de Jonge, 1995; Tak, 2001). The policy of minimal use 
of prison was abandoned (Downes, 1998), and prison capacity increased (Baerveldt & 
Bunkers, 1996). Holland had the highest rate of increase in incarceration in Europe 
since the 1970s, according to Tonry & Bijleveld (2007). Buruma (2007) suggests that 
Dutch tolerance to drug offenders and prostitutes was also declining. Downes & van 
Swaaningen (2007) suggested that disillusionment began between 1975 and 1985 due 
to the rise in crime, the symbolic importance of highly visible crimes, concerns about 
Turkish and Moroccan immigration and the growth of heroin imports. These could be 
said to have created windows of opportunity for a reaction against the liberal policy 
that had occurred since the war, allowing a challenge to be made to the liberal 
philosophy which then led to more punitive sentencing, a reduction in the use of 
suspended sentences, and the criminalisation of heroin addiction. By 2005 there was 
then the prospect of ‘dystopia’, with an emotive politics of law and order, fear of 
ethnic minorities, drug-related and organised crime, longer sentences, the demise of 
probation, and the development of an instrumentalist managerialism and a more 
disciplinary regime in prison (see also Downes, 2007). 
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Canada  
 
In an analysis of Canadian government attempts to reduce prison populations in the 
1970s, Chan and Ericson (1981) claimed that innovations that were meant to be 
alternatives to incarceration actually became supplements to them, or ‘add-ons to the 
system’ (ibid: 45).  
 
Also drawing from Canadian material, Hylton (1981a) claimed that a high profile 
initiative to develop ‘residential community correctional centres’ instead of prison in 
Saskatchewan had simply resulted in the creation of ‘a modified institutional 
environment in the community’ (ibid: 84) and that ‘community programs have made 
the expansion of the correctional system economically feasible’ (ibid: 106). He 
questioned whether community programmes were ‘humane’ and argued that they had 
a detrimental effect on some offenders. Despite the development of the community 
programmes, he documented that the number of people incarcerated had also 
increased (see also Hylton, 1981b), and that those in the community programmes 
were the less serious offenders, so the institutions were being supplemented by 
community corrections, not replaced (Hylton, 1981c). He developed this perspective 
in a more theoretical paper, bringing together much of the critical literature on 
diversion and alternatives to custody (Hylton, 1982), in which, while saying that ‘this 
essay is not intended to be a condemnation of community correctional programs’ 
(ibid: 370 - 371), he argued that ‘there is a tendency for community programs to 
extend state control over an increasing proportion of the population’ (ibid: 341), and 
that ‘decreases at one point in the correctional system may have been compensated for 
by increases in the use of custodial care elsewhere in the system’ (ibid: 343). Many 
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alternatives were not alternatives to incarceration, but ‘alternative forms of 
encapsulation’, he argued. 
 
Yet Canada has actually maintained a stable imprisonment rate between 1960 and 
2005 (Doob & Webster, 2006; Webster & Doob, 2007), which Brodeur (2007) links 
to traditions of multi-culturalism, minority empowerment and a Canadian wish to be 
different from the USA. According to Webster & Doob (2007) this has not been 
recognised by many academics, who regularly make ‘data free assertions’ claiming 
rises in imprisonment across all western societies (they single out Haggerty, 2001; 
Pratt, 2002; Roberts et al., 2003 and Young & Hoyle, 2003).  For Webster & Doob 
(2007) this has been achieved via wide judicial discretion, a culture of restraint in the 
use of incarceration, a political and juridical system that acts as a buffer to popular 
punitiveness, cultural scepticism about punishment, and resistance to the influence of 
the USA policy of mass imprisonment. 
 
Finland 
 
Finland has also managed to produce declining imprisonment rates continually 
between the 1950s and the 1990s. Admissions to prison fell from 13,457 in 1976 to 
9,851 in 1992, and the prison population fell from 5,706 on January 1st 1976 to 3,427 
on the same date in 1991 (Tornudd, 1993: 18), and to 3,506 in 1992 (Proband, 1997), 
with median sentence length falling from 5.1 months to 3.6 months. By 1997 
admissions were 6,201 (58 per 100,000 in the population as compared with 200 per 
100,000 in the 1950s: see Lappi-Seppalla, 1998) and the population below 3,000 
(Lappi-Seppalla, 2001). Lappi-Seppalla (2001; 2007) ascribed this to ‘a conscious, 
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long-term and systematic criminal justice policy strategy built upon criticism of the 
treatment ideology which linked to an overly severe criminal code and excessive use 
of custody before 1950’ (see also Christie, 1994: 51 – 52); the development of a new 
sentencing ideology of ‘humane neoclassicism’ which linked proportionality and 
leniency; and a reduction in penalties via decriminalisation, day fine reform, parole 
reform, suspended sentences and development of community service. He also linked 
this to a culture of low levels of imprisonment throughout Scandinavia caused by the 
strengths and credibility of the welfare state; high levels of social trust and political 
legitimacy; a consensual and corporatist political culture which saw high 
imprisonment rates as a disgrace (see Tornudd, 1993); having career judges and non-
political practitioners; the influence of criminal justice professionals; Nordic co-
operation around uniform provisions and policies, and a sober media. Tornudd (1997: 
193) simply argues that ‘Finnish use of prisons has declined because Finish policy 
makers decided prison use should decline’. 
 
The Deinstitutionalization of the Training Schools for young offenders in 
Massachusetts 
 
In the late 1960s, after a series of scandals were exposed in Massachusetts’ training 
schools, Jerry Miller was appointed as the Commissioner for Youth Services in the 
Division of Youth Services [hereafter DYS], effectively in charge of placement of all 
children and young people referred to the state by the courts (Montilla, 1978). At that 
time, all youths determined by the courts to be in need of detention were held in jail-
like settings, where the main activity was watching TV (Coates et al., 1975; Coates et 
al., 1978), with little constructive activity (Bakal & Polsky, 1979: 23). There had been 
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sustained criticism of the existing system by ‘citizens groups, law enforcement 
agencies, judicial personnel, the Governor, and members of the legislature’ 
(Isralowitz, 1979: 21), due to high recidivism rates, overcrowding, abuse in the 
institutions (Behn, 1976), the oppressive and deteriorating state of the facilities, the 
custodial, rather than therapeutic attitudes of staff, inefficiency, political patronage, 
and the failure to rehabilitate (Isralowitz, 1979).  Between 1965 and 1968 the DYS 
had been subject to six investigations regarding the punitive nature of the institutions, 
which found that staff saw ‘punishment, personal degradation and deprivation’ as 
essential (Ohlin, 1975, and see Feld, 1977; Bakal & Polsky, 1979: 26; Loughran, 
1997: citing Leaf, 1988).  
 
Miller is a classic example of a policy entrepreneur, in Kingdon’s terms, who seized a 
window of opportunity afforded by scandal. He encountered intense opposition to his 
attempts to reform the schools by bringing in therapeutic techniques (see Bakal, 
1973a; Bakal, 1973c; Coates & Miller, 1973: 1977; Coates et al., 1973; Ohlin et al., 
1974; 1975; 1977; Miller & Ohlin, 1976; Montilla, 1978; Binder et al., 1988: 356ff; 
Binder et al., 1997: 315ff). He found the staff resistant to change, wedded to 
diagnostic labels (Coates et al., 1975), and deliberately undermining his reforms 
(Feld, 1977: 63; Coates et al., 1978; Behn, 1978; Bakal & Polsky, 1979: 19; Miller, 
1979; Lundman, 1984). He believed that sending every delinquent home would 
probably lead to less delinquency (Miller, 1971) and adopted what he calls a ‘deep-
end strategy’, closing the institutions, placing the young people with a range of 
private sector organisations in the community,  and using Federal grants for this in 
order to bypass state budget controls (Sargent, 1973; Arnaud & Mack, 1982). He had 
concluded that ‘only a rapid, massive change could overcome the capacity of hostile 
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staff to mobilize political resistance and to sabotage the new policy’ (Miller & Ohlin, 
1976).  
 
Resistance grew. Miller received death threats, and encountered systematic hostility 
from bodies such as the American Correctional Association and the National 
Conference of Superintendents of Training Schools and Reformatories (Rutherford, 
1975: 64; Serrill, 1975a; 1975b; 1981). Social workers and probation officers in the 
state never supported him (Rutherford, 1986b).  
 
From the beginning, his activities were subject to detailed research by the Harvard 
Center for Criminal Justice (see Ohlin et al., 1977; Coates et al., 1978), and follow up 
research has suggested that the decarcerated youngsters had no worse reconviction 
rates than others kept in custody. This was despite the fact that the training school 
sample contained ‘status offenders’ (committed for a range of welfare reasons) and 
the community-based group had a higher proportion of serious offenders (Krisberg 
and Austin, 1993: 144ff). The volume and severity of crime committed by youth 
under the DYS was less after the initiative, accounting for only one per cent of all 
arrests in Massachusetts, leading Krisberg and Austin (1993; 160) to conclude that 
there was no evidence that the initiative had compromised public safety, and Miller 
(1979: 144) to argue that ‘if we got a set level of recidivism whether we treat someone 
decently or indecently, I would hope that we would opt to treat him or her decently’.  
 
In the earliest published discussion of the Massachusetts initiative, Bakal (1973b: xiv) 
set out the philosophy: 
 ‘it is the closing of large institutions that actually stimulates new thinking 
about community-centred programs …. Only when the decision for 
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closing institutions is made are ways then found to effect the 
transformation and to open new directions for helping people in trouble in 
the community …. Without the actual decision to close the institution, all 
progressive solutions are stillborn’.  
 
 
Miller (1973: 6 - 7) further argued that ‘to secure fundamental and lasting reform, 
therefore, our institutions must be closed’. Gula (1973: 15 – 16) added that the 
strategy needed dedicated leadership, legislative or executive support, sufficient 
funding, and an effective and successful public relations strategy.  
 
The best statement of Miller’s philosophy is set out by him in Miller (1977 and 1979), 
in which he notes how juvenile justice bureaucracies ‘over-predict’ violence and 
possible seriousness, using ‘psychological or social work jargon as the fainthearted 
bureaucrats’ means of avoiding accountable decisions or potentially embarrassing 
incidents’ (Miller, 1979: 135). Writing long after he had departed from 
Massachusetts, Miller (1991; 1998) talked about tackling “the untamed punitive 
impulses” (Miller, 1998: x) of those who ran American juvenile justice institutions, 
and of having to resist the more subtle control techniques, such as using isolation cells 
and psychotropic drugs suggested by the new professions, as he reduced the direct 
physical bullying and abuse of the old professions. He claimed that ‘alternatives are 
seldom what they claim to be’ and are usually ‘quasi-institutional additions to an 
unassailable institutional tradition’ (ibid: xvi). He was very critical of ‘ersatz 
alternatives’ (ibid: 4) which were unwilling to take those who would otherwise be 
incarcerated, therefore simply extending the net of social control. He saw these as 
designed to bring in whole new populations, and allowed to exist only as long as they 
did not threaten institutions. Those middle class young people who did enter the 
juvenile justice system were quickly diverted to the mental health system or private 
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education establishments. In advising Hawaii’s development of its juvenile justice 
system (Schiraldi, 1990), where the number in training schools fell with no increase in 
juvenile crime (see Chesney-Lind & Matsuo, 1995) Miller asked ‘If my son 
committed this crime, would I pay the cost of incarceration to the prison system to 
rehabilitate him, or would I think of something more creative?’ 
 
For Miller, institutions ‘have a life of their own, unrelated to their stated task. Should 
the requisite number of youngsters from one group or class be unavailable, others will 
be found to fill the void’ (Miller, 1998: 12). ‘The ideal institution is one with no 
inmates’, he claimed in an interview with Katkin et al. (1976). 
 
The unique features Miller claims for Massachusetts were that “(1) the resources 
followed the inmates to the community, and (2) the alternatives were reserved for the 
most difficult inmates in the system”. For him: 
‘successful deinstitutionalization has more to do with manipulating labels 
than diagnosis; more to do with deflating stereotypes than with 
management techniques; more to do with mitigating immediate harm than 
with human service planning’ (Miller, 1998: xiv)  
 
and  
 
‘few professional models for deinstitutionalization have succeeded. Those 
done by the book have been disastrous’ (ibid: 154). 
 
 
Accordingly, authentic reforms must be marked by a commitment to individual 
clients, personal responsibility, case-by-case involvement, the ability to rebound from 
unanticipated crises, the ability to exploit vulnerabilities, and adherence to values 
(ibid: xviii).  He claimed that one reason for the success of the Massachusetts 
initiative was that there were few ‘professionals’ working in the system able to use 
professional jargon to undermine the plans (Miller, 1979: 138), and that decarceration 
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was total. 
 
The resistance to the Massachusetts model continued after Miller’s departure (see 
Tamilia, 1976; Boisvert et al., 1976; Shubow & Stahlin, 1977; Calhoun, 1979; 
Isralowitz & Harshbarger, 1979; Guberman, 1979; Fabricant, 1980: 80 and 195; 
Lovell & Bullington, 1981: 9; Rogers & Mays, 1987: 439 – 441; Guarino-Ghezzi & 
Byrne, 1989), but the State continues to have one of the lowest levels of juvenile 
incarceration in the USA. 
 
Matthews (1989: 132 - 133) considered that Massachusetts’ significance had been 
‘overplayed’, due to the idiosyncratic political situation in Massachusetts at the time, 
and that it is ‘unable to provide any model of reform’. He also cites Lerman (1984a) 
and Schwartz et al (1986) as evidence that ‘it fed into the expanding privatised 
network of juvenile control which in turn created a more opaque and less accountable 
system of juvenile justice’. This seems surprising, as it assumes that the previous 
system was accountable, despite all the evidence of its unaccountability and abuse 
cited above, and neither Lerman (1984) nor Schwartz et al (1986) comment on the 
Massachusetts initiative.  Fitzgerald  (1975b) claimed that Miller had ‘only succeeded 
in replacing one set of institutions with another’ with a ‘clinical’ orientation instead of 
a punitive one, which were still based on the same penal objectives and theories and  
were ‘further removed from public control and scrutiny’, so it had ‘not resulted in the 
development of “real” alternatives’. Later (Fitzgerald, 1977: 260) he also claimed that 
‘Even, as in Massachusetts … the closing down of correctional institutions has not 
provided a genuine alternative’ and that ‘the fundamental objectives of the new 
clinical approach in Massachusetts are the same as those of the punitive penal 
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system’.  
 
Others have assessed the Massachusetts initiative more positively. Alper (1978) noted 
that there was no increase in juvenile crime for five years after the closure of the 
training schools. Fabricant (1980: 25) called it ‘the single most ambitious public 
attempt to replace the training schools with small community-based settings’ (see also 
Barnard & Katkin, 1986; Bullington et al., 1986; Austin et al., 1991 and Ferdinand, 
1991).  
 
Andrew Rutherford championed Miller’s work in England and Wales, and publicised 
the initiative widely (Rutherford, 1974a; 1975; 1978; 1986a: 67-107), arranging for 
Miller to come over to England and lecture on the experience, which proved highly 
influential on the decarceration initiative in England and Wales (see above: page 124). 
The evidence that institutions could be closed, the importance of campaigners (policy 
entrepreneurs) and the concept of a ‘deep-end’ strategy were particularly important on 
IT practitioners, as was the notion of the dangers of young people being transferred to 
another institutional structure (see below: pages 359ff). Declan Kerr, of NACRO, told 
me (personal interview) that he had spent a month’s placement in Massachusetts 
during the mid-1980s, and that they had ‘taken away the debate … they were very 
young people focused … had respect for young people and their rights … liberated 
staff’, and that he promoted this in his own work in the UK. 
 
Macallair (1993: 114) has described what happened as ‘the most dramatic in the 
history of corrections in America’, and Calhoun & Wayne (1981) as ‘one of the most 
dramatic changes in our national correctional history’. Hamm (1993: 706) said ‘If 
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there has ever been a more intelligent public policy to control crime and delinquency, 
I have missed it’. For Bartollas et al. (1976a: 9) it ‘remains unique in the annals of 
penal history’. 
 
After Massachusetts, Miller went to Pennsylvania, where he claimed to have removed 
400 children from adult prisons and prevented a further 600 from going there, and 
placed them all in community settings, with no change in crime rates (Miller, 1977), 
and to Illinois (Blackmore et al., 1988). In Pennsylvania he had to negotiate individual 
cases with judges and welfare officials to remove 400 young people from Camp Hill 
training school. He again faced institutional staff hostility (Sprowls & Bullington, 
1977), and succeeded in closing it as a juvenile facility within two years.  Overall he 
reduced the number of children in institutions from 1,846 in 1977 to 644 in 1986 
(Blackmore et al., 1988), again using Federal funds (Feldman, 1982).  By 1979 the 
number of status offenders and non-serious juvenile offenders in institutions had 
fallen from 494 in 1975 to zero, and children in adult jails from 3,196 in 1975 to only 
four in 1980 (Specter, 1981). 
 
In Illinois he reduced the number of children in public foster care from 3,160 to 2,078 
in a short period (Testa, 1982), using evidence of brutality of Illinois children sent to 
Texas based wilderness camps to support his policies, provoking a vehement attack 
by the Illinois Association of Social Workers (ibid). Seven correctional institutions 
were closed between 1970 and 1976, and the juvenile population in institutions 
reduced from 2,500 in 1969 to 950 in 1977 (Sublett, 1977). 
 
Looking back, Schwartz (1989: 101), said that ‘when the full history of juvenile 
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justice in America is written, I suspect that Miller will emerge as one of the key actors 
in the latter half of the century’. Miller et al. (1977a: 104) concluded that ‘what 
happened in Massachusetts was neither an accident of forces nor the result of one 
person’s personality’, but it was a concerted, systematic movement that followed 
principles common to other examples of major policy change. Other similar 
assessments have been made by Miller et al. (1977b), Bakal & Polsky (1979: 32), 
Guarino-Ghezzi (1988) and Krisberg (2005: ix). 
 
Decarceration of the Mentally Ill in the USA 
 
Following the exposure of dreadful conditions in state hospitals for the mentally ill by 
Soloman (1958), Ferleger (1973) and Biklen (1979), President Kennedy  (1963) had 
called for a 50 per cent reduction in the number of mentally-ill people in institutions, 
and  set up  ‘national programmes’ to achieve this (see Shinn & Felton, 1981: 1). 
Many people had spent most of their lives living in the hospitals. California, for 
example, had 36,556 resident patients in 1960, 45 per cent of whom had been resident 
for over five years and 14 per cent for over 15 years (Morrisey, 1982). In Modesto 
Hospital in California 72 per cent of a sample had been hospitalized for over 20 years 
(Marlowe, 1976).  
 
Many studies (see Langsley et al., 1971; Markson & Cumming, 1976; Faden & 
Goldman, 1979; Okin & Pearsall, 1993; Francis et al., 1994; Conroy & Elks, 1999; 
McGrew, 1999; McGrew et al., 1999) found that many inmates could live in the 
community without any problems, and did not need to live in institutions to have their 
needs met, though internal studies carried out by the psychiatrists in the institutions 
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themselves claimed that few of the inmates could cope in the community (see Lawton 
et al., 1977). Model programmes were developed to encourage replication (Stein & 
Test, 1985), with assertive outreach, close monitoring and intensive contact at their 
core (Stein & Diamond, 1985). Research also found that ‘the increased number of 
mentally ill on the streets is not the result of emptying the mental hospitals’ (Rothbard 
et al., 1999: 906). 
 
A controlled study of schizophrenic patients newly admitted to a state hospital was 
carried out by Dinitz (1979). These were randomly assigned to placement home on 
drugs, home on a placebo, or to a hospital placement. Of those placed at home on 
drugs 77 per cent remained in the community for six months, functioning well or 
better than the hospital group. They were then followed up after five years, and of the 
92 per cent located all were still at home. Another group of schizophrenic patients 
who were discharged from hospital and followed up as out-patients with ongoing 
medication had less rehospitalisation when compared with a control group who were 
discharged without follow up (Clagborn & Kinross-Wright, 1971: see also Stein & 
Test, 1979).  
 
Markson (1985) followed up 2,174 older chronic schizophrenic patients in New York 
State Hospitals, with an average length of stay of 19 years, who had been assessed as 
‘improbable’ for discharge and as poor candidates for release. Following transfer to 
other hospitals 174 were discharged within three months, but many were subsequently 
found in board and care homes with a lack of service and a poor quality of life. 
Davidson et al. (1995) also followed up a small group of long stay patients discharged 
from state hospitals and found that, while they all preferred community living, they 
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led ‘stark, empty, lonely and tragic lives’. This was a particular problem of the 
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill in the US, as many were left without real 
support. Rose (1979), for example, in an important review of deinstitutionalization, 
believed that its rhetoric had masked ‘general abandonment of mentally disabled 
people, and an abandonment of organisational responsibility for them’, and Leona 
Bachrach was a major critic of the implementation of community care for the 
mentally ill in the USA over the next two decades, following a review that she carried 
out for the government (Bachrach, 1976; 1978; 1981; 1985; 1986; 1995; 1996). Her 
views were often echoed by Lamb (1977; 1979; 1981; 1982; 1998). 
 
Some of the tactics of those campaigning for deinstitutionalization included  seeking 
legal rulings for the right to liberty, right to therapy (Fleschner, 1974; 1975; Ennis, 
1975), and the promotion of the concept of the ‘least restrictive alternative’ placement 
that met the assessed needs. The incompetence of officials was challenged in court 
(Rothman, 1973) in landmark cases such as Wyatt v Stickney (325 Federal 
Supplement 781 (1971) 781 – 786; 334 Federal Supplement 1341 (1971) 1341 – 4; 
344 Federal Supplement 373 (1972) 373 – 411) and Brewster v Dukakis (Geller et al., 
1990a and 1990b). All of this led to a massive reduction of the long stay mentally ill 
throughout the USA, as shown in Table 85. 
 
It has been argued (e.g.by Scull, 1977) that the US experience of deinstitutionalizing 
the mentally ill was based on the attempt to cut and transfer financial responsibility, 
and that as a result the experience for service users was largely negative. The slashing 
of benefits for those moved to community living, together with the failure of the 
government and mental health agencies to support them, led to the failure of 
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deinstitutionalization (Bloche & Cournos, 1990).  ‘The largest social experiment in 
twentieth century America except for the New Deal’ (Torrey, 1994), failed because of 
poor funding, according to Torrey, and a lack of attention to housing issues (Howell, 
1991), though had still improved the lives of many people. However, many of the 
critics confused the concept of deinstitutionalization with the way it had been 
implemented in the USA, as if there was no other way. One of the biggest problems 
seemed to be that the Community Mental Health Centers, which were created to deal 
with the mentally ill in the community following deinstitutionalization, did not see 
this as their role, but rather saw it as a preventative one with the newly mentally ill 
(Tessler & Goldman). 
 
While the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill in the USA had little impact on 
juvenile justice policy and practice in England and Wales, this was mainly because 
the only well known account of it at the time was the critical one of Scull (1977). 
However, it is possible to see how the window of opportunity arising from the 
scandals allowed a political initiative from the President to take effect. The concept of 
‘least restrictive alternative’ has some resonance with the ‘care and control test’ of 
Lancaster (see above: page 292), and the use of legal challenges to change case law, 
while much more widespread in the USA, was used to clarify the restrictions on 
custody in the 1982 CJA (see above: page 215). Model programmes were also part of 
the strategy in England and Wales, and the notion that  claims by the institutions, 
particularly  by those in the CHE’s, that the children needed to be there were self 
serving and based on questionable research. In retrospect, one of the most significant 
lessons is the closure and demolition of the institutions so that the policy could not 
easily be reversed. 
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Deinstitutionalisation of the mentally ill in the UK 
 
A similar attempt to empty the mental hospitals in the UK was also influenced by 
exposure of the poor conditions in which long stay patients were living, in what were 
referred to as the ‘back wards’ of the institutions, and the long lengths of stay. Public 
attention was drawn to the condition of the back wards of the hospitals by a series of 
scandals, such as that at Ely Hospital in Cardiff (NHS, 1969: and see Baker, 1961; 
Hailey, 1971; Bewley et al., 1975; Fottrell et al., 1975; Ford et al., 1987; Pickard et 
al., 1992; Perring, 1993; Michael, 2003). 
 
The first statement of an intention to reduce the number in long-stay mental hospitals 
was set out in The Hospital Plan 1962 (Ministry of Health, 1962), and has developed 
since then with the full support of the then Minister for Health, Enoch Powell, who 
surprised the Annual Conference of the National Association of Mental Health in 
March 1961, who were expecting lots of praise, by announcing a 50 per cent cut in 
mental health beds (see Jones, K., 1993). Table 86 shows the fall. 
 
Developments in the UK were influenced by a range of patient-led movements in 
mental health in the UK (see Rogers & Pilgrim, 1991), often taking their initial brief 
from an ‘anti-psychiatry’ perspective, and also drawing on the Italian Psychiatrica 
Democratica (see below: pages 297ff). One of the most important of these was People 
Not Psychiatry, set up in 1969 as a network of support for people experiencing mental 
distress, the support being an alternative to psychiatry and the mental hospital (see 
Barnett, 1970). A more radical group was the Mental Patients Union (see Barnett, 
1973 and Crossley, 2006).  
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However, by the mid-1980s, there was growing concern at the slow progress of the 
development of community care for those who were targeted for discharge from the 
hospitals, and the DHSS funded 28 pilot projects brought together as the ‘Care in the 
Community Demonstration Project’ which was to provide many models of good 
practice (Cambridge & Knapp, 1988) for supporting people with mental health 
problems and learning difficulties in the community.  The Audit Commission (1986) 
also began to take a leading role as a driver of change. A very negative report by the 
House of Commons Social Services Committee (House of Commons, 1985) could 
have set developments back, but most of its recommendations were ignored by the 
Government (DHSS, 1985e; 1985f; 1985h).  
 
The planned movement of people from the institutions to the community was well 
researched. One of the most important studies was that carried out by Julian Leff and 
his colleagues at Friern Hospital, North London, one of the largest in the country, 
which in 1952 had 2,400 beds, and Clayburn Hospital, which was known as the 
‘TAPS project’. The studies followed those in residence into the community over a 
lengthy time period (see Tomlinson, 1988; Perring, 1993; Leff, 1997a). Between 1983 
and 1997 a hundred small residential facilities were established providing for every 
long stay psychiatric patient discharged from the North East Thames Regional Health 
Authority’s psychiatric hospitals, despite strong opposition from the Consultant 
Psychiatrist (Weller, 1985; 1989).  The majority settled successfully and ‘gained 
greater freedom in all aspects of their lives’ (Trieman, 1997), despite an earlier 
internal study that had assessed only 15 per cent of the residents of Clayburn as 
having the ‘potential for discharge’ (Carson et al., 1989). In the community they were 
more often the victims of crime than perpetrators (Leff, 1997b). A five year follow up 
  295 
of 281 people found that 60 per cent stayed in the original placement and only six 
were lost from the study. There was only one suicide, one person sent to prison (see 
Dayson, 1993) and 35 natural deaths, which was to be expected in terms of the 
samples age and health (Trieman & Kendal, 1995).  Community reprovision was 
assessed as highly successful (Leff et al., 1994; Trieman & Wills, 1997). A matched 
comparison of 278 leavers with stayers found the leavers had more diverse social 
networks, more autonomy, and were happier (Anderson et al., 1993). Even former 
residents aged over 70 in 1989, followed up for three years, who left the hospital were 
stable or improved, while those who stayed in the hospital deteriorated and became 
more disturbed (Trieman et al., 1996). After five years there was no increased 
mortality or suicide, and 80 per cent wished to stay in their community homes (Leff, 
1997b: 90). A comparison of 479 discharged with 279 who remained in the hospital 
during the closure programme found that both groups experienced 13 deaths, six of 
those discharged had become vagrants, two were imprisoned, and one committed 
suicide, while 86 per cent of them said that they preferred community living (Leff et 
al., 1996a). Some six per cent of the first 369 patients were readmitted in the first four 
years (Dayson et al., 1992), but only 27 per cent of all those discharged experienced 
readmission at any stage (Thornicroft et al., 1992), while there was no relationship 
between re-admission and the type of community setting in which they had been 
placed (Gooch & Leff, 1996). The costs of community care were marginally but 
significantly greater than those of the hospital (Beecham et al., 1997). The 
conclusion of the studies was that, except for very difficult-to-place patients, long 
stay, non-demented patients were ‘generally well served’ (Leff & Trieman, 1997: 
190; Trieman & Leff, 1998), and that even ‘the most difficult to place’ could have 
their needs met in specialist placements (Trieman & Leff, 1996a): ‘when carefully 
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planned and adequately resourced, community care for long-stay patients provides 
many benefits and few disadvantages’ (Leff et al., 1996b). Last to leave were 72 long-
stay and ‘extremely disturbed’ patients who were mainly transferred to other hospitals 
(Trieman & Leff, 1996b). 
 
Similar results were found by the Worcester Development Project, which followed up 
the 1,200 people who had been in Powick Hospital following its closure in 1988, six 
of whom had been there for over 60 years, 46 for over 40 years and 73 per cent for 
over 20 years, and found that they had all been placed satisfactorily (Khoosal & 
Jones, 1991; Milner & Hassall, 1991).  In Cheltenham (Cheltenham & District HA, 
1988; Johnstone, 1991) and at Cane Hill, the large psychiatric hospital in the South 
East Thames Regional Health Authority Area (Pickard et al., 1992), research found 
similar outcomes.  
 
Between 1977 and 1997 forty psychiatric hospitals in the UK were closed (Leff, 
1997c), after recognition that if highly staffed community care facilities were 
provided then there was little need for long-term psychiatric hospitals (Clifford et al., 
1991). The largest follow-up of deinstitutionalisation in the UK, which followed 272 
service users discharged from mental health and learning disability hospitals for 12 
years, found that only three per cent of the mental health users preferred to live back 
in the hospital (Forrester-Jones et al., 2002). 
 
There were many critics of the policy, such as Reid & Wiseman (1986) and Jones (K., 
1982; 1993: see also Bennett and Morris, 1983; Groves, 1990; Murphy, 1991). This 
was often based on the growth in the homeless mentally ill living on the streets of 
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Britain, but there was dispute about cause and effect. The Health Committee of the 
House of Commons (1994a: 6) concluded that: 
‘the closure of the old institutions is not the principle cause of the numbers of 
homeless people who are mentally ill, and that the majority of mentally ill 
people who are homeless are those who have lost touch with services or have 
never properly engaged with them’. 
 
They also found that fewer than two per cent of homeless people in central London 
who were seriously mentally ill had ever been in a long-stay hospital, and less than 
0.5 per cent became homeless when they left hospital (House of Commons, 1994: 17). 
 
What seems to have happened is that, while deinstitutionalisation was succeeding 
with those discharged from the hospitals, there was a lack of services for those 
needing new provision (Thornicroft & Bebbington, 1989), as resources were not 
being diverted, government objectives and actual services were inconsistent, and there 
were few incentives for any specific agency to develop the service. 
 
Again, there was little direct influence on juvenile justice in England and Wales of the 
closure of the mental hospitals in the UK, and little recognition of any links across the 
two decarceration policies, even though many of the strategies had similarities. In 
retrospect, the role of scandals, the development of model programmes, long-term 
government support and research into the decarceration are significant factors for 
consideration of a decarceration policy, as is the ignoring of internal self-justifying 
research and campaigns from within the institutional staffing base. 
 
Closure of the mental health asylums in Italy 
 
Italy embarked upon ‘one of the most radical experiments in psychiatric care of 
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modern times’ (Perris & Kemali, 1985) following the passing of a Law in 1968 that 
prevented the use of asylums. Much of this was due to the work of Franco Basaglia, a 
radical psychiatrist who had been imprisoned during the war and then shut down 
several asylums, one of which was in Trieste, where ‘a team of workers set out to 
systematically dismantle the authoritarian structure’ of the 500 bed psychiatric 
hospital and ‘the ultimate goal was the abolition of the asylum itself’ (Basaglia, 
1981). He then found himself in the position of being able to draft the Legislation that 
became Law 180 (see Scheper-Hughes & Lovell, 1986; 1987; Mangan, 1989; 
Girolamo & Cozza, 2000), that shifted the focus of service from individual pathology 
to a right to treatment and placed a responsibility on services to provide appropriate 
care, and prohibited first admissions to public mental health hospitals after December 
1979 (Bollina et al., 1988). As a result, numbers in the institutions fell from 78,500 in 
1978 to 7,704 in 1998 (Girolamo & Cozza, 2000; Burti, 2001). 
 
Basaglia adopted an abolitionist position, believing that abnormal behaviour was a 
way of resisting the powerful in the institution and society and that community care 
was the answer, and engaged with wider issues of poverty, exclusion and 
marginalization as part of a social and political critique that aimed to reveal the 
contradictions in society that underlie repressive social structures. (Accounts in 
English of the history and policy leading up to Law 180 are provided by De Plato & 
Minguzzi, 1981; Benaim, 1983; Mosher, 1983; Crepet & De Plato, 1983; Crepet & 
Pirella, 1985; Maj, 1985; Morosino et al., 1985; Robb, 1986,  Mangan, 1989 and 
Palermo, 1991, and of the opposition to the reforms by Basaglia, 1985).  
 
These developments in Italy provoked a major debate, being heavily criticised by 
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Kathleen Jones (the leading historian of residential mental institutions in the UK) and 
Poletti (see Jones, K., & Poletti, 1984; 1985a; 1985b; 1986). They were responded to 
by Ramon (1984; 1985; 1988), Tansella (1985; 1986), Pirella (1987), De Girolamo 
(1985; 1989), Bourne (1984; 1985), Lacey (R., 1984) and McCarthy (1985). Jones 
(K., 1993: 221) argued that claims of success were ‘politically based accounts’, and 
attacked what she saw as the ‘communist ideals’ behind the Law. Bollina & Mollina 
(1989) claimed that a review of all the major empirical investigations ‘support the 
conclusion that Italian society has successfully generated a psychiatric system without 
asylums’ (and see De Salvia & Barbato, 1993). 
 
There was little awareness of the Italian mental health decarceration in the juvenile 
justice field in England and Wales. Most of the research was being published in 
journals that juvenile justice practitioners would not be aware of. However, for 
Kingdon’s model, the ability of Basaglia to fill the role of policy entrepreneur, to 
seize a window of opportunity presented by his political involvement, and to change 
the law in order to sustain change, is important, and relevant to any understanding of 
sustainable decarceration. 
 
Deinstitutionalization of people with learning difficulties (mental retardation) in 
the USA 
 
Strategies to move adults with learning difficulties out of institutions in both the USA 
and the UK went through a series of stages, from ‘normalisation’ (Emerson & Hatton, 
1994: 4: see also Brown & Smith, 1992; Emerson, 1992) to  ‘social role valorisation’  
(Wolfensberger, 1983; 2000) moving on to ‘inclusion’ (Culham & Nind, 2003), via 
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the ‘five accomplishments’ of O’Brien (1987), the notion of ‘least restrictive 
environment’ and the concept of ‘an ordinary life’ lived in ‘independent living’ 
supported by a range of housing and personal services  (see Scheerenberger, 1978; 
Lakin & Bruininks, 1985; Rowitz, 1992). 
 
The living situation of those with learning difficulties in institutions in the USA was 
generally abysmal, with attitudes derived from the eugenics movement still 
widespread in the mid-1970s. Fernald (1975 cited by Lerman, 1985: 138), for 
example, claimed that every ‘girl’ should be ‘segregated’ during their ‘reproductive 
period’ as: 
‘feeble-mindedness is an important factor as a cause of juvenile vice and 
delinquency, adult crime, sex immorality, the spread of venereal disease, 
prostitution, illegitimacy, vagrancy, pauperism, and other forms of social evil 
and social disease’. 
 
 Corr (1967: cited by Wolfensberger, 1969) called for the ‘sacrifice’ of ‘mentally 
defective humans’ for organ transplants. Blatt & Kaplan (1966; 1974) had published a 
photo essay of two anonymous institutions documenting the horrendous conditions. 
Blatt (1969; 1970) compared the back wards of the institutions with evil and the 
Holocaust, saying he found few institutions ‘completely free of dirt and filth, odors, 
naked patients grovelling in their own feces’, where people were called ‘research 
material’ and where, when a staff member was dismissed for kicking a patient while 
he was having an epileptic seizure, other staff protested that the management were 
putting the welfare of patients before the welfare of employees (ibid: 72 -73). 
 
Some of the institutions were huge: Lynchburg in Virginia peaked at 3441 residents in 
1971 (Smith & Polloway, 1995), and remained dreadful even as they reduced in size. 
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A Senate (1985) Committee hearing received a catalogue of accounts of abuse, ill 
treatment and poor conditions that made up 686 pages.  
 
The publication of a collection of papers for the President’s Committee on Mental 
Retardation by Kugel & Wolfensberger (1969) was the catalyst for change in the 
USA, and in 1970 the Committee (President’s Committee on Mental Retardation, 
1970) suggested that mental retardation in itself should not be sufficient grounds for 
removal from home. Even President Nixon had supported the move to reduce 
numbers in institutions, aiming for a cut of one third (Presidents’ Committee on 
Mental Retardation, 1971). 
 
The campaign against the institutions was often clearly abolitionist, and was to use 
lawsuits, exposure of abuses, federal initiatives, parent activism, consumer activism 
and professional activism as tools in the campaign (Taylor et al., 1987: xi). In the 
Pennhurst case, class actions were taken on behalf of all the residents in a hospital, 
promoting new strategies by pro-institutional and deinstitutional campaigns 
(Rosenberg & Friedman, 1979: see Ferleger & Boyd, 1979; Burt, 1985). At 
Willowbrook {New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc v Rockefeller, 
357 Federal Supplement 752 (1973) 752 – 770} court action addressed the conditions 
in an institution holding 6,200 children and adults in 1969, in a State with the largest 
system of institutions in the world (Castellani, 1996: see Rothman, 1982 on 
Willowbrook).  Based on Staten Island, the institution held 5,200 residents in 1972, 
with over 50 people living in wards staffed by only one or two unqualified attendants, 
who made routine use of cattle prods (Hansen, 1977). A doctor at the institution told a 
Senate hearing in 1977 (cited Senate, 1979: 394) that new entrants, including 
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children, either learned ‘to swallow a large amount of food rapidly or they died’. 
Willowbrook used the inmates for research on hepatitis (Rothman, 1996), so that 
between 1956 and 1971 children in Willowbrook were fed live hepatitis B virus as 
part of a research programme (Rothman & Rothman, 1984: 260). All inmates then 
contracted hepatitis within 6 months of admission, according to Rivera (1972), the 
journalist who first exposed the conditions there, claiming that no one was given solid 
food, only mashed, and were fed by staff at speed (causing some deaths from 
choking), so that their gums weakened and teeth fell out. Rivera described some of the 
accommodation as ‘kennels’ and said the place felt like a Nazi death camp (Rothman 
& Rothman, 1984). Robert Kennedy made an unannounced visit in 1965 and 
described Willowbrook as a ‘snake pit’ (Rothman & Rothman, 1984: 23). 
 
Institutional closure was slow to begin with, with just five closing between 1970 and 
1982, but a further 13 between 1982 and 1985 (Braddock & Heller, 1985a), often 
following a difficult political struggle (Braddock & Heller, 1985b). However, by 1998 
118 institutions had closed, and 50 per cent of those in residential services were living 
in settings with less than six residents. The numbers living in small group homes with 
under six residents had increased from 20,400 in 1977 to 202,000 in 1998 (Kim et al., 
1999). Nine states had closed all institutions by 2005 (Eidelman, 2005). Between 
1982 and 2002 there had been a 59 per cent decrease in institutional residents in the 
USA, and a 698 per cent increase in community residences housing six or fewer 
people (Stancliffe & Lakin, 2005: 4). A review of 33 studies carried out between 1980 
and 1999 was also positive, with almost all of the studies showing significant 
increases in overall adaptive behaviour of those deinstitutionalized (Kim et al., 1999; 
Kim et al., 2001). 
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In Connecticut, the closure of Mansfield Training School,  which had housed 7,500 
people at one time, was followed up for five years by Conroy (1996), who found that 
people ‘were much better off in almost every way we measured’ and that the 
‘overwhelming picture is positive’. (MacNamara (1994) describes this institution in 
all its routine horror).  
 
Key to the closure of the mental retardation institutions were the  strategies of 
exposure of the scandals within them, the development of campaign slogans, court 
actions, and the long-term influence of policy entrepreneurs such as Wolfensberger, 
Blatt and Kaplan. Unlike juvenile justice, there was a recognition that many of those 
in the hospitals did need to be in some form of residential care, and the development 
of small group homes for 4 to 6 people, at little extra cost compared to the 
institutional cost, was crucial, and also avoided the problems that beset the 
deinstitutionalisation of the mentally ill in the USA. While not clearly voiced, there 
were many elements of an abolitionist strategy present, with few concessions to the 
idea that the institutions could be improved internally. Most of the legal test cases can 
be seen as classic ‘negative reforms’ and ‘unfinished’ strategies in abolitionist terms. 
 
Closure of the long stay institutions for those with learning difficulties in the UK 
 
 The political agenda to reduce the number of mentally handicapped people living in 
long-stay hospitals in the UK began later than that for the mentally ill. A Royal 
Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency in 1957 had recommended 
radical changes and a move to community care, but little had happened during the 
subsequent decade, despite exposes of the conditions in the hospitals (see Morris, 
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1969; Ericcson & Mansell, 1996). A good example of current thinking was an article 
by Gunzburg (1970) that opposed ‘utopian’ thinking about deinstitutionalisation  of 
‘subnormals’ whose deficiencies needed more supervision than was possible in the 
community.  
 
A series of scandals exposing abuse and ill-treatment of patients in NHS-run learning 
difficulty hospitals such as Farleigh (NHS, 1971), Ely (NHS, 1969), Normansfield 
(HMSO, 1978b), South Ockenden (HMSO, 1974b) and other hospitals, and at Church 
Hill House (Martin, 1984: 45). led to a White Paper (DHSS, 1971b) that urged an 
acceleration of moves to care in the community, an end to ‘unnecessary segregation’, 
and the development of maximum capacity and use of skills, to enable ‘as nearly 
normal a life’ as people’s handicaps permit. This was returned to a decade later 
(DHSS, 1980c; 1981b). There was substantial evidence from the inquiry reports of 
professional isolation, low expectations, corruption, weakness and superficiality of lay 
management (Martin, 1984). 
 
In 1972 a Government Committee called for ‘a new caring profession for the mentally 
handicapped’ (DHSS et al., 1972), and another committee at the end of that decade 
(HMSO, 1979b) put forward the idea of ‘normal patterns of life’, setting out a 
philosophy and model of care based on three principles: the right to a normal pattern 
of life within the community; the right to be treated as individuals; and the provision 
of additional help to develop to the maximum potential, all using normal community 
services. Those with mental handicap should have individual plans and the report 
recommended independent living and group home models. The DHSS (1978b; 1980d; 
1982c; 1985g) then set up a ‘Development Team for the Mentally Handicapped’ to 
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advise and assist local authorities to develop joint planning and joint financing as set 
out in Circulars issued by the Department of Health (1976; 1977) and the DHSS 
(1977a). 
 
The King’s Fund, the Campaign for the Mentally Handicapped and the British 
Institute of Mental Handicap were major promoters of good practice (see King’s 
Fund, 1980; 1982; O’Brien & Tyne, 1981; Ward, 1982; Wertheimer, 1982; Shearer, 
1986; Blunden & Allen, 1987; Felce & Toogood, 1988), as was a research unit set up 
at the University of Kent (Mansell et al., 1987), all urging services to be community 
based, using existing general services in the community, living in ordinary housing, 
working in ordinary workplaces (Kings Fund, 1984) and giving many examples of 
how to implement these ideas, built around the theme of ‘An Ordinary Life’ (Towell, 
1988; Towell & Beardshaw, 1991). They particularly promoted the notion of ‘five 
accomplishments’ for ordinary living: a community presence, relationships, choice, 
competence and respect, which had been devised by John O’Brien (1987).  
 
One of the most important developments was that of the ‘dowry’ system, in which a 
sum of money was allocated to the resident as their community care plans were 
developed, which had to be agreed by both the local authority and the Health 
Authority (DHSS, 1983c). 
 
Another body behind many of the changes was the Audit Commission, who believed 
that community care was more cost effective, but needed the transfer of funding and 
staff from the hospital services to the local authorities responsible for the new services 
(Audit Commission, 1987) and identified the barriers to this. They were the ones who 
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ensured that the ‘dowry’ went with the service user as they left the hospital, and was 
maintained in perpetuity (Audit Commission, 1989b), and then noted that new service 
users would not have a ‘dowry’ and would need new funding (Audit Commission, 
1992). 
 
There was some opposition to the development of community care, including from 
families who feared it would place greater burdens on them, and from the institutions, 
their staff and unions (see Olsen, 1979).   However, research suggested that relatives’ 
opinions changed after the move and they saw the reality of community living (see 
Larson & Lakin, 1991 and Tuvesson & Ericcson, 1996).  
 
 A range of research showed the gains that residents made in community living 
situations (Mansell et al., 1982; 1984; Felce et al., 1985; Repp et al., 1987; Rawlings, 
1985a; 1985b; Felce et al., 1987; de Kock et al., 1988; Fleming & Kroese, 1990; 
Markova et al., 1992). These included a follow up of 100 severely mentally 
handicapped adults moved out of institutions in Wessex (Felce et al., 1980a; 1980b 
Smith et al., 1980), and the NIMROD study (Humphries et al., 1985; Evans et al., 
1987; Davies et al., 1991) which followed 116 adults taken out of large hospitals and 
placed in a variety of community settings (Lowe & De Paiva, 1990; 1991; Lowe et al., 
1992). The first very large institution to be closed was the one at Darenth Park in 
Kent, which had had 1,700 beds (see Emerton, 1981; Challis & Shepherd, 1983; 
Wing, 1989; Korman & Glennerster, 1990; Brooks & Bowler, 1995). 
 
A government commissioned review of 71 publications (Emerson & Hatton, 1994; 
1996b) found that the move to staffed houses from hospital wards improved former 
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patients’ material standard of living, led to greater satisfaction with services and with 
life, provided more skills opportunities and the chance to develop new skills, reduced 
stereotypical behaviour, provided greater choice over routine daily activities, more 
contact with other people, greater use of ‘ordinary’ community facilities, more time 
on constructive activities, more staff contact and support, and  led to them being 
supported in a less institutional environment. They also seemed relatively well 
accepted in the local community.  
 
There was also evidence that even people with the most ‘challenging behaviour’ 
(people who made physical attacks, were destructive, self-injured, threw temper 
tantrums, committed anti-social behaviour, and had unpleasant habits, including 
sexual ones: see Kiernan, 1993) could be successfully cared for in community based 
services (Conneally et al., 1992; Young et al., 2000; Emerson et al., 2000). According 
to Felce & Emerson (1996) the concept of ‘challenging behaviour’ was adopted in 
order to remind people that severely problematic behaviours were a challenge to 
services, not a pathological condition (Emerson et al., 1987a; Emerson & Bromley, 
1995). Challenging behaviour was described (Emerson et al., 1988) as were methods 
of developing individual service plans (Toogood et al., 1988; Cummings et al., 1989; 
McCool et al., 1989; Felce, 1991). Manuals were developed to promote this area of 
work (McBrien & Felce, 1992), and specialist Housing Associations created to 
provide housing and support (National Federation of Housing Associations, 1995). 
Emerson (2001) produced a detailed literature review and survey of approaches with 
this group (see also Emerson & Hatton, 1996a). The Government set up a ‘Special 
Development Team’ to promote best practice (Emerson et al., 1987a; 1987b; 
Emerson, 1990; Mansell & Beasley, 1990; Cambridge et al., 1994; Mansell et al., 
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2001) with  those with severe challenging behaviours, designing individual service 
plans for the most severe clients in the South East Thames Regional Health Authority 
area. A five year follow up of those in the projects found that there was ‘successful 
maintenance of skills acquired’ in the early months, and ‘by every criterion of 
normalisation that we examined, community accommodation after one year was better 
than hospital’ (Cambridge et al., 1994). After five years all were in planned 
accommodation, most had support, there had been no suicides, mortality rates were 
normal, there was no evidence of neglect and little evidence of victimisation. 
Individual changes in ‘skills, behaviour, morale, social networks and participation in 
community living were generally positive and sometimes quite marked’ (ibid: 103).  
A 12-year follow-up of 75 per cent of the original sample found that all the gains had 
continued, except for those due to age-linked deterioration, and not a single person in 
the sample expressed the wish to return to the hospital setting (Cambridge et al., 
2002). 
 
In contrast to the USA, costs of services had increased in the UK, though semi-
independent living had lower costs than group homes, alongside increased 
empowerment of the service user, and greater involvement in the community and in 
domestic tasks (Felce et al., 2008).  
 
Research continued to show the benefits of deinstitutionalisation over time (Beadle-
Brown & Forrester-Jones, 2003) and the benefits of living in dispersed settings rather 
than NHS institutions, ‘residential campuses’ or ‘village communities’. The outcome 
of all the initiatives has been that no adult with learning difficulties was living in large 
hospital-based institutions after 2011 (HM Government, 2009), as shown in Table 88. 
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The deinstitutionalisation of adults with learning difficulties in the UK is probably the 
outstanding example of a successful decarceration strategy that has been sustained 
and seems impossible to be overturned. Keys to the strategy were the role of policy 
entrepreneurs such as Wolfensberger (offering a theoretical) perspective from North 
America, O’Brien offering  key concepts and slogans, and Mansell willing to combine  
his research with influencing day to day practice and government policy (in many 
ways similar to the role of Tutt in the juvenile justice field). Slogans such as 
‘normalisation’ were influential, scandals assisted change, and there were many 
models of good practice, a deep-end strategy and the use of the dowry concept to aid 
the transition from institutional living to independent living or to small group homes. 
The demolition of the institutions and the realisation of the value of the land on which 
they sat was also attractive to national and local politicians and health bodies, 
ensuring that they were unlikely ever to be re-established. While there was no direct 
link between juvenile justice decarceration and learning difficulty, the implications 
for a decarceration strategy are clear. 
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Chapter 9 
 Explaining Youth Justice Decarceration in England and Wales: 
Alternative Accounts 
 
There has been substantial academic debate about what really happened to cause the 
decline in youth incarceration between 1982 and 1992, with views ranging from my 
own earlier claims that it was a “successful revolution” (Jones, D., 1989a; 1993; 
Cavadino & Dignan, 1992; 1997), highly influenced by a small group of juvenile 
justice practitioners, to denial of any significant practitioner effect and strong 
criticism of practice in juvenile justice (e.g.: Hudson, 1987; Drakeford, 1988; 
Matthews, 1989; Pratt, 1989; Farrington, 1992a; Pitts, 1992a; Windlesham, 1993; 
Gelsthorpe & Morris, 1994; Muncie, 1999a; Padfield, 2002).  
 
In this chapter I will initially discuss the views of the critics of the practitioner 
interpretation, before then considering each element of their critique against the 
available evidence. Though the juvenile justice system is a complex interlocking 
mechanism, it is necessary, however difficult, to deal initially with its distinct parts. 
Overall analysis is then amalgamated in the final part of the chapter. 
 
David Farrington 
 
David Farrington has been one of the major critics of the idea that a practitioner led 
initiative was the cause of the reduction of juvenile custody in the 1980s, offering a 
combination of reasons for his alternative explanation. These are:  
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1. An increase in informal, unrecorded warnings – as distinct from cautioning - by the 
police (Farrington, 1992a; 1992b; 1993; Farrington et al., 1994; Langan & Farrington, 
1998), for which he cited Home Office research by Barclay (1990), and refers to 
Northampton as his main example. As a result, he argued, 
 ‘the gap between the number of apprehended juvenile delinquents and the 
number officially recorded gets wider every year, making the official 
figures since 1985 useless as an indication of trends in juvenile offending’ 
(Farrington, 1992a: 125). 
 
 In a specific reference to shoplifting offences, he suggests that a survey of major 
retailers indicated that the amount of shoplifting had not changed, but that a steep 
increase in juvenile shoplifters being dealt with informally by the police meant that 
they were not included in official statistics of offending (Farrington and Burrows, 
1993), as retailers claimed that they had been told not to report shoplifters to the 
police. 
. 
2. The introduction of the safeguards for accused persons in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, which caused ‘a marked decrease in the number of detected 
offenders’ (Farrington, 1992a: 126; 1993; Farrington et al., 1994; Langan & 
Farrington, 1998), for which he cites Irving & McKenzie, 1989). 
 
3. The introduction of the CPS in 1986, which ‘caused a decrease in the number of 
people prosecuted’ (Farrington, 1992a: 126; Farrington, 1993; Farrington & 
Wikstrom, 1993; Langan & Farrington, 1998),  increased  the tendency for cases to be 
discontinued (Farrington et al., 1994), and decreased the probability of the ‘morally 
guilty’ being found ‘legally guilty’ (Farrington & Langan, 1992). This is also based 
on the assumption that a declining risk of imprisonment will be calculated by 
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offenders, so their crime rate will increase (Farrington & Langan, 1992). 
 
4. The downgrading of the offence of ‘unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle’ from 
an indictable to a summary offence by the CJA 1988, ‘thereby eliminating about 
25,000 (mostly young) offenders from the official crime statistics’ (Farrington, 1992a: 
126; 1993; Farrington et al., 1994; Langan & Farrington, 1998). 
 
5. As the overall rates of recorded burglary and shoplifting offences increased, it is 
unlikely that there was any real decline in these offences committed by juveniles 
(Farrington, 1992b: 157). 
 
As a result, Farrington argued, ‘the official figures probably reflect official reactions 
to delinquency more than juvenile misbehaviour’ (Farrington, 1992b: 155), and the 
decline in recorded juvenile crime must have been ‘an illusion caused by changes in 
police policies’ (Farrington, 1992b: 157). He went on to ask ‘why has juvenile 
offending increased?’ (my emphasis). In a paper on persistent young offenders 
(Farrington, 1999) he developed his views, noting that ‘a large increase in crime in the 
1980’s – and especially in the types of crimes particularly committed by young people 
… coincided with a decrease in the number of recorded juvenile offenders’. 
Accordingly, he concluded that the average juvenile offender must be committing 
more crimes, as ‘it is highly unlikely that the decrease in recorded juvenile offenders 
coincided with a true decrease in the number of juvenile offenders’, so the reasons for 
the recorded decrease almost certainly lie in procedural changes, which are those 
mentioned above. As a result  
‘For all these reasons, it is very likely that the dramatic increase in crime 
between 1981 and 1991 coincided with a true increase in the number of juvenile 
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offenders. The number of recorded juvenile offenders only decreased because 
the probability of being convicted or cautioned after offending decreased’ 
(Farrington, 1999: 3 - 4). 
 
John Pitts 
 
Probably the UK’s most influential youth justice author in the 1980s and 1990s, John 
Pitts has written widely about IT, and his views are cited widely by others. He 
declined to be interviewed by me, stating that he thought that his published work was 
a sufficient guide to his position. While complex, his arguments, which are repeated 
throughout his different books and articles, can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. IT failed and would continue to fail to reduce the number sent to institutions. It 
would ‘divert only insignificant numbers of young people from residential 
institutions’ (Pitts, 1976) owing to the institutions’ ‘symbolic and political 
importance’. Also ‘I do not believe that IT will … diminish the borstal and detention 
centre population’, though he now, three years later, thought that it might have some 
impact on the numbers sent to CHEs (Pitts, 1979: 25 - 26). In addition ‘we do not 
avoid the taint of institutionalisation by getting rid of the beds’ (ibid). Instead, IT is ‘a 
holding operation’ for the institutional system, ‘not an alternative to it’ (Pitts et al., 
1986a: 177). 
 
2. Developments in IT would actually increase custody so ‘we may see more rather 
than fewer children and young people … in institutions’ (Pitts, 1979). 
 
 
3. However, there was ‘a small but articulate professional group with a coherent 
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model of an alternative non-institutional response to young people in trouble’ (Pitts, 
1979: 17). 
 
4. Any attempt to develop IT as an alternative to custody would only increase social 
control, becoming ‘a resource for magistrates’, with an ‘emphasis on control … where 
treatment is prescribed and then reinforced by legal sanctions’ (Pitts, 1979: 26). This 
limited the room for practitioners to manoeuvre, restricting them to controlling and 
policing young people. Meanwhile the ‘rise of minimalism’ and radical non-
intervention allowed local authorities to close down residential centres, while face to 
face practice became ‘more controlling and more punitive’ (Pitts, 1979), with IT 
workers only too willing to offer ‘a heightened level of discipline, control and 
surveillance’ (Pitts, 1992a: 176).   
 
5. As a result, IT had ‘thrown off its welfarist trappings and emerged as a hard-
headed, confrontational response to offending behaviour’ (Pitts, 1996: 255) in which 
the main models of practice were ‘tracking’ schemes and the ‘correctional 
curriculum’ (Pitts, 1992a: 176). Furthermore ‘some intensive IT projects’ actually 
‘included specifically punitive programme elements, including manual labour and 
restriction of liberty’ (Pitts, 1996: 261).  
 
6. Pitts is strongly critical of the systems intervention model of IT proposed by the 
CYCC at Lancaster, accusing them of failing to grasp political realities, as 
‘It was not social workers or magistrates who planned and built the new secure 
units in community homes in the 1970s, it was the government. It was not social 
workers or magistrates who expanded the number of places in borstals and 
detention centres, it was the government’ (Pitts, 1988: 24). 
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He argued that Tutt, Thorpe and their colleagues ignored the formidable constraints 
under which social workers work – police and magistrates are the power-builders:  
‘by suspending considerations of political power and the relationship between 
the juvenile justice system and broader political and administrative changes in 
the state, the delinquency management approach has presented a prescription for 
change which leaves the major determinants of the present crisis in the system 
untouched … it remains unreflective about the roots of its own strategies and 
uncritical of an increasingly authoritarian response to young offenders’ and 
misses the point that the youth custody centre ‘is being driven deeper and 
deeper into the working class community’ (ibid: 89 - 90). 
 
As a result of this misunderstanding of the reality of juvenile justice the CYCC had 
developed a blueprint ‘that will appeal to a punitive magistracy’ (ibid: 151). Their  
‘preoccupation with the more effective management of social reaction … to 
correct the apparatus of justice … (and) … quest for a technology of system 
manipulation ... (which) … eschewed consideration of the state, the causes of 
crime and … the motivation of deviant action’ (Pitts, 1986b: 118 - 119)  
 
 
had failed young people, within an ‘orthodoxy of “minimal statism”’ (ibid: 119). This 
‘precluded the possibility of understanding changing patterns of juvenile crime in 
relation to the radically changed political landscape of Britain in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s’ (ibid: 120). This then ‘denies the necessity of a historical or political 
dimension … (with) … no possibility of grasping the social realities’ (ibid: 122). 
Unless workers enter the ‘contentious political arena’ then a ‘systematic’ approach is 
a ‘nonsense’, and will ‘sustain the notion that social circumstances have no bearing’ 
upon offending (ibid: 144). Lancaster’s perspective failed to show why the closure of 
CHEs ‘should result in young offenders entering community facilities rather than 
penal institutions’, ignored the need to attack the YC as the pinnacle and backstop of 
the juvenile justice system, and advocated ‘administrative and procedural reforms 
which could well condemn even larger numbers of youngsters to penal dustbins’ 
(Pitts, 1988: 88). 
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7. Using the Lancaster model, youth justice workers ‘abandoned concern with 
inequality for “technical discussion” about manipulating the apparatus of justice’ 
(ibid: 23), while assuming ‘that juvenile crime was no more than a relatively 
innocuous manifestation of working-class youth culture’ (ibid: 27). 
 
8. Accordingly, the strategies used by the projects that were influenced by the 
Lancaster model were suspect.  The ‘custody free zones’ of Basingstoke, Southend 
and Corby had nothing to do with delinquency management and IT practice but were 
caused by police willingness to caution and divert (Pitts, 1988: 165; Pitts, 1990).  
 
9.  Instead, IT should have been a wide form of youth work, social education and 
political awareness raising, including creative work ‘in the area of alternative 
education, community work, community action, law centres and welfare rights’ (Pitts, 
1982; 1986a). However ‘concern for the social and psychological needs of young 
offenders … was marginalised’ (Pitts, 1996: 251). IT should also have addressed the 
politics of juvenile justice (Pitts, 1986a), and the expansion of IT should have been 
linked to a political decision to reduce places in prison and residential care, not 
something strived for through practice. It should have also ‘exert(ed) influence on 
local authority child care policy’ (ibid: 109), and should have been part of 
neighbourhood strategies based around clubs, adventure playgrounds, detached youth 
work and community work initiatives designed to give young people more power and 
control over their lives (Pitts, 1992a). IT workers had ignored the rise in youth 
unemployment, heroin addiction, urban civil disorder, child abuse and racism, living 
in their ‘bunker at the end of the welfare state’ (Pitts, 1983). They did not talk about 
‘need’ or ‘deprivation’ since ‘no link was made between the personal or social 
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circumstances of young offenders and the crime(s) they had committed’ (Pitts, 1996: 
261; 1992b: 137), and ‘those perspectives which address the personal, cultural, social, 
economic and racial factors which may increase the vulnerability of young people to 
involvement in crime … are not admitted’ (Pitts, 1992b: 138). 
 
10. This had all occurred because ‘the theory, policy and practice of youth justice had 
effectively become disengaged from social reality’ (Pitts, 1996: 287), and the ‘youth 
justice lobby had chosen to remain silent about the growing poverty, victimisation and 
social polarisation’ of their clientele because of fear that a causal connection would be 
made between falling youth custody and rising youth crime (Pitts, 1997: 129 - 130). 
 
11. Pitts regularly claimed that IT failed black young people, as IT had been colour 
blind (Pitts, 1984). and called for an ‘anti racist IT’ to meet the needs of black 
juveniles (Pitts et al., 1986b). The alternative to custody type of IT had had a 
‘classless and colour-blind minimalism’ (Pitts, 1990: 25) which meant that social 
workers were less likely to recommend alternative to custody programmes for black 
young people, and ‘ignored the political and face-to-face levels’ (Pitts, 1986b: 38), 
though he also claimed that, where juvenile justice workers did intervene, they were 
more likely to propose care orders on black than on white young people, at an earlier 
age. He noted that LAC 83/3 makes no mention of the fact that YOIs were attracting 
larger black populations, and ‘unless controls are placed both upon the judiciary and 
the magistrates, the situation will undoubtedly  worsen’ (ibid: 143). The failure of IT 
to address race issues masked ‘a substantial increase in the confinement of black 
young people in child-care and penal institutions’ (ibid: 45 my emphasis), and girls 
and young women becoming ‘more vulnerable’ to care and custody (ibid: 51). 
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However, elsewhere Pitts (1993: 105) also said that anti-racism ‘has had a significant 
impact on practice and policy in juvenile justice’. 
 
12. Yet at other times he and his co-authors supported and promoted many of the 
strategies that identified the new form of IT, such as  the need for ‘gatekeeping’ of 
SERs, an appeals strategy, the need to assist defendants to obtain good legal 
representation, a bail appeal strategy and a permanent juvenile justice position in 
court (Pitts et al., 1986a). He also referred to the ‘controversial’ involvement of IT 
with truants (Pitts, 1993: 41), and wanted social workers to act as advocates for young 
people when arrested (ibid: 44). Practitioners’ target ‘must be the criminal justice 
system itself’ (1990: 52), via working with the court, using SERs, using contracts, 
working with individuals, working with young people’s friends, avoiding care orders, 
preventing custody, and adopting an abolitionist perspective.  
 
13. In writing on the wider politics of juvenile justice (Pitts, 1986a) he said that ‘the 
war against the incarceration of working-class young people in trouble is being lost’ 
as the mid-1980s would be a period of ‘rapid and substantial increase in the levels of 
youth incarceration’, not ‘decarceration’. This was because ‘we have a decarceration 
movement without an abolitionist politics’, and ‘decarcerationists … now have no use 
for theory’, and ‘continue to espouse theoretical ideas which even their originators 
have subsequently revised’ (ibid: 7). IT was ‘romantic’ and ‘naïve’, ignoring the 
reality of juvenile crime and its victims, displaying ‘culpable negligence’ to inner-city 
suffering, with programmes which focus ‘exclusively upon the modification and 
eradication of offending behaviour …. The alternatives offered by IT has no merits 
over the CHE or DC beyond the fact that the participants usually go home at night’. 
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He concluded that The Home Office and Home Secretary are not on the point of 
‘handling (sic) the response to young offenders over to the IT industry’. 
 
14. This is then developed into a complex critique of the wider political stance of 
those trying to reduce custodial sentencing, who are accused of being opposed to 
justice, social well-being and morality; of believing that the existing system has arisen 
by mistake and can be corrected and restored to ‘optimal functioning’; of having a 
benign view of the state, the existing social order and free market forces; and of 
ignoring links between poverty, offending and social control, rather than seeing the 
juvenile justice system as a ‘battleground on which a class struggle was being 
enacted’ (Pitts, 1988: 106 – 108). In contrast to his criticism of the Lancaster 
academics, he offered praise to NAPO for trying to ‘transform practice as a step 
towards the achievement of a socialist transformation’ (ibid: 116 – 119), replacing the 
‘radical authoritarianism’ of the delinquency managers with ‘radical collectivism’, 
and the ‘development of an internal radical practice linked to individual action’, 
whereas ‘social work and IT have been fairly ineffective participants in the politics of 
reform’ (ibid: 119).  
 
15. This analysis led to his belief that the ‘central irony’ of the LAC 83/3 initiative 
was to ‘impose the prison on the community’ (Pitts, 1988: 54), generating a new form 
of IT in which ‘an exclusive focus on offending behaviour and excursions into 
questions of need or subconscious motivation are rejected in favour of hard-headed 
behaviour modification’ (ibid: 87). The LAC 83/3 initiative was an ‘attempt to deflect 
political attention from juvenile crime’ (Pitts, 1992a), which ‘gave legitimacy to the 
government’s attempts to rationalise expenditure on criminal justice’ (Pitts, 1992b: 
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134), to ‘promote an alternative, non-custodial sentencing tariff’ (Pitts, 1992b: 141), 
and to de-politicise crime. 
 
16. Looking back in 2000 on the 1980s and 1990s and the decline in custody that 
occurred, he concluded that 
‘Far from diverting serious offenders from imprisonment, “alternatives to 
custody” have been the means whereby less serious offenders have been 
propelled further up the sentencing tariff …. Radical reductions in custodial 
sentencing [were] not solely attributable to changes in ‘sentencing culture’ and 
the provision of alternatives to custody, although they may have played a minor 
role’ (Pitts, 2000: 141 - 143). 
 
 
Instead (Pitts, 1990) the fall in custody was due to diversionary initiatives, the 
development of alternative to custody programmes, and the reduction of young people 
in the age group, 
‘but it would be a mistake to assume, as some commentators have, that such 
reductions indicate that agencies of social care and juvenile justice systems are 
necessarily making more rational decisions or targeting their interventions more 
accurately’ (Aymer et al., {including Pitts} 1991: 92), 
 
because Parker et al. (1989) had pointed out that there was no possibility of estimating 
a likely custodial sentence.  
 
17. While the LAC 83/3 initiative appears to have been ‘the most successful 
innovation in the criminal justice system in the post-war period’ (Pitts, 1992a: 182: 
my emphasis), contributing to a 68 per cent reduction in juvenile imprisonment 
between 1981 and 1989 (Pitts, 1992b: 136), he argued that Initiative projects were 
established mainly in low custody areas, and reductions in custodial sentencing were 
achieved in other areas, so the phenomenon could not be put down to LAC 83/3. 
Meanwhile the proportion of juveniles appearing in court who received custodial 
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sentencing actually increased slightly, so it was not really a success (Pitts, 2001).  He 
cited Burney (1984) and Parker et al. (1989) as evidence that magistrates ignore 
restrictions on their sentencing powers, so it was not down to section 1(4) of the 1982 
CJA either. Rather, the reduction in recorded juvenile crime ‘is a product of a growing 
reluctance on the part of the police to proceed against 10 – 14 year olds and the 25 per 
cent drop in the numbers in the age range’ (Pitts, 1992b).  
 
18. However, in other writings he offered praise for NACRO and accepted that the 
LAC 83/3 initiative ‘reduced levels of custody substantially’ (Pitts, 1990: 15), and 
‘ultimately it is as strategic initiatives which aim to change the behaviour of juvenile 
court magistrates … that they should be evaluated’. The important contribution made 
by alternative to custody projects, especially LAC 83/3 ones, was also acknowledged 
in a chapter in which he is one of the co-authors (Aymer et al., 1991: 94). He also 
claimed that the LAC 83/3 initiative ‘triggered the most radical release from 
incarceration of children and young people this century’ (Pitts, 1995: 8), and noted 
that between 1983 and 1989 the number of juveniles imprisoned in England and 
Wales fell from 7,900 to 2,200, and that ‘the projects developed within the DHSS IT 
Initiative were a key factor in this reduction’ (Pitts, 1996: 267). He said that this was 
due to a government alliance with a marginal group of radical youth justice 
professionals, and despite the introduction of the shorter DC sentence, which could 
have increased numbers sentenced to custody. The 1991 CJA ‘was to be the means 
whereby the lessons learned in the 1983 IT Initiative would be generalized to young 
adult offenders’ (Pitts, 1996: 272). 
 
He was even positive about the  ‘progressive minimalism’ that had produced a huge 
  322 
reduction in the number of children and young people entering juvenile court, due to 
diversion, ‘robust intervention’ and cautioning plus, with the Conservative 
government institutionalising the success of alternative-to-custody practice and multi-
agency diversion in the 1991 CJA (Pitts, 2003). 
  
John Pratt 
 
John Pratt believed that the provision of education and employment training in IT was 
leading to greater social control of young people (Pratt, 1983a); that IT ‘has become 
the vehicle for an increasingly wider and more intensive regulation of the lives of 
young people’ (Pratt, 1983b: 19); and that alternatives to custody actually ‘legitimise’ 
custody, as the ‘community/custodial sectors complement each other: each addition to 
the infra-structure of the one is likely to generate corresponding increases in the other’ 
(Pratt, 1985: 97 -98). He thought that the Home Office  1984 Circular on cautioning 
would increase recorded crime and recorded juvenile offending, while the decline in 
the population of 14 to 17 year olds would increase the rate of custody, in order to fill 
beds, and result in net-widening as new client groups were brought into the system. In 
a review of diversion, he argued that it is all net-widening (Pratt, 1986a), but is also 
situated on the ‘margins’ of the juvenile justice arena, ‘an appendage to, rather than 
diversion from, the juvenile court’ (Pratt, 1986c: 46). 
 
In another paper (Pratt, 1985) he identified the main features of juvenile justice as the 
growth of inter-agency co-operation, the increase in administrative discretion through 
diversion panels, the extension of IT to those ‘at risk’, an increase in coercion and 
surveillance through heavy-end IT and tracking schemes, earlier and longer 
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interventions, and a growth in professionalism and bureaucracy. He suggested the 
need to move away from developing community alternatives, and instead a more 
political approach to SERs, to challenges to other agencies, and an improvement of 
supervision practice. 
 
Speaking at a practitioner conference in the North East (Pratt 1986b: 15), he claimed 
that ‘the omens for the success of intermediate treatment as an alternative to custody 
(or care) practice could hardly be said to be very good’, and that it would widen the 
net, escalate offenders up the tariff, create ‘a new site of control’ and ‘reproduce the 
prison form in the community’, citing the example of tracking schemes. Projects were 
accused of not emphasising ‘the wider social context of juvenile crime, the impact of 
inner-city policing, urban decay, mass unemployment and so on’, so becoming ‘a 
collusion with the prevailing view of juvenile crime … rather than effectively 
challenging this’ (Pratt, 1986b: 17).  
 
He distinguished between liberal and new right ‘back to justice’ movements (Pratt, 
1987: 148) but still argued that decarceration failed because of insufficiently 
developed programme rationales; not addressing the structural biases in the criminal 
justice system; inappropriate client selection; professional resistance; and 
insufficiently conceived services and agencies. He referred to LAC 83/3 as a burden 
on the voluntary sector, used for the wrong clients, having no impact on custody rates, 
and based on intense control in the community, citing ‘tracking’ schemes as if they 
were typical of IT projects.   
 
In later work, he questioned why ‘non-custody’ was ‘presumed to be a lesser 
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punishment than custody’ (Pratt, 1989: 240) before going on to argue that what had 
really happened in youth justice was the development of ‘corporatism’, which was 
made up of: 
 
1. increased cautioning and pre-court disposals (citing Northampton) 
2. the development of inter-agency co-operation 
3. the development of alternative to custody and care programmes 
4. a decline in personal autonomy of social work professionals and sentencers 
5. an increased voluntary sector role 
6. the development of juvenile justice technology by the private sector 
7. bifurcation 
8. privatisation (seeing LAC 83/3 as the example of this). 
 
He argued (Pratt, 1989: 246 - 247) that the male custodial population remained at 12 
per cent of those sentenced in the youth court, and that little had actually changed in 
practice. He said that Intensive IT schemes ‘carefully’ designed their entry criteria to 
ensure ‘a large catchment population (so as to achieve reasonably full occupancy)’, 
retained the right to exclude the ‘hard core’ to maintain their credibility, and 
continued to allow a disproportionate number of black offenders to go to custody 
(citing Pitts, 1986a). As a result, the ‘hard core’ would still be locked up, and the 
unhealthy result was the reproduction of the features of the carceral system in the 
community. 
 
However, in a review of Pitts’ work on the politics of youth crime he accused Pitts of 
not getting to grips with the complexities of right wing policies, ignoring the falling 
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numbers of juveniles in custody and being too critical of the use of computers for 
system monitoring (Pratt, 1990). 
 
In correspondence with me in 2006, John Pratt acknowledged that ‘probably my own 
criticisms were exaggerated’ but restated his view, supported by the work of Scull 
and Cohen, that  
‘all the alternatives to custody seemed to be leading to much more intrusive 
forms of social control in the community – but to those developing these 
programmes, this didn’t really seem to matter …. I think Nellis always said that 
the reality of what happened in them was rather different from the way in which 
they were written up to get approval, funding etc. Nonetheless, I think what was 
taking place in the community punishments area raised fundamental principles 
of accountability and ethics – which I don’t think were ever really addressed. 
 
He also raised concern about the development in the 1980s of 
‘the way in which largely non-accountable social work organisations began to 
dispense justice themselves – diversion from court and particularly all those 
intrusive and coercive ATC {Alternative to Custody} programmes with their 
conditions and penalties for non-compliance, dressed up in social work language … all 
those ridiculous contracts the kids had to sign …’. 
 
Barbara Hudson 
 
Barbara Hudson was also one of the main critics of the juvenile justice developments 
of the 1980s, seeing them as part of a ‘back to justice’ movement which offered 
‘dangerous ideological support for the withdrawal of welfare from amongst the most 
vulnerable sections of the population’, which would lead to ‘more and longer 
custodial sentences’. She believed that the 1982 CJA ‘cannot fail to lead to more and 
longer custody’ (Hudson, 1985), reversing the trend towards treatment (Hudson, 
1984). She considered that the development in Britain of decarceration policies was 
‘now over’, after it had been influenced by the ‘notorious’ Massachusetts experiment, 
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and IT was now offering cognitive training around debriefing and decontamination 
which would ‘extend, diffuse and strengthen’ incarceration (Hudson, 1984). She also 
believed that closure of institutions would lead to transcarceration (Hudson, 1993: 
17). 
 
In 1987, Hudson’s influential Justice Through Punishment was published, offering a 
powerful critique of the justice model, which she argued 
 
 ‘too readily provides a legitimating rhetoric for the reduction of social-work 
presence in courts, the exclusion of offenders from caseloads, the curtailing of 
intermediate treatment programmes, and the cutting of counselling, training and 
other rehabilitative services in prisons’ (Hudson, 1987: xi).  
 
She clearly believed that  juvenile justice workers had an adherence to a ‘justice 
model’ which offered ‘the theoretical possibility and actual practice of imposition of 
something which could be said to be definitionally not-punishment, but which was 
experienced by those on whom it was inflicted as punitive’ (Hudson, 1996: 42). 
Instead, she called for ‘a direct abolitionist policy’ (Hudson, 1987: xii) in place of a 
decarcerationist strategy which ‘cannot be said to have been pursued at anything other 
than rhetorical levels in England and Wales’ (Hudson, 1987: 174). Falling juvenile 
crime rates were due to ‘the increasing practice of cautioning rather than prosecuting 
juveniles’ and some decline in the numbers of juveniles apprehended (Hudson, 1987: 
100).  
 
In a confusing chapter on juvenile justice, which moved indiscriminately back and 
forth between the British and American systems, and between the literature on adult, 
young adult and juvenile offenders, citing evidence from one to critique the other,  she 
seems to assume that the failure of an initiative such as ‘diversion’ in one jurisdiction 
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must mean that it will fail in other jurisdictions, without any sense that lessons can be 
learned from research documenting a failure that can then be avoided in future. She 
also shows no awareness of how different the 50 state juvenile justice systems in the 
USA are, and how these are different again to that in England and Wales.  She noted 
the decarcerationist intent of policy and practice, but claimed that it led to increased 
convictions and more youth incarceration (Hudson, 1987: 139) and gave ‘unwitting 
support to … law and order ideology’ (Hudson, 1987: 176). She cited evidence from 
the 1970s, that social workers often recommended custody, to criticise the advocacy 
style of the new youth justice practitioners in the 1980s, who she believed had too 
much faith in lawyers, and a lack of a judicial perspective on the seriousness of crimes 
(Hudson, 1987: 157).  Burney’s work on the impact of the restrictions on custody in 
the early days of the 1982 Act was cited by Hudson to show that they did not achieve 
their objective, and she claimed that campaigners were more concerned with the 
procedures than the outcomes (Hudson, 1987: 142; 1993).  
 
She argued that the development of diversion was responsible for diverting people 
into the system, and not out of it, citing evidence from the USA (Hudson, 1987; 
1993). Diversion will increase differential treatment, she argued, and draw more 
young people into social control processes (Hudson, 1987: 147). She claimed that ‘we 
have continued to build and fill more and more custodial institutions for young 
people’ (Hudson, 1987: 148). IT is cited as a ‘paradigmatic example … of net-
widening, goal-displacement tendencies’ (Hudson, 1987: 150), while ‘no judge was 
ever made redundant, no police force or prison service reduced because of the success 
of diversion projects’ (Hudson, 1993: 40). Thus  
‘Decarceration through the expansion of welfare programmes has been a 
spectacular failure, resulting in expansion of the whole juvenile control 
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apparatus …. What is open to doubt, however, is whether the most apposite 
lessons have been learned, or whether the correct conclusions have been drawn’ 
(Hudson, 1987: 152). 
 
Hudson then claimed that juvenile justice practitioners were not trying to solve 
juveniles’ problems, but trying to stop their criminality, strengthening the net of social 
control. Her description of alternative to custody IT included casework interviews, 
group activity focused on offending, a  residential  component, daily attendance at a 
centre, and ‘near-constant surveillance’ through ‘tracking’ by telephone, such that it is 
‘taking up almost all the young person’s time and effectively removing them from 
their normal associations’ (Hudson, 1987: 153: see also Worrall, 1997). She suggested 
that  
‘These projects, established as alternatives to custody, have in fact blurred the 
boundaries between custody and non-custody, to the extent that with some of 
them, it is difficult to know whether they should be categorised as alternatives 
to custody, or alternative custody’ (Hudson, 1987: 154). 
 
She concluded that the development of more punitive supervision in the community  
‘might well be a price worth paying if it were successfully decarcerating 
substantial numbers of offenders. The available evidence is that while 
intermediate treatment is having considerable impact in gaining clients in the 
fourteen- to sixteen-year-old age range the use of custody for the seventeen- to 
twenty-year-olds continues to rise’(Hudson, 1987: 154), 
 
 
and argued that the closure of the residential institutions in England and Wales 
precipitated the decline in children being sent to them, due to financial stringencies. 
 
For Hudson, ‘social workers and probation officers have not taken up the challenge of 
urging the abolition of penal institutions for young people’, whereas NAPO and 
ACOP have. The result was ‘the failure of decarceration’ in England and Wales, and 
increased custody for young people (Hudson, 1987: 160 - 161). 
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In a later work she also criticised the  approach of the youth justice movement for its 
failure to address the issue of delinquency by girls and young women, as focusing on 
the offence would encourage the judgement of female delinquency ‘against standards 
of adult femininity rather than juvenile immaturity’ (Hudson, 1989: 110).  She 
believed that it ‘would be anything but beneficial for females’ and said that it was ‘the 
legitimising rhetoric of the right-wing law and order lobby’ (Hudson, 1989: 112).  
 
Other critics 
 
Many subsequent commentators seem to take some of the above arguments as given, 
without a more detailed look at the matter. Many rely heavily on Farrington’s and 
Pitt’s analyses. Newburn (1996 and 1998), for example, believed that ‘structural 
changes … were at least equally, if not more, important’ than practice, citing 
demographic change, increased cautioning, bifurcation, the restrictions of the 1982 
Act, and ‘diversion’ in IT as the reasons and concluded (Newburn, 1998: 199) that 
‘the possibility that what the statistics represented was actually a “real” decline in 
juvenile offending has now largely been discounted’, citing Farrington. 
 
Bottoms et al. (1998: 173) believed that the decline in juvenile offending since 1985 
was ‘an illusion’, and  Morgan & Newburn (2007)  that the reasons for the fall in 
youth custody were an 18 per cent drop in the population of 14 to 16 year old males 
between 1981 and 1998, the 1982 Act, Intensive IT and, ‘crucially’, diversion from 
court. Phillips (1990) repeated the claim that the LAC 83/3 initiative failed to respond 
to black young people and young women.  
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Gelsthorpe and Morris (1994) suggested that, as the proportionate use of custody for 
those juveniles actually sentenced ‘hardly changed’, and that custody for young black 
people did not fall ‘so markedly’, then the alternative to custody thesis cannot be 
upheld: 
‘It is only when we look at the proportionate use of custody for the whole of the 
known juvenile offender population that we see a very marked reduction: from 
8% in 1981 to 1% in 1990. This indicates that it was the impact of diversion 
(cautioning) practices rather than deinstitutionalization (intermediate treatment) 
practices, the increased use of fines, compensation, or community service, the 
introduction of criteria to restrict the use of custody or legal representation 
which reduced custody’ (Gelsthorpe & Morris, 1994; pp. 976 - 977). 
 
Roger Matthews referred to ‘the bizarre situation in which the community-based 
alternatives are depicted as being more of a problem than a solution’ (Matthews, 
1989: 128). He then claimed (ibid: 135 – 137) that a ‘minimalist’ approach failed to 
acknowledge the problems of transcarceration, of displacement  to other equally 
problematic agencies, of transfer of discretion to more administrative and less 
accountable realms, and of benign neglect, concluding that ‘successive alternatives 
have failed to live up to expectations’ (ibid: 139). He suggested that a successful 
decarceration policy depended upon limiting judicial discretion by providing rational 
guidelines (ibid: 140 - 141), and by developing inter-agency approaches, which have 
been particular successful, ‘where other strategies have failed’ in juvenile justice 
(ibid: 143). 
 
In some of his later writings (Matthews, 1992; 1995;  1999) he acknowledged the 
dramatic fall in juvenile custody and recorded juvenile crime (Matthews, 1995: 83), 
but claimed that emerging forms of  inter-agency co-operation (Matthews, 1992: 84 -
85), managerialism or ‘corporatism’ were responsible for this,  along with a fall of 30 
per cent in the population (Matthews, 1995), and the ‘judiciary’s willingness to 
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explore a wide range of alternatives and adopt a growing array of non-custodial 
options’ (Matthews, 1995: 96).  He saw a critical role played by ‘the improved penal 
climate’ and the ‘declining level of serious juvenile crime’ (Matthews, 1992: 84 – 85) 
but does not consider cause and effect (was the fall in serious juvenile crime and the 
improved penal climate a cause or a consequence of the reduction in juvenile 
incarceration?). However, he argued, ‘custody rates for young Afro-Caribbean’s and 
for females did not decrease significantly during the 1980’s’ (Matthews, 1995: 86; 
1999: 174).  He saw little impact of cautioning, as it was not usually used when 
custody was a possibility, though it did reduce pressure on the courts (Matthews, 
1995: 89). He said that the overall achievements of the diversion of juveniles from 
custody was ‘not wholly positive’, because of a contradictory set of imperatives and a 
weak theoretical position (Matthews, 1995: 96 – 101).  In a bizarre misunderstanding 
of the order of developments, he says that 
‘In Northamptonshire, Basingstoke and elsewhere, inter-agency co-operation 
has been established in order to achieve a reduction in the use of custody for 
juveniles through the creation of what have been termed ‘non-custodial zones’ 
(Matthews, 1989: 143). 
 
 
Yet it was only after there were several years of no custodial sentencing in 
Basingstoke that the ‘custody-free zone’ was used as a concept. As he put it again a 
few years later, ‘the attempt to limit prison use through the expansion of more 
welfare-oriented “alternatives” in the 1970s and 1980s never quite lived up to 
expectations’,  while youth justice practitioners were no longer  
‘responding to the perceived needs of offenders and providing care and support 
… impervious to the links between social and economic disadvantage and 
patterns of offending … unwillingness to explore “deeper causes” … (and the) 
possibility of addressing the basis of offending becomes increasingly unlikely 
… young people who may be facing serious difficulties are simply left to their 
own devices’ (Matthews, 1999: 178). 
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Cheetham (1986: 34 - 35), one of the few writers to explore the racial aspects of 
sentencing, claimed that IT workers were not offering positive recommendations for 
community based sentences in their SERs on black young people, not offering black 
young people explanation, advocacy or help, and that when they did engage with 
black young people this engagement actually stigmatised them and drew them 
prematurely into the net of welfare services. She claimed that  ‘some projects’ have a 
racial quota system, only admitting a small number of black young people or resting 
content with a few applications. 
 
Roger Smith (1981: 32) claimed that intensive IT ‘virtually amounts to a custodial 
sentence where money is saved by inmates going home to sleep’. He later (Smith,  
2003) thought that too much emphasis had been placed on only one measure of 
success in the 1980s – reducing custody – which then had no defence against ‘prison 
works’ talk, and as a result the 1990s became a period of ‘unlearning’ in juvenile 
justice. Bernard Davies (1982) argued that Intensive IT was a ‘progressive fad’ that 
was failing to focus on ‘poverty, inequality and powerlessness’ of young people. 
Knapp & Robertson (1986) believed that LAC 83/3 would lead to IT being over-used. 
 
Windlesham (1993: 168 and 240) gave prime importance for the decline in custodial 
sentencing of young offenders to the statutory restrictions on custody (as did Padfield, 
2002) though stated that  
‘The steady decline in the number of young male offenders sentenced to 
custody which occurred throughout the 1980’s is one of the most remarkable 
post-war achievements of deliberate legislative enactment’ (Windlesham, 1993: 
170).  
 
He noted that recorded juvenile crime was falling (Windlesham, 1993: 171). In 
addition to the statutory restrictions, he acknowledged the role played by increased 
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cautioning, magistrates’ greater use of IT, and the extension of community service to 
16 year olds. However he stated ‘while it was true that other factors beside the 
statutory restrictions on the use of custody for young offenders contributed to the 
decline, judicial interpretation and practitioners usage was crucial’. 
  
Howard Parker et al, in various writings, had predicted that juvenile custody would 
rise after 1982,  and in 1987 (Parker et al. 1987: 21) still considered that ‘it is unlikely 
that custody rates will decrease significantly’, though acknowledged that the steep rise 
in custody that he and his colleagues had predicted in 1982 had not occurred. LAC 
83/3 projects had, they argued, not been alternatives, but ‘sentences in their own 
right’, causing ‘over capacity and mistargeting’, and there had been ‘no substantial 
impression on custody rates. Decarceration may be more at the level of rhetoric’. 
They then suggested that: 
‘There has … been a drop in the proportionate use of custody if the percentage 
of males receiving a custodial sentence is expressed as a proportion of those 
found guilty and cautioned by the police. However, the custody rate for those 
convicted has not dropped …. The inevitable conclusion is that the new 
‘alternatives’, like others before them, are not supplanting custody but other 
sentences …. The reality behind the rhetoric of decarceration is an escalation of 
control and surveillance’ (Parker et al., 1987: 38 – 39). 
 
McLaughlin & Muncie (1993) believed that community based initiatives ‘have never 
replaced the custodial option’ but ‘have become additions to a seemingly ever 
expanding juvenile justice system’. They claimed that cautioning was used by IT ‘to 
recruit clients, and that intensive IT was ‘an institutionalised and punitive form of IT’, 
yet go on to describe the ‘unexpected and dramatic shift to decarceration and 
deinstitutionalisation’ which they attribute to diversion policies, legislation, the 
curbing of professional autonomy, the development of alternatives to custody and 
bifurcation.  
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John Muncie believed that the justice movement provided a legitimating rhetoric for 
the political right, ignoring unemployment, poverty and inequality (Muncie, 1997).   
Later he (Muncie, 1999a: 272) noted the fall in the number of CHEs from 125 in 1975 
to 60 in 1984, and the drop in residents from 7,500 to 2,800 over the same period. He 
suggested that the restrictions on custody in the 1982 CJA were gradually tightened 
by case law, and attributed the fall in youth crime and custody in the 1980s to LAC 
83/3  rather than the ‘successful revolution’, noting that the 1991 CJA was an attempt 
to build on juvenile strategies in the adult arena. He went on to offer a radical critique 
of decarceration under the heading of ‘the contradictions of decarceration’ (ibid: 
Table 7.5: 278). These he defined as net-widening, up-tariffing, the lack of purpose of 
community based programmes, the jeopardy to which they subjected youngsters by 
accelerating the entry to custody through breach of the alternative order, the dubious 
financial and economic rationale of the alternatives, their limited vision and lack of 
awareness of the broader social context, and their political vulnerability. In his 
reading of the 1980s, he claimed that ‘while magistrates were committed to 
incarcerating the young offender, social workers extended their preventive work with 
the families of the “pre-delinquent”’ (Muncie, 1999a: 266). However, in another 
article of the same year, he cited the ‘successful revolution’ in youth justice and ‘the 
diversionary successes of the 1980s’ (Muncie, 1999b), though also claimed that by the 
late 1980s youth justice was ‘a delinquency management service’ (Muncie, 1999c). 
 
Goldson has also offered various views on the 1980s and early 1990s. While 
documenting the good practice and reduction in custody (Goldson, 1997a; 1997b; 
1999), he argued that it was ‘misleading’ to describe this as an ‘unqualified success’ 
due to institutional injustices, and the lack of attention to race and gender by ‘colour 
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blind’ and ‘gender-blind’ practitioners, so ‘girls and young women in trouble did not 
benefit’. However, in 2005 he said: 
‘The principles, policies and practices of diversion, decriminalisation and 
decarceration made a positive impact across the juvenile/youth justice system in 
England and Wales during the 1980s and early 1990s’ (Goldson, 2005: 86). 
 
Rogowski (1995), a practitioner writing from an avowed radical perspective, accused 
community based initiatives as being ‘alternative incarceration’, rather than 
alternatives to incarceration. For him (Rogowski, 1984), ‘IT itself cannot reduce the 
overall rate of delinquency as delinquency itself has its roots in the structure of 
society’ and the politicisation of young people. So ‘even if IT did emerge as a genuine 
alternative to incarceration … seen from a Marxist perspective it is merely a more 
subtle method of social control’ (Rogowski, 1985), a ‘conservative practice’ 
(Rogowski, 1990a) ‘perpetuating a capitalist society’, that instead should aim 
‘towards the longer-term structural transformation of society’ via non-pathologising 
groupwork that develops a ‘sense of oppression’ (Rogowski, 1990b). ‘Removing 
young people from gaols and the like is all well and good but does not address the 
fundamental inequalities of wealth and power in society’ (Rogowski, 1994). However 
in 2009 he criticised both New Labour and Conservative governments for ignoring 
that  
‘there were social work successes in relation to youth crime in the 1980s which 
showed that minimal intervention and being channelled away from the youth 
justice system, together with genuine alternatives to incarceration, were the way 
forward’ (Rogowski, 2009: 10). 
 
Robertson & Knapp (1987: 133) were convinced that there was an ‘apparently 
irreducible custodial population of young people’, which could not be affected unless 
custodial sentences were abolished. Rawlings (1999: 153) placed responsibility for 
the decline in custody on the increase in cautioning, and Brown (1998) believed that 
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the fall in juvenile custody rates was mainly due to the restrictions on custodial 
sentencing in the 1982 and 1988 Acts, alongside ‘increased use of “punitive” 
community measures’ such as IT, police entry into social work areas via cautioning 
panels, and the ‘refashioning of intermediate treatment in a “law and order” image’ 
during the ‘darkest hour’ for juvenile justice. 
 
The juvenile justice experience in the UK between 1982 and 1994 is also totally 
ignored by some academics writing about attempts to reduce custody. Goldblatt & 
Lewis (1998), for example, in a Home Office study on ways of dealing with offending 
behaviour, made no reference to IT. Bishop (1988), writing on non-custodial 
alternatives in Europe, also ignored juvenile justice in England and Wales, as did  
McConville & Williams (1987) and Snacken et al. (1995). Bottoms (1987), writing on 
limiting prison use in England and Wales, showed no interest in juvenile 
imprisonment. Reiner (1987), reviewing Rutherford’s Growing out of Crime, said that 
he remained ‘unconvinced about its feasibility either politically or as a means of 
dealing with all young offenders’. Garland (1989) writing about the Punishment in the 
Community green paper, ignored juvenile justice, as did Davies (1989), Smith (1989), 
and Davies et al. (1996). In a collection on ‘radical social work today’ Langan & Lee 
(1989) made no reference at all to the radical social work going on in youth justice, 
but had a chapter on probation  which thought that ‘the recent proliferation of non-
custodial alternatives is a component of a more general drift towards coercion’ 
(Senior, 1989: 309). Writing at the time of some of the most significant changes in 
sentencing and the closing of residential and custodial institutions for delinquents, Ely 
(1985: 135 - 136) concluded that ‘no particularly important initiatives with regard to 
the continuing management of delinquency appear to be in prospect’. Recent 
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discussion on decarceration in North America (Barker, 2011; Bosworth, 2011; 
Bushway, 2011; Gartner et al, 2011; Gottschalk, 2007; Staples, 2007; Uggen, 2007; 
Mauer, 2007), ignore  the lessons of abolitionism  and other decarceration initiatives, 
instead coming up with calls to ‘reclaim the rehabilitative ideal (Gottschalk) and 
institute executive pardons (Uggen) as their strategies. Jacobs argues that little is 
known about how to decarcerate; ‘this is practically virgin territory’ (Jacobs, 2007). 
 
There is a similar neglect of juvenile justice developments in many overviews of 
wider criminal justice policy in the UK or in England and Wales, when one would 
have thought that the massive reduction in imprisonment of juveniles at least deserved 
a mention (see Dingwall & Davenport, 1995). Sim (2009), despite proposing an 
abolitionist agenda and asking ‘why have empathic policies been ignored and 
marginalised?’ (ibid: 134ff), discusses the period 1983 to 1990 with no reference to 
the closure of youth prisons, and relegates the Massachusetts initiative to a footnote 
(ibid: 141), thereby answering his own question. Even campaign groups who had 
supported and drawn on the juvenile justice success in the 1980s would ignore it in 
the late 1990s (see PRT, 1998). Fionda (1988), in explaining juvenile justice in the 
1980s, referred to ‘alternatives developed by the probation service’, ignoring the role 
of social services and the charitable and voluntary sector, who set up and managed 
many of the LAC 83/3 Projects. Pickford’s (2000) collection is significant for its lack 
of reference to practitioner gains in the 1980s, and for an example of alternatives to 
custody she went to the USA (Hunt, 2000). Mills (2011) claims that community 
sentence reform will leave ‘the overall size of the prison population’ untouched, that 
‘alternatives to custody’ cannot bring about change ‘on the scale necessary to release 
meaningful sums of money from prison’, and will not act as ‘like-for-like 
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replacements’ to custody, but will push offenders up tariff. 
 
An Alternative analysis 
 
This amounts to a strong academic critique of youth justice practice in England and 
Wales in the 1980s. Each of the above authors make some similar and some unique 
points, and it makes sense to discuss each of the concerns separately.  
 
Changes in the age cohort 
 
Pitts (see above: page 320) and Hudson (see above: page 326) both suggest that a 
falling age cohort was one of the main reasons for declining custody. The 14 – 16 
year old population fell from 1,268,000 in 1981 to 1,045,000 in 1988 (an 18 per cent 
fall). There was no decline in the number of 10 - 13 year olds in the population 
between 1985 and 1991 (Howard League, 1994: 195). As Rob Allen (1991a) 
suggested, ‘the decline in custodial sentencing easily outstrips the decline in 
population’ (see also Allen, 1991b). Pratt (see above: page 322) argued that custodial 
sentencing would increase proportionately as the population fell, in order to maintain 
institutional capacity, but this did not happen. The fall in the percentage of offenders 
sentenced to care or custody cannot be explained by changes in the age cohort. At 
most it would only account for barely a fifth of the reduction in care and custody. 
 
The role of informal warnings 
 
Almost all the evidence about the expansion of informal warnings, especially 
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Farrington’s evidence (see above: page 311), came from studies of the Northampton 
juvenile justice system.  Northampton’s juvenile justice system was unique, however, 
and must be seen as a special case (see below: pages 357ff), and it is not appropriate 
to use it to generalise across the country. 
 
Other evidence is less supportive of the belief in the expansion of informal warnings. 
Evans & Wilkinson (1990), for example, looked at 16 police force areas across the 
country in 1988, and found that 11 of them did not use informal warnings at all, two 
forces used them for one per cent of arrests, one force for  six per cent, and one for 15 
per cent. The remaining police force in the study was Northampton, which used them 
for 35 per cent, but never used instant cautions, whereas some others cautioned up to 
45 per cent of all cautions instantly. Across the country, the officers that they 
interviewed said that they used warnings and instant cautions for ‘the most minor 
offences’, such as dropping litter or cycling on the footpath. 
 
Collier (1996) found that the fall in the number of recorded male offenders under 18 
could not be accounted for by increased use of informal warnings, as the number of 
young male offenders known to the police in 1995, including those informally 
cautioned, was significantly less than the numbers found guilty or cautioned in 1985. 
He claimed that, at least for the 10 – 13 age group, this was due to a genuinely 
declining rate of offending per 100,000 in the population. Barclay (1990) considered 
that it was not clear that the fall in shoplifting was due to an increase in informal 
police action, despite being cited by Farrington (see above: page 311) in support of 
this. Furthermore, while Farrington and Burrows (1993) cited the increase in informal 
warnings as masking the rate of shoplifting, there is no available evidence that the 
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police did not record offences that they cleared up because they had dealt with them 
informally. 
 
The impact of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
The Codes of Practice introduced under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(HMSO, 1984a) were designed to ensure fair and consistent treatment of suspects. 
Young people under 16 were designated as ‘vulnerable’ and were required to have an 
‘appropriate adult’ with them when being interviewed. In most cases this would be a 
parent. They were also entitled to a solicitor. There is very little evidence to support 
Farrington’s view (see above: page 311) that the introduction of these safeguards 
dramatically changed police convictions or clear-up rates of juvenile offences. The 
research that has been carried out (Dixon et al., 1990; Brown et al., 1992; Evans, 
1993; Pearse & Gudjohnnson, 1996; Evans & Rawsthorne, 1997; Brown, 1997; 
Bucke & Brown, 1997) suggested that parents often collaborated with the police to 
get an admission; that police regularly broke the rules and were unchallenged by the 
appropriate adult; and that admissions by children and young people in expectation of 
getting a caution occurred when there would not have been valid evidence to sustain a 
prosecution (see Jones, D W, (2005) for an overview of appropriate adult research). 
Farrington (1984: 75) had elsewhere argued that juvenile admissions ‘may not meet 
strict legal requirements of proof’. 
 
The impact of the introduction of the CPS 
 
The introduction of the CPS was seen by juvenile justice practitioners as an 
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opportunity to promote alternatives to custody, by reducing prosecutions (Hardy & 
Batty, 1988a; 1988b) following negotiations with prosecutors, as the Codes by which 
the CPS were governed encouraged diversion of juveniles until 1993 (see above: page 
194), after which they were changed.  Gelsthorpe and Giller (1990), found that 96 per 
cent of recommendations for prosecution made by the police to the CPS were actually 
prosecuted (citing Gelsthorpe et al., 1990). So while it is possible that the creation of 
the CPS led to increased cautioning, it is difficult to see how it would have 
contributed to lower custodial sentencing, as Farrington suggests (see above: page 
311). 
 
The naivety of youth justice practitioners and their lack of awareness of net-
widening and the expansion of social control 
 
Much of the academic criticism of the focus on offending behaviour made by Pitts 
(see above: page 314ff) and Muncie (see above: page 334) ignored the fact that, in the 
court arena, projects had to emphasise this rather than the welfare work that they 
carried out around wider social and youth issues, in order for magistrates to recognise 
their programmes as realistic alternatives to custody. Project publicity, leaflets and 
reports were written for magistrates, court clerks and police, and needed to be 
interpreted in this light. Juvenile justice practitioners were one of the rare parts of the 
social work profession that did read and respond to research, and it is possible that 
many of the academic critics ‘underestimated both the political and the ethical 
awareness of social workers’ (Smith, 1995: 84). Wade (1996) described an 
occupational culture and ethos around reductionism and systems management in 
Hampshire, with a tactical awareness that enabled a small group of just 10 – 12 
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juvenile justice workers to have a much greater influence on their local juvenile 
justice system than would be expected from their low status and power position. They 
were comfortable with conflict between juvenile justice workers and social workers, 
residential staff and managers, and had clear strategies designed to influence the 
police, magistrates, court clerks, solicitors, prosecutors and others, and ‘they held 
firmly to the belief that the unintended and destructive consequences of criminal 
justice system intervention outweighed the benefits’ of providing welfare support to 
minor offenders (ibid: 83), and instead offered support and premises to other 
organisations to develop such services.  
 
Many practitioners had a sophisticated understanding of the possible impacts of their 
practices and a consciousness of the dangers of net-widening, which they saw as not 
inevitable (Raynor, 2002: 1179). The reality was that projects had to manage the 
public image of their work with an awareness of the views of sentencers, so they 
developed a language that masked some of the reality of practice. Many projects 
gradually reduced the amount of contact that they had with young people, as part of 
the statutory court order, as they gained credibility. For example, the CSV Kent 
schemes reduced the length of programmes as the project became accepted by their 
local courts (CSV Kent, 1987). Chris Stanley, who managed all the LAC 83/3 
schemes in Kent, told me (personal interview) that ‘programmes had to be incredibly 
tight to begin with, and then became less severe as time went on’. The alternative to 
custody programme in Hampshire involved three attendances a week over 10 weeks; 
the one in Solihull three individual sessions a week for 40 sessions in all (Howard 
League, 1994: 101ff). The North City IT project run by Barnardos required attendance 
for just three evenings a week, and their more intensive IT with Specified Activities 
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programme for five sessions a week (Ames, 1991). Surrey Juvenile Offender 
Resource Centre’s programme as an alternative to care and custody involved two 
sessions totalling seven hours per week (Curtis, 1989: 22). Denne & Peel (1983) 
describe programmes offering from one to five contacts per week. The Well Hall 
Project in Greenwich required 2 -3 three-hour evening sessions a week over 12 weeks 
(Jones, D W, 1987) and the Hounslow Action for Youth Sixteen Plus Project between 
one and five individual sessions, often around an hour in length a week (Hounslow 
Action for Youth, 1988). This hardly seems similar to the experience of custody while 
living at home, as Pitts (see above: pages 318 - 319) and Hudson (see above: page 
328) have both suggested. 
 
The most extensive study of IT found that those sent to heavy-end Intensive IT 
projects were serious and persistent offenders genuinely at risk of a custodial sentence 
(Bottoms, 1995b: 8), and found ‘intensive’ to mean three or more contacts a week, 
with an ordered approach and authoritative style ‘coupled with a strongly caring 
focus’, whose clients rated them as helpful (ibid: 12). The same study argued that the 
‘simple’ net-widening critiques oversimplified the nature of ‘the state’ and implied 
that state intervention was inevitably harmful to the disadvantaged, when this was not 
always the case (ibid: 83). 
 
Paul Cavadino (personal interview) told me that he thought that the most significant 
development in criminal justice at this time was  
‘the strong practitioner led culture of diverting young people from court and 
keeping them out of custody wherever possible. Intensive IT was being used for 
young people who would otherwise have been at risk of custody, contrary to 
previous experience of the development of more intensive alternatives (which 
was why there was a lot of academic scepticism at this time) …’. 
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His comments were echoed by Henri Giller (personal interview): 
‘You can’t minimise how much of this was practitioner led … they were fully 
engaged with this debate and these strategies, and there was a real enthusiasm 
to try and make a difference, make a change … practitioners were dedicated to 
this’. 
 
Hughes et al. (1996) attended team meetings and interviewed staff in the 
Northamptonshire Diversion Unit, and found them very aware of the dangers of net-
widening and taking steps to prevent these dangers being realised. They also found 
staff very aware of the ‘lack of justice’ argument and very clear in promoting clients’ 
legal rights. NACRO’s (1986b, for example) regular bulletin promoting cautioning 
clearly showed an awareness of the dangers of net-widening.  
 
In fact, it could be argued that the ‘naivety’ was more that of the academics (Pitts, 
Pratt, Hudson, Matthews etc), whose ideological belief that alternatives to custody 
were impossible obstructed their understanding of the complex reality of IT practice, 
an issue that is dealt with more fully later (see below: pages 379ff). 
  
The role of tracking schemes and punitive juvenile justice 
 
Pitts (see above: page 314) and Pratt (see above: page 322ff) both imply that tracking 
schemes were typical of intensive IT, yet tracking schemes actually made up a very 
small proportion of juvenile justice projects around the country (see Robinson, 1986) 
and were constantly criticised by the mainstream campaigning youth justice 
organisations and juvenile justice practitioners (see Nellis, 1991: 382). They did not 
epitomise IT or youth justice practice. Many of them were probation based, such as 
the Leeds one documented by Clayden et al. (1987: and see Crine, 1983, and 
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Falkingham & McCarthy, 1988).  Nellis (2004) identified only 12 such projects in the 
whole of England and Wales, which were ‘the focus of a controversy out of all 
proportion to its incidence’. He accused Pitts and others of heightening the 
surveillance elements in tracking ‘in order to critique it’, and it is hard to see why else 
the critics equated IT with tracking. 
 
This analysis contributed to the wider views that IT had become much more punitive, 
as espoused by Pitts (see above: page 314ff), Pratt (see above: page 322ff), Hudson 
(see above: page 325ff), McLaughlin & Muncie (see above: page 333), Matthews (see 
above: page 331) and Brown (see above: page 335), and was part of their belief that 
IT had moved away from concerns with young people’s welfare, discussed below. 
 
The lack of attention by LAC 83/3 projects and social services to social need 
 
This is based on the failure to recognise the distinction between rhetoric and reality in 
juvenile justice. Many projects could state, for the benefit of sentencers, that they 
were focusing on offending behaviour, but in reality the welfare needs of the young 
people that they were working with were not ignored. 
 
Stone’s account of the Junction Project is a good example of this. She quotes internal 
reports of the projects’ aims and objectives, including attention to ‘work, educational 
attainment, home situation, peer group relationships … use of leisure time and the 
community’ (Stone, 1984: 15). The project recognized that, while there was some 
control over the offenders’ lives, the young people had more choice than if they were 
in custody (ibid: 17), and she suggested that there was a strong sense of 
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empowerment: 
 ‘Offenders are not viewed as passive receivers of ‘treatment’ but as active 
participants in measures which are seen as offering them choices and the means 
of changing their behaviour …. These means are seen as consistent with respect 
for the individual and reflects a belief in the individual’s capacity to be self-
determined whatever the structural problems existing in society’ (ibid: 17 – 18). 
 
The Fitzgerald Project run by the Rainer Foundation in Lewisham, and part funded 
under LAC 83/3, offered counselling, group work, education, employment 
workshops, housing and skills training (Macdonald, 1987). Another Rainer 
Foundation project, the Well Hall Project in Greenwich, employed a clinical 
psychologist to attempt to measure the successful inputs on a range of welfare issues 
(see Brown, 1986). The Hampshire projects run jointly by the Rainer Foundation, 
Hampshire Social Services and the Hampshire probation service clearly set out to 
provide ‘high quality support programmes’ and to ‘tackle the underlying difficulties’ 
that the young people faced (Wade, 1992). This had followed an acknowledgement in 
the 1980s at the Woodlands project that they had not tackled housing, unemployment, 
family issues, social conditions, and head teachers’ attitudes as well as they should 
have (Pauline Owen: personal interview ‘you can’t divorce a young offender from his 
living circumstances’). Andrew Rutherford (personal interview) told me that he found 
that Woodlands were working on welfare issues: 
‘certainly meeting the welfare needs of young people, but not doing this in a 
way which stuck them into some form of welfare dependency … Woodlands was 
like a very well run youth club which was also acutely conscious of not 
attaching some criminal label upon the young people’ . 
 
Lorraine Gelsthorpe said: 
‘I think that the work I saw showed an absolute commitment to young people 
and their needs. I don’t think that this was an ideological thing, but a social 
work thing’ (personal interview). 
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The Northampton Diversion project was aware that in its work it would identify other 
needs, but claimed that it was also conscious of the need to promote children’s rights 
and not undermine them (Hinks & Smith, 1985). O’Dowd et al. (1991) claim that, 
although their starting point was always an offence, once they were working with an 
offender staff would get involved in welfare issues as appropriate.  
 
Henri Giller told me that youth justice practitioners ‘did want to try and identify some 
of the kids’ needs and try and meet some of them’. Certainly Gibson et al. (1994b: 40) 
stated that ‘this was not to say that … working with young people in the community 
was neglected’. 
 
An account of three Barnardos intensive IT projects in the North West by Ames 
(1991) noted the attention to social and life skills and leisure activities; that ‘the staff 
worked to ensure’ the young peoples’ ‘well-being in whatever ways they were able’; 
the provision of a neighbourhood youth and community service; a ‘commitment to 
alleviating the effects of severe poverty and disadvantage’, and a ‘genuine 
commitment to meeting welfare needs’.  
 
Norman Tutt told me (personal interview) that he ‘did not think it was ever true’ that 
projects did not address welfare issues: 
‘What I always said was that, if you have got the kids for a week, then what you 
have to do is to work out a sensible curriculum, part of which was the offending 
curriculum, working on the attitudes and behaviour that were linked to the 
offending, but that other aspects were just as important: having a meal with a 
child, seeing how they are getting on at home,  teaching them social skills, and I 
think that what John Pitts and others never understood was that we took as read 
that these things would be going on, and that you overlaid them with working on 
the offending …. I don’t know of any youth justice worker who thought you 
could just deal with offending from nine in the morning until nine at night’. 
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The five LAC 83/3 projects set up in Devon by NCH ‘all involved’ education, 
literacy, numeracy, social skills and job skills (Millham, 1986), and those in Kent 
ensured that staff had the skills to work with young people on social issues (Chris 
Stanley; personal interview). The Miskin Project (1987) gives a clear account of an 
intensive specified activity programme for ‘Billy’ which addresses a range of welfare 
issues.  Rob Allen (personal interview) claimed that the Redlees centre in Hounslow, 
which he managed, was working on: 
‘a lot more than the offending behaviour – the actual amount of contact time 
with youngsters was a lot of the time spent in trying to support them at home, 
get them engaged in other activities, working with their parents to try and stop 
them throwing the kids out. It wasn’t just about offending: it was about trying to 
work with these young people in their families – to try and help them get 
through to the other end’. 
 
Given that many of the LAC 83/3 projects were actually managed by national 
children’s charities (Barnardos, Save the Children; NCH, Rainer) it is hard to believe 
that their parent bodies would have allowed children’s welfare needs to be ignored. 
 
The lack of development of LAC 83/3 in high custody areas 
 
Pitts (see above: page 320) raised this concern. The LAC 83/3 projects cannot be seen 
as unique, and different to already existing local authority intensive IT schemes. The 
LAC 83/3 initiative itself was based upon already existing projects, mainly in local 
authorities, that the DHSS believed were showing success in reducing custodial 
sentencing, and was an attempt to push those authorities that had not yet developed 
such projects to do so. In many high custody areas (such as Rochdale, Oldham, 
Sefton, Northampton and Essex) local authorities had already set up similar projects, 
following commissioning of research into the local juvenile justice system by people 
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such as the CYCC at Lancaster. These were often the models for the LAC 83/3 
projects. When surveyed by Bottoms et al. (1990: 72) the reasons that areas that had 
not applied for LAC 83/3 funding gave for this ‘was overwhelmingly that alternatives 
to care and custody were already well established’ in their areas. Personnel moved 
easily between the two sectors, and methods used were shared. The national 
practitioner bodies had membership from both statutory and voluntary sector projects, 
with little tension between them. Workers from both types of project met up at 
national youth justice conferences run by NACRO, the AJJ and BASW and shared 
ideas, and workers moved between the voluntary sector and statutory sector regularly. 
 
The role of diversion and caution plus 
 
 Lee (1998: 6)  argued that diversion is ‘best understood in terms of the management 
of unruly groups and the state’s adaptation to high crime rates and high case loads’, so 
that it was able ‘to limit the level of demand placed upon the criminal justice system 
by letting minor offences and offenders fall below the threshold of official notice’.  
Certainly the young people that she interviewed saw cautioning as punitive, and she 
observed the police trying to make a visible impact, such as getting the youth to cry 
(ibid: 128). Diversion and Caution Plus schemes are often discussed in the literature 
as if they somehow stand alone, whereas they were in fact part of a much more 
integrated juvenile justice strategy than the critics allow. Lorraine Gelsthorpe 
(personal interview) said that 
 ‘cautioning was part of the thinking. A little bit of evidence went a long way in 
persuading police officers that maybe a second caution could be important, and 
had a low level of reoffending. 
 
Paul Cavadino echoed this (personal interview), seeing the trend towards diversion as 
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a key feature of the 1980s: 
‘Caution and caution plus had an impact on keeping people down the tariff. 
Most did not reoffend. It kept a lot of young people out of court, and the 
evidence clearly indicated that you were less likely to reoffend if kept outside 
the formal criminal justice stages. If they did reoffend they were coming before 
courts for the first time, not the second, and therefore not moving up the tariff 
ladder as quickly towards custody’. 
 
 
Andrew Rutherford (personal interview) told me that ‘cautioning initiatives were 
clearly part of an agenda to keep young people out of custody’, and Uglow et al. 
(1992) considered that there was a clear link between intensive IT and cautioning 
strategies in Kent. By removing a large chunk of minor offences from the juvenile 
court, practice was allowed to concentrate on those who did appear in court, and 
courts given more time for deliberation about sentencing options (see Tutt, 1984d).  
As Bottoms et al. (1990: 5) noted, the expansion of juvenile cautioning in the 1980s 
was achieved without the net-widening effects that had been seen in the 1970s. 
Practitioners were familiar with the research showing that ‘diversion’ had failed in the 
USA and learnt lessons from this, avoiding replication of the structures that had 
failed. 
 
Given magisterial hostility to the development of cautioning (see above: page 211ff), 
there could easily have been a backlash, with much tougher sentencing on those that 
did come into court. The huge decline in the numbers being dealt with in court  meant 
that the courts were only dealing with more serious offences, and this could have led 
to them passing more custodial sentences (Gibson et al., 1994b: 41), which did not 
occur. Bell & Gibson (1991: 97) were clear that cautioning practice played a major 
part in the reduction of custodial sentencing. 
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Repeat cautioning 
 
One of the pieces of ‘evidence’ used to challenge the expansion of cautioning of 
juveniles was the increased reoffending rate by those cautioned after 1991, but this 
was partly due to the fact that repeat cautioning was increasing, with a fall in the 
proportion of those being cautioned for a first offence from 81 per cent in 1985 to 69 
per cent in 1991, and a large increase in the cautioning of adults, from only 20 per 
cent of those cautioned in 1985 to over 50 per cent in 1991 (Home Office, 1994f). 
Repeat cautioning could also be a statistical artefact: a person cautioned for taking a 
motor vehicle without consent could also accrue cautions for driving under age, not 
having car tax and not being insured, giving the false impression of four separate 
cautions (see evidence by the Association for Youth Justice to House of Commons, 
1993b: 78 – 79 and Audit Commission, 1996). Multiple cautioning, however, only 
occurred in a few police areas, notably Kent and Northampton. 
 
The proportion of court sentences resulting in custody 
 
Given that many of those now cautioned would previously have appeared in court and 
received, presumably, minor sentences, the fact that the proportion of those sentenced 
to custody, as a percentage of court appearances, did not rise may itself be something 
of significance. Yet Pratt (see above: page 324), Gelsthorpe and Morris, (see above: 
page 330) and Parker et al (see above: page 333) all see it as significant evidence of 
the failure of intensive IT. As Parry (1992: 216) argued, given the reduction in 
custodial sentencing of juveniles, it could be reasonably expected that those few now 
receiving custodial sentences would pose a grave and direct threat to the community. 
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Haines & Drakeford (1998: 59 - 60) offer an excellent statement of this: 
‘If more and more minor and younger offenders are being diverted from formal 
prosecution then it is increasingly the older and more serious offenders who 
appear in court …. If there were no changes to courts’ sentencing behaviour, 
then an increase in diversion would be likely to lead to a proportionate increase 
in more severe sentences … the decline in custody over the 1980s is far more 
significant than straightforward sentencing trends tend to suggest’. 
 
Bell & Haines (1991: 121) pointed out that, as courts began to see only the more 
serious offenders, a percentage decline in custody actually masks the greater absolute 
decline, as is shown in the Tables in Appendix 1. As Smith (1999: 152) noted, the 
proportion of 14 to 16 year old boys receiving custody, as a percentage of all those 
cautioned or convicted, fell from eight per cent in 1981 to two per cent in 1991, and 
this was far more than demographic factors could account for. Bottoms et al. (1990) 
were clear that there had been a decrease in custody and care in the 1980s when 
considered as a proportion of all offenders. 
 
Faith in lawyers  
 
The view of Hudson (see above: page 327) that juvenile justice practitioners had too 
great a faith in lawyers is not backed up by any evidence. Many youth justice projects 
actually had such concern about the quality of representation of juveniles in court that 
they maintained informal lists of good solicitors and tried to encourage youngsters to 
use them (see Wilson, 1987). Blackwell (1986) called for a Crown Court strategy, 
involving the cultivation of barristers sympathetic to juveniles, challenging other 
barristers, and appeals against sentence.  
 
The first issue of AJJUST (1984a) claimed that solicitors ‘don’t care’ about young 
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offenders going to custody. A campaign was launched to try and improve the quality 
of barristers representing children in Crown Court, and their understanding of youth 
justice practice. The AJJ ran a regular training day on ‘Justice and the Law’ (see 
AJJUST, 1984d), and promoted the development of links with solicitors and barristers 
(AJJUST, 1984e).  
 
One of the leading practitioners at the Woodlands Project, Sanders-Graham (1987), 
raised concern about the incompetence of barristers in juvenile appeal proceedings 
and the need for a strategy to deal with this. Declan Kerr (personal interview), talking 
about his work in NACRO’s Manchester office in 1990, told me how they had 
worked with the North West Solicitors’ Association to try and influence solicitors and 
barristers, actually put on training for barristers and attempted to obtain Law Society 
accreditation for this training. 
 
Seventeen of the projects worked in by respondents to my questionnaire indicated that 
they specifically directed juveniles to selected solicitors that they knew worked well 
with young offenders, while one said ‘it was thought unprofessional to openly’ do this 
(as it could have led to commissions being paid by solicitors to youth justice workers, 
for example) he added that it ‘was common practice to carefully manipulate it’. 
Another talked about telling young people to go and stand at a particular spot in the 
town centre and then look around, knowing that they would then be near to the offices 
of good juvenile justice specialist solicitors. Geoff Monaghan (questionnaire 
submission) said that 
‘important features included ensuring that the juvenile justice team staff 
maintained a high level of legal knowledge and networking. In time, key staff 
were viewed by crown prosecutors, defence lawyers, magistrates and other 
players as the most knowledgeable in the local system and were highly 
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respected …. There was more confrontation and challenge’. 
 
 The impact of the 1982 s.1 restrictions on custody 
 
These legal restrictions have either been cited as ineffectual by Hudson (see above: 
page 327) and Pitts (see above: page 321) or as massively influential by Windlesham 
(see above: page 332) and Brown (see above: page 335). Much of the research that is 
cited to claim that these restrictions were ineffective was carried out in the very first 
year after the implementation of the Act by Burney (1985) and Reynolds (1985), yet it 
continued to be cited even when more up to date evidence was available that showed 
that the interpretation of the restrictions was changing (Stanley, 1988 and 1992; 
NACRO, 1989f; 1991d; 1991c; Gibson et al., 1994b). As Ashworth (1989) noted 
‘after some early years in which the courts did not know quite how to apply the new 
requirements, the sub-section is now influencing courts’ reasoning in marginal cases’. 
It is necessary to question why some academics (e.g. Hudson, 1993) continued to use 
the early research of Burney and Reynolds and ignored more recent evidence. 
 
Paul Cavadino (personal interview) agreed that the restrictions on custody  
‘took a while to bite …. Initially magistrates were deciding what they wanted to 
do and then looking at a way to fit this into the criteria. It was only when you 
had a determined local attempt to appeal cases, like that of Chris Stanley in 
Kent, who wrote a Justice of the Peace article about it, showing most appeals 
were successful, that it began to spread. NACRO summarised all the court of 
Appeal cases which were interpreting the criteria so they could be used in 
appeals – it took time – but it gradually built up and spread. There was no 
doubt that the 1988 strengthening of the criteria helped as well. Almost all of 
the impact was after 1985, after Burney’s research’. 
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The impact on girls and young women 
 
It is difficult to argue that juvenile justice practitioners trying to reduce care and 
custody ignored girls and young women, as Pitts (see above: pages 317 - 318), 
Matthews (see above: page 331), Hudson (see above: page 329) and Goldson (see 
above: pages 334 - 335) do, when by 1988 there were only 25 fifteen year old and 26 
sixteen year old girls in custody (Nellis, 1991). The figures for young women under 
17 receiving custodial sentences actually fell so low (see Tables 75 and 84) that they 
were shown as ‘nil’ in the criminal statistics. It is true that, as most young female 
offenders were diverted from court, projects offering alternatives to custody mainly 
worked with young men, but then the projects could have been accused of ‘net-
widening’ if they had continued to work with girls. Projects did work with young 
women when appropriate. The Fitzgerald project, for example, had a 30 per cent 
intake of young women (Macdonald, 1987). The DEWIS Project (Phipps, 1990), after 
reducing the numbers entering care and custody, started to focus on girls who were 
deemed to be ‘beyond control’ and working with those who were homeless. 
 
The impact on black young people 
 
The claim that black young people did not gain from the fall in custody is a 
particularly serious one when aimed at a group of practitioners who would claim to be 
radical. It is made by Pitts (see above: page 317), Pratt (see above: page 324), Phillips 
(see above: page 329), Cheetham (see above: page 332), Goldson (see above: page 
334), Gelsthorpe and Morris (see above: page 330) and Matthews (see above: page 
331). However, a great deal of the belief that black young people did not get the best 
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support from intensive IT was based on a piece of research by Tipler (1989) on the 
sentencing of juveniles in Hackney, North London, which was based on 1000 cases 
appearing in juvenile court. This noted a difference in cautioning of black and white 
youths, and higher rates of custody for black youths, after controlling for offence and 
previous convictions. However, Tipler’s findings on cautioning were ‘statistically 
insignificant’, while his study did not control for plea, despite the finding that black 
youths were more likely to deny the charge and/or plead not guilty, which ruled out 
cautioning and could also rule out the development of a comprehensive alternative to 
custody programme prior to trial.  
 
It is also necessary to question the claim that black young people did not gain from 
the fall in custody, though they may not have gained as much as youths from non-
minority ethnic communities, but there is no hard evidence either way. Given the fall 
from 14,000 young people in care and custody for offending in 1982, to 1800 in 1992, 
then even if all of these 1,800 were black (which they were not) this was likely to be 
less than the total in 1982, as this would only amount to 11 per cent of the 1982 
population in custody.  
 
The conference organiser of the NITFED (1987) annual conference in 1987 called for 
attention to anti-racist practice, and Stone (1984) found that over half of those 
attending the Junction project were of ethnic minority status, while  55 per cent of the 
Fitzgerald Projects’ intake was Afro-Caribbean (Macdonald, 1987).  
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The role of Northampton as a special case 
 
Northampton was a very special case in juvenile justice, a ‘product leader’ according 
to Hughes et al. (1998), and a ‘blueprint’ (Wright, 1993) and it is dangerous for 
commentators to draw on it as typical of juvenile justice practice nationwide, as 
Farrington often does. Initially one of the pioneering schemes monitored by the 
CYCC at Lancaster, it soon developed a ‘unique’ system of pre-court diversion 
(Thorpe, 1994) which it saw as ‘well ahead of the rest of the country’ (Crook & 
Dolan, 1986), and was seen by others as ‘apart from other initiatives of its kind’ 
(Blagg, 1985), using victim-offender reparation as a key part of the input (see Hope, 
1985; Lunn, 1987). There was an 81 per cent fall in prosecutions in the county 
between 1981 and 1986, with care orders and custodial sentencing falling from 53 in 
1980 to 16 in 1985 (Crook, 1987). It was one of the first inter-agency Juvenile Liaison 
Bureaux to be established (Bowden & Stevens, 1986a: Hinks and Smith, 1986a), 
using a model of ‘corporate action’ (Stevens & Crook, 1986; Bowden & Stevens, 
1986c), and it deliberately sought to increase informal action by the police (Davis et 
al., 1989). The juvenile cautioning rate, as a proportion of all police decisions, rose to 
83 per cent, one of the highest in the country, and remained there over time (Evans & 
Ellis, 1997; Hughes et al., 1998), while custody fell from 31 in 1980 to seven in 1985, 
and care orders from 16 to three over the same period (Bowden & Stevens, 1986b). 
Juvenile crime also fell despite an increase of 10 per cent in the juvenile population 
(Bowden & Stevens, 1986c). 
 
Evans (1994), researching cautioning practice nationwide for the Home Office, noted 
the ‘unusualness’ of Northampton in terms of the use of informal warnings (see 
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above: page 339), where it was ‘very much the exception’, as did Gibson et al. 
(1994b: 225 - 226: see also NACRO, 1998). Geoff Monaghan worked in youth justice 
teams in Northampton from 1982 to 1986, including a spell in the Juvenile Liaison 
Bureau and told me (comments attached to his returned questionnaire) that ’it was 
created to be as independent as possible of any agency …. The manager was 
employed by the Local Authority Chief Executives’ department’.   
 
The staff of the project promoted its work at every opportunity (Woods, 1982; Crook, 
1985a; 1985b; Wellingborough JLB, 1985; Hinks, 1985; Hinks & Smith, 1986b; 
Smith, 1987; Wright, 1993) so its impact on academics could have distorted their 
perception of what was happening in juvenile justice across the country. 
 
Up-tariffing  
 
Muncie (see above: page 334) suggested that IT up-tariffed young offenders, but 
Nellis (1987), considered that up-tariffing was a ‘myth’, as there was no real evidence 
that early IT led to stiffer sentences on offenders at later court appearances, though he 
agreed that it had been a ‘tactically useful’ concept. He felt that there were clear 
remedies to the possibility of up-tariffing available to practitioners, and that the 
concept should be abandoned.  Yet Mills (see above: page 337) supports the view that 
alternatives to custody will push offenders up tariff. 
 
Lorraine Gelsthorpe agreed that ‘down-tariffing’ was part of the strategy and 
philosophy of juvenile justice (personal interview), and Paul Cavadino (personal 
interview) said that 
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Practitioner-led initiatives included a strong emphasis on gatekeeping – 
keeping young people down-tariff so that they didn’t get projected up the tariff 
to more intensive alternatives, and didn’t get supervision orders too early so if 
they reoffended they would be more at risk of custody’. 
 
Restricted entry criteria to projects to exclude referrals 
 
There is no evidence to support this claim by Pratt (see above: page 324), either in the 
literature on projects or in the many project documents I have seen. Most projects had 
very clear criteria based around a risk of custody and the young person’s willingness 
to work with the alternative programme being put forward to court. Such a criterion 
could also have led to refusal of LAC 83/3 funding. 
 
Wide entry criteria to ensure full occupancy 
 
While there is evidence that ‘diversion’ projects in the USA, and those involved in the 
‘deinstitutionalization of status offenders’ programmes in the 1960s and 1970s, did 
this (see Government Accounting Office, 1973; Klein et al., 1976; Dunford, 1977; 
Bohnstedt, 1978; Blomberg, 1980; Palmer & Lewis, 1980; Kobrin & Klein, 1982; 
1983; Klein, 1983; Roesch & Corrado, 1983 and Schneider, 1985), there is no 
evidence of this from juvenile justice in the UK, as claimed by Pratt (see above: page 
324) where projects actually shut down once their targets had been achieved and they 
ceased to receive referrals. 
 
Transcarceration  
 
Hudson (see above: page 326) and Matthews (see above: page 330) both suggest that 
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juvenile justice practitioners totally ignored, or were unaware of, the dangers of 
transcarceration. Yet Rutherford had drawn attention to the need to prevent the 
slippage of young people from the penal system to the psychiatric and medical 
systems. In Massachusetts, Miller (1998: 12) had noted that ‘whenever the number of 
inmates in state reform schools has dropped, there has been an equivalent rise in 
youth populations in other institutions’ (child welfare and psychiatric). Binder & 
Binder (1994: 357) noted that the mental health system in the USA was ‘eager to take 
up the slack’ of juvenile justice institutional closure, with a fourfold increase in 
adolescent admission to private psychiatric hospitals (10,764 to 48,735). Rutherford, 
drawing on lessons from the USA (Warren, 1981; Lerman, 1982; Austin and 
Krisberg, 1982; Krisberg and Schwartz, 1983; Schwartz et al., 1984), painted a 
disturbing picture of the use of psychiatric facilities for children. 
 
While transcarceration was therefore a real issue, there was a clear recognition of the 
dangers within youth justice in England and Wales. Coppock (1996) identified four 
different systems dealing with problem adolescents: education, health, social services 
and criminal justice, with their own diagnostic labels, definitions and pathways.  
Stewart & Tutt (1987), in trying to identify where children were in custody, included 
penal systems, secure care and mental health care, and noted how many children may 
be locked up in less visible systems. John Denne, a leading youth justice activist and 
AJJ committee member, was in a position to commission research into how children 
entered education and health institutions via referrals from probation, social services, 
education officers and psychologists (Malek, 1988; Malek & Kerslake, 1989; Malek, 
1993), which noted  
‘that if the route to custody via the judicial system was blocked, then the same 
young person could still be removed from home via the social services 
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department, the education department, or the health services. It seemed that 
controlling the number of young people removed from home via one system 
could lead to ‘spillage’ into another system (Malek, 1988: 1).  
 
Fennell (1992) raised concern and awareness of the misuse of mental health 
provisions to remove safeguards for children at St Charles YTC and at Langton House 
in Dorset.  
 
The awareness of the possibilities of transinstitutionalisation, and monitoring of each 
system by juvenile justice practitioners and organisations, may in itself have been 
enough to ensure that there were no increases in the numbers of children in special 
education or mental health facilities during this period. 
 
Racial quota systems 
 
No evidence is available to assess this allegation by Cheetham (see above: page 332) 
against IT, and one would have thought that, if it had been happening, there would 
have been at least one practitioner who would have taken this issue to the social work 
press or the campaigning organisations. 
 
Breach policies, and acceleration into custody through breach proceedings 
 
Again there is no evidence to support this claim by Muncie (see above: page 334). In 
fact, projects tried hard to hold onto young people because of the strong anti-custody 
ethos, decarceration and abolitionist cultures, even when young people did not co-
operate. 
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Corporatism 
 
Haines & Drakeford (1998: 54 - 57) suggest that it is difficult to accept the 
‘corporatist’ analysis of Pratt (see above: page 324): ‘juvenile justice practice in the 
1980s was characterised by far more conflict and abrasion than corporatism allows 
for’, with ‘aggressive pro-diversion and anti-custody strategies’. They note that many 
battles were fought between juvenile justice teams and courts, police and social 
services, with gatekeeping and appeals strategies causing tension. Diversion panels 
were often sources of conflict, with disagreements in some cases such as Kent (see 
above: page 236) reaching the appeal court. 
 
Lack of understanding of the youth justice system as a whole 
 
There is substantial evidence that many practitioners did have a clear understanding 
of the interlocking nature of all parts of the juvenile justice system. Rainer’s project in 
Lewisham (Rickman et al., 1989) described the work with the juvenile bureau, liaison 
with the CPS, a gatekeeping panel, SER screening, a project presence in court, crown 
court liaison, assessments and programmes for the 79 young people it worked with 
that year. Brownlie et al. (1983) reported on a Barnardos project clearly aiming to 
reduce both care and custody sentencing. Haines & Drakeford (1998: xiii) point out 
how ‘an effective appropriate adult service and intervention can reduce the chance of 
an ultimate custodial sentence’. 
 
Helen Edwards, for example, told me that  
‘the overall strategy was to tackle the whole system, from cautions to custody 
and to find the best ways to reduce offending, something which often had to be 
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done outside the juvenile justice system´(personal interview). 
 
The major piece of research on Intensive IT by Bottoms (1995b) contained a figure 
‘showing possible optimum delivery of youth justice services from the point of view 
of persuading courts to use custody to the minimum practical extent’ (ibid: 38), 
divided into structural issues and personal issues. This included, under structural 
issues, having a small number of SER writers, with well argued SERs containing clear 
details of the content of community programmes; clear operational instructions and 
internal procedures, including gatekeeping; a professional (not administrator) agency 
presence in court, with good links with all relevant service delivery teams; and 
programmes that began immediately after sentence. The personal issues included 
specialist court officers, report writers and project workers trained and experienced in 
handling offenders, trusted by magistrates, who regularly visited the projects. Of the 
1217 projects in the original survey (Bottoms, 1990b) 163 were defined as ‘heavy end 
only’ and likely to have had these characteristics and a further 329 had ‘heavy end’ 
programmes within a wider brief. 
 
As part of this research I distributed questionnaires to practitioners who had worked 
in youth justice between 1982 and 1996, via an appeal in the NAYJ Newsletter, an e-
mail to all the Youth Offender Teams in the country in 2005-06, and mail shots to 
people that I knew (a copy of the questionnaire is at Appendix 2). However, a large 
number of practitioners left youth justice when the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act was 
implemented, as they considered that the philosophy behind the 1998 Act was so 
different to their previous practice, and were resistant to the proposal from the Youth 
Justice Board that everyone had to be retrained and forget everything that they had 
done in the past, so not many returns (16) were received. Those that did respond are, 
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however, worth drawing attention to: 
 
I asked people to indicate which of the following 16 services were offered by their 
projects: 
Cautioning strategy with the police 
Inter-agency cautioning panels 
Caution plus services 
Bail remand strategy 
Remand placement 
Court system monitoring 
Attempts to influence magistrates and court clerks in formal forums 
PSR/SER gatekeeping 
Directing juveniles to selected solicitors 
A dedicated professional court officer from the SSD 
Court advocacy 
Alternative to custody programmes via specified activities 
Alternative to custody programmes via deferred sentences 
Crown court strategy 
Appeals policy 
Wider PR strategies about youth justice. 
 
Of the 26 youth justice projects that people had worked in, four had 15 of these 
services, three had 14,  three 13,  five 12, three 11 and three 10, suggesting that these 
projects were all working across many areas of the youth justice system. 
 
When asked about the main characteristics of juvenile justice policy between 1982 
and 1986 comments included: 
‘innovative/radical practice’ 
‘the correctional curriculum’ 
‘practice led policy’ 
‘massive reduction in custodial sentencing’ 
‘the use of the systems management system and the diversion from prosecution, 
  reducing tariff interventions and diversion from custody’ 
‘the use of the legal system to slow down progression into the system whilst 
  young people grew out of offending’ 
‘a groundswell of practitioner involvement in policy development’ 
‘a general belief that custody should be a ‘last resort’ for children’ 
‘Local Authorities were proud to be custody free zones’ 
‘commitment to diverting young people from the criminal justice system’ 
‘commitment to diverting young people from care and custody’ 
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‘commitment to down tariffing young people’ 
‘feeling part of a radical workforce’ 
‘shielding young people from the worst excesses of the justice and welfare  
  systems’ 
‘a pervasive anti custody culture’ 
‘a belief that young people tend to grow out of crime’ 
‘minimum necessary intervention combined with a harm reduction approach to 
  work with young people’ 
‘practitioner led policy and practice development’ 
‘a campaigning orientation’ 
 
 
and in response to a question about their over-riding concerns  
‘to reduce custody’ 
‘to gain confidence of sentencers’ 
‘get young people to 16 and they would likely grow out of crime’ 
‘developing creative problem-solving responses to deal with offences/offenders 
  within a context of informal/minimum intervention’ 
‘a strongly held commitment to reduce the use of custody by influencing  
  sentencers and policy makers’ 
‘to advocate on behalf of young people in the youth justice system’ 
‘to stop young people going into custody’ 
‘giving young people the space to grow out of crime’ 
‘to maximise opportunities for young people to mature without being subject to 
  negative forms of intervention’. 
 
 I asked what they were trying to achieve in practice, to which the answers included: 
‘reduce custody levels’ 
‘reduce offending’ 
‘delay entry into the criminal justice system’ 
‘gain confidence of magistrates’ 
‘divert young people who would otherwise be pulled into a system that  
  escalated the response to quite minor offending using custody quickly 
  and easily’ 
‘providing a professional and credible service to courts’ 
‘working with courts to ensure equity, proportionality and fairness in  
  sentencing’ 
‘change practice among social workers and probation workers’ 
‘influence magistrates and Crown Court judges’ 
‘keep young offenders out of custody’ 
‘act as an advocate for young people’ 
‘create a more just response to young people’s offending’. 
 
The respondents views about LAC 83/3 were 
‘practice ahead of policy’ 
‘clear targets’ 
‘Tory government needed to reduce custody/costs but felt Hurd/Clarke had a 
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  value on our work’ 
‘it started a small revolution in practice, and had an effect out of proportion to 
  the budget’ 
‘Halcyon days – It seemed to be a real commitment to do something about  
  reducing the use of custody’ 
‘At times it felt as if we walked on water, with the successes we had in court’ 
‘it felt that it was practitioner led and IT seemed to be taken seriously as a  
  means of creatively working with young people and keeping them out 
  of custody’ 
 
and they thought that policy changed in the early 1990’s because of 
‘change of Home Secretaries’ 
‘the Bulger case’ 
the abolition of doli incapax’ 
‘multiple/discredited cautioning’ 
‘Media campaigns: ‘rat boy, safari trips’ etc’. 
 
Other comments made about this period of youth justice were: 
‘I think we made massive short-term gains – reduced custody in my area by 
over 50 per cent’ (Richard Smith: Calderdale 1982 - 1996). 
 
‘multi-agency management/steering groups hugely important’ (Richard Smith: 
Save The Children LAC 83/3 project: Calderdale, 1986 – 88). 
 
‘one of our first objectives was to squeeze the probation service out of juvenile 
justice matters’. 
 
‘there developed a strong team ethos of doing ‘whatever it takes’ to avoid 
custody’. 
 
‘it is a period I remember in purely personal terms as one of creativity, success 
and “winning the argument”’. 
 
‘One of the main memories that I have is of a campaigning effort, an 
extraordinary commitment, a kind of zeal – which was associated with the view 
that we were at the radical cutting edge’.  
 
What also emerges from these submissions is the sense of achievement and 
excitement when  the project managed to keep a child out of custody, with 
descriptions of the strategies used. One former worker with whom I had a discussion, 
but who did not submit a questionnaire, referred to going back to the office and 
opening a bottle of champagne after ‘winning’ a difficult case in Crown Court, and 
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others said: 
‘Gaining a three year supervision order with a 90 day specified activity 
requirement at Inner London Crown Court including bringing the offender and 
victim together, in which the judge made it clear that the defendant would have 
been given a long custodial sentence had it not been for the demanding 
programme’. 
 
‘submitting a 60 page SER to Crown Court recommending a very intensive 
community sentence that prevented a young woman suffering Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder following a car accident in which some of her family had died, 
who had committed a very serious wounding offence, from going to custody, 
even though her barrister was convinced she would be going to Holloway, 
didn’t understand IT and wanted to offer a Community Service option instead, 
while my department had refused to fund a Youth Treatment Centre placement’. 
 
‘Successfully challenging a DC sentence for young people committing damage 
to a golf course on the grounds that the magistrates were members of the golf 
club’. 
 
‘We attached articles from Justice of the Peace to Reports to courts to back up 
our proposals’. 
 
 
Norman Tutt suggested (personal interview) that the decline in youth custody was due 
to the fact that 
 ‘practitioners put all the bits together, from challenging SERs to an appeals 
strategy. The really important thing is that, however it happened, there was 
constructed a consensus amongst youth justice practitioners that custody was 
bad, and they stood firmly against it. This was done by confrontation – the best 
way of achieving change is to have somebody to oppose – people were 
invigorated, seeing it as their job to oppose custody. The key issue is that the 
legislation supported this movement, in which people said “my job is to keep 
kids out of custody”. Practitioners put themselves and their reputations on the 
line to keep kids out of custody. It is extraordinary how powerful that became. I 
remember one Assistant Director of Social Services who picked a 16 year old up 
every morning, took him to work in his office and took him home at night, every 
day’. 
 
Political awareness of youth justice practitioners 
 
This is one of the repeated claims made against youth justice practitioners, made by 
Pitts (see above: page 315ff), Matthews (see above: page 331), Muncie (see above: 
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page 334) and Davies (see above: page 332). Nellis (1991: 375) found that 
practitioners considered that playing into the government’s concerns was worth the 
risk, and that after considering the option of taking a confrontational style with the 
Conservatives, as the probation service did, or taking account of the government 
emphasis towards reducing custody, youth justice practitioners took the latter course. 
They did not believe that notions of diversion, alternatives to custody, crime 
reduction, economy and effectiveness were reactionary concepts; were well aware of 
the risk of being co-opted by a law and order agenda; and took steps to distance 
themselves and protect themselves from this, so that their relationship with 
government was not a collusive one. 
 
As Rob Allen told me (personal interview) 
‘we sometimes elevated the correctional curriculum and the techniques partly to 
impress the courts and imply that there was a scientific basis behind the work 
that we were doing – lay it on heavy – but actually the practical work was most 
of it’. 
 
He went on: 
‘some of the zealots went too far – all kinds of intervention was seen as equally 
negative, stigmatising and labelling. Sending someone to DC and trying to get 
someone into a youth club were not equally stigmatising!’ 
 
Richard Kay, of the Rainer Foundation, said  
‘there was a realistic package addressing welfare and offending, even though 
we played the political game of saying we focused on offending’. 
 
This contrasts with the ‘political’ stance taken by NAPO and praised by Hudson (see 
above: page 328), and Pitts (see above: page 319) which had no impact on sentencing 
patterns and led to serious consequences for the probation service (see below: page 
370ff). 
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Commitment to the ‘Justice’ model 
 
Hudson (1994 and see above: page 326) believed that IT had adopted a ‘justice 
model’ developed from conservative criminology, and was committed to the ‘just 
deserts’ philosophy. However, she failed to see that there was little direct connection 
between ‘systems management’ and the justice model. Andrew Rutherford (personal 
interview) told me that ‘justice talk’ was used to ‘limit intervention’ as a strategy, 
rather than a philosophy. As Denne (1986) argued, ‘previously innocent social 
workers unexpectedly found themselves called “justice advocates” merely because 
they wanted proper targeting and programming in their practice’.  
 
Thorpe et al. (1980: 31) suggest that they were never arguing for a return to justice, 
but in favour of proportionality in sentencing, using some of the literature from the 
justice movement. Nellis (1991) noted that the CYCC did not make any reference to 
the justice lobby literature, but took the ‘insistence that legal principles matter’ from 
the justice movement: ‘They did not see a commitment to due process and 
proportionality as compromising their basic and overreaching commitment to welfare’ 
(Nellis, 1991: 315), and were more influenced by systems management thinking 
around targeting, gatekeeping and monitoring than they were by a justice model. 
‘Justice’ language was a tool, not a philosophy: as Henri Giller said to me:’you could 
use the ‘justice’ approach to construct minimally acceptable interventions’ (personal 
interview). Tutt (1984d) pointed out that the ‘justice model’ was a strategy, not an 
ideology, and would be used even when it could be seen as contradictory.  
 
Haines & Drakeford (1998: 44) noted that ‘the normative argument that justice is 
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inherently a good thing was important at the ideological level’ (my emphasis), and 
that the attempts to avoid custody were not based on ‘any explicit justice philosophy’, 
but on ‘system manipulation (ibid: 58 - 59), while ‘minimum intervention was a 
tactic, not a philosophy’ (ibid: 73). As Paul Cavadino told me (personal interview): 
‘Lancaster were also influential in the move towards the ‘justice model’ – but 
the type of justice model that would prevent the disproportionate punitive things 
being done to young people as opposed to the kind of justice model that results 
in greater punishment – a liberal justice model’.  
 
The probation service and youth justice 
 
The decline in work with young offenders by the probation service meant that 
recruitment to the service began to be less attractive to those sympathetic to young 
offenders (Priestley et al., 1977: 22; Bottoms and Stevenson, 1992). In their survey of 
IT in the 1980s, Bottoms et al. (1990: 24 - 26) noted ‘explicit resistance’ to 
involvement in IT by NAPO, possibly due to a feeling that early probation service 
involvement in outdoor pursuits, boys clubs etc had been usurped by social services. 
This was not helped by a lack of clear government guidance on the respective roles of 
social services and probation with young offenders.  
 
Probation service attitudes to the developments in juvenile justice in the 1980s ranged 
from opposition to denial. Many key texts on the political changes faced by the 
probation service in the 1980s totally ignored developments in juvenile justice 
(Harding, 1987; May, 1991a; 1991b; Ward & Lacey, 1995; May & Vass, 1996). A 
classic example of this is the conference reported in Shaw & Haines (1989) in which 
none of the key papers makes any reference to the lessons of juvenile justice, but the 
topic appears in reports of all the subsequent plenary discussion summaries, and the 
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editors’ overview! (Haines & Shaw, 1989: 147 – 160).  
 
In addition, probation service opposition to  social work training, and its lack of 
relevance to their jobs, had been part of the culture since the mid-1970s, and was 
eventually to contribute towards its own downfall (Worrall, 1997), not helped by the 
failure of CCETSW: ‘an organisation that is quite ill-fitted to have responsibility for 
probation training’ (Nellis, 1992: 145). 
 
 Nellis wondered why the 1991 Act was seen by probation officers as coercive and 
controlling when the police, magistrates and the media saw it as liberal and lenient 
(Nellis, 1995). Smith (1996a: 152; 1996b: 17) noted that NAPO belatedly discovered 
the virtues of the 1991 Act after it had been destroyed (see above: page 325). 
 
Blagg and Smith (1989: 117) found it ‘odd that a service which has been running 
probation hostels for many years should baulk at the prospect of orders being 
enhanced by far less restrictive conditions’. One of the most intrusive IT Projects, the 
Medway Close Support Unit, was actually run by the probation service (see Ely et al., 
1983; 1987; Ralphs, 1986). Another ‘alternative to custody’ project in Middlesbrough 
which offered attendance for two sessions a week for 15 weeks, run by the probation 
service and described by its staff as offering friendship, advice and respect, found that 
field probation officers viewed it ‘as being a form of control and surveillance which 
uses oppressive means by which to make people conform to conventional norms and 
values’ and described the unit workers as ‘fascists’ (Middleton, 1995). 
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More positive views about juvenile justice policy and practice 
 
Some academics did see a link between youth justice practice and the 1991 Act. 
Roberts (1992), in a paper for ACOP, believed that the significant reductions in the 
use of custody for juveniles through diversion, the development of community 
sentences via LAC 83/3 and the statutory restrictions on custody in the 1982 and 1988 
CJAs were ‘fundamental’ to the 1991 Act, as did Giller (1989b).  
 
Cavadino et al. (1999: 183) claimed that the systems management approach to youth 
justice was ‘an outstanding and successful example of managerialism being applied 
from the practitioner level’ (ibid: 212). Hendrick (2006: 13) echoed this, referring to 
the years 1982 - 1992 as ‘a remarkably progressive period in the treatment of juvenile 
delinquents’. Lord Bingham (1997: 5) noted that ‘as recently as 1991 … the system of 
juvenile justice was, I think, seen as a story of success’. Gibson et al. (1994b) referred 
to the ‘success story’ and ‘remarkable decade’ of juvenile justice, due to a ‘range of 
initiatives by practitioners at local level and important steps taken by government 
from the centre’. Fionda (2005: 38) said that  
‘Towards the middle of the 1980s, an unprecedented decarceration occurred in 
youth justice … all this happened without an increase in the extent of youth 
crime; indeed the number of known offenders … dropped slightly’. 
 
Loader (2010: 357), setting out the case for penal moderation, suggests that: 
‘one might...seek to bring to public consciousness some relatively recent but 
now politically forgotten episodes of English penal history such as the 
practitioner-led movement to reduce custody for juveniles in the 1980s and the 
coalition of officials, practitioners and criminologists who formulated a new 
approach to reducing prison use in the period from 1987 to 1993’. 
 
 
Haines & Drakeford (1998), pointed out that ‘much is to be learned from the success 
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of recent juvenile justice practice’ and its ‘re-invigorated efforts aimed at the abolition 
of custody for children (ibid: xii) which became ‘a remarkable criminal justice 
success story’ (ibid: xv and 32). They suggested that the 1980s was ‘a low point in 
cycles of concern about juvenile offending’ and ‘the heyday of juvenile justice’ (ibid: 
32). This, they argued, was part of a ‘quiet consensus’, and ‘not the product of some 
grand government plan or policy’, but ‘a disparate group of academics, senior civil 
servants … and practitioners were developing an alternative’ (ibid: 32 - 33). They 
stressed the importance of ‘an extremely active and influential practitioner-based 
movement’, and ‘an increasingly robust consensus formed between government 
departments and juvenile justice practitioners, underpinned by the belief in the 
harmful effect of intervention’, based on diversion and ‘the targeted provision of 
community-based treatment programmes’ (ibid: 34). 
 
They then said that ‘In official policy terms, however, the government joined the quiet 
consensus’ and the development and provision of alternatives to custody received 
support at the highest levels, while custody numbers fell and the prevalence of 
juvenile crime was also declining, which could not be linked to population changes 
(ibid: 34). Accordingly ‘There is a great deal about the 1980s which was positive and 
even exceptional’ (ibid: 35), and ‘much of the credit for developments in the 1980s 
must go to those individuals working in the emerging local juvenile justice teams’ 
(ibid: 47), where a ‘remarkable … unprecedented criminal justice success’ was 
occurring as  
‘practitioners at the local level were able to make effective use of systems 
management techniques to change the decisions that were made in respect of 
individual young people and thus to manipulate the overall operation of the 
juvenile justice system’ (ibid: 60). 
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Drakeford & Vanstone (1996: 21) said that ‘the most thorough-going attempts to 
affect individual offending patterns through system intervention are to be found in the 
field of youth justice’. 
 
Brownlee (1998: 14 – 15) identified how the government’s reform of adult sentencing 
drew on ‘the dramatic reduction in the use of custody that had been effected for 
juvenile offenders since 1981’ (his italics), which he put down to  
‘a coordinated multi-faceted strategy bringing together the activities of a range 
of agencies in pursuit of a common objective, bolstered by legislative 
restrictions on the use of custody and supported by additional government 
funding (through the DHSS Intermediate Treatment initiative) for a range of 
innovative alternative to custody disposals’ .  
 
David Smith (Smith, 1999) believed that the aim of Home Office policy in the 1991 
Act was to shift probation towards the successful model developed in youth justice:  
‘as well as contributing to a genuine shift in penal practice away from custody, 
youth justice workers in the 1980s developed methods of face-to-face work with 
young people in trouble which were … likely to be most effective in reducing 
offending …(with) … a confidence, clarity of purpose and coherence of thought 
which were unusual in social work’ (ibid: 153). 
 
Michael Cavadino (personal correspondence) said that ‘I think most credit’ {for the 
decline in youth imprisonment} ‘has to go to the Lancasterites and their 
associates/followers among practitioners around the country; also, and connectedly 
the AJJ’. When asked about the influences behind the LAC 83/3 initiative, he referred 
to the 1979 IT Conference and the need for the new government to decide the line it 
was to take, a view echoed by John Pratt (personal correspondence). The AMA 
(1993: 10) claimed that 
 ‘there are few areas of recent public policy and fewer in the area of criminal 
justice of which we can be proud. Juvenile justice is an exception. The 1980s 
have seen a revolution in the way the juvenile justice system operates’.  
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Raynor referred to ‘one of the most remarkable practitioner-led changes in British 
social policy’ (Raynor et al., 1994: 8), which ‘transformed the official view of what 
social workers in the criminal justice system could achieve’ (Raynor, 2002: 1176 -
1177). 
 
Reappraisal: towards abolition of juvenile imprisonment 
 
Hanley and Nellis (2001) refer to the ‘success’ of juvenile justice in England and 
Wales in the 1980s, and attribute this to the influence of labelling theory; the notion 
that young people grow out of crime; and the way that practitioners ‘distanced 
themselves from the liberal rhetoric of social work’. John Pratt (personal 
communication) also noted how important labelling theory was in the 1980s. Utting 
(1991: 40) referred to the fall in children in public care as 
 ‘one of the success stories of the last decade, owing much to the work of Local 
Authorities and voluntary organisations as well as to the extension of police 
cautioning and diversion from the penal system’.  
 
Bottoms (1995a; 2002: 436) also suggested that the application of ‘managerialist 
techniques from below’ in youth justice in England and Wales showed that middle 
and lower level workers can have an impact on sentencing, adding that ‘any serious 
account of the 1980s juvenile justice policy in England must give pride of place to a 
remarkable social movement, colloquially known as the juvenile justice movement’, 
which was a creative partnership between academics, especially those at Lancaster, 
and juvenile justice practitioners (Bottoms, 2002: 444). Bottoms & Dignan (2004) 
also noted that the youth justice movement had had highly significant on-the-ground 
effects. The Director of the PRT could say that ‘the approach to juvenile offending 
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has been the one unambiguous success’ of the Government’s law and order policies 
(Shaw, 1993). David Downes (1997) considered that the Conservative acceptance of 
the case against high imprisonment was ‘one of the most remarkable developments of 
the 1980s’ and attributed some of this to the importance of the ‘practical 
demonstration … that juvenile offenders could be dealt with more effectively’ in the 
community. 
 
By the mid-1980s, serious commentators started calling for the abolition of custody 
for juvenile offenders. Gibson (1986a) pointed out that the daily youth custody 
population now stood at just over a thousand, or the population of a medium-sized 
comprehensive school. Basingstoke had reduced its custodial sentencing from 18 in 
1980 to zero in 1986, and was ‘a custody-free zone’ (Gibson, 1987), in which 
reconviction rates were also falling. He went on (Gibson, 1986b) to say ‘if some 
“serious” and “persistent” offenders can be dealt with in the community, why not 
others’, and suggested that the abolition of custody, together with 400 maximum 
secure places within the child welfare system, would be adequate. The Director of the 
CLC, Jenny Kuper, echoed this (Kuper, 1986). The PRT called for the abolition of 
DCs, which it claimed were ‘a totally discredited part of the penal system’ (PRT, 
1986), and the Howard League for Penal Reform proposed the abolition of custody 
for all under 18s (Howard League, 1987).  
 
Tutt and Giller (1987) offered a ‘manifesto for management’ which would eliminate 
custody by 1989, based on the fact that everyone expressed opposition to custody: the 
government, police, magistrates, social services and probation, so that with this will 
there must be a way. Even the fairly cautious and politically sensitive NACRO, most 
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of whose juvenile justice funding came from the Home Office,  could call for the 
‘phasing out’ of prison department custody for juveniles (NACRO, 1989a; Cooper, 
1989). 
 
Around the country local success stories and models of good practice were being 
disseminated as part of the ‘evidence’ that custody was no longer needed. In Surrey 
custody rates fell from 13 per cent of convicted juveniles to under six per cent 
(Featherstone, 1987), and care and custody rates combined from 16 per cent of all 
court sentences in 1982 to 2.5 per cent in 1987 (Curtis, 1989).  In Knowsley they fell 
from 43 (17 per cent) to seven (five per cent) (Children’s Society 1988b; Knowsley 
Alternatives to Custody, 1987). In Ebbw Vale custodial sentencing fell by 76 per cent 
in a year (Children’s Society, 1988b); in Kirklees  by 80 per cent (ibid), with CHE 
numbers falling from 74 to 21 between 1981 and 1986, and custodial sentences from 
118 in 1983 to 26 in 1986 (Curtis, 1989: 113). In South Birmingham DC sentences 
fell by 88 per cent (Children’s Society, 1988a: 15). Hillingdon Alternative to Custody 
Scheme claimed falls in care and custody from 20 in 1981 to eight in 1986 and three 
in 1987 (Barker & Hester, 1988), and was claiming a “custody free zone” in April 
1988 (Hillingdon Alternatives to Custody, 1988; AJJUST, 1989: 5 - 7).  Barnardos in 
North Liverpool claimed ‘a nil custody rate’ in 1989 (Ames, 1991). The CSV Kent 
schemes, who received some of the largest funding from the LAC 83/3 initiative, 
reduced care and custody sentences from 157 in 1983 to 62 in 1986, with court 
appearances falling from 649 to 299 over the same period (CSV Kent, 1987; Fielding 
& Fowles, 1988). In Wales, the Barnardos 175 project reported a fall in care and 
custody from 40 to 17 from 1985 to 1986 (Barnardos, 1987). 
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Juvenile crime rates 
 
There was a fall in the number of known juvenile offenders from 3,130 per 100,000 to 
2,616 per 100,000 between 1980 and 1991. Whereas juveniles made up 32 per cent of 
known crime in 1980 this had fallen to 20 per cent in 1991 (Goldson, 1999: 6). This 
dramatic change has led to a belief that it may be a statistical aberration rather than a 
real phenomenon. However, a reduction in incarceration of juveniles may itself have 
led to a reduction in the ‘contamination’ effect of imprisoning people in situations 
where they can learn new criminal skills off other inmates, while the closure of the 
CHE’s also put an end to the joint offending by groups of absconders who were then 
left living in hiding where crime was necessary for personal survival. 
 
Overall crime rates actually increased by around 50% between 1988 and 1992, after 
which total recorded crime began to fall. In many ways the decline in juvenile crime 
rates was masked by this, and juvenile justice became an innocent casualty of the 
wider issue. While British Crime Survey data indicated a fall in victimisation 
experiences from 1995, this all happened as public concern about crime increased, 
due to what Green (2008) claims were media distortions and misconceptions and a 
growing lack of trust in government and the criminal justice system. The killing of 
two year old James Bulger in 1993 by two ten-year-old boys combined with the steep 
rise in the crime rate was taken to symbolise a rampant state of moral crisis and to 
justify a U-turn in penal policy that extended to all age groups (Downes, 2007; 
Newburn, 2007; Reiner, 2007). 
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Some questions about critical criminology 
 
In Massachusetts, Miller pointed out that  
‘radical sociologists pretty much dismissed what we were doing. Only after we 
had finally closed the institutions did they pay much attention, and then it was to 
discount as basically irrelevant whatever we might have accomplished’ (Miller, 
1998: 86).  
 
This resembles the case put forward by Dean-Myrdal & Cullen (1998: 15) about 
liberals, who decided that it was  
‘foolish … to anticipate that prevailing realities would ever allow for humanistic 
and efficacious reforms outside the penitentiary walls … and that well-
intentioned criminal justice reforms unwittingly were “dangerous”’. 
 
These liberals were therefore reduced to advising that nothing works and all reforms 
were doomed to failure. Heijder (1980: 3) noted the ‘persistent sniping … by critics 
who have no concrete alternatives’.  
 
As Francis Allen said, the idea that the criminal law served the interests of the state 
seems ‘hardly to warrant the excitement’ that it created in the theorists, and he 
accuses social control theorists of ‘often tendentious and reductive’ sweeping 
generalisations, suspecting all motives of those trying to reduce imprisonment (Allen, 
1981), even though most reforms in institutions have been achieved by people with 
humanitarian impulses and rehabilitative aspirations. Diversion could be seen either 
as ‘an unacceptable extension of state control’ into juveniles’ lives or as beneficial 
provision of support (Frazier et al., 1983), and the failure to distinguish this in the 
critical literature has caused a great deal of confusion. 
 
An interesting way of looking at the views of radical criminologists is to consider 
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their attitudes to community service. Pitts (1988: 30) pointed out that community 
service research in England and Wales showed that a half of its clients were diverted 
from prison, and the other half would not have been given custody anyway, so as a 
decarcerating strategy it must be viewed as a ‘goalless draw’. (Not a 50 per cent 
success? See Pease et al., 1977 and Van Dyck, 1989). Yet a few pages later he said 
‘as we have seen, community service from its inception has tended to be imposed 
upon those who would otherwise have received a less serious non-custodial penalty’ 
(ibid: 54). Stanley & Baginsky (1984: 163) had argued similarly: that any new 
alternatives to custody would ‘probably’ be the same as community service orders or 
suspended sentences, and would pull 50 per cent up-tariff. They had also dismissed 
the Massachusetts model as not credible (ibid: 48), as less easy to implement in the 
UK (ibid, 133), and felt that increases in police cautioning, though they ‘can act as an 
alternative to custody’ may have increased custody as courts think that they are only 
dealing with the more serious offenders (ibid: 30 - 31). Snacken et al. (1995: 34) said 
that non custodial sanctions were ‘only’ alternatives to custody in half of the cases in 
which they were imposed. 
 
In many ways, some of the critical criminologists’ comments on juvenile justice in 
England and Wales reflect Hirschman’s (1991) concept of the ‘perversity thesis’, 
where those favouring this concept believe that ‘any purposive action to improve 
some feature of the political, social or economic order only serves to exacerbate the 
condition one wishes to remedy’. He argued that advocates of this thesis embrace it 
‘for the express purpose of feeling good about themselves … unduly arrogant … 
portraying ordinary humans as groping in the dark’ while they themselves claim a 
remarkable understanding. They will often focus on one simplistic outcome which is 
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the opposite of the intended one (ibid: 38). 
 
Hirschman’s second thesis is the ‘futility thesis’ (ibid: 7): a belief that any attempt at 
social transformation will be unavailing, and any alleged change merely cosmetic as 
the ‘deep’ structures of society remain untouched (ibid: 43). Accordingly, advocates 
‘deride ordinary efforts at … change while … perhaps celebrating the resilience of the 
status quo’ (ibid: 44); oppose any idea that the social world might be open to 
progressive change; and believe that there is no hope, and that all motives are selfish 
(ibid: 72 – 75). He also argued that ‘futility is proclaimed too soon’, the first 
incidence of non-achievement is proclaimed in a rush to judgement, making no 
allowance for incremental and corrective policy making (ibid: 78). 
 
In many ways, this has links with Turk’s (1980) attack on radical criminology for its 
assertion, use of anecdotes and analogy, and putting forward dogmatic theories from a 
politically determined position, irrespective of the evidence. West (1985: 11) accused 
the ‘new criminologists’ of ‘ideological intolerance of alternative opinions’ and 
referred to their lack of concern for empirical evaluation, concluding that their critical 
stance towards treatment schemes for delinquents aided the new right agenda in 
favour of punishment and incarceration. Downes (1979) accused ‘radicals’ of 
dismissing other reformers as ‘knaves’, who actively supported the system, or ‘fools’, 
as they were indirectly re-enforcing the capitalist economy, as the radicals have 
equated proposals for change as ‘mere’ reformism, dismissing any idea of gradual 
change as contemptible and easily reversible: ‘theorising may not have to end with 
what exists, but should at least take it into account’. Stanley Cohen had attacked the 
assumption of radicals that any sort of correctionalism, however liberal, must depend 
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upon theories of pathology (Cohen, 1979c: 25), and their rejection of ‘middle-range 
policy alternatives which do not compromise any overall design for social change’ 
(ibid: 49). He noted how, in the late 1960s, the radicals had attacked the welfare state 
as being repressive but then, with the economic crisis of the 1970s, started defending 
it against the cuts that they had encouraged (ibid: 51: footnote 15). 
 
Binder & Geis (1984a: 309; 1984b) suggested that catchy words and phrases, such as 
‘net-widening’ were used instead of logic to produce ‘polemical and ideological 
conclusions lacking firm anchorage in fact’, while ‘over the top’ words like 
‘accelerated social control’ were used to refer to a counselling session or helping a 
young person find a job. Developers of programmes were put into a no-win situation: 
If they were offered to less of a group (such as black young people) they were 
discriminatory, and if offered to more of this group they were discriminatory. They 
suggested replacing ‘widen the net’ with ‘provides services to young people and their 
families where none were provided before’.  
 
McMahon (1992) has offered one of the most thorough critiques of this careless 
thought. She notes that ‘the most striking feature of post-war penal trends has been a 
dramatic increase in alternatives to imprisonment’ (ibid: 4) and that this was subject 
to detailed analysis by ‘critical’ criminology in the 1970s and 1980s, who used 
concepts of ‘net-widening’ and ‘nothing works’ and made unfounded allegations, 
such as those of Scull that Massachusetts offered no support to those released form 
juvenile institutions, to undermine practice. The critics, she argued. ‘ignore the 
potential importance of … proportionate declines in the use of imprisonment’ (ibid: 
37), which ‘hinders recognition of any progressive accomplishments of penal reform’ 
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(ibid: 45). Unintended consequences can also be desirable ones, she argues, and those 
who believed that all alternatives increased imprisonment ignored the facts, so ‘the 
experience of those who have struggled for progressive changes within the penal 
realm have all too often been omitted from the critical criminology story’ (ibid: 215).  
 
This is further explored by Nelken (1990: 1 - 4), who claimed that the arguments 
against alternatives ‘often say more about the hopes and fears of the various 
commentators than about the developments themselves’, as some of the larger 
questions raised in the social control literature ‘are either unanswerable or 
unmanageable’ and were such that no alternative could ever have met the critics 
demands. 
 
Young (1997) noted that critical criminology had been ‘impossibilist’,  detecting net-
widening in everything, and Van Swaaningen (1997: 6) that critical criminologists 
‘have largely confined themselves to a display of moral indignation about social 
inequality and exploitation’ within  ‘academic dilettantism, with fuzzy morals and 
flaky politics’, and ‘analytical despair’ (ibid: 170), while defining every police 
intervention as repressive, racist or class-biased. Criminologists ‘tend to hop rather 
quickly from one academic fashion to another’ and ‘by simply discarding what has 
been done before, there is little accumulation of knowledge’, and by judging  
alternatives to custody as either naïve or irresponsible, they have opened the door for 
the new right. 
 
Garland (2001) used Hirschman’s perversity thesis to explain the growth of the 
‘culture of control’, noting that the new criminologists engaged in a critique of their 
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own academic discipline and ended up challenging the academic credentials that had 
been the basis of their own authority (ibid: 67), leaving the field free for a 
‘momentary alliance of the accumulated enemies’ (ibid: 71). This academic ‘hostile 
scepticism’ towards community alternatives has given political support to those 
wishing to expand the prison system, according to Van Dyck. 
 
If new initiatives are in danger of becoming bureaucratised and institutionalised, 
widening their net, and unwilling to close when their aims have been met, then so 
may criminological ideas be reluctant to acknowledge when they have become 
outdated, out of touch and need to change.  
 
Summary 
 
I have shown, in this chapter, that many of the criticisms of juvenile justice practice in 
the 1980s and early 1990s were incorrect, often based on a failure to understand the 
actual reality of how the small juvenile justice projects actual operated. Some of the 
criticisms made by the main critics are inconsistent and they sometimes contradict 
themselves in their different publications. Instead, I have shown that most juvenile 
justice practice was coherent, well-planned, and that many practitioners often had a 
strong understanding of the academic debate and took steps to address possible 
pitfalls. 
 
Some of the criticisms are based on misleading uses of untypical elements in a 
minority of juvenile justice projects, such as ‘tracking’ and the Northampton model, 
while there is a failure to make use of up to date research on the impact of, for 
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example, section 1(2) of the 1982 CJA, a failure to understand the links between LAC 
83/3 and other intensive IT projects, and how a whole range of interventions, from 
appropriate adult and diversion schemes to alternative to custody provision, were part 
of the overall provision. I have also suggested that some of the criticism was made 
from an ideological position rather than on a real understanding of what was really 
happening in juvenile justice. This might explain why  Hudson (see above: page 327) 
could claim that no prison has ever closed as a result of alternatives to custody, at a 
time when announcements of the closure of juvenile prisons was happening on a 
regular basis, with over half the DC’s closing in 1987 (see above: pages 190 - 191). 
 
Sadly, this lack of support from the academic world meant that attempts to promote 
the model politically, or to recommend changes to wider criminal justice policy based 
on the experience of juvenile justice, were continually undermined by the theoretical 
critiques. In Kingdon’s terms, a ‘policy stream’ influence was lost, the window of 
opportunity closed, and a new ‘problem stream’ that supported a more punitive 
approach to juvenile offenders became dominant. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions: Conditions for Sustainable Decarceration Strategies 
 
I have tried in the above to indicate that a planned and co-ordinated decarceration 
strategy for young offenders in England and Wales achieved significant success 
between 1980 and 1993, that most of the existing academic interpretations of this 
period are incorrect, and that one of the most important elements of the decarceration 
was the result of creative work by a small group of juvenile justice practitioners. It is 
surprising that little academic attention has been given to a strategy that achieved a 90 
per cent reduction in custody, and that it has been ignored in decarceration or 
abolitionist literature. In exploring theories of policy change, I chose to use that of 
Kingdon, and demonstrated that his notions of problem-streams, policy-streams, 
political-streams and policy windows of opportunity were all relevant to the 
development of juvenile justice policy in the 1980s, and were seized upon by policy 
entrepreneurs, in a manner that he suggests. 
 
I have also considered other examples of decarceration initiatives in the adult mental 
health and learning difficulty fields, noting that both of these have been successful 
and more sustainable than the juvenile justice decarceration, which has been 
overturned since 1993. One possible reason for this is that the public and media have 
different perceptions of young offenders than they do of adults with mental health 
problems, and with learning difficulties in particular. There may be political and 
public perception constraints on the sustainability of decarceration in juvenile justice 
such that it was pushed to its limits  by 1992 and could not be taken further, as there 
will always be case examples that can provoke the view that community sentencing 
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has gone too far. Thus the political streams and the window of opportunity were lost, 
and new windows of opportunity (such as that provided by the Bulger case) were 
seized by those wishing to overturn developments and return to a more punitive 
approach. 
 
I have identified 16 features of a sustainable decarceration strategy which contributed 
to the youth justice and other decarceration initiatives, which may contribute towards 
a ‘template of sustainability’: 
 
1. A ‘Deep-end’ or ‘heavy end’ strategy 
 
While it would seem to be common sense to develop alternative provision for those 
already incarcerated before starting to take them out of the institution, the evidence 
suggests that there is a real danger that the new places will become filled by a new 
client group rather than those for whom they were intended. It is also dangerous to 
start with those in the institution who are most easily discharged, as this can lead to 
the new facilities failing to develop the skills to cope with the most difficult (see 
Rutherford & Bengur, 1976). One of the strengths of the juvenile justice movement in 
England and Wales was that it targeted those already in institutions and developed 
services to return them to the community (in the CHE’s) while also adopting 
strategies to prevent new entrants to CHEs (gatekeeping of reports) and sentences to 
custody (direct advocacy in court, specialist court officers, specialist reports, intensive 
programmes in the community). Bakal (1973a: 16) claimed that ‘the radical 
alternatives to institutions began to emerge only after the decision to close the 
institutions’ in Massachusetts, and Ramm (1985), writing about the mental health 
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reforms in Italy, said that it was crucial to empty and close the hospitals in order to 
forestall their gradual re-establishment by the opponents of deinstitutionalization. 
Williams et al. (1999) claimed that there was a conscious decision in the pioneer 
learning difficulty hospital closure strategy in Exeter to start with the most difficult 
inmates. The development of services in the community for those with challenging 
behaviours in the learning difficulty hospitals in the UK was also crucial to the ability 
to achieve hospital closures. 
 
It is also important to retain existing low-tariff or community disposals in order to be 
able to continue to keep the clientele down-tariff. One of the crucial features of 
juvenile justice in England and Wales was the continued use of the discharges and 
supervision orders even when courts were only dealing with the most serious 
offenders. In contrast was the failure to provide sufficient mental health services in 
the community for newly diagnosed patients in both the UK and the USA. 
 
Otherwise the opposition to decarceration will become organised. Johnson et al. 
(1981) noted how the notion of the ‘hard core offender’ developed when training 
school admissions were reduced, as the institutions searched for new admissions. 
They recommend a ‘surgical strike’ (ibid: 167), with the development of community 
based services after the closure of the institutions, as ‘the alternative to radical 
correctional change will often be no change at all’ (ibid: 170). In England and Wales, 
the government had to order DC and borstal governors not to visit courts to promote 
themselves. The CHE’s in England and Wales ran a continuous campaign trying to 
convince everyone that they were dealing with very delinquent and difficult children 
and young people that no-one else could cope with. 
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Harris (1983) noted that many so-called alternatives to custody in the USA in the 
1970s and 1980s simply gave sentencers more options, and few were explicit at being 
a substitute for incarceration, often having access criteria that almost guaranteed that 
they would not reach those who were bound for prison. As a result they indirectly 
suggested that ‘alternatives’ were not able to deal with serious offenders.  
 
2. Complete closure of the institutions and re-use of the land or premises 
 
Institutions need to be closed, demolished or turned to other uses that prevent them 
being reopened if decarceration is to be sustainable. Most of the CHEs that were 
closed in the 1980s either became nursing homes for the elderly, special schools or 
were demolished and sold off for new housing. Most of the juvenile prisons were 
converted into adult prisons. The realisation of the assets and land of the former 
mental hospitals and learning difficulty hospitals, most of which were demolished and 
turned into housing estates, was both crucial to NHS funding and to the impossibility 
of similar institutions ever being rebuilt. When there were suggestions that there 
should be a return to CHEs in England (Hyland, 1993) it quickly became clear that the 
capital outlay to set up new provision would be impossible to realise. 
 
3. A clear understanding of the group being targeted 
 
The juvenile justice movement had a very clear aim of reducing the sentencing of 
children to care and to custody. All other positions had to fit into this, in Mathiesen’s 
sense of being ‘negative’ reforms. This prevented net-widening, but attracted 
considerable criticism for not addressing wider youth problems. It also focused 
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practice on the most difficult clients. The deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill and 
people with learning difficulties in the UK, USA and Italy all had a clear target group 
in the institutions, though the development of community mental health centres in the 
USA did lead to net-widening and a reluctance to deal with the ‘heavy end’.  
 
4.  Models of good practice and campaign tools 
 
The availability of models of good practice and tools that new local initiatives can use 
appear in most decarceration strategies. In adult mental health and learning difficulty 
services it was the models of group homes in the community, notions of ‘dowry’ 
budgets attached to the service users, legal campaigns in the USA, and concepts such 
as social role valorisation, normalisation, an ordinary life and the five 
accomplishments. In juvenile justice, the systems analysis model of Lancaster, the 
notion of down-tariffing, the materials to support directly working with young 
offenders and the appeals strategy were all helpful tools. The intensive alternative to 
custody projects built upon the examples of the Woodlands and Junction projects, and 
the cautioning models from Exeter and Northampton were influential in the 
development of cautioning schemes. NACRO’s JOT team promoted good practice 
models at every opportunity all over the country. 
 
5. Scandals 
 
Many, but not all, decarceration initiatives began following scandals in the 
institutions, such as the exposure of the abuse of children in the training schools in 
Massachusetts, the abuse of adults with mental health problems or learning difficulties 
  391 
in state hospitals in the USA and the NHS hospitals in the UK. However, this does not 
seem an essential requirement. Few of my interviewees saw the scandals in DCs as 
significant. The dissemination of research into the ineffectiveness of DC, borstal, 
youth custody and the CHE’s helped to undermine their use. 
 
6. Independence of decarceration strategies from statutory services 
 
The role of the voluntary and independent sectors in all decarceration strategies is 
significant. This allows challenges to institutional bureaucracies and vested interests 
in the continuation of the institutions. The allocation of LAC 83/3 money to the 
voluntary sector was crucial in allowing projects to challenge social workers reports, 
submit their own alternatives to court, and co-opt magistrates and court clerks to their 
committees. In Massachusetts, the use of Federal funding allowed Miller to bypass 
state budgets and commission new services from the independent sector. The creation 
of joint financing for those in the institutions for learning difficulties and mental 
health hospitals in England and Wales forced the NHS to transfer funds to community 
care, while the development of the ‘dowry’ system attached funding to the client, not 
the agency. Most of the new services in the community for adults with learning 
disabilities were provided by housing associations and charities, who were also able 
to change the model of care away from a nursing/medical model and to a social caring 
model. 
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7. A small group of ideologically committed campaigners and charismatic 
leaders 
 
Ramon (1983) noted ‘the value of a small group of professionals with a high degree 
of commitment’ to the Italian mental health reforms, and the role of Franco Basaglia. 
The Massachusetts reforms in juvenile justice would never have occurred without 
Jerry Miller, and the work of people like Eric Emerson, Jim Mansell and David Felce 
who were crucial in showing that community care was feasible for all adults with 
learning difficulties in the UK. Wolfensberger performed a similar role in the USA.  
The low custody rate in the Netherlands was heavily influenced by the Utrecht 
School. The juvenile justice reforms in England and Wales were promoted and 
consolidated by the work of Andrew Rutherford, Norman Tutt and colleagues, while 
the achievement of Archie Pagan in producing the funding for LAC 83/3 was crucial. 
The support of NACRO and the development of the AJJ were also vital in supporting 
otherwise isolated practitioners in their small projects in local authority areas, 
generating a real sense of a national movement.  Paul Cavadino (personal interview) 
talked about the culture of the time, that  
‘cemented it all together – the strong practitioner movement promoted in the 
less academic journals, such as Social Work Today and Community Care, with 
a lot of networking excitement – an evangelical fervour – a belief that this was 
the right thing to do and a good time to do it’. 
 
However, problems of sustainability occur when these charismatic figures move on to 
other areas, retire or lose their influence. 
 
8. The willingness to advocate for clients and directly challenge other agencies 
 
In juvenile justice, practitioners were prepared to directly challenge local authority 
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social workers and their managers, magistrates, police, probation officers, solicitors 
and barristers and judges, developing appeals strategies and pushing professional 
boundaries to the limit. This was often uncomfortable.  SERs became a key 
campaigning tool, with authors using them as ‘pleas of mitigation’, aligning 
themselves with the defence (Smith, 1996a: 144, 153). In Massachusetts, Miller faced 
death threats for challenging the training schools, and in mental health services the 
campaigners faced regular personal and media attacks from those with vested 
interests, such as hospital psychiatrists and administrators. The notion that adults with 
mental health problems, adults with learning difficulties and juvenile offenders had 
‘rights’ was important in all these areas. 
 
9. Not a major challenge to staff or unions in the institution 
  
In England and Wales, due to overcrowding and stress in the prison system, and to the 
relatively marginal role of the youth prison estate, even the closure of establishments 
meant their transfer to the adult prison service, and no loss of jobs. This is in contrast 
to the decarceration movement in the US in the 1970s, which led to significant union 
opposition (see Rutherford, 1984a: 97). The closure of the CHEs did provoke hostility 
from headmasters, but recent scandals in these institutions reduced their ability to 
challenge change, and many closed down with surprisingly little fuss. The early 
developments in mental health and learning difficulties in the UK tried to transfer 
institutional staff to the new community services, though it was not always possible to 
re-train them to offer a more caring service, whereas in the USA the 
deinstitutionalization often occurred with little support and there was much stronger 
opposition to it from the more powerful trade unions. In some parts of the USA local 
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institutions are the main employers, and this increases opposition to closure. The most 
successful decarceration initiatives are those that bring new staff in rather than those 
that try to change the attitudes and values of institutional staff to work in new settings. 
 
10. Incorporation of key personnel who influence commitments to projects 
 
The involvement of magistrates and court clerks in the LAC 83/3 projects gave real 
credibility to them, which could also be used to gain wider public support and support 
from other agencies, such as the police, CPS and judges. Many projects arranged 
visits from their Member of Parliament and other local worthies so that they were in a 
position to speak with authority when allegations were made against the projects. 
Jerry Miller had important supporters to back him when under challenge, and the 
Kennedy family’s’ commitment to learning difficulty deinstitutionalization was very 
important (see Braddock, 2010). 
 
The ‘gatekeepers’ to services are crucial. In juvenile justice the prosecution service 
were influential in diverting children from court, while challenges to social workers’ 
recommendations in local authorities and in court stopped many young people going 
into care or custody. 
 
11. Political support  
 
Many have noted the irony that the decarceration in juvenile justice was achieved 
with a Conservative government in power that had a strong ‘law and order’ agenda. 
The key  Conservative politicians at that time, John Patten and Douglas Hurd, were 
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both sympathetic to attempts to reduce imprisonment, while Patten’s period at the 
DHSS had convinced him that many juveniles need not be imprisoned and that the 
alternatives had merit. When they were replaced by less sympathetic politicians, such 
as Michael Howard, and other civil servants replaced David Faulkner, the movement 
failed to respond constructively and lost political support and influence. Miller had 
strong support from the State Governor in Massachusetts. 
 
12. Challenges to transinstitutionalisation 
 
A decarceration strategy needs to be fully aware of the other institutional systems into 
which their targets can slip, and this was the case in juvenile justice in England and 
Wales, whereas there was little concern about what happened to deinstitutionalized 
mental health patients in the USA. Many ended up in atrocious board and lodging 
provision, and drifted into crime and the prison system, due to the lack of adequate 
welfare benefits in the USA for marginal individuals. There is some evidence that 
there is an inverse relationship between penal and welfare capital. Beckett & Western 
(2001), in a study of 33 states in the USA, found that those that provided more 
generous welfare benefits had lower incarceration rates, while those that spent less on 
welfare incarcerated a larger share of their population. Downes & Hansen (2006) and 
Downes (forthcoming) have found a similar relationship using data from 19 OECD 
countries. 
 
13. Ability to deal with changing circumstances 
 
Stephen Shaw noted the surprising fragility of the 1991 Act, and the failure of those 
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who supported the Act to recognise this and defend it vigorously:  
‘There was a collective failure by pressure groups to understand how fragile the 
consensus that we thought that we had put in place was. We had no strategies to 
defend the Act. We were in oppositional mode and did not know how to adjust. 
We thought we had won the argument’. He said that the period from 1982 to 
1992 ‘was the high point of pressure group influence. We simply did not realise 
at the time that it was the high point of our influence and that it was based on 
such thin foundations and we had no thoughts or strategies as to what to do 
when the pendulum swung’ (personal interview). 
 
At times, the idealism of some practitioners led them to forget that a lot of their 
rhetoric was strategic, and placed an extreme interpretation on their philosophy. 
While Ray Jones’s criticisms of what he called ‘the new orthodoxy’ were more 
influential with academics than practitioners (Jones, R., 1984a: and see the letters in 
response by Jones, D (1984) and others in the same issue), there is some truth in 
Smith’s (1995: 82) claim that ‘some juvenile justice workers … did in fact seem to 
assume that any face–to–face contact between worker and client was bound to be 
damaging’. This then put them into a situation which they were unable to defend 
when challenged about their lack of contact with children. 
 
Helen Edwards considered that a ‘false dichotomy’ had been created. The juvenile 
justice system was being ‘managed’, but ‘we needed to be clearer what we were 
diverting young people to … we talked a lot about diverting young people from 
custody but not enough about diverting them from crime’ (personal interview). 
 
The result was that the Bulger case and a change of both government and opposition 
philosophy left juvenile justice in no position to defend its work, allowing the return 
to incarceration of juveniles as a main plank of penal policy. 
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14. Dealing with the media 
 
Many of those I interviewed commented on how the role of the media changed in the 
1990s. Stephen Shaw reflected that: ‘pressure groups could guarantee a place for our 
news in at least two or sometimes all four of the broadsheet newspapers’, and noted 
the decline of Home Affairs correspondents and stories as a major newspaper sector 
in the 1990s (personal interview). Paul Cavadino (personal interview) talked about 
how much of the work in the 1980s  
‘happened below the radar of the media – detailed work by practitioners and 
assiduous lobbying work by those of us in a position to do so. What the media 
did do was give regular coverage to the case for reducing custody. This had 
shifted from the 1970s, when everybody thought that young people were being 
dealt with more leniently when the reverse was the case – we kept hammering 
away that we lock up more young people and adults than comparable European 
countries, high reconviction rates, and made a strong case for dealing with 
more young people in the community, which the broadsheets published’. 
 
Isralowitz (1979) had noted, when discussing the Massachusetts experiment, that a 
focus on serious and persistent juvenile offenders by the media can undermine the 
wider agenda. Juvenile justice campaigners in England and Wales were unable to 
respond constructively to a series of stories in the tabloid media criticising their 
practice, and lost credibility very quickly. Similar problems have occurred in mental 
health services whenever a mentally ill person, who may or may not have previously 
been incarcerated, commits murder or another serious offence. Learning difficulties 
has so far been sheltered from this exposure. 
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15. Maintaining the campaigning focus when the early practitioners and activists 
move on 
 
It is hard for new practitioners, arriving at the height of success, to replicate the 
ideological fervour of the pioneers. Their work will seem much more routine to them, 
not being aware of how things have changed. They will need new issues and concerns 
to enthuse them. In interview, Pauline Owen (personal interview) felt that the loss of 
key practitioners after 1992, as they made career moves, was crucial, and they were 
not replaced by people with the same vision and enthusiasm:  
‘there is only so much time that you can work with young offenders before 
losing enthusiasm and imagination. We stopped marketing it, and it became old-
hat, with no succession plan’. 
 
16. Avoiding becoming victims of success 
 
Once the institutions are closed, there is no need for a decarceration strategy. This 
point was well made by Roger Matthews (1995: 89), who pointed out that the decline 
in the juvenile population coming to the notice of local authorities for offending 
allowed them to de-prioritise youth justice, which had already been taken over in 
many areas by the voluntary sector running the LAC 83/3 projects. There is no longer 
any expertise in social work in England and Wales in working with offenders, or even 
in wider direct work with young people (Munro, 2011). Many of the LAC 83/3 
projects folded at the end of their short-term funding, and while this can be seen as a 
positive outcome in not perpetuating bureaucracies, they could have been in a position 
to offer a different type of service to young people now living in the community. 
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And finally 
 
The election of New Labour in 1997, whose election campaign had contained strong 
pledges on criminal justice and law and order, including promises to be ‘tough on 
crime and tough on the causes of crime’, led to new legislation on juvenile justice 
which transformed the way that young offenders were responded to. I had described 
this as ‘tough on crime and nasty to children’ (Jones, D. W., 1996) in an analysis of 
early proposals.  The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (HMSO, 1998) also drew heavily 
on an Audit Commission report, Misspent Youth (Audit Commission, 1996) in which 
the Conservative government had not shown much interest This was possibly because 
of its investigative weaknesses which I have identified elsewhere (Jones, D. W.,  
2001), including an over-simplification of the youth justice process, neglect of 
important research on re-offending rates, a cavalier use of crime statistics, an 
assumption that those found not guilty were really guilty and it is therefore safe to 
include them in offending statistics, and an assumption that if a case is adjourned it 
must be for non-attendance of the defendant. Many of the new sentencing orders and 
service structures created by the 1998 Act had a poor research base, such as the 
introduction of child curfew schemes, anti social behaviour orders (ASBO’s), and 
parenting orders (Jones, D. W.,  2002). These dramatic changes produced a situation 
which led to the surge in youth imprisonment shown in Figure 1, which is only 
recently beginning to slow down. 
 
Ironically, it does seem that, after years of neglect of the lessons from youth justice in 
the 1980s, they are being returned to again in the new century. Goldson (2005) has 
called for an abolitionist strategy and Bateman (2005) ‘a decarcerative strategy’ 
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involving tariff widening, campaigns against custody by report authors, and a 
crusading zeal.  In the USA abolition has been on the agenda at conferences organised 
by critical resistance (www.criticalresistance.org accessed 18.05.11). It remains to be 
seen whether the financial crisis brought about by the latest recession will lead to the 
rediscovery of the lessons of juvenile justice in England and Wales in the 1980s and 
early 1990s and a reapplication of them to current circumstances, or whether yet 
another lesson from history will be ignored. 
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Appendix 1: Statistical Tables 
 
 
It is hard to be completely accurate with sentencing statistics in England and Wales 
over the period being covered, as the quality of data gathering improved over time, 
and the way in which they are published varied: several series were discontinued or 
merged following the review of government statistics in 1980 (Rayner, 1980). In 
particular, statistics gathered by the Home Office, the Department of Health and 
Social Security and the Prison Department do not always match, so for example the 
Home Office Criminal Statistics will give one figure for those sentenced to prison, 
but the Prison Statistics will give a different figure for those received under sentence. 
Those committed from magistrates’ courts to higher courts for sentence may also 
change their age during this period, so attempts to track those committed as far as 
their final sentence will not be accurate.  Many authors writing about juvenile justice 
have used the Criminal Statistics figures only for those sentenced for indictable 
offences in magistrates’ courts, ignoring those sentenced for non-
indictable/summary and motoring offences and those sentenced in the higher courts. 
Where possible, I have combined available figures to give the most accurate figure 
available for all those sentenced, and given the different figures where relevant from 
Criminal Statistics and Prison Statistics.  
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Table 1: Sentencing of boys aged under 14* (13 and under) in all courts for all 
offences 1963 – 1970: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
Year         AD        CD       Fine     Att. C       Prob        A S       FPO     Other       Total 
1963 1919 10579   9863 1869 9420 1551 698 631 36530 
1964 1134   7945 7929 2098 8157 1426 593 745 30027 
1965 1096   7414 7908 2462 8105 1441 680 503 29609 
1966   889   6666 7562 2589 7668 1521 594 479 27968 
1967   830   7368 7009 2568 7293 1407 715 419 27609 
1968   848   7738 6398 2902 7126 1479 729 431 27651 
1969   802   7239 5919 2821 7174 1532 747 438 26672 
1970   681   7100 5846 2968 6644 1558 841 357 25995 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  Prob = Probation Order 
AS = Approved School  FPO = Fit Person Order 
 
*includes children aged 8 – 13 up to 1970 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b: 
various tables of sentencing in magistrates’ courts and higher courts combined 
 
 
Table 2: Sentencing of boys aged under 14* (13 and under) in all courts for all 
offences 1963 – 1970:  England and Wales: percentages. 
 
       Year         AD        CD       Fine       Att. C     Prob        A S        FPO     Other      
1963 5 29 27   5 26 4 2 2 
1964 4 26 26   7 27 5 2 2 
1965 4 25 27   8 27 5 2 2 
1966 3 24 27   9 27 5 2 2 
1967 3 27 25   9 26 5 3 2 
1968 3 28 23 10 26 5 3 2 
1969 3 27 22 11 27 6 3 2 
1970 3 28 23 12 26 6 3 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  Prob = Probation Order 
AS = Approved School  FPO = Fit Person Order 
*includes children aged 8 – 13 up to 1970 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b:  
various tables of sentencing in magistrates’ courts and higher courts combined 
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Table 3: Cautions and sentencing of boys aged under 14* (13 and under) 1963 – 
1970: England and Wales: percentages when cautioning is added. 
 
Year     Caution     AD        CD       Fine      Att. C      Prob      A S        FPO     Other     
1963 33 4 20 18 3 17 3 1 1 
1964 33 3 18 18 5 18 3 1 1 
1965 32 3 17 18 6 19 3 1 1 
1966 35 2 16 18 6 18 4 1 1 
1967 34 2 17 17 6 17 3 2 1 
1968 37 2 18 15 7 16 3 2 1 
1969 44 2 15 12 6 15 3 2 1 
1970 49 1 14 12 6 13 3 2 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  Prob = Probation Order 
AS = Approved School  FPO = Fit Person Order 
 
* includes children aged 8 – 13 up to 1970 
 
Source: based on Tables 2 and 28 
 
Table 4: Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1963 – 1970: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
 Year      AD        CD      Fine     Att. C     Prob      A S      DC         B    FPO     Total*  
1964 1694   9223 4968 2964 11553 3213 1376   266 278 81477 
1965 1735   8992 51161 2988 11686 3149 1390   478 313 82932 
1966 1439   7970 51307 3136 10834 3232 1443   478 304 81123 
1967 1445   8828 47755 2817 10503 2996 1400   561 304 77545 
1968 1632 10329 47351 3412 11239 2998 1887   751 391 80980 
1969 1695 10667 48524 3352 11968 3292 2228   799 430 84191 
1970 1542 10726 50314 3827 11920 3837 2516 1026 571 87728 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  Prob = Probation Order 
AS = Approved School  DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal    FPO = Fit Person Order 
* includes ‘others’ so line totals do not add up 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b: 
various tables of sentencing in magistrates’ courts and higher courts combined 
 
Note:  In this and similar tables I have deleted the figure for those committed from 
magistrates’ courts to higher courts for sentence (Table 7), and added the figures for 
those sentenced in higher courts committed for sentence and those sentenced in 
higher courts who were not committed. For example, in 1964 598 young men were 
committed by magistrates’ courts for sentence, but only 422 were sentenced by the 
higher courts following committal in that year, while an additional 736 were found 
guilty in higher courts and sentenced. Significantly, while the main reason for 
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committal would be for a borstal sentence, only 266 of the 422 committed actually 
received this sentence, the remainder receiving less severe sentences (possibly 
because in most cases they would have been in custody on remand prior to higher 
court sentence, and this may have been taken into account). 
 
 
Table 5: Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1963 – 1970: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
       Year      AD      CD      Fine    Att. C     Prob    A S      DC      B     FPO   Other    
1964 2 11 61 4 14 4 2 - - 2 
1965 2 11 62 4 14 4 2 1 - 1 
1966 2 10 63 4 13 4 2 1 - 1 
1967 2 11 62 4 14 4 2 1 - 1 
1968 2 13 58 4 14 4 2 1 - 1 
1969 2 13 58 4 14 4 3 1 1 1 
1970 2 12 57 4 14 4 3 1 1 2 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  Prob = Probation Order 
AS = Approved School  DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal    FPO = Fit Person Order 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b: 
various tables of sentencing in magistrates’ courts and higher courts combined 
 
 
Table 6: Cautioning and sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 for all 
offences 1963 – 1970: England and Wales: percentages when cautions are 
included. 
 
Year caution   AD       CD      Fine    Att. C     Prob     A S      DC        B     FPO  Other  
1964 14 2 10 52 3 12 3 1 - - 1 
1965 13 2   9 54 3 12 3 1 - - 1 
1966 12 2   9 55 3 12 3 2 1 - 1 
1967 13 2 10 54 3 12 3 2 1 - 1 
1968 13 2 11 51 4 12 3 2 1 - 1 
1969 16 2 11 48 3 12 3 2 1 - 1 
1970 18 1 10 47 4 11 4 2 1 1 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  Prob = Probation Order 
AS = Approved School  DC = Detention centre 
B = Borstal    FPO = Fit Person Order 
 
Source: calculated from data in Table 4 and Table 28 
 
  405 
Table 7: Committals of young men aged 14 and under 17 from magistrates’ 
courts to higher courts for sentencing for all offences (usually with a 
recommendation for borstal training): 1964 – 1970: England and Wales: actual 
numbers. 
 
 
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1979 1970 
committals 598 700 785 793 939 1139 1390 
 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Sentencing of girls aged under 14* (13 and under) in all courts for all 
offences 1963 – 1970: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
        Year        AD        CD        Fine        Prob      A S        FPO     Other     Total 
1963 193 1008 606 1068 59 104 15 3053 
1964 126 951 675 1029 68 103 86 3038 
1965 118 911 781   987 61 105 35 2998 
1966 107 784 804   885 58 100 17 2755 
1967 112 926 764   842 56   98 18 2816 
1968 103 915 624   899 53 130 25 2749 
1969   93 953 634   859 80 109 36 2764 
1970   82 890 723   755 82 119 26 2677 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Prob = Probation Order  AS = Approved School   
FPO = Fit Person Order 
*includes children aged 8 – 13 up to 1970 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b: 
various tables of sentencing in magistrates’ courts and higher courts combined 
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Table 9: Sentencing of girls aged under 14* (13 and under) in all courts for all 
offences 1963 – 1970: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
              Year         AD         CD       Fine        Prob      A S        FPO     Other      
1963 6 33 20 35 2 3 - 
1964 4 31 22 34 2 3 3 
1965 4 30 26 33 2 4 1 
1966 4 28 29 32 2 4 1 
1967 4 33 27 30 2 3 1 
1968 4 33 23 33 2 5 1 
1969 3 34 23 31 3 4 1 
1970 3 33 27 28 3 4 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Prob = Probation Order  AS = Approved School   
FPO = Fit Person Order 
*includes children aged 8 – 13 up to 1970 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b: 
various tables of sentencing in magistrates’ courts and higher courts combined 
 
 
 
Table 10: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1963 – 1970: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
Year         AD         CD       Fine       Prob        A S      DC/B*     FPO     Other     Total    
1963 213 1237 2323 1624 184 31   81   35 5728 
1964 184 1459 2509 1811 171 34   91   99 6358 
1965 188 1397 2968 1861 174 20   98   81 6787 
1966 149 1353 3116 1931 218 28 126   70 6991 
1967 189 1394 2899 1728 229 28 124   89 6680 
1968 183 1502 2863 1703 230 30 117   73 6701 
1969 199 1530 2939 1750 239 19 138 130 6944 
1970 192 1697 3237 1774 264 28 185 132 7509 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Prob = Probation Order  AS = Approved School   
FPO = Fit Person Order  DC/B = Detention Centre and Borstal 
* Detention Centre for young women abolished in 1968 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b: 
various tables of sentencing in magistrates’ courts and higher courts combined 
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Table 11: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1963 – 1970: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
       Year        AD         CD        Fine       Prob       A S       DC/B*    FPO      Other     
1963 4 22 41 28 3 1 1 1 
1964 3 23 39 28 3 1 1 2 
1965 3 21 44 27 3 - 1 1 
1966 2 19 45 28 3 - 2 1 
1967 3 21 43 26 3 - 2 1 
1968 3 22 43 25 3 - 2 1 
1969 3 22 42 25 3 - 2 2 
1970 3 23 43 24 4 - 2 2 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Prob = Probation Order  AS = Approved School   
FPO = Fit Person Order  DC/B = Detention Centre and Borstal 
* Detention Centre for young women abolished in 1968 
 
Source Home Office, 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b: 
various tables of sentencing in magistrates’ courts and higher courts combined 
 
 
Table 12: Admissions of offenders and non-offenders to approved schools in 
England and Wales: 1961 to 1970. 
 
Year                     Offenders                           Non 
                                 Admitted                      Offenders                            Total 
                                                                         admitted 
                                M                    F                       M                 F                         M                     F 
1961   4077     266     285     539    4362      805 
1962   4355     269     265     490          4620    759 
1963   4411     302     233     466    4644    768 
1964   4589     772     224     475    4783  1247  
1965   4392     304     241     460    4633    764 
1966   4355     360     244     476    4599    806 
1967   4076     388     264     436    4340    824 
1968   4284     788     204     471    4488  1259 
1969   4548     845     232     467    4780  1312 
1970   4655     827     206     412    5067  1236 
 
Source: HMSO: 1963; 1964a; 1964b; 1965; 1966; 1967; 1968a; 1969b; 1970c; 
1972:  all Table 2 
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Table 13: Children and young people in residence in Approved Schools on 30th 
June 1961 – 1970: England and Wales. 
 
                         Year                        Male                      Female 
1961 7133 1244 
1962 7319 1169 
1963 7382 1153 
1964 7560 1138 
1965 7434 1123 
1966 7323 1027 
1967 7095 1118 
1968 6309 1071 
1969 6088 1086 
1970 6198 1029 
 
Source: HMSO: 1963; 1964a; 1964b; 1965; 1966; 1967; 1968a; 1969b; 1970c; 
1972: all Table 5 
Table 14: Young men aged 16 and under admitted to Detention Centre and 
Borstal, 1964 to 1970: England and Wales. 
 
    Year              Admissions 
1964 1658 
1965 1753 
1966 1873 
1967 1884 
1968 2334 
1969 2655 
1970 2934 
 
Source: Tables D9, D15 and D16 in Home Office 1966c; 1966d; 1967d; 1968b; 
1970f; 1970g; 1971c 
 
 
Table 15A: Cautions given to young offenders 1963 to 1970 (excluding motoring 
offences): England and Wales. 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1963 17689 14278 2398 1665 
1964 15030 13525 2128 1896 
1965 13855 12412 2447 2107 
1966 14080 11585 2600 2323 
1967 14509 11136 2604 1908 
1968 16292 12188 2954 2259 
1969 21312 16569 3883 3234 
1970 24794 19652 5043 3989 
 
Source: Home Office: 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b 
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Table 15B: Cautions given to young offenders 1963 to 1970 (excluding motoring 
offences) as a percentage of all those found guilty or cautioned for all offences 
except motoring offences: England and Wales. 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1963 33 18 44 23 
1964 34 18 42 24 
1965 32 17 45 25 
1966 34 17 49 26 
1967 35 17 48 23 
1968 37 18 52 27 
1969 45 17 59 32 
1970 49 18 66 37 
 
Source: Home Office: 1964b; 1965c; 1966b; 1967e; 1968d; 1969b; 1970e; 1971b 
 
Table 16: Children in Care in England and Wales on 31st March 1972 to 1976 
resident in Community Homes with Education or Observation and Assessment 
Centres. 
 
      Year 
        1972                1973                1974               1975               1976          
O & A 4200 4800 4800 5300 5000 
CHE 6700 7100 6700 6200 6800 
Total     10900              11900              11500             11500             11800 
                 
 
O & A = Observation and Assessment Centre  
CHE = Community Home with Education on the premises 
 
Source: HMSO, 1973; 1974a; 1975; 1976a; 1976b; 1977b; 1979a: all Table 2 
 
Table 17: Sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
  Year         AD          CD          Fine       Att. C         SO          CO        Other       Total 
1971 567 5678 5376 2421 5723 2481 264 22510 
1972 594 5864 5249 2522 5210 2386 300 22125 
1973 513 6024 5908 2573 5322 2535   69 22944 
1974 513 7326 6368 2878 5776 2934   56 25851 
1975 558 7154 5789 2763 5162 2635   67 24128 
1976 431 6988 5594 2871 4579 2295   82 22840 
 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
 
Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a: combined from 
  410 
various tables covering magistrates’ courts and higher courts 
 
Table 18: Sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
  Year         AD          CD         Fine        Att. C         SO          CO         Other      
1971 3 25 24 11 25 11 1 
1972 3 27 24 11 24 11 1 
1973 2 26 26 11 23 11 - 
1974 2 28 25 11 22 11 - 
1975 2 30 24 11 21 11 - 
1976 2 31 24 13 20 10 - 
 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
 
Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a: combined from 
various tables covering magistrates’ courts and higher courts 
 
 
 
Table 19: Cautioning and sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: percentages when cautions are 
included. 
 
  Year       caution      AD           CD         Fine       Att. C        SO          CO              
1971 58 1 11 10 5 11 5 
1972 62 1 10   9 4   9 4 
1973 62 1 10 10 4   9 4 
1974 62 1 11   9 4   9 4 
1975 62 1 11   9 4   8 4 
1976 63 1 11   9 5   8 4 
 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
 
Source: adapted from data in Tables 17 and 28 
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Table 20: Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
   Year     AD        CD      Fine    Att. C      SO       CO      DC        B     Other    Total 
1971 1542 10912 50949 3788 10373 4300 2475 1116 1363 86818 
1972 1531 11429 47878 4233   9980 4005 3083 1255 1706 85100 
1973 1377 12171 45921 4654 10643 4224 3694 1378   745 84807 
1974 1538 14147 46036 5825 12076 4342 4451 1572   701 90688 
1975 1815 14597 46389 5625 11037 3903 4793 1773   824 90756 
1976 1862 15688 48298 6182 10631 3191 5388 1907 1253 94400 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal     
 
Source: Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a: 
combined from various tables covering magistrates’ courts and higher courts 
 
 
 
Table 21: Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
      Year      AD      CD       Fine   Att. C     SO       CO      DC        B    Other    
1971 2 13 59 4 12 5 3 1 2 
1972 2 13 56 5 12 5 4 1 2 
1973 2 14 54 5 13 5 4 2 1 
1974 2 17 51 6 13 5 5 2 1 
1975 2 16 51 6 12 4 5 2 1 
1976 2 17 51 7 11 3 6 2 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal     
 
Source: Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a: 
combined from various tables covering magistrates’ courts and higher courts 
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Table 22: Cautioning and Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: percentages when cautions are 
included. 
 
    Year  caution   AD       CD       Fine     Att. C     SO       CO      DC        B      Other 
1971 23 1 10 45 3 9 4 2 1 1 
1972 26 1 10 41 4 9 3 3 1 1 
1973 27 1 10 39 4 9 4 3 1 1 
1974 29 1 11 36 5 9 3 3 1 1 
1975 26 1 12 38 5 9 3 4 1 1 
1976 28 1 12 37 5 8 2 4 1 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal  
 
Source: Source: compiled from Tables 20 and 28 {Note: percentages in the cautions 
column do not match those in Table 29 due to exclusion in this table of motoring 
offences} 
 
 
Table 23: Committals of young men aged 14 and under 17 from magistrates’ 
courts to higher courts for sentencing (usually with a recommendation for 
borstal training): 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
committals 1785 2075 2229 2348 2538 2582 
 
Source: Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a 
 
 
Table 24: Sentencing of girls aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
  
  Year         AD          CD         Fine           SO          CO       Other        Total 
1971 60 603 512 587 182 24 1968 
1972 56 589 516 658 194 24 2037 
1973 63 626 587 617 218   8 2119 
1974 49 840 613 787 267   3 2559 
1975 50 845 603 751 304 22 2575 
1976 45 994 666 664 232   5 2606 
 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
SO = Supervision Order  CO = Care Order 
 
Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a: combined from 
various tables covering magistrates’ courts and higher courts 
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Table 25: Sentencing of girls aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
  Year         AD          CD          Fine          SO         CO         Other     
1971 3 31 26 30   9 1 
1972 3 29 25 32   9 1 
1973 3 29 28 29 10 - 
1974 2 33 24 31 10 - 
1975 2 33 23 29 12 1 
1976 2 38 26 25   9 - 
 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
SO = Supervision Order  CO = Care Order 
 
Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a: combined from 
various tables covering magistrates’ courts and higher courts 
 
 
 
Table 26: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
                 Year     AD       CD       Fine        SO       CO       B     Other  Total 
1971 207 1645 3345 1548 536 30 132 7443 
1972 179 1532 3249 1498 541 40 148 7187 
1973 153 1593 3311 1570 623 43   74 7367 
1974 152 2088 3833 1882 696 50   65 8766 
1975 174 2435 3785 2000 761 81   77 9313 
1976 142 2527 4271 1847 735 76   66 9664 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
SO = Supervision Order  CO= Care Order 
B = Borstal   
 
Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a: combined from 
various tables covering magistrates’ courts and higher courts 
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Table 27: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1971 – 1976: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
                       Year     AD      CD       Fine        SO       CO        B     Other  
1971 3 22 45 21 7 - 2 
1972 2 21 45 21 8 1 2 
1973 2 22 45 21 8 1 1 
1974 2 24 44 21 8 1 1 
1975 2 26 41 21 8 1 1 
1976 1 26 44 19 8 1 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
SO = Supervision Order  CO= Care Order 
B = Borstal   
 
Source: Home Office, 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a: combined from 
various tables covering magistrates’ courts and higher courts 
 
 
Table 28: Cautions given to young offenders 1971 to 1976 (excluding motoring 
offences): England and Wales. 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1971 31129 26575   6891   6362 
1972 35477 29738   9177   7707 
1973 37069 32098 10008   8073 
1974 41794 37395 12142   9904 
1975 39701 32415 11932   9798 
1976 38176 36698 10793 10068   
 
Source: Home Office: 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a 
 
Table 29: Cautions given to young offenders 1971 to 1976 (excluding motoring 
offences) as a percentage of all those found guilty or cautioned for all offences 
except motoring offences: England and Wales. 
 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1971 59 30 78 57 
1972 63 31 82 53 
1973 63 35 83 54 
1974 62 29 83 53 
1975 62 25 82 50 
1976 63 29 80 52 
 
Source: Home Office: 1972a; 1973a; 1974a; 1975a; 1976b; 1977a 
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Table 30: Young men aged 16 and under admitted to DC and Borstal, 1971 to 
1976: England and Wales. 
 
    Year              Admissions 
1971 3037 
1972 3607 
1973 4270 
1974 4953 
1975 5916 
1976 6599 
 
Source: Home Office: 1972b: Tables C12, D9, D15 and D16; 1973b Tables D 9, D15 
and D16; 1974b Table 3; 1975b, Table 3; 1976c Table 3.1 and 3.5; 1977b, Tables 3.1 
and 3.5. Note that figures in Tables 3.5 for earlier years vary slightly from the figures 
previously  given in those years.  
 
Table 31: Males under 17 sentenced to Care and Custody for Offences: England 
and Wales 1964 to 1976. 
 
    Year              A.S /CO*              DC                   B                  Total 
1964 4639 1376   266   6281 
1965 4590 1390   478   6458 
1966 4753 1443   478   6714 
1967 4403 1400   561   6364 
1968 4477 1887   751   7115 
1969 4824 2228   799   7851 
1970 5395 2516 1026   8937 
1971 6781 2475 1116 10372 
1972 6391 3083 1255 10729 
1973 6759 3694 1378 11831 
1974 7278 4421 1572 13271 
1975 6538 4793 1773 13104 
1976 5486 5388 1907 12781 
 
*Approved School Order 1964 – 1970 and Care Order from 1971 
DC = Detention Centre  B = Borstal 
 
Sources: adapted from Tables 1, 4, 17 and 20 above 
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Table 32: Females under 17 sentenced to Care and Custody for Offences: 
England and Wales 1964 to 1976. 
 
    Year              A.S /CO*               B                  Total 
1964   239 34   273 
1965   212 20   232 
1966   276 28   304 
1967   285 28   313 
1968   283 30   313 
1969   319 19   338 
1970   376 28   404 
1971   718 30   748 
1972   735 40   775 
1973   841 43   884 
1974   963 50 1013 
1975 1065 81 1146 
1976   967 76 1043 
 
*Approved School Order 1964 – 1970 and Care Order from 1971 
B = Borstal 
 
Sources: adapted from Tables 8. 10, 24 and 26 above. 
 
 
Table 33: Sentencing of males aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
  Year         AD          CD          Fine       Att. C        SO           CO        Other       Total 
1977 469 7584 5736 2833 4659 2102   64 23447 
1978 414 7488 5773 2915 4335 1924 119 22968 
1979 296 5681 4943 2971 3847 1568   74 19300 
1980 270 6178 4891 3296 3884 1540   78 20137 
1981 250 5811 3956 3081 3393 1220   36 17747 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
  
Source: Home Office, 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982b; 1982c: Tables for 
magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
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Table 34: Sentencing of males aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
 
  Year         AD          CD         Fine        Att. C        SO          CO        Other        Total 
1977 2 32 24 12 20 9 - 23447 
1978 2 33 25 13 19 8 - 20868 
1979 2 29 26 15 20 8 - 19300 
1980 1 31 24 16 19 8 - 20137 
1981 1 33 22 17 19 7 - 17747 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
  
Source: Home Office, 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982b; 1982c: Tables for 
magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
 
 
 
Table 35: Cautioning and sentencing of males aged over 10 and under 14 for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: percentages when cautions are 
included. 
 
  Year      caution       AD          CD         Fine        Att. C        SO          CO             
1977 66 1 11 8 4 7 3 
1978 63 1 12 9 5 7 3 
1979 65 1 10 9 5 7 3 
1980 65 - 11 8 6 7 3 
1981 68 - 10 7 5 6 2 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
  
Source: compiled from Tables 33 and 43. 
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Table 36: Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
  Year     AD       CD       Fine     Att. C      SO       CO      DC        B      Other   Total 
1977 1748 16448 50033   6863 10874 2975 5757 1859 1049   97606 
1978 1727 16277 52743   7813 10118 2926 6303 2012 1207 101126 
1979 1119 12137 44223   7826   9945 2321 5478 1617   657   85323 
1980 1237 14118 47801   9929 11500 2407 6000 1637   779   95400 
1981 1124 14665 40316 10607 11469 2132 6221 1683   657   88874 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal  
 
Source: Home Office, 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982b; 1982c: Tables for 
magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
 
 
 
Table 37: Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
           Year     AD       CD      Fine     Att. C     SO      CO      DC        B      Other   
1977 2 17 51 7 11 3 6 2 1 
1978 2 16 52 8 10 3 6 2 1 
1979 1 14 52 9 12 3 6 2 1 
1980 1 15 50 10 12 3 6 2 1 
1981 1 17 45 12 13 2 7 2 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal  
 
Source: Home Office; 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982b; 1982c: Tables 
for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
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Table 38: Cautioning and sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: percentages when cautions are 
included. 
 
   Year   caution  AD       CD       Fine     Att. C     SO       CO     DC       B      Other   
1977 29 1 12 36 5 8 2 4 1 1 
1978 28 1 12 37 6 7 2 4 1 1 
1979 31 1 10 36 6 8 2 4 1 1 
1980 31 1 10 35 7 8 2 4 1 1 
1981 34 1 11 30 8 9 2 5 1 - 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal  
   
Source: adapted from Tables 36 and 43 
 
 
 
Table 39: Sentencing of females aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
  Year         AD          CD          Fine       Att. C         SO          CO        Other       Total 
1977 50 986 686 - 671 250 4 2647 
1978 37 899 740 - 612 235 8 2531 
1979 32 759 704 6 553 177 5 2236 
1980 34 847 614 23 542 172 5 2237 
1981 37 714 476 33 482 143 5 1890 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
  
Source: Home Office, 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982b; 1982c: Tables for 
magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
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Table 40: Sentencing of females aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
  Year         AD          CD        Fine        Att. C        SO          CO             
1977 2 37 26 - 25 9 
1978 1 36 29 - 24 9 
1979 1 34 31 - 25 8 
1980 2 38 27 1 24 8 
1981 2 38 25 2 26 8 
 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
  
Source: Home Office, 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982b; 1982c: Tables for 
magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
 
 
 
Table 41: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
         Year     AD       CD      Fine     Att. C     SO       CO        B      Other    Total 
1977 158 2585 4424 * 1974 661   76 79   9957 
1978 133 2714 4716 * 1940 659 105 79 10346 
1979   91 2180 4312 105 1876 486   66 64   9180 
1980 114 2527 4309 301 2117 517   71 84 10040 
1981 101 2639 3514 427 2009 461   40 67   9258 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   B = Borstal  
 
*Note: Attendance Centre not available until 1979 for young women 
 
Source: Home Office, 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982b; 1982c: Tables for 
magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
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Table 42: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1977 – 1981: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
                Year     AD       CD      Fine     Att. C     SO       CO        B      Other     
1977 2 26 44 * 20 7 1 1 
1978 1 26 46 * 19 6 1 1 
1979 1 24 47 1 20 5 1 1 
1980 1 25 43 3 21 5 1 1 
1981 1 29 38 5 22 5 - 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   B = Borstal  
 
*Note: Attendance Centre not available until 1979 for young women 
 
Source: Home Office, 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982b; 1982c: Tables for 
magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
 
 
Table 43: Cautions given to young offenders 1977 to 1981 (excluding motoring 
offences): England and Wales. 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1977 45369 40623 14462 11468 
1978 38990 39693 13191 11530 
1979 36296 38387 12315 11228 
1980 37500 43100 11800 12000 
1981 38500 45000 12000 12800 
 
Source: Home Office: 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981c; 1982d. Note: figures are 
rounded up to nearest hundred from 1980 onwards 
 
 
Table 44: Cautions given to young offenders 1977 to 1981 (excluding motoring 
offences) as a percentage of all those found guilty or cautioned for all offences 
except motoring offences: England and Wales. 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1977 66 29 85 53 
1978 63 28 84 53 
1979 65 31 85 55 
1980 65 31 84 55 
1981 68 34 86 58 
 
Source: Home Office: 1978d; 1979a; 1980b; 1981c; 1982d. 
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Table 45: Processing of Juvenile Offenders in the Metropolitan Police District: 
1975 – 1981: actual numbers. 
 
      Year 
Disposal                  1975      1976      1977     1978         1979         1980          1981 
Prosecute 23246 20615 22934 22058 20041 20880 21033 
Caution 13195 11023 13786 12921 11629 11906 11655 
N F A   3120   2820   3309   2677   2194   2419   2388 
Totals                      39561   34458     40049      37656      33864  35205       35076  
 
NFA = No Further Action 
 
Source: HMSO, 1976c; 1977c; 1978a; 1979c; 1980b: 29; 1981: 28; 1982c; 1984b: 
Appendix 3i: 123 
 
 
Table 46: Processing of Juvenile Offenders in the Metropolitan Police District: 
1975 – 1981: percentages. 
 
      Year 
Disposal            1975         1976       1977   1978         1979          1980          1981 
Prosecute 59 60 57 59 59 59 60 
Caution 33 32 34 34 34 34 33 
N F A   8   8   8   7   6   7   7 
 
NFA = No Further Action 
 
Source: HMSO, 1976c; 1977c; 1978; 1979c; 1980b: 29; 1981: 28; 1982c; 1984b: 
Appendix 3i: 123 
 
 
Table 47: Children in Care in England and Wales on 31st March 1977 to 1981 
resident in Community Homes with Education or Observation and Assessment 
Centres in England and Wales. 
 
      Year 
         1977                1978                1979               1980              1981  
O & A 5000 5000 4800 5200 4900 
CHE 6400 6100 5900 5600 5000 
Total      11400      11100                10700             10800              9900 
                             
 
Source, HMSO, 1979a; 1980a; 1982b: all table 3.4; DHSS, 1980b; 1981f; 1982b 
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Table 48: Young men aged 16 and under admitted to Detention Centre and 
Borstal, 1977 to 1981: England and Wales. 
 
    Year              Admissions 
1977 6987 
1978 7251 
1979 7020 
1980 7339 
1981 7535 
 
Source: Home Office, 1978e, Tables 3.1 and 3.5; 1979b, Tables 3b and 3c; 1980c, 
Table 3.3; 1981d, Table 3.3; 1982e, Table 3.3 
 
 
Table 49: Males under 17 sentenced to Care and Custody for Offences: England 
and Wales 1977 – 1981. 
 
       Year            A.S /CO*            DC                   B                  Total 
1977 5077 5757 1859 12693 
1978 4850 6303 2012 13165 
1979 3889 5478 1617 10964 
1980 3947 6000 1637 11584 
1981 3352 6221 1683 11256 
 
*Approved School Order 1964 – 1970 and Care Order from 1971 
DC = Detention Centre  B = Borstal 
 
Source: adapted from Tables 33 and 36 above 
 
 
 
Table 50: Females under 17 sentenced to Care and Custody for Offences: 
England and Wales 1977 – 1981. 
 
    Year              A.S /CO*                B                 Total 
1977 911   76 987 
1978 894 105 999 
1979 663   66 729 
1980 689   71 760 
1981 604   40 644 
 
*Approved School Order 1964 – 1970 and Care Order from 1971 
DC = Detention Centre  B = Borstal 
 
Source: Tables 39 and 41 above 
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Table 51: Cautions given to young offenders 1982 to 1986 (excluding motoring 
offences): England and Wales. 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16      Females 10-13      Females 14-16 
1982 37500 47400 13300 13600 
1983 38300 49900 12600 14700 
1984 39400 54600 11000 14800 
1985 40500 61900 13000 19200 
1986 30200 56800   9100 16500 
 
Source: Home Office: 1983a; 1984f; 1985f; 1986d; 1987c 
 
 
Table 52: Cautions given to young offenders 1982 to 1986 (excluding motoring 
offences) as a percentage of all those found guilty or cautioned for all offences 
except motoring offences: England and Wales. 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1982 70 36 88 62 
1983 74 39 90 66 
1984 76 43 91 69 
1985 79 49 93 76 
1986 81 53 94 79 
 
Source: Home Office: 1983a; 1984f; 1985f; 1986d; 1987c 
 
Table 53: Processing of Juvenile Offenders in the Metropolitan Police District: 
1982 – 1984: actual numbers. 
 
   Disposal              1982         1983    1984 
Prosecute 19720 17440 14455 
Instant caution       673 
Caution 11960 11828 13167 
N F A   2208   2566   2871 
   Totals                 33888       31834       31166 
 
NFA = No Further Action 
Source: HMSO, 1983; 1984b, 123; 1985b table 3i 
 
 
  425 
Table 54: Processing of Juvenile Offenders in the Metropolitan Police District: 
1982 – 1984: percentages. 
 
   Disposal              1982        1983  1984 
Prosecute 58 55 46 
Instant caution - -   2 
Caution 35 37 42 
N F A   7   8   9 
    
NFA = No Further Action 
Source: HMSO, 1983; 1984b, 123; 1985b table 3i 
Table 55: Sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
  Year       AD         CD        Fine      Att. C        SO       CO       s 53      Other      Total  
1982 204 5261 3396 2942 2944 998     20 15765 
1983 184 5032 2800 2593 2387 653 3 114 13766 
1984 135 4877 2553 2365 2074 537  123 12664 
1985 139 4130 1908 2142 1786 416 2   84 10607 
1986 101 2917 1247 1377 1115 275 1   72   7105 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order    
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: Home Office: 1983d; 1983e; 1984d; 1984e; 1985d; 1985e; 1986b; 1986c; 
1987a; 1987b: merger of tables 
 
Table 56: Sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
  Year       AD         CD        Fine      Att. C       SO        CO       s. 53     Other   
1982 1 33 22 19 19 6 - - 
1983 1 37 20 19 17 5 - 1 
1984 1 39 20 19 16 4 - 1 
1985 1 39 18 20 17 4 - 1 
1986 1 41 18 19 16 4 - 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order    
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: Home Office: 1983d; 1983e; 1984d; 1984e; 1985d; 1985e; 1986b; 1986c; 
1987a; 1987b: merger of tables 
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Table 57: Cautioning and sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: percentages with cautions included. 
 
  Year   caution      AD         CD        Fine      Att. C      SO        CO       s 53     Other     
1982 70 - 10 6 6 6 2 - - 
1983 74 - 10 5 5 5 1 - - 
1984 76 -   9 5 4 4 1  - 
1985 79 -   8 4 4 3 1 - - 
1986 81 -   8 3 4 3 1 - - 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order    
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: adapted from Tables 51 and 55 
 
 
 
Table 58: Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
         B/YC/  
Year  AD       CD       Fine     Att. C      SO       CO      DC      s.53    CSO  Other  Total  
1982 902 14609 36944 10801 10575 1954 5841 1463 ---- 595 83684 
1983 864 14543 32996 10299   9725 1272 4946 1932   576 642 77795 
1984 929 13868 28464   9431   9692 1045 4627 2281 1849 636 72822 
1985 671 13116 24024   8466   8923   864 4185 2059 2046 638 64992 
1986 509 11060 17823   6386   7400   603 2992 1605 1576 497 50451 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal    YC = Youth Custody 
CSO = Community Service Order 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: Home Office: 1983d; 1983e; 1984d; 1984e; 1985d; 1985e; 1986b; 1986c; 
1987a; 1987b: merger of tables 
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Table 59: Sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
               B/YC/  
      Year     AD       CD      Fine     Att. C      SO       CO      DC     s.53  CSO  Other   
1982 1 17 44 13 13 2 7 2 ---- 1 
1983 1 19 42 13 13 2 6 2 1 1 
1984 1 19 39 13 13 1 6 3 3 1 
1985 1 20 37 13 14 1 6 3 3 1 
1986 1 22 35 13 15 1 6 3 3 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal    YC = Youth Custody 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
CSO = Community Service Order 
 
Source: Home Office: 1983d; 1983e; 1984d; 1984e; 1985d; 1985e; 1986b; 1986c; 
1987a; 1987b: merger of tables 
 
 
 
Table 60: Cautioning and sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: percentages with cautions included. 
 
         B/YC/  
Year  caution AD       CD       Fine     Att. C      SO       CO      DC     s.53   CSO  other 
1982 36 1 11 28 8 8 1 4 1 - - 
1983 39 1 11 26 8 7 1 4 2 - 1 
1984 43 1 11 22 7 8 1 4 2 1 1 
1985 49 1 10 19 7 7 1 3 2 2 1 
1986 53 - 10 17 6 7 1 3 1 1 - 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal    YC = Youth Custody 
CSO = Community Service Order 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: adapted from Tables 51 and 58 
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Table 61: Sentencing of girls aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
Year          AD          CD        Fine        Att. C        SO          CO        other       Total 
1982 19 740 452 47 449 89 6 1802 
1983 21 648 346 56 291 53 6 1421 
1984 22 496 257 49 250 38 15 1127 
1985   9 513 185 46 164 27 2   946 
1986   7 322 112 17 117 18 1   594 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
  
Source: Home Office, 1983d; 1983e; 1984d; 1984e; 1985d; 1985e; 1986b; 1986c; 
1987a; 1987b: Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined. 
 
 
 
Table 62: Sentencing of girls aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
Year          AD          CD        Fine        Att. C        SO          CO        other        
1982 1 41 25 3 25 5 - 
1983 1 46 24 4 20 4 - 
1984 2 44 23 4 22 3 1 
1985 1 54 20 5 17 3 - 
1986 1 54 19 3 20 3 - 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
  
Source: Home Office, 1983d; 1983e; 1984d; 1984e; 1985d; 1985e; 1986b; 1986c; 
1987a; 1987b: Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined. 
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Table 63: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
             B/YC/  
     Year    AD      CD      Fine     Att. C       SO       CO     s.53    CSO  Other    Total  
1982   95 2547 3215 415 1718 371   46 * 47 8454 
1983   69 2389 2714 473 1357 244   73 18 84 7421 
1984 110 2253 2261 404 1220 172   92 57 87 6656 
1985   71 2228 1903 345 1395 130 110 93 61 6336 
1986   50 1772 1339 251   752   87   70 66 49 4436 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   B = Borstal     
YC = Youth Custody 
CSO = Community Service Order {* not available until 1982} 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: Home Office: 1983d; 1983e; 1984d; 1984e; 1985d; 1985e; 1986b; 1986c; 
1987a; 1987b: merger of tables 
 
 
 
Table 64: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1982 – 1986: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
                    B/YC/  
           Year    AD      CD       Fine     Att. C       SO       CO     s.53    CSO  Other     
1982   1 30 38 5 20 4 1 * ` 
1983 1 32 37 6 18 3 1 - 1 
1984 2 34 34 6 18 3 1 1 1 
1985 1 35 30 5 22 2 2 1 1 
1986   1 40 30 6 17 2 2 1 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO= Care Order   B = Borstal     
YC = Youth Custody 
CSO = Community Service Order {* not available until 1982} 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: Home Office: 1983d; 1983e; 1984d; 1984e; 1985d; 1985e; 1986b; 1986c; 
1987a; 1987b: merger of tables 
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Table 65: Children in Care in England and Wales on 31st March 1982 to 1987 
resident in Community Homes with Education or Observation and Assessment 
Centres. 
 
      Year 
   1982             1983             1984            1985            1986       1987          
O & A 4600 3828 3276 3003 2995 2910 
CHE 4200 3463 2831 2288 1977 1933 
Total 8800 7291 6107 5291 4972 4843 
                                                                         
Source: DHSS 1983b; 1984; 1985d; 1986; 1987a; 1988; HMSO, 1985a; 1988a 
 
 
 
Table 66: Young men aged 16 and under admitted to Detention Centre and 
Youth Custody, 1982 to 1986: England and Wales. 
 
    Year              Admissions 
1982 6961 
1983 6544 
1984 6360 
1985 5681 
1986 4206 
 
Source: Home Office, 1983b Table 3.3; 1984g, Table 3.3; 1985g, Table 3.3; 1986e, 
Table 3.1; 1987d 
 
 
Table 67: Males under 17 sentenced to Care and Custody for Offences: England 
and Wales 1982 – 1986. 
 
 
      Year                  CO                 DC             B/YC/S. 53         Total 
1982 2952 5841 1463 10256 
1983 1925 4946 1935   8806 
1984 1582 4627 2281   8490 
1985 1280 4185 2061   7526 
1986   878 2992 1606   5476 
 
CO = Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal    YC = Youth Custody 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
Source: adapted from previous Tables 55 and 58 
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Table 68: Females under 17 sentenced to Care and Custody for Offences: 
England and Wales 1982 – 1986. 
 
      Year                  CO            B/YC/S. 53         Total 
1982 460   46 506 
1983 297   73 370 
1984 210   92 302 
1985 147 110 257 
1986 105   70 175 
 
CO = Care Order    
B = Borstal    YC = Youth Custody 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: adapted from previous Tables 61 and 63 
 
 
Table 69: Sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1987 – 1992: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
 Year       AD          CD       Fine      Att C        SO         CO        s 53      Other    Total  
1987 51 2078 821 986 776 195 - 53 4960 
1988 52 1960 670 833 595 133 3 75 4321 
1989 52 1791 470 679 518   97 - 77 3684 
1990 56 1661 492 678 500   57 - 68 3512 
1991 40 1529 339 608 508   37 - 39 3100 
1992 35 1499 293 591 517 - - 59 2994 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order    
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: Home Office, 1988e; 1988f; 1989a; 1989b; 1990d; 1990e; 1991b; 1991c; 
1992b; 1992c; 1993a; 1993b. Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts 
combined 
 
  432 
Table 70: Sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1987 – 1992: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
 Year        AD         CD       Fine      Att C        SO        CO        s 53      Other    
1987 1 45 16 19 14 3 - 2 
1988 1 45 16 19 14 3 - 2 
1989 1 49 13 18 14 3 - 2 
1990 2 47 14 19 14 2 - 2 
1991 1 49 11 20 16 1 - 1 
1992 2 50 10 20 17 - - 2 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order    
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: Home Office, 1988e; 1988f; 1989a, 1989b, 1990d, 1990e, 1991b, 1991c, 
1992b, 1992c, 1993a, 1993b. Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts 
combined 
 
 
Table 71: Sentencing of boys aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all offences 
1987 – 1992: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
 Year     AD      CD      Fine    Att C     SO      CO     YOI    s 53    CSO   Other    Total  
1987 436 10210 14421 5810 6748 484 4029 155 1739 583 44615 
1988 384 9055 12395 5126 5926 300 3331 167 1491 600 38755 
1989 304 8905   9887 4365 5326 193 2324 117 1302 696 33419 
1990 329 8875   7706 4197 5347 311 1705 126 1230 668 30494 
1991 265 8271   4931 3959 4949 211 1817 104 1276 584 26367 
1992 211 7927   3787 3498 4338   28 1644   81 1135 555 23204 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order   YOI: Young Offender Institution  
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
CSO: Community Service Order 
 
Source: Home Office, 1988e; 1988f; 1989a; 1989b; 1990d; 1990e; 1991b; 1991c; 
1992b; 1992c; 1993a; 1993b. Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts 
combined 
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Table 72: Sentencing of boys aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all offences 
1987 – 1992: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
 Year      AD      CD     Fine    Att C    SO      CO     YOI    s 53     CSO   Other    
1987 1 23 32 13 15 1 9 - 4 1 
1988 1 23 32 13 15 1 9 - 4 2 
1989 1 26 29 13 16 1 7 - 4 2 
1990 1 29 23 14 18 1 6 - 4 2 
1991 1 31 19 15 19 1 7 - 5 2 
1992 1 34 16 15 19 - 7 - 5 2 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order   YOI: Young Offender Institution  
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
CSO: Community Service Order 
 
Source: Home Office, 1988e; 1988f; 1989a; 1989b; 1990d; 1990e; 1991b; 1991c; 
1992b; 1992c; 1993a; 1993b. Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts 
combined 
 
Table 73: Cautioning and sentencing of young men aged 14 and under 17 for all 
offences 1987 – 1992: England and Wales: percentages with cautions included. 
 
Year   caution  AD      CD     Fine     Att C    SO     CO     YOI      s 53    CSO   Other  
1987 53 - 11 15 6 7 1 4 - 2 1 
1988 59 - 10 13 5 6 - 4 - 2 1 
1989 61 - 10 12 5 6 - 3 - 2 1 
1990 67 - 10 8 5 6 - 2 - 1 1 
1991 68 - 10 6 5 6 - 2 - 2 1 
1992 71 - 10 5 4 5 - 2 - 1 1 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order   YOI: Young Offender Institution  
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
CSO: Community Service Order 
 
Source; compiled from Tables 71 and 77 
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Table 74: Sentencing of girls aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1987 – 1992: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
Year          AD          CD        Fine        Att. C        SO          CO        other       Total 
1987 6 206 67 10 45 4 3 341 
1988 11 185 59 9 38 7 2 311 
1989 5 166 32 12 35 11 9 270 
1990 9 165 28 13 36 6 6 263 
1991 4 143 28 16 46 3 2 242 
1992 3 161 16 11 45 - 8 244 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order 
  
Source: Home Office, 1988e; 1988f; 1989a; 1989b; 1990d; 1990e; 1991b; 1991c; 
1992b; 1992c; 1993a; 1993b: Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts 
combined 
 
 
 
Table 75: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1987 – 1992: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
                 YOI/ 
 Year      AD      CD     Fine    Att C     SO      CO     s 53    CSO    Other   Total  
1987 49 1486 1016 200 650 61 63 59 51 3635 
1988 34 1576 846 169 549 60 59 70 49 3412 
1989 45 1455 618 147 490 39 37 28 84 2943 
1990 40 1507 547 132 534 49 30 40 75 2954 
1991 33 1501 399 194 476 56 39 44 62 2804 
1992 46 1397 306 149 477 2 29 47 73 2526 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order   YOI: Young Offender Institution  
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
CSO: Community Service Order 
 
Source: Home Office, 1988e; 1988f; 1989a; 1989b; 1990d; 1990e; 1991b; 1991c; 
1992b; 1992; 1993a; 1993b. Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts 
combined 
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Table 76: Sentencing of young women aged 14 and under 17 in all courts for all 
offences 1987 – 1992: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
                 YOI/ 
 Year     AD      CD      Fine    Att C     SO      CO     s 53    CSO    Other   
1987 1 41 28 6 18 2 2 2 1 
1988 1 46 25 5 16 2 2 2 1 
1989 2 49 21 5 17 1 1 1 3 
1990 1 51 19 4 18 2 1 1 3 
1991 1 54 14 7 17 2 1 2 2 
1992 2 55 12 6 19 - 1 2 3 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
CO = Care Order   YOI: Young Offender Institution  
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
CSO: Community Service Order 
 
Source: Home Office, 1988e; 1988f; 1989a; 1989b; 1990d; 1990e; 1991b; 1991c; 
1992b; 1992c; 1993a; 1993b. Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts 
combined 
 
Table 77: Cautions given to young offenders 1987 to 1993 (excluding motoring 
offences): England and Wales. 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1987 30100 49600 7900 15800 
1988 26900 55500 5700 13500 
1989 25600 51500 4900 12600 
1990 28000 61400 6400 16300 
1991 26200 55700 6800 17000 
1992 28100 56500 8900 19500 
1993 25600 NA* 8100 NA* 
 
Source: Home Office: 1988c; 1989c; 1990f; 1992a; 1993c; 1993d; 1994c  
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Table 78: Cautions given to young offenders 1987 to 1992 (excluding motoring 
offences) as a percentage of all those found guilty or cautioned for all offences 
except motoring offences: England and Wales 
 
Year        Males 10-13        Males 14-16     Females 10-13     Females 14-16 
1987 86 53 96 81 
1988 86 59 95 80 
1989 87 61 96 81 
1990 89 67 97 84 
1991 89 68 97 86 
1992 90 71 98 89 
1993 90 * 98 * 
 
Source: Home Office: 1988c; 1989c; 1990f; 1992a; 1993c; 1993d; 1994c. Note that 
these figures differ slightly (never more than 1%) from those given in the annual 
Home Office Statistical Bulletin ‘Cautions, Court Proceedings and Sentencing’,  
Home Office: 1989d; 1990g; 1991d; 1992d; 1993e; 1994d. 
 
Table 79: Processing of Juvenile Offenders in the Metropolitan Police District: 
1985 – 1989: actual numbers. 
 
      Year 
Disposal        1985 1986          1987  1988            1989 
Prosecute 13, 078 11, 953  12, 318 10, 583  10, 319 
Instant Caution   5, 745   3, 730    3, 591   2, 926    2, 912 
Caution 10, 626   8, 598    9, 244   8, 027    8, 737 
No Further Action   2, 842   2, 481    2, 613   2, 709    3, 324 
Totals        32, 291     26, 762      27, 766        24, 198        25, 292 
 
Source: HMSO, 1986; HMSO, 1990 Appendix 4 
 
 
 
Table 80: Processing of Juvenile Offenders in the Metropolitan Police District: 
1986 – 1989: percentages. 
 
      Year 
Disposal        1985 1986          1987  1988            1989 
Prosecute 40 45 44 44 41 
Instant Caution 18 14 13 12 12 
Caution 33 32 33 33 35 
No Further Action   9   9   9 11 13 
 
 
Source: HMSO, 1986; HMSO, 1990 Appendix 4 
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Table 81: Children in Care in England and Wales on 31st March 1988 to 1991 
resident in Community Homes with Education or Observation and Assessment 
Centres. 
      Year 
   1988                  1989                    1990                     1991          
O & A 2665 2372 2266 2117 
CHE 1682 1457 1255 1128 
Total               4347           3829           3521               3245       
 
Source:  DHSS, 1989; 1990; HMSO, 1991a: Table 3.5 
 
 
Table 82: Young men aged 16 and under admitted to Young Offender 
Institutions, 1987 to 1992: England and Wales. 
 
    Year              Admissions 
1987 3826 
1988 3120 
1989 2131 
1990 1483 
1991 1656 
1992 1479 
 
Source: Home Office: 1988d, Table 3.11; 1989e, Table 3.11; 1990c, Table 3.8 and 
3.10; 1992e, Table 3.8; 1993f; 1994e, Table 3.8 
 
 
Table 83: Males under 17 sentenced to Care and Custody for Offences: England 
and Wales 1987 – 1992. 
 
      Year                 CO             YOI/S. 53           Total 
1987 679 4029 4708 
1988 456 3498 3954 
1989 290 2441 2731 
1990 368 1831 2199 
1991 248 1921 2169 
1992 28  1725 1753 
 
CO = Care Order   DC = Detention Centre 
B = Borstal    YC = Youth Custody 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: adapted from previous Tables 69 and 71 
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Table 84: Females under 17 sentenced to Care and Custody for Offences: 
England and Wales 1987 – 1992. 
 
     Year                  CO            B/YC/S. 53         Total 
1987 65 63 128 
1988 67 59 126 
1989 48 37   85 
1990 55 30   85 
1991 59 39   98 
1992   2 29   31 
 
CO = Care Order    
B = Borstal    YC = Youth Custody 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: adapted from previous Tables 74 and 75 
 
 
Table 85: Residents in long stay mental hospitals in the USA. 
    Year  Numbers 
1955 560, 000 
1975 191, 000 
1980 154, 000 
1990   90, 000 
1995   77, 000 
 
Source: Presidents Commission on Mental Health, 1978: 56; Kaiser Commission, 
2007: 1; Stroup & Manderscheid, 1988;  Senate, 1994; Bachrach, 1997. 
 
 
Table 86: Residents in long stay mental hospitals in the UK. 
    Year  Numbers 
1955 165, 000 
1965 120, 000 
1993   43, 000 
2005   30, 000 
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Table 87: Residents in long stay mental retardation institutions in the USA. 
    Year  Numbers 
1967 194, 650 
1970 186, 000 
1975 167, 000 
1982 117, 000 
1986 100, 000 
1988   91, 500 
1992   75, 000 
1998   50, 000 
 
Source: Willer & Intagliata, 1984; Presidents’ Committee on Mental Retardation, 
1976; Switsky et al., 1988; Lakin et al., 1992;  Lakin et al., 1999 
 
 
Table 88: Residents in long stay learning difficulty institutions in England and 
Wales. 
 
 
    Year  Numbers 
1970 190, 000 
1995   70, 000 
2011   none 
 
Source: Ericsson & Mansell, 1996; HM Government, 2009 
 
 
Table 89: Sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1993 – 1997: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
  Year          AD          CD        Fine        Att. C        SO         s. 53        other        Total 
1993 28 1490 201 566 586   3 61 2935 
1994 45 1967 222 641 767   2 81 3725 
1995 43 2066 237 655 901   5 79 3986 
1996 29 1888 192 584 778 13 53 3537 
1997 35 2060 209 653 977 33 78 4045 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
 Source: Home Office, 1994a; 1994b; 1995a; 1995b; 1996a; 1996b; 1997a; 1997b; 
1998a; 1998b: Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
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Table 90: Sentencing of boys aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1993 – 1997: England and Wales: percentages. 
 
  Year         AD          CD         Fine        Att. C        SO         s. 53        other       
1993 1 51 7 19 20 - 2 
1994 1 53 6 17 21 - 2 
1995 1 52 6 16 23 - 2 
1996 1 53 5 17 22 - 1 
1997 1 51 5 16 24 1 2 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
  
Source: Home Office, 1994a; 1994b; 1995a; 1995b; 1996a; 1996b; 1997a; 1997b; 
1998a; 1998b: Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined 
 
 
Table 91: Sentencing of girls aged over 10 and under 14 in all courts for all 
offences 1993 – 1997: England and Wales: actual numbers. 
 
  Year         AD           CD        Fine        Att. C         SO         s. 53        other       Total 
1993 3 179 18 22 30  5 257 
1994 6 244 24 22 66  2 364 
1995 3 317 32 21 62  5 440 
1996 2 256 27 35 33  8 361 
1997 8 301 19 37 108 3 10 486 
 
AD = Absolute Discharge  CD = Conditional Discharge 
Att. C = Attendance Centre  SO = Supervision Order 
s. 53 = detained for long period for grave crime under section 53 of 1933 CYPA 
 
Source: Home Office, 1994a; 1994b; 1995a; 1995b; 1996a; 1996b; 1997a; 1997b; 
1998a; 1998b: Tables for magistrates’ courts and higher/crown courts combined. 
 
{After 1997 all the published statistics include 14 year olds with 10-13 year olds in 
the comparative table, so it is not possible to provide comparable data after this} 
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Table 92: Cautions given to boys and girls under 14:  1994 to 1997 (excluding 
motoring offences): England and Wales. 
 
 
             Year                Boys 10 - 13                Girls 10 - 13 
1994 26200 9800 
1995 24000 9000 
1996 21500 7400 
1997 20100 6200 
 
Source: Table 5.2 in Home Office 1995c; 1996c; 1997c; 1998c  
 
 
Table 93: Cautions given to young offenders under 14 from 1994 to 1997 
(excluding motoring offences) as a percentage of all those found guilty or 
cautioned for all offences except motoring offences: England and Wales. 
 
 
             Year                Boys 10 - 13                Girls 10 - 13 
1994 88 96 
1995 86 95 
1996 86 95 
1997 83 93 
 
Source: Table 5.2 in Home Office: 1995c; 1996c; 1997c; 1998c 
 
Table 94: Males under 17 sentenced to immediate custody: England and Wales: 
1993 – 2002 and received into custody during the year. 
          
      Sentenced to       Received into 
    Year       Custody  Custody 
1993 1603 1626 
1994 2003 1933 
1995 2282 2172 
1996 2600 2387 
1997 2810 2445 
1998 2820 2436 
1999 2904 2583 
2000 3032 2736 
2001 3331 2863 
2002  2734 
 
Source: Table 7.15 in Home Office: 1994c; 1995c; 1996c; 1997c; 1998c; Table 7.16 
in Home Office: 1999a; 2000a; 2001a; Table 3.9 in Home Office: 1995d; Table 3.10 
in Home Office: 1996d, 1996e; 1997d; 1998d; 1999b; 2000b; 2001b; 2002a; 2003; 
Table 3.4 in Home Office 2002b 
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Appendix 2 
 
Ph, D Questionnaire: Youth Justice 1982 – 1996: Denis Jones 
 
As part of my doctoral research in Social Policy at LSE, I am looking at developments 
in juvenile justice policy and practice in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
 
If you were a practitioner in juvenile justice between 1982 and 1996 I would like 
you to participate in this research by filling in the following questionnaire. The 
questionnaires are being distributed via the National Association for Youth Justice 
and the journal ‘Youth Justice’, and via direct mailings to YOT teams. 
 
My aim is to explore some of the characteristics of juvenile justice in this period and 
what you think may have influenced policy at that time. 
 
The following questions ask you to think back to your practice and experiences at that 
time and to try to remember what you and the projects that you worked in were trying 
to achieve, and what was influencing you in this practice.  
 
 
Q1. YOUR CONTACT DETAILS 
 
Name: 
 
Current address: 
 
e-mail:  
 
Are you happy for me to contact you about your comments below (circle one) 
 
  YES    NO 
 
 
Q2. ABOUT YOU 
 
Current Age   gender: M/F   
 
Ethnicity: 
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Q 3: Where did you work in youth justice between 1982 and 1996  (please list all) 
 
 Project name  Agency Dates  Your Post 
 
Eg Well Hall Project Rainer  1982-85 Director 
 Greenwich  Foundation 
 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
4. 
 
If more than 4, please add below. 
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Q4. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Which of the following services were offered by the projects that you worked for:  
 
please use the column corresponding to the projects you listed in Question 3 if you 
worked in more than one project. Please put a tick in every box that applies, and add 
DK for ‘Don’t know’. If you worked in more than 4 projects please add extra 
columns. If you worked for a specific  project (eg bail support scheme) within a wider 
youth justice team please use a column for each. 
 
                Service      Project 
                     1         2          3         4 
Cautioning strategy with the police     
Inter-agency cautioning panels     
Caution plus services     
Bail remand strategy     
Remand placement     
Court system monitoring     
Attempts to influence magistrates and court clerks in 
formal forums 
    
PSR/SER gatekeeping     
Directing juveniles to selected solicitors     
A dedicated professional court office from the social 
services department 
    
Court advocacy     
Alternative to custody programmes via specified 
activities 
    
Alternative to custody strategy via deferred sentences     
Crown Court strategy     
Appeals policy     
Wider PR strategies to explain the reality of juvenile 
crime via the media, local organizations etc. 
    
Other (please state)     
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Q5. What do you think were the main characteristics of juvenile justice between 
1982 and 1996? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q6. What was your over-riding concern as a manager/practitioner in juvenile 
justice at this time? 
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Q7. Please describe what you were trying to achieve in practice? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q8.  Please list and describe briefly what you think were the main reasons for the 
decline of young people in Community Homes with Education, and custody, 
between 1982 and 1992. 
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Q9. THE LAC 83/3 INITIATIVE 
 
What views, if any, do/did you have about the LAC 83/3 (DHSS Circular) on 
‘Further Initiatives in Intermediate Treatment’? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q 10.  Do you think that youth justice policy changed in the early 1990’s, and if 
so how? 
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Please add below any further comments that you wish to about this period of 
youth justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you happy for me to quote you by name in the thesis? YES      NO 
 
If you have any local juvenile justice studies from the period 1982 to 1996 that I could 
borrow I would be happy to cover postage etc 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please return it to Denis 
Jones, 8 Sandgate Close, Seaford, East Sussex, BN25 3LL or via e-mail to 
deniswjones@hotmail.com. If you wish to discuss it please call me on 01323-899452. 
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